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on Collective Decision-Making |
| By: | Korthals R.A.; Levels M. (ROA) |
| Abstract: | This paper introduces a technique to elicit voter preferences, by integrating multiattribute compositional analyses Macs with a voting advice application VAA. The technique requires users to make trade-offs between different positions on a single issue, and between different issues. MacVAAs more closely resemble the electoral decision-making process in elections in which more than two parties participate than classic VAAs. MacVAAs also overcomes the assumption of issue orthogonality and assumption of rationality that classic VAA erroneously make. Results of a field application of the technique during the 2012 Dutch parliamentary elections in 2012 are presented. Advantages and disadvantages are discussed. |
| Keywords: | Economic Methodology: General; Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior; |
| JEL: | B40 D72 |
| Date: | 2016 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:unm:umaror:2016004&r=cdm |
| By: | Mostapha Diss (GATE Lyon Saint-Étienne - Groupe d'analyse et de théorie économique - ENS Lyon - École normale supérieure - Lyon - UL2 - Université Lumière - Lyon 2 - UCBL - Université Claude Bernard Lyon 1 - Université Jean Monnet - Saint-Etienne - PRES Université de Lyon - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique); Ahmed Doghmi (Université de Rabat) |
| Abstract: | The goal of this paper is to propose a comparison of four multi-winner voting rules, k-Plurality, k-Negative Plurality, k-Borda, and Bloc, which can be considered as generalisations of well-known single-winner scoring rules. The first comparison is based on the Condorcet committee efficiency which is defined as the conditional probability that a given voting rule picks out the Condorcet committee, given that such a committee exists. The second comparison is based on the likelihood of two paradoxes of committee elections: The Prior Successor Paradox and the Leaving Member Paradox which occur when a member of an elected committee leaves. In doing so, using the well-known Impartial Anonymous Culture condition, we extend the results of Kamwa and Merlin (2015) in two directions. First, our paper is concerned with the probability of the paradoxes no matter the ranking of the leaving candidate. Second, we do not only focus on the occurrence of these paradoxes when one wishes to select a committee of size k = 2 out of m = 4 candidates but we consider more values of k and m. Abstract The goal of this paper is to propose a comparison of four multi-winner voting rules, k−Plurality, k−Negative Plurality, k−Borda, and Bloc, which can be considered as generalisations of well-known single-winner scoring rules. The first comparison is based on the Condorcet committee efficiency which is defined as the conditional probability that a given voting rule picks out the Condorcet committee, given that such a committee exists. The second comparison is based on the likelihood of two paradoxes of committee elections: The Prior Successor Paradox and the Leaving Member Paradox which occur when a member of an elected committee leaves. In doing so, using the well-known Impartial Anonymous Culture condition, we extend the results of Kamwa and Merlin (2015) in two directions. First, our paper is concerned with the probability of the paradoxes no matter the ranking of the leaving candidate. Second, we do not only focus on the occurrence of these paradoxes when one wishes to select a committee of size k = 2 out of m = 4 candidates but we consider more values of k and m. |
| Keywords: | Multi-winner voting rules,committee,Condorcet committee efficiency,paradoxes |
| Date: | 2016 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:wpaper:halshs-01285526&r=cdm |
| By: | Choy, James P. (University of Warwick) |
| Abstract: | Many societies are divided into multiple smaller groups. Certain kinds of interaction are more likely to take place within a group than across groups. I model a reputation effect that enforces these divisions. Agents who interact with members of different groups can support lower levels of cooperation with members of their own groups. A hierarchical relationship between groups appears endogenously in equilibrium. Group divisions appear without any external cause, and improvements in formal contracting institutions may cause group divisions to disappear. Qualitative evidence from the anthropological literature is consistent with several predictions of the model. |
| Keywords: | Cooperation, Caste, Social Institution JEL Classification: C73, O12, O17 |
| Date: | 2016 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cge:wacage:266&r=cdm |
| By: | Schötz, Lukas |
| Abstract: | The pursuit of individual rents by political representatives is recognized as one of the major shortcomings of political systems. While both legal and illegal types of rents are distributed by political decisions, research has focused primarily on illegal rent-seeking by politicians. This article examines the extent to which elected Bavarian mayors are provided with legal political rents. As independently elected councils determine the remuneration of mayors in Bavarian municipalities, an examination of this process is used to determine whether evidence exists that strong political competition limits rent allocation in the political system. Results from this quasi-experimental regression discontinuity design (RDD) approach show that political competition and party considerations have a significant impact on the allocation of legal rents to local leaders. However, this effect is not present in cases where rents received by mayors were already high prior to the election. |
| Keywords: | political rents,local affairs,regression discontinuity design |
| Date: | 2016 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:upadvr:v7016&r=cdm |
| By: | Sawada, Yasuyuki; Aida, Takeshi; Griffen, Andrew S; Kozuka, Eiji; Noguchi, Haruko; Todo, Yasuyuki |
| Abstract: | In this paper, we investigate the role of School Management Committees (COGES) in Burkina Faso. These committees include elected members of each community, and are tasked with setting and implementing annual school plans. The study adopted a hybrid evaluation method incorporating a randomized controlled trial and a large-scale artefactual field experiment a la Levitt and List (2007) on public goods with monetary rewards, to closely examine unexplored issues impacting on the sustainability of community-driven projects, and to identify at least partially the mechanisms of this sustainability. We found that the COGES project significantly increased social capital in the form of voluntary contributions to public goods, especially by linking those that people can be connected to vertically. On average, the direct increase in voluntary contributions to public goods from the implementation of the COGES project was between 8.0 and 10.2%. For groups composed of school principals, teachers, and parents, the average contribution increased by between 12.7 and 24.1% through the democratic election of school management committee members, and by between 11.0 and 17.2% through the implementation of the COGES project. These results suggest that community management projects can improve local cost recovery by increasing local contributions of public goods, potentially leading to better fiscal sustainability in community-driven projects. Moreover, the results based on our hybrid experiments are largely in line with real-world decisions observed in the schools under our investigation. As a byproduct, our findings are supportive of models of other-regarding preferences. |
| Keywords: | school-based management , randomized controlled trials , artefactual field experiments , public goods game , social capital , sustainability of development project |
| Date: | 2016–03–10 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:jic:wpaper:192&r=cdm |
| By: | James Andreoni; Michael A. Kuhn; Larry Samuelson |
| Abstract: | We report experimental results for a twice-played prisoners’ dilemma in which the players can choose the allocation of the stakes across the two periods. Our point of departure is the assumption that some (but not all) people are principled to “do the right thing,” or cooperate, as long as their opponent is sufficiently likely to do so. The presence of such types can be exploited to enhance cooperation by structuring the twice-played prisoners’ dilemma to “start small,” so that the second-stage stakes are larger (but not too much larger) than the first-stage stakes. We compare conditions where the allocation of stakes is chosen exogenously to conditions where it is chosen by the players themselves. We show that players are able to find and choose the payoff maximizing strategy of starting small in a twice-played prisoners’ dilemma, and that the salutary payoff effects of doing so are larger than those that arise when the same allocation is exogenously chosen. |
| JEL: | C92 D64 Z13 |
| Date: | 2016–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:21934&r=cdm |
| By: | Mavridis, Christos; Díaz, Guillermo; Casas, Agustin |
| Abstract: | We show how an institutional provision designed to increase accountability of local legislature officials can lead to a distribution of power within the legislature which is not consistent with voters' true preferences. The cause of this inconsistency is the ballot design which asymmetrically affects the officials listed on it. We analyze the case of the Lima's 2013 city legislature recall referendum and show that, controlling for the legislators' individual characteristics, the design of the referendum ballot had adverse and significant effects on the composition of the Lima's city legislature, and examine the counterfactuals of different ballot designs. We show that the election results with more "neutral" ballot designs would have been significantly different, and the composition of the new council would have been more representative of voters' preferences. |
| Date: | 2016–03–09 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cte:werepe:22539&r=cdm |
| By: | Lisa Balzarin (Dept. of Management, Università Ca' Foscari Venice); Chiara Monica Calcagno (Dept. of Management, Università Ca' Foscari Venice) |
| Abstract: | The interplay between the world of arts and that of business is at the centre of the present paper, where the processes of artistic entrepreneurship are investigated through the observation of a group of artists living the experience of founding their own cultural enterprises in the specific context of performing arts. The result is a picture of what the contemporary artists-entrepreneurs are: they act entrepreneurially guided by the respect of the integrity of the Art and assume the role of gatekeepers of the quality of their product, playing in the business world and challenging its logics and structures. |
| Keywords: | cultural entrepreneurship, artistic entrepreneurship, creativity, innovation, paradox, compromise, performing arts |
| JEL: | L26 |
| Date: | 2016–03 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:vnm:wpdman:112&r=cdm |
| By: | Santiago J. Rubio (Department of Economic Analysis and ERI-CES, University of Valencia) |
| Abstract: | This paper examines international cooperation on technological development as an alternative to international cooperation on GHG emission reductions. In order to analyze the scope of cooperation, a three-stage technology agreement formation game is solved. First, countries decide whether or not to sign up to the agreement. Then, in the second stage, the signatories (playing together) and the non-signatories (playing individually) select their investment in R&D. In this stage, it is assumed that the signatories not only coordinate their levels of R&D investment but also pool their R&D efforts to fully internalize the spillovers of their investment in innovation. Finally, in the third stage, each country decides non-cooperatively upon its level of energy production. Emissions depend on the decisions made regarding investment and production. If a country decides to develop a breakthrough technology in the second stage, its emissions will be zero in the third stage. For linear environmental damages and quadratic investment costs, the grand coalition is stable if marginal damages are large enough to justify the development of a breakthrough technology that eliminates emissions completely, and if technology spillovers are not very important. |
| Keywords: | International Environmental Agreements, R&D Investment, Technology Spillovers, Breakthrough Technologies |
| JEL: | D74 F53 H41 Q54 Q55 |
| Date: | 2016–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:fem:femwpa:2016.02&r=cdm |