|
on Collective Decision-Making |
| By: | Lionel Page; Paul Antoine-Chevalier |
| Abstract: | Why people vote and how they decide to allocate their vote is still a challenging question for economic analysis. We investigate the extent to which voting decisions are determined by political values, economic interest or even simply candidates' individual characteristics. To do so, we use a large scale online survey recording social preferences and political choices of voters for candidates in the 2007 French Presidential election. We find that political values matter but that the effect of differences in political position is much smaller than the effect of the voters' perceived economic interest. We also find that the individual characteristics of the candidates play a significant role. |
| Keywords: | social preferences, voting behavior, online experiment |
| JEL: | A13 D72 |
| Date: | 2016–05–30 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:qut:qubewp:wp037&r=cdm |
| By: | Rommel, Tobias (University of Zurich); Walter, Stefanie (University of Zurich) |
| Abstract: | How does offshoring affect individual party preferences in multi-party systems? We argue that exposure to offshoring influences individual preferences for those political parties with clear policy positions on issues relevant for individuals with offshorable jobs (left, liberal and center-right parties), but does not affect voting decisions for parties concentrating on other issues (green parties or populist right parties). Examining individual-level data from five waves of the European Social Survey for 18 advanced democracies, we find that these effects vary by skill and exposure. Offshoring increases the preference for parties advocating economic openness among the highly skilled. In contrast, among the low-skilled, those exposed to offshoring are more likely to prefer leftist political parties that champion social protection and redistribution. |
| Keywords: | JEL Classification: |
| Date: | 2016 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cge:wacage:286&r=cdm |
| By: | Manami Tsuruta (Graduate School of Economics, Osaka University) |
| Abstract: | In this paper I analyze how different between groups and individual time preferences. I compare two hypothesis | Altruistic decision making and Selfish majority decision making | by laboratory experiments. In Altruistic decision making hypothesis I assume Altruistic people who discount themselves more than other group members, thus discount more themselves more than group decision making. In Selfish majority decision making hypothesis I assume selfish people and group time preferences are decided by majority rule. In experiments group are three persons. There are three condition. (1)Individual decision making for themselves. (2)Individual decision making for other group members. (3)Group decision making. In Group decision making Subjects anonymously talk with each other by PC. I found three results. First, people discount more in individual decision making for themselves than in group decision making. Second, Selfish majority decision making hypothesis is supported. Third, Reason why Individual time preferences and group time preferences differ is due to distortion of individual discount factor. |
| Keywords: | time preference, laboratory experiment, group decision making |
| JEL: | C91 C92 D03 |
| Date: | 2016–05 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:osk:wpaper:1611&r=cdm |
| By: | Cheikbossian, Guillaume |
| Abstract: | This paper provides a political economy analysis of (de)centralization when local public goods -- with spillovers effects -- can be substitutes or complements. Depending on the degree of complementarity between local public goods, median voters strategically delegate policy to either `conservative' or to `liberal' representatives under decentralized decision-making. In the first case, it accentuates the free-rider problem in public good provision, while it mitigates it in the second case. Under centralized decision-making, the process of strategic delegation results in either too low or too much public spending, with the outcome crucially depending on the sharing of the costs of local public spending relative to the size of the spillover effects. Hence, with a common financing rule, centralization is welfare improving if and only if both public good externalities and the degree of complementarity between local public goods are both relatively large. |
| Keywords: | (De)centralization; Local Public Goods; Complements; Strategic Delegation; Spillovers |
| JEL: | D72 H41 H77 |
| Date: | 2016–05 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:tse:wpaper:30433&r=cdm |
| By: | Tyagi, Ashish; Shortle, James S. |
| Abstract: | Water allocation in river basins across the world has been historically determined through various institutional arrangements, which are generally hierarchical in nature. But institutions are generally not explicitly recognized in the literature on resources and environmental economics as they do not yield easily to modeling in the conventional framework. This paper proposes a model to assess the potential of efficiency gains possible from institutional change under hierarchical water institutions. We hypothesize two types of institutional change from status-quo; efficient water markets yielding Pareto optimal outcomes, and more interestingly, regional and intra-sectoral water trading under imperfect markets. Using Banks and Duggan (2006) model of collective decision making to model non-cooperative bargaining, we present here the general framework. The innovative model also allows for incorporating the impact of climate change, population growth, economic growth and technological change on future supply and demand, which help study the benefits of plausible institutional changes in otherwise relatively stagnant water allocation institutions. Application of the proposed hierarchical model to Upper Rio Grande basin calculates the efficiency gains possible from non-cooperative bargaining and compares it with the outcome under cooperation. The analysis can guide policy making by highlighting the gains that institutional reforms can achieve. |
| Keywords: | Water Economics, Institutions, Non-cooperative bargaining theory, Environmental Economics and Policy, |
| Date: | 2016 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ags:aaea16:235571&r=cdm |
| By: | Alp Simsek; Muhamet Yildiz |
| Abstract: | We propose a tractable model of bargaining with optimism. The distinguishing feature of our model is that the bargaining power is durable and changes only due to important events such as elections. Players know their current bargaining powers, but they can be optimistic that events will shift the bargaining power in their favor. We define congruence (in political negotiations, political capital) as the extent to which a party's current bargaining power translates into its expected payoff from bargaining. We show that durability increases congruence and plays a central role in understanding bargaining delays, as well as the finer bargaining details in political negotiations. Optimistic players delay the agreement if durability is expected to increase in the future. The applications of this durability effect include deadline and election effects, by which upcoming deadlines or elections lead to ex-ante gridlock. In political negotiations, political capital is highest in the immediate aftermath of the election, but it decreases as the next election approaches. |
| JEL: | C73 C78 D74 D78 |
| Date: | 2016–05 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:22284&r=cdm |
| By: | Canesio D. Predo (College of Forestry and Natural Resources, University of the Philippines Los Baños, College, Laguna 4031, Philippines) |
| Abstract: | This study aimed to document the actual experience of the community and households in Ormoc, Leyte and selected municipalities along Cabalian Bay in Southern Leyte to flooding brought about by extreme climatic events and their perception, preparedness, and planned adaptation for the potential threat posed by climate change-induced sea level rise. Primary data collected through survey, key informant interviews, and focus group discussions, and secondary data were used in the study. Interviewed were 141 respondents from Ormoc (60), Hinundayan (62), and St Bernard (19). The respondents were selected using simple random sampling from the list of affected households. |
| Keywords: | adaptation, climate change, storm, flood, Philippines |
| Date: | 2016–04 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:eep:tpaper:tp201604t3&r=cdm |