nep-cdm New Economics Papers
on Collective Decision-Making
Issue of 2016‒08‒07
nine papers chosen by
Stan C. Weeber, McNeese State University

  1. “Attitudes to Leadership and Voting: Finding the Efficient Frontier” By Davis, Brent
  2. Individual and Group Preferences Over Risk: An Experiment By Morone, Andrea; Temerario, Tiziana
  3. Electoral Cycles in Public Expenditures: Evidence from Czech Local Governments By Lenka Stastna
  5. Political determinants of fiscal transparency: a panel data empirical investigation By Cicatiello, Lorenzo; De Simone, Elina; Gaeta, Giuseppe Lucio
  6. Switch towards tax centralization in Italy: a wake up for the local political budget cycle By Massimiliano Ferraresi; Umberto Galmarini; Leonzio Rizzo; Alberto Zanardi
  7. Cooperation among behaviorally heterogeneous players in social dilemma with stay of leave decisions By Xiaochuan Huang; Takehito Masuda; Yoshitaka Okano; Tatsuyoshi Saijo
  8. The power of weak interests in financial reforms: Explaining the creation of a US consumer agency By Kastner, Lisa
  9. Collective Sensemaking: The Cave within the Cage By Olivier Baly; Frédéric Kletz; Jean-Claude Sardas

  1. By: Davis, Brent
    Abstract: Winning elections is essentially a matter of translating the attitudes of voters into votes. Although this proposition may sound simple, the reality is considerably more challenging. Despite vast scholarship over many years we know very little, if anything, about the efficiency with which the inputs (voter attitudes) to the political process are converted into outputs (vote support). Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) provides a statistical method to measure the efficiency with which inputs are converted into outputs. The results of the DEA analysis and associated modelling find marked differences in the political efficiency of recent Australian political leaders.
    Keywords: campaigns; election; politimetric modelling; Data Envelopment Analysis; voter behaviour; political marketing; Australian elections
    JEL: C1 C13 C5 C51 C53 C54 H1 H11 K0
    Date: 2016–08
  2. By: Morone, Andrea; Temerario, Tiziana
    Abstract: The recent literature on individual and group choices over risk has led to different results. In some studies under unanimity, groups were found to be less risk averse than individuals, while those under majority did not highlight significant differences. However, both the types of studies impose the decision rule to the group. In the present work we elicited groups’ preference under risk using a consensus rule, i.e. groups are free to solve disagreement endogenously, just as in the real life. Results from our pairwise choices experiment shows that when group members are free to use any rule they want in order to reach unanimity, there is no statistical difference between individuals’ and groups’ risk aversion.
    Keywords: Risk; uncertainty; decision-making; group decision; lottery; experimental economics; experiment;
    JEL: C92 D81
    Date: 2016–07
  3. By: Lenka Stastna (Institute of Economic Studies, Faculty of Social Sciences, Charles University in Prague, Smetanovo nabrezi 6, 111 01 Prague 1, Czech Republic)
    Abstract: This paper analyzes local political cycle in Czech municipalities over the period between 1997 and 2013. We apply the system GMM and the difference GMM estimators to identify distortion in current and capital expenditures per capita in electoral and pre-electoral years, while focusing on various spending groups (infrastructure, leisure, housing, education, etc.). We also test specific effects of local governments' characteristics (partisanship, strength, experience). In general, municipalities increase capital spending (primarily on infrastructure, housing, leisure activities) and decrease current spending (administration) before elections. Rightist governments target leisure activities and save more on administration, whereas leftist governments target current spending on social services. Stronger governments and those with newly elected mayors have lower incentive to create an electoral cycle. Voters' involvement in local policies and also success of ruling local (and parliamentary) parties in nat ional parliamentary elections diminish local electoral cycles.
    Keywords: political cycle, local government expenditures, municipalities
    JEL: H72 D72 R50
    Date: 2015–12
  4. By: Shashi Pandey
    Abstract: One of the most significant social changes over the past 10 years in Allahabad is the membership of women in SHGs (Self-Help Group) through the intervention of Block and bank initiatives. The group based lending with new norms has generated new role of women at family and community level. This economic tie has positively influenced their social relations and actions. In present time 99 percent of the household women have engaged from the SHGs in the village and as a ‘peer group’ they spread all over the village. So, present paper examines that in how political sphere is affected due to existence of SHGs in village. This study is based on the interviews of 45 women members of SHGs in which 15 members from OBC SHG, 15 from SC and remaining 15 from mixed caste SHGs from Hathiganha village in Allahabad district, Uttar Pradesh. Study reveals that women become important for the pachayat election due to the membership of SHG while before joining the SHG male members of the family were more involved in political issues and women have passively obeyed the male members of the family on such issues. Key words: SHGs, Women, political participation
    Date: 2016–06
  5. By: Cicatiello, Lorenzo; De Simone, Elina; Gaeta, Giuseppe Lucio
    Abstract: This paper contributes to the literature on the determinants of fiscal transparency by empirically identifying its political determinants in democratic countries. Our static and dynamic panel data analysis highlights that government control over parliaments and political competition influence the level of fiscal transparency, while the effect of government ideology is only partially confirmed. These results extend the existing literature which is based on cross-country analyses.
    Keywords: Fiscal transparency; panel data; political determinants
    JEL: H6 P5
    Date: 2016
  6. By: Massimiliano Ferraresi (Università di Ferrara); Umberto Galmarini (Università dell'Insubria e IEB); Leonzio Rizzo (Università di Ferrara e IEB); Alberto Zanardi (Ufficio Parlamentare di Bilancio)
    Abstract: The abolition of the municipal property tax on owner-occupied dwellings accomplished in Italy in 2008 offers a quasi-natural experiment that allows for the identification of the presence of political budget cycles - the incentives for municipalities close to elections to manipulate policy outcome decisions. Our empirical analysis shows that the reform impacted on municipalities that in 2008 were in their pre-electoral year, by expanding the size of their budget in the form of an increase of current expenditure and fees and charges, but this did not occurred in municipalities that experienced their pre-electoral year before 2008.
    Keywords: political budget cycle, transfers, federal budget, property tax, fiscal reform, local elections
    JEL: C23 H71 H72
  7. By: Xiaochuan Huang (DT Capital Management Co., Ltd.); Takehito Masuda (Institute of Economic Research, Kyoto University); Yoshitaka Okano (School of Economics and Management, Kochi University of Technology); Tatsuyoshi Saijo (School of Economics and Management, Kochi University of Technology)
    Abstract: We experimentally test a two-stage mechanism called the stay-leave mechanism to achieve cooperation in n-plyer prisoner's dilemma situations. Under this mechanism, each cooperator has the chance to revise his choice when players' choices are not unanimous. We say a player is selfish if he eliminates dominated choices in each stage. If all participants of the stay-leave mechanism are selfish, for any value of public good benefit that arises, the unique equilibrium is unanimous cooperation. The average cooperation rate in the stay-leave mechanism experiment averaged 86.6% across 15 periods, with an upward trend, increasing to 96.0% after period 5. By examining earlier period data, we detected that selfish and conditionally cooperative subjects coexist at a proportion of approximately 3:1. Finally, we extended our model to incorporate a mixture of the observed two types and misbeliefs about others' types. Paradoxically, unanimous cooperation is less likely to occur as the number of conditionally cooperative players increase. The model also partially explains the observed upward trend in the cooperation rate in the stay-leave mechanism sessions.
    Keywords: social dilemma; experiment; conditional cooperator; behavioral heterogeneity
    JEL: C72 C72 D74 H41 P43
    Date: 2016–07
  8. By: Kastner, Lisa
    Abstract: Dodd-Frank, the US financial reform law passed in response to the 2008 financial crisis, established the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB), a new federal regulator with the sole responsibility of protecting consumers from unfair, deceptive, or abusive practices. This decision marked the end of a highly politicized reform debate in the US Congress, involving lobbying from business associations and civil society groups, in which proponents of the new bureau would normally have been considered to be much weaker than its opponents. Paradoxically, an emerging civil society coalition successfully lobbied decision-makers and countered industry attempts to prevent industry capture. What explains the fact that rather weak and peripheral actors prevailed over more resourceful and dominant actors? The goal of this study is to examine and challenge questions of regulatory capture by concentrated industry interests in the reform debates in response to the credit crisis which originated in the US in 2007. The analysis suggests that for weak actors to prevail in policy conflicts over established, resource-rich opponents, they must undertake broad coalition-building among themselves and with influential elite allies outside and inside of Congress who share the same policy goals.
    Keywords: financial crisis,financial regulation,consumer protection,interest groups,lobbying
    Date: 2016
  9. By: Olivier Baly (CGS i3 - Centre de Gestion Scientifique i3 - MINES ParisTech - École nationale supérieure des mines de Paris - PSL - PSL Research University - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique); Frédéric Kletz (CGS i3 - Centre de Gestion Scientifique i3 - MINES ParisTech - École nationale supérieure des mines de Paris - PSL - PSL Research University - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique); Jean-Claude Sardas (CGS i3 - Centre de Gestion Scientifique i3 - MINES ParisTech - École nationale supérieure des mines de Paris - PSL - PSL Research University - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)
    Abstract: Situated cognition and neo-institutional theory have revived two fruitful allegories of collective sensemaking within organizations: Plato's Simile of the Cave and Max Weber's Iron Cage. Scholarly efforts to combine these two approaches have converged towards a shared vision of collective sensemaking as an interaction between institutionalized cognitive schemas and contextual grounding. Nevertheless, the mechanisms framing and shaping the outcome of this contextual cognitive interaction, i.e. the collective meanings actually produced and institutionalized, have remained largely unexplored. We aim to address this common gap by examining how the interplay of institutional and contextual factors determined the collective sensemaking of an emergent occupational group, namely, management controllers in French hospitals. Comparing the results from a two-year focus group study held in a community of practice and survey data from 163 respondents, we draw consistent findings indicating that a similar position within supervision micro-structures, which we label isothetism, contributed to shaping the group's transactive memory and to framing the institutionalization of its cognitive schemas. We conclude by discussing the implications of isothetism for future research on the meaningfulness of organizations.
    Keywords: Collective sensemaking,situated cognition,neo-institutional theory
    Date: 2016–08–07

This nep-cdm issue is ©2016 by Stan C. Weeber. It is provided as is without any express or implied warranty. It may be freely redistributed in whole or in part for any purpose. If distributed in part, please include this notice.
General information on the NEP project can be found at For comments please write to the director of NEP, Marco Novarese at <>. Put “NEP” in the subject, otherwise your mail may be rejected.
NEP’s infrastructure is sponsored by the School of Economics and Finance of Massey University in New Zealand.