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on Collective Decision-Making |
| By: | Isabel Marcin (Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods); Pedro Robalo (Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods); Franziska Tausch (Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods) |
| Abstract: | This paper studies experimentally how the endogeneity of sanctioning institutions affects the severity of punishment in social dilemmas. We allow individuals to vote on the introduction of third-party-administered sanctions, and compare situations in which the adoption of this institution is endogenously decided via majority voting to situations in which it is exogenously imposed by the experimenter. Our experimental design addresses the self-selection and signaling effects that arise when subjects can vote on the institutional setting. We find that punishment is significantly higher when the sanctioning institution is exogenous, which can be explained by a difference in the effectiveness of punishment. Subjects respond to punishment more strongly when the sanctioning institution is endogenously chosen. As a result, a given cooperation level can be reached through milder punishment when third-party sanctions are endogenous. However, overall efficiency does not differ across the two settings as the stricter punishment implemented in the exogenous one sustains high cooperation as subjects interact repeatedly. |
| Keywords: | Endogeneity, Third-party punishment, Voting, Institutions, Social dilemma, Public good |
| JEL: | C92 D02 D72 H41 |
| Date: | 2016–04 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:mpg:wpaper:2016_06&r=cdm |
| By: | Aarti Garg |
| Abstract: | Constitution of India was amended by way of 73rd amendment in 1992, wherein constitution and establishment of Panchayats was made obligatory. It was the resolve of the Parliament to take democracy to the grassroot level, which climaxed in the carrying out of this amendment. A period of twenty three years has passed since 73rd amendment and the present study was commenced with an exertion to study the contribution of women in Panchayats. The study was conducted in two blocks of Sambhal district namely (Sambhal and Asmoli block) of Moradabad Division. A total of 50 women respondents out of 147 women respondents from Sambhal and Asmoli block were randomly selected for the study. The tool used for conquering information was an Interview Schedule. The findings exposed that majority of the women elected as Panchayat members were marital, belonged to joint families and were mostly educated. They were mainly housewives before joining politics. Husbands of majority of the women enthused with them and provided complete morale support and stood by them throughout elections. Economic liberation was the main motive in joining politics as specified by majority of them. The women confronted tremendous administrative problems, and had scanty knowledge about working of panchayats. They could not exercise their right of sovereignty of expression as their husbands or other male members did not support them. A proportion more still needs to be done by the Government in training and empowering the women to exercise their authority at all the levels of Panchayati Raj institutions, local NGO’s and government organizations need to come accelerative to train women for this role. Key words: Women Representation, Political Participation, Rural Leaders, Women Reservation, Panchayat Raj, Leadership |
| Date: | 2016–03 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:vor:issues:2016-03-12&r=cdm |
| By: | Parinduri, Rasyad |
| Abstract: | I examine whether education increases voter turnout and makes better voters using an exogenous variation in education induced by an extension of Indonesia's school term length, which fits a fuzzy regression discontinuity design. The longer school year increases education, but I do not find evidence that education makes people more likely to vote in elections or changes whether they consider political candidates' religion, ethnicity, or gender important when they vote. If anything, education seems to make voters more likely to think candidates' development programs are important. |
| Keywords: | education, political participation, regression discontinuity design, Asia, Indonesia |
| JEL: | D72 |
| Date: | 2016–03 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:70326&r=cdm |
| By: | TOMASZ BICHTA (UNIVERSITY OF MARIA CURIE SKLODOWSKA) |
| Abstract: | The paper examines the issue of ethnicity in political parties and its implications for democracy in three African countries: Nigeria, Ghana and Namibia. It also examines the ways ethnic and nonethnic parties deal on political market in different countries. Ethnicity seems to be one of the most important factors that affects on political and social life in African countries. Moreover, since the colonialism and its ruthless and formal end, it is still present in daily life with double power. It is also a frequent element of political parties and their formation. Does it help or leads to conflicts? Is it necessary or avoidable? African politics seems to be accustomed to its ethnical affects and political organizations with ethnic factor are prevalenced all over the continent. It is not a rule however and we have some countries with the advantage of nonethnic parties. For sure the understanding of the ethnicity issue on the political scene allows for more insightful research of party development and dynamics on the continent. |
| Keywords: | Africa, political party, party structure, ethnicity |
| JEL: | D72 F54 D73 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:sek:iacpro:3505944&r=cdm |
| By: | Marco Faillo; Federico Fornasari; Luigi Mittone |
| Abstract: | Following some recent studies, we experimentally test the effect of intra-group leadership in a public good experiment. Specifically, individuals taking part in our experiment are randomly assigned either the role of leader or the role of follower. Leaders take part in a public good game, aware of the fact that every decision they make directly affects their followers. In this sense, our experimental setting combines the dimension of leadership in cooperation with the one of delegated agents. In our experiment, we find that leadership produces two main effects: subjects contribute more, and tend to punish more frequently. In spite of the presence of higher contributions, we observe lower payoffs; these are caused by an aggressive behavior that push leaders to mane an undue use of punishment. Allowing one-sided communication between followers and leaders provide a different effect: communication reduces decision makers’ aggressiveness, leading to lower contributions and punishment, but better results in terms of final payoffs. The same welfare can be reached when leadership is not implemented at all; this suggests that the presence of a dictatorial leader in public goods with punishment can be beneficial only when there is communication. |
| Keywords: | Voluntary contribution experiment, Leadership, Punishment |
| JEL: | C72 C92 H41 O12 |
| Date: | 2016 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:trn:utwpce:1604&r=cdm |
| By: | Bag, Kanti Parimal (National University of Singapore, Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences, Department of Economics); Pepito, Nona (Essec business school) |
| Abstract: | In a two-period continuous effort investment game as in Mohnen, et al. (2008), we demonstrate that peer transparency can be strictly harmful. This contrasts with Mohnen et al.'s result that transparency, through the observability of interim efforts, induces more effort and is thus beneficial if team members are inequity-averse. If, instead, preferences are standard utilitarian, the marginal benefit is decreasing and marginal cost is increasing in a player's own effort, then players' collective and individual efforts are strictly less with transparency than under non-transparency. |
| Keywords: | free-riding; transparency; team; perfect substitution |
| JEL: | D02 |
| Date: | 2016–01–26 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ebg:essewp:dr-16003&r=cdm |
| By: | Jost Halfmann (TU Dresden, Institute of Sociology) |
| Abstract: | Populist movements are abound in Europe: since the 1990s such movements and parties as Podemos in Spain, the Lega Nord in Italy, the UKIP in England or the Front National in France sprang up and attracted substantial numbers of voters and followers over time. Populist movemements and parties claim to speak for the people, they oppose elites in politics and economy and large associations and demand direct democracy. The thesis of the paper is that these movements and parties protest against the perceived erosion of the political status of the people as the legitimate constituent of democratic rule. According to populist views, political and social elites violate the obligation of the implicit contract between elites and the people to pursue the common good of the people in exchange for the people's loyalty to political rule. This loyalty appears to be challengd by perceived corruption, fatal governmental decisions and actions risking the wealth and the security of the nation, among which immigration politics rank highly. Immigration violates this contract because, as populists see it, only the people (that is: the legal and legitimate members of a constituency) should profit from the provisions of the state (welfare, safety, public order). The paper will illustrate this thesis by comparing selected populist movements and parties and reflect on the possible consequences of populism for representative democracy. |
| Keywords: | populism, protest, common good, immigration |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:sek:iacpro:3506108&r=cdm |
| By: | Debra Hevenstone; Ben Jann |
| Abstract: | We construct an empirically informed computational model of fiscal federalism, testing whether horizontal or vertical equalization can solve the fiscal externality problem in an environment in which heterogeneous agents can move and vote. The model expands on the literature by considering the case of progressive local taxation. Although the consequences of progressive taxation under fiscal federalism are well understood, they have not been studied in a context with tax equalization, despite widespread implementation. The model also expands on the literature by comparing the standard median voter model with a realistic alternative voting mechanism. We find that fiscal federalism with progressive taxation naturally leads to segregation as well as inefficient and inequitable public goods provision while the alternative voting mechanism generates more efficient, though less equitable, public goods provision. Equalization policy, under both types of voting, is largely undermined by micro-actors' choices. For this reason, the model also does not find the anticipated effects of vertical equalization discouraging public goods spending among wealthy jurisdictions and horizontal encouraging it among poor jurisdictions. Finally, we identify two optimal scenarios, superior to both complete centralization and complete devolution. These scenarios are not only Pareto optimal, but also conform to a Rawlsian view of justice, offering the best possible outcome for the worst-off. Despite offering the best possible outcomes, both scenarios still entail significant economic segregation and inequitable public goods provision. Under the optimal scenarios agents shift the bulk of revenue collection to the federal government, with few jurisdictions maintaining a small local tax. |
| Keywords: | Fiscal Federalism, Equalization Grants, Computational Modeling, Tiebout Sorting, Theory of Justice, Multi-community model |
| JEL: | C63 D63 H21 H23 H3 H71 |
| Date: | 2016–04–12 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:bss:wpaper:19&r=cdm |
| By: | George Marbuah (Swedish University of Agricultural Sciences) |
| Abstract: | The growing recognition of social capital as an important parameter necessary for shaping pro-environmental behaviour and attitudes is well established in the literature and continues to engage the attention of policymakers, academics and citizens in many jurisdictions. In this paper, we contribute to this strand of literature by investigating the extent to which various elements of social capital influences Swedish public’s tendency to contribute financially or through lifestyle changes in order to protect the environment. Using data from the latest wave of the International Social Survey Programme (ISSP) on the environment in 2010, we explore empirically the link between individuals’ willingness to pay (WTP) and social capital influence using an ordered logistic model. The results show, that, individuals in Sweden are fairly willing to pay for the environment and that this decision is principally and significantly influenced by elements of social capital. In particular, we find quite robust results to show that social and institutional trust, environmental group membership among related civic participation activities and adherence to environmental norms significantly impacts the probability of individuals’ decision to sacrifice toward environmental sustainability by paying higher environmental taxes, prices or through standard of living adjustments. |
| Keywords: | Willingness to pay, Social capital, Environmental protection, Ordered logistic regression, Sweden |
| JEL: | A13 A14 Q50 Q51 |
| Date: | 2016–04 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:fae:wpaper:2016.13&r=cdm |
| By: | Kazuhiko Hashimoto; Kohei Shiozawa |
| Abstract: | We study strategy-proof probabilistic mechanisms in a binary public decision model when monetary transfers are allowed. We consider not only the pivotal mechanism, the majority voting mechanism, the random serial dictatorship mechanism, and the unanimity mechanism, but also the random chair pivotal mechanism (Faltings 2005), which is a probabilistic variant of the pivotal mechanism. We first show that the random chair pivotal mechanism, the majority voting mechanism, the random serial dictatorship mechanism, and the unanimity mechanism are second-best efficient. Next, we calculate the expected welfare of the mechanisms by the Monte Carlo method, where each agent's valuation is independently, identically, and uniformly (or normally) distributed. These calculations exhibit that the random chair pivotal mechanism is more efficient than the other mechanisms. We also show that in large economies, the random chair pivotal mechanism is efficient, while the other mechanisms might be highly inefficient. Finally, we characterize the random chair pivotal mechanism with strategy-proofness, budget-balance, equal treatment of equals, and decision-robustness. |
| Date: | 2016–03 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:dpr:wpaper:0964&r=cdm |
| By: | Spiller, Jörg; Bolle, Friedel |
| Abstract: | In a laboratory experiment we investigate inter-generational concerns and myopia in a dynamic Public Good game. Groups of four played a 15-period game where they could either invest in a green sector or in a more profitable brown sector that builds a pollution stock. We find that subjects are more cooperative when their final pollution stock will be inherited by another group in a later session. Furthermore, we observe that defection from a negotiated common plan is higher when subjects are in a loss frame, negotiated plans are more ambitious. We analyze our results in reference to several social preference theories and find that Linear Altruism is most supported in such a dynamic environment. |
| Keywords: | Dynamic,Environmental Economics,Experimental Economics,Inter-Generation,Public Good |
| JEL: | H41 C91 |
| Date: | 2016 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:euvwdp:383&r=cdm |
| By: | Philip Mirowski (University of Notre Dame) |
| Abstract: | Why do so many people who should know better argue that Neoliberalism 'does not exist'? In this paper I examine the disinclination to treat the Neoliberal political project as a serious intellectual project motivating a series of successes in the public sphere. Economists seem especially remiss in this regard. |
| Keywords: | Neoliberalism, Angus Burgin, Leo Strauss, Friedrich Hayek, Mont Pelerin, classical liberalism. |
| Date: | 2014–09 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:thk:wpaper:23&r=cdm |
| By: | Mollers, Judith; Traikova, Diana; Birhala, Brandusha; Wolz, Axel |
| Abstract: | In Romania, after the breakdown of the communist regime, collective farms were replaced by a large number of small-scale private farms. Although cooperation seems to be a favorable choice for these smallholders, it did not develop so far. This paper explores the factors that determine the intention formation of Romanian fruit and vegetable farmers to join marketing cooperatives in the form of so-called Producer Groups. Our theoretical framework refers to Ajzen’s Theory of Planned Behavior, modelled by a Structural Equation Model. Intention formation is mainly influenced by expectations for better prices and easier access to capital. Perceived family support is another significant factor while confidence in own capabilities and resource endowment do not seem to play an important role. The level of distrust is generally high, but not significant as a driver of the intention to cooperate in PGs. |
| Keywords: | Producer Group, smallholder, Romania, Theory of Planned Behavior, cooperation, Farm Management, Q12, Q13, |
| Date: | 2015 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ags:iaae15:212472&r=cdm |