nep-cdm New Economics Papers
on Collective Decision-Making
Issue of 2016‒06‒04
eleven papers chosen by
Stan C. Weeber, McNeese State University

  1. Democracy and redistribution By Santanu Gupta; Raghbendra Jha
  2. Intensification and Intra-Household Decisions: Fertilizer Adoption on Collective and Individual Fields in Burkina Faso By Smale, Melinda; Haider, Hamza; Theriault, Veronique
  3. Institutional Investors and Corporate Political Activism By Albuquerque, Rui; Lei, Zicheng; Rocholl, Jorg; Zhang, Chendi
  4. Local Government Proliferation, Diversity, and Conflict By Samuel Bazzi; Matthew Gudgeon
  5. Political Loyalty Vs Economic Performance: Evidence from Machine Politics in Russia’S Regions By Michael Rochlitz
  6. The Effect of Labor Migration on the Diffusion of Democracy: Evidence from a Former Soviet Republic By Toman Barsbai; Hillel Rapoport; Andreas Steinmayr; Christoph Trebesch
  7. Voters' preferences and electoral systems: The EuroVotePlus experiment in Italy By Luca, Bettarelli; Giovanna, Iannantuoni; Elena, Manzoni; Francesca, Rossi
  8. Economic and Class Voting in a Model of Redistribution with Social Concerns By Andrea Gallice; Edoardo Grillo
  9. Social Media and Protest Participation: Evidence from Russia By Enikolopov, Ruben; Makarin, Alexey; Petrova, Maria
  10. Destroying Surplus and Buying Time in Unanimity Bargaining By Volker Britz
  11. Sharing Skills and Needs between Providers and Users of Climate Information to Create Climate Services: Lessons from the Northern Adriatic Case Study By Valentina Giannini; Alessio Bellucci; Silvia Torresan

  1. By: Santanu Gupta; Raghbendra Jha
    Abstract: In a probabilistic voting model with three jurisdictions with residents with different income levels, we demonstrate that it is always optimal to distribute tax revenues as public good to only the residents of richest and median income jurisdictions. In this context, we compare the overall welfare of all citizens in a one bracket Tax Structure where the poor contribute to tax and does not receive public goods, to that in a progressive Two bracket or a Three bracket Tax Structure where the poor face no taxes but neither do they receive any public goods. In a situation where the government extracts a part of the tax revenues as political rents and maximizes expected payoff rather than the probability of re-election, there is a possibility of complete extraction which implies taxing away all private income with no allocation of public good, if electoral uncertainty be high.
    Keywords: median voter, local public good, reservation utility
    JEL: H41 H72
    Date: 2016
  2. By: Smale, Melinda; Haider, Hamza; Theriault, Veronique
    Abstract: We contribute to the understanding of technology adoption decisions by complex farm households in the Sudano-Sahelian region of West Africa, where production is organized collectively under the leadership of a senior head who also allocates individual fields to members. Farm families span generations and encompass several nuclear households. We examine the nature of the linkage between fertilizer use decisions on collective and individual plots based on a conceptual model of intra-household bargaining that enables us to draw inferences about efficiency of input allocation. Although the share of individual maize plots receiving fertilizer is lower, use rates on maize tend to be higher than on collective fields. Adoption of fertilizer on a collective plot contributes to a 0.32 rise in adoption probability on an individual plot, but the converse is not true. The marginal effect of application rates on collective plots is positively associated with intensity of use on individual plots but of a magnitude consistent with inefficiency of resource allocation. Determinants of adoption differ between individual and collective fields, and between the decision to use fertilizer and the intensity of use. Findings have implications for the design of extension programs and policies to support agricultural intensification in the region.
    Keywords: fertilizer, adoption, gender, household farm, Burkina Faso, Agricultural and Food Policy, Farm Management, International Development,
    Date: 2016
  3. By: Albuquerque, Rui; Lei, Zicheng; Rocholl, Jorg; Zhang, Chendi
    Abstract: The landmark decision by the U.S. Supreme Court on Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission asserts for the first time that corporations benefit from First Amendment protection regarding freedom of speech in the form of independent political expenditures, thus creating a new avenue for political activism. This paper studies how corporations adjusted their political activism in response to this ruling. The paper presents evidence consistent with the hypothesis that institutional investors, in particular public pension funds, have a preference for not using the new avenue for political activism, a preference not shared by other investors.
    JEL: G3
    Date: 2016–05
  4. By: Samuel Bazzi (Boston University & BREAD); Matthew Gudgeon (Boston University)
    Abstract: The creation of new local governments is a key feature of decentralization in developing countries. This process often causes substantial changes in contestable public resources and the local diversity of the electorate. We exploit the plausibly exogenous timing of new district creation in Indonesia to iden- tify the implications of these changes for violent conflict. Using new geospatial data on violence, we show that allowing for redistricting along group lines can reduce conflict. However, these reductions are undone and even reversed if the newly defined electorates are ethnically polarized, particularly in areas that receive an entirely new seat of government. We identify several mechanisms highlighting the violent contestation of political control.
    Keywords: Conflict, Polarization, Ethnic Diversity, Decentralization
    JEL: D72 D74 H41 H77 O13 Q34
  5. By: Michael Rochlitz (National Research University Higher School of Economics)
    Abstract: Electoral authoritarian regimes often rely on patron-client relationships and political machines to win elections. While a growing literature has focused on the reasons why authoritarian regimes might want to hold elections, the economic consequences associated with the need to win elections have been less intensely studied. In this paper, we argue that while holding elections might offer authoritarian regimes a range of informational and other advantages in the short and medium run, the long-term economic costs can be significant and potentially destabilizing. This effect is especially strong in transition economies, where outdated and inefficient economic structures might be kept alive for political reasons. The theory is tested with an original dataset of gubernatorial appointments from a leading electoral authoritarian regime, the Russian Federation. We find that by incentivizing regional governors to use their political machines to win elections for the regime, the Kremlin effectively punishes those governors that are successfully developing their regional economies, with the effect being especially strong in regions where a high percentage of the population lives in Soviet-era single company towns.
    Keywords: authoritarian elections, political machines, bureaucratic incentives, patronclient relationships, economic growth
    JEL: M51 O43 P31 P52
    Date: 2016
  6. By: Toman Barsbai (Kiel Institute for the World Economy - Kiel Institute for the World Economy); Hillel Rapoport (CES - Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne - UP1 - Université Panthéon-Sorbonne - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, PSE - Paris School of Economics); Andreas Steinmayr (University of Munich); Christoph Trebesch (CESifo - Center for Economic Studies and Ifo for Economic Research - CESifo Group Munich, University of Munich)
    Abstract: Migration contributes to the circulation of goods, knowledge, and ideas. Using community and individual-level data from Moldova, we show that the emigration wave that started in the late 1990s strongly affected electoral outcomes and political preferences in Moldova during the following decade, eventually contributing to the fall of the last Communist government in Europe. Our results are suggestive of information transmission and cultural diffusion channels. Identification relies on the quasiexperimental context and on the differential effects arising from the fact that emigration was directed both to more democratic Western Europe and to less democratic Russia.
    Keywords: Emigration,political institutions,elections,social networks,information transmission,cultural diffusion
    Date: 2016–05
  7. By: Luca, Bettarelli; Giovanna, Iannantuoni; Elena, Manzoni; Francesca, Rossi
    Abstract: Motivated by the need of understanding voting behavior under different electoral rules, Laslier et al. (2015) have conducted an online experiment in several European countries during the three weeks before the 2014 elections for the European Parliament, the EuroVotePlus experiment. This paper focuses on the Italian data . We first show that the behavior of Italian respondents is consistent with the empirical findings at the European level. Then, we exploit the change from open list to closed list elections implemented in Italy in 1993 to investigate whether and how preferences over institutions are affected by experience. We find that respondents who voted using the open list system in Italy are more likely to prefer closed list systems, and that the effect is stronger the higher the number of open list elections that the respondents have faced.
    Keywords: European Parliament Election, Open list, Closed list, Voting rules
    JEL: D7 C9
    Date: 2016–05–19
  8. By: Andrea Gallice; Edoardo Grillo
    Abstract: We investigate how concerns about social status may affect individuals?preferences for redistribution. In our model, agents are heterogeneous across two dimensions, productivity and social class, and an individual?s social status is de?ned as his relative standing in terms of a weighted average of these two components. The weight on each component depends positively on its standard deviation. Redistribution thus simultaneously affects labor supply and the weights that determine social status. As such, taxation not only redistributes resources from the rich to the poor but also becomes a way of preserving or modifying social status. Thus, individuals who have the same productivity but belong to different social classes support different tax rates. We characterize the equilibrium of the political game as the solution of a system of non-linear equations and identify the interclass coalition of voters who support the equilibrium tax rate.
    Keywords: economic voting, class voting, social status, voting, redistribution.
    JEL: D10 D63 H23
    Date: 2016
  9. By: Enikolopov, Ruben; Makarin, Alexey; Petrova, Maria
    Abstract: Do new communication technologies, such as social media, reduce collective action problem? This paper provides evidence that penetration of VK, the dominant Russian online social network, affected protest activity during a wave of protests in Russia in 2011. As a source of exogenous variation in network penetration, we use information on the city of origin of the students who studied together with the founder of VK, controlling for the city of origin of the students who studied at the same university several years earlier or later. We find that a 10% increase in VK penetration increased the probability of a protest by 4.6%, and the number of protesters by 19%. Additional results suggest that social media has affected protest activity by reducing the costs of coordination, rather than by spreading information critical of the government. In particular, VK penetration increased pro-governmental support and reduced the number of people who were ready to participate in protests right before the protests took place. Also, cities with higher fractionalization of network users between VK and Facebook experienced fewer protests. Finally, we provide suggestive evidence that municipalities with higher VK penetration received smaller transfers from the central government after the occurrence of protests.
    Keywords: collective action; impact of technology adoption; political protests; social media
    JEL: D7 H0
    Date: 2016–05
  10. By: Volker Britz (ETH Zurich, Switzerland)
    Abstract: In non-cooperative bargaining games in the tradition of Rubinstein, the proposer derives bargaining power from the prospect of a costly delay which would follow the rejection of a proposal. We consider a unanimity bargaining game in which the proposer can strategically choose to prolong this delay. Prolonging the delay increases the proposer's bargaining power, but is assumed to come at a cost and thus cause an inefficiency. We use an appropriate refinement of stationary subgame-perfect equilibrium as the solution concept. We characterize equilibrium strategies and payoffs. We establish conditions on model parameters under which equilibrium is or is not efficient. For inefficient equilibria, we quantify the extent of the inefficiency. Moreover, we study the relation between the number of players and the degree of inefficiency. We find that inefficient equilibria become more inefficient the more players there are. Moreover, the parameter region in which an efficient equilibrium is possible shrinks when the number of players increases.
    Keywords: Bargaining, Surplus Destruction, Discount Factor, Timing
    JEL: C72 C78
    Date: 2016–05
  11. By: Valentina Giannini (Centro Euro-Mediterraneo sui Cambiamenti Climatici); Alessio Bellucci (Centro Euro-Mediterraneo sui Cambiamenti Climatici); Silvia Torresan (Centro Euro-Mediterraneo sui Cambiamenti Climatici)
    Abstract: The need to cope with the expected impacts of climate change on socio-ecological systems calls for a closer dialogue between climate scientists and the community of climate information users (e.g. decision makers belonging to public institutions). We describe an interactive process designed to bridge this gap by establishing a two-way communication, based on mutual learning. We analyse the need of climate information for the integrated assessment of climate change impacts on the coastal zone of the Northern Adriatic Sea, which is considered to be particularly vulnerable to several climate-related phenomena, e.g. heavy rainfall events, pluvial flood, and sea-level rise, causing potentially high damages to coastal eco-systems and urban areas (e.g. acqua alta in the Venice Lagoon). A participatory process is designed engaging representatives from both the scientific and local stakeholders communities, and facilitated by a boundary organization, embodied by the Euro-Mediterranean Center on Climate Change.
    Keywords: Decision Making, Climate Products, Climate Services, Risk Assessment, Northern Adriatic, Participatory Process, CLIM-RUN
    JEL: O1 Q2 R5
    Date: 2016–05

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