|
on Collective Decision-Making |
| By: | Kaori Tembata (Graduate School of Economics, Kobe University); Kenji Takeuchi (Graduate School of Economics, Kobe University) |
| Abstract: | The management of common-pool resources requires collective action and cooperation, especially when resource users face extreme weather events. This study examines col- lective decision-making in water resource management during droughts. By focusing on the drought response by groups of water users in river basin communities in Japan, we investigate the determinants of collective decisions on water withdrawal restrictions. Our main finding suggests that water user groups are more willing to cooperate for water con- servation when other water user groups in a community also cooperate. Moreover, we examine the impact of climate variability on drought management. Our findings show that drought-related weather patterns lead to more stringent water restrictions, suggesting that climate change may pose a threat to the management of the water supply. |
| Keywords: | Common-pool resource, Collective decision-making, Cooperation, Drought, Water conservation, Japan |
| JEL: | D70 Q25 Q54 |
| Date: | 2016–12 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:koe:wpaper:1646&r=cdm |
| By: | Framcisco Cavalcanti (Barcelona Economic Institute, University of Barcelona, Spain); Gianmarco Daniele (Barcelona Economic Institute, University of Barcelona, Spain); Sergio Galletta (IdEP, Economia, Universita' Svizzera italiana, Switzerland) |
| Abstract: | We show that the disclosure of information about a government's conduct affects the types of candidates who stand for election. Our empirical test focuses on Brazilian city council elections in 2004 and 2008. The identification strategy exploits the randomness of the timing of the release of audit reports on the (mis)use of federal funds by local governments. We observe that when the audit finds low levels of corruption (i.e., when it represents a positive popularity shock), the parties supporting the incumbent select less-educated candidates. On the contrary, parties pick, on average, more-educated candidates when the audit reveals a high level of corruption (i.e., when it represents a negative popularity shock). These effects are stronger in municipalities that have easier access to local media. Our evidence confirms that parties are strategic players: their decisions are affected by shocks that influence the electoral race. |
| Keywords: | Political selection, Corruption, Competence, Local election, Political parties, Candidates |
| JEL: | D70 D72 D73 |
| Date: | 2016–10–25 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:lug:wpidep:1607&r=cdm |
| By: | Afridi, Farzana (Indian Statistical Institute); Dhillon, Amrita (King's College London); Solan, Eilon (Tel Aviv University) |
| Abstract: | In developing countries with weak institutions, there is implicitly a large reliance on elections to instill norms of accountability and reduce corruption. In this paper we show that electoral discipline may be ineffective in reducing corruption when political competition is too high or too low. We first build a simple game theoretic model to capture the effect of electoral competition on corruption. We show that in equilibrium, corruption has a U-shaped relationship with electoral competition. If the election is safe for the incumbent (low competition) or if it is extremely fragile (high competition) then corruption is higher, and for intermediate levels of competition, corruption is lower. We also predict that when there are different types of corruption, then incumbents increase corruption in the components that voters care less about regardless of competition. We test the model's predictions using data gathered on audit findings of leakages from a large public program in Indian villages belonging to the state of Andhra Pradesh during 2006-10 and on elections to the village council headship in 2006. Our results largely confirm the theoretical results that competition has a non-linear effect on corruption, and that the impact of electoral competition varies by whether theft is from the public or private component of the service delivery. Overall, our results suggest that over-reliance on elections to discipline politicians is misplaced. |
| Keywords: | audit, electoral competition, corruption, social accountability |
| JEL: | D72 D82 H75 O43 C72 |
| Date: | 2016–11 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps:dp10396&r=cdm |
| By: | Matthew Gould (Westminster Business School, University of Westminster); Matthew D. Rablen (Department of Economics, University of Sheffield) |
| Abstract: | The United Nations Security Council (UNSC) is critical to globalpeace and security, yet more than twenty years of negotiations over itsreform have proved fruitless. We use recent advances in the theory ofa-priori voting power to present a formal quantitative appraisal of theimplications for democratic equity and efficiency of the “structuralreforms” contained within eleven current reform proposals, as well asthe separate effect of expansion of the UNSC membership. Only tworeform proposals – the EU acting as a single entity, or a weakening ofthe veto power for Permanent Members – robustly dominate the statusquo against our measures of equity and efficiency. Several proposedstructural reforms may actually worsen the issues they ostensiblyclaim to resolve. |
| Keywords: | United Nations, United Nations Security Council, United Nations SecurityCouncil reform, equity, efficiency, voting power, square-root rule |
| JEL: | D72 D71 C71 C63 |
| Date: | 2016–12 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:shf:wpaper:2016009&r=cdm |
| By: | Aditi Singhal (Department of Economics, Delhi School of Economics) |
| Abstract: | This study estimates the impact of incumbency on re-election prospects of parties and candidates in India, between 1977 and 2014, for Lok Sabha elections. We make use of regression discontinuity design to estimate the causal effect of incumbency by comparing outcomes in closely fought elections. Results indicate that on an average, incumbent parties are significantly disadvantaged in comparisontonon-incumbentparties. Similarly,thecausal impact of incumbency on candidates highlights significant disadvantage to the incumbents. Moreover, on comparing the results, we conclude that it is a candidate who is more disadvantaged than a party. This is indicative of stronger ties amongst voters and parties rather than with candidates. |
| Keywords: | Elections, party, candidates, regression discontinuity design |
| JEL: | D72 |
| Date: | 2016–11 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cde:cdewps:266&r=cdm |
| By: | Jeffrey Penney (Pontificia Universidad Javeriana); Erin Tolley (University of Toronto); Elizabeth Goodyear-Grant (Queen's University) |
| Abstract: | We analyze the results of a large-scale experiment wherein subjects participate in a hypothetical primary election and must choose between two fictional candidates who vary by sex and race. We find evidence of affinities along these dimensions in voting behaviour. A number of phenomena regarding these affinities and their interactions are detailed and explored. We find that they compete with each other on the basis of race and gender. Neuroeconomic metrics suggest that people who vote for own race candidates tend to rely more on heuristics than those who do not. |
| Keywords: | Gender, Prejudice, Race, Voting |
| JEL: | D72 C90 J15 J16 |
| Date: | 2016–10 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:qed:wpaper:1370&r=cdm |
| By: | Michal Paulus (Institute of Economic Studies, Faculty of Social Sciences, Charles University in Prague, Smetanovo nabrezi 6, 111 01 Prague 1, Czech Republic); Eva Michalikova (Brno University of Technology, Brno, Czech Republic; Anglo-American Univesity, Prague, Czech Republic) |
| Abstract: | We propose a novel application of a gravity model of trade as a policy preference mapping tool that reveals areas of potential interest groups formation. We examine a hypothesis that the EU’s inability of the coordinated anti-corruption effort is caused by its internal heterogeneity in preferences towards the anti-corruption policy. We focus only on anti-corruption effort against bribery in foreign transaction which is reflected in the effectiveness of the enforcement of the OECD anti-bribery convention. Using the gravity model, we estimate and compare preferences of western, eastern and Mediterranean EU members towards the enforcement of the convention. In addition to aggregate exports we estimate the model on disaggregated data and examine preferences across trading sectors and identify those industries which would support or oppose the anti-corruption policy. To analyse the hypothesis, we estimate a micro-founded augmented gravity model for bilateral exports of 131 countries within period 1995-2013. The results reveal significant differences between western and eastern EU members when the eastern countries are much more motivated to oppose the policy and to form a strong interest group also on the EU level. However, there are specific sectors which have potential to form a coalition towards the policy across all country groups. We have found out that the country origin (country group to which it belongs) is much better predictor of the policy preferences than exporting sector. |
| Keywords: | gravity model; OECD anti-bribery convention; international conflict; policy preference mapping; EU heterogeneity |
| JEL: | F14 F42 F51 F53 F55 O17 |
| Date: | 2016–11 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:fau:wpaper:wp2016_23&r=cdm |
| By: | Joseph A. Clougherty, (University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, CEPR-London); Michał Grajek, (ESMT European School of Management and Technology); Oz Shy |
| Abstract: | Operations management scholarship has focused on reference-group adoption positively influencing focal-facility adoption; i.e., positive imitation parameters manifest due to the presence of mimicry and contagion. We instead argue that the incentive to adopt a quality-management system can be inversely related to reference-group diffusion. Our theoretical model formalizes the potential for strategic substitution and negative imitation parameters to be applicable in quality-management adoption. We compile a dataset of 2,895 facility-level observations that allows for three different industry-level reference groups; i.e., domestic industry, domestic exporters and foreign exporters. When undertaking probit estimations that do not account for appropriate fixed effects, we find positive imitation parameters which support the presence of mimicry and contagion. Yet when accounting for fixed effects, the imitation parameters turn negative in line with the presence of strategic substitution. Furthermore, the negative influence of reference-group adoption on focal-facility adoption is robust across the three reference groups. |
| Keywords: | adoption, quality management, standards, mimicry, contagion |
| Date: | 2016–11–28 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:esm:wpaper:esmt-16-05&r=cdm |
| By: | Dominik Rothenhaüsler (Seminar for Statistics, ETH Zurich); Nikolaus Schweizer (Department of Econometrics and OR, Tilburg University); Nora Szech (Karlsruher Institut für Technologie) |
| Abstract: | This paper analyzes how moral costs affect individual support of morally difficult group decisions. We study a threshold public good game with moral costs. Motivated by recent empirical findings, we assume that these costs are heterogeneous and consist of three parts. The first one is a standard cost term. The second, shared guilt, decreases in the number of supporters. The third hinges on the notion of being pivotal. We analyze equilibrium predictions, isolate the causal effects of guilt sharing, and compare results to standard utilitarian and nonconsequentialist approaches. As interventions, we study information release, feedback, and fostering individual moral standards. |
| Keywords: | moral decision making, committee decisions, diffusion of responsibility, Shared guilt, being pivotal, division of labor, institutions and morals |
| JEL: | D02 D03 D23 D63 D82 |
| Date: | 2016–11 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hka:wpaper:2016-026&r=cdm |
| By: | Mostapha Diss (GATE Lyon Saint-Étienne - Groupe d'analyse et de théorie économique - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - UCBL - Université Claude Bernard Lyon 1 - UL2 - Université Lumière - Lyon 2 - Université Jean Monnet - Saint-Etienne - PRES Université de Lyon - ENS Lyon - École normale supérieure - Lyon); Abdelmonaim Tlidi (ENSA Marrakech - École nationale des sciences appliquées de Marrakech) |
| Abstract: | This paper presents the conditions required for a profile in order to never exhibit either the strong or the strict Borda paradoxes under all weighted scoring rules in three-candidate elections. The main particularity of our paper is that all the conclusions are extracted from the differences of votes between candidates in pairwise majority elections. This way allows us to answer new questions and provide an organized knowledge of the conditions under which a given profile never shows one of the two paradoxes. Abstract This paper presents the conditions required for a profile in order to never exhibit either the strong or the strict Borda paradoxes under all weighted scoring rules in three-candidate elections. The main particularity of our paper is that all the conclusions are extracted from the differences of votes between candidates in pairwise majority elections. This way allows us to answer new questions and provide an organized knowledge of the conditions under which a given profile never shows one of the two paradoxes. |
| Keywords: | Voting, Geometry, Borda's Paradox, Condorcet Pairwise Procedure, Borda, Plurality, Negative Plurality,Weighted Scoring Rules |
| Date: | 2016 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:wpaper:halshs-01402268&r=cdm |
| By: | Gallier, Carlo; Langbein, Jörg; Vance, Colin |
| Abstract: | We conduct a framed field experiment in Indonesian fishing communities, with an eye towards evaluating the potential of Territorial Use Rights for Fisheries (TURFs) to preserve coral reef fisheries. Conducted in three culturally distinctive sites, the study assembles groups of five fishers who participate in a common-pool resource game. We implement the game with randomly assigned treatments in all sites to explore whether the extraction decision varies according to three recommended non-binding extraction levels originating from (1) a democratic process, (2) a group leader or (3) an external source that recommends a socially optimal extraction level. In one of the sites - that having the highest levels of ethnic and religious diversity - we find that democratic decision-making as well as information originating from outside the community promotes the cooperative behavior that underpins TURFs, a result that is robust to regressions controlling for individual and community attributes. |
| Keywords: | Framed field experiment,commons dilemmas,coral reefs,self-governance |
| JEL: | C93 H43 L31 Q32 |
| Date: | 2016 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:rwirep:651&r=cdm |
| By: | Pickering, Jonathan; Jotzo, Frank; Wood, Peter J. |
| Abstract: | Mobilizing climate finance for developing countries is crucial for achieving a fair and effective global climate regime. To date developed countries retain wide discretion over their national contributions. We explore how different degrees of international coordination may influence the fairness of the global financing effort. We present quantitative scenarios for (i) the metrics used to distribute the collective effort among countries contributing funding; and (ii) the number of contributing countries. We find that an intermediate degree of coordination—combining nationally determined financing pledges with a robust international review mechanism—may reduce distortions in relative efforts as well as shortfalls in overall funding, while reflecting reasonable differences over what constitutes a fair share. Broadening the group of contributors may do little to improve adequacy or equity unless the more heterogeneous group can converge on credible measures of responsibility and capacity. The analysis highlights the importance of building common understandings about effort-sharing. |
| Keywords: | Climate policy, climate finance, equity, fairness, climate change mitigation, climate change adaptation, development assistance, Environmental Economics and Policy, Research and Development/Tech Change/Emerging Technologies, |
| Date: | 2015–04 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ags:ancewp:249508&r=cdm |
| By: | Dietrich, Franz |
| Abstract: | A group is often construed as a single agent with its own probabilistic beliefs (credences), which are obtained by aggregating those of the individuals, for instance through averaging. In their celebrated contribution “Groupthink”, Russell et al. (2015) apply the Bayesian paradigm to groups by requiring group credences to undergo a Bayesian revision whenever new information is learnt, i.e., whenever the individual credences undergo a Bayesian revision based on this information. Bayesians should often strengthen this requirement by extending it to 'non-public' or even 'private' information (learnt by 'not all' or 'just one' individual), or to non-representable information (not corresponding to an event in the algebra on which credences are held). I propose a taxonomy of six kinds of 'group Bayesianism', which differ in the type of information for which Bayesian revision of group credences is required: public representable information, private representable information, public non-representable information, and so on. Six corresponding theorems establish exactly how individual credences must (not) be aggregated such that the resulting group credences obey group Bayesianism of any given type, respectively. Aggregating individual credences through averaging is never permitted. One of the theorems – the one concerned with public representable information – is essentially Russell et al.'s central result (with minor corrections). |
| Keywords: | probabilistic opinion pooling, Bayesian groups, geometric pooling, public information, private information, characterization theorems |
| JEL: | D7 D8 |
| Date: | 2016–11 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:75363&r=cdm |