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on Collective Decision-Making |
| By: | Bouton, Laurent; Llorente-Saguer, Aniol; Malherbe, Frédéric |
| Abstract: | We study the information aggregation properties of unanimous voting rules in the laboratory. In line with theoretical predictions, we find that majority rule with veto power dominates unanimity rule. We also find that the strategic voting model is a fairly good predictor of observed subject behavior. There are, however, cases where organizing the data seems to require a mix of strategic and sincere voting. This pattern of behavior would imply that the way majority rule with veto power is framed may significantly affect the outcome of the vote. Our data strongly supports such an hypothesis. |
| Keywords: | constructive abstention; framing; information aggregation; laboratory experiments; unanimity rule; veto power |
| JEL: | C92 D70 |
| Date: | 2016–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:11087&r=cdm |
| By: | Damien Bo (King's College, London); Arnaud Dellis (University of Quebec in Montreal); Mandar Oak (School of Economics, University of Adelaide) |
| Abstract: | We survey the literature that compares the theoretical properties of different voting procedures using models of electoral competition with endogenous candidacy. In particular, we focus on the predictions made by these models regarding the number of candidates running for election and their polarization. We organize the different models into three families based on different assumptions regarding candidate motivation and the timing of candidate entry. We argue that endogenous candidacy models offer both theoretical and empirical advantages over the standard Hotelling-Downs model in the comparison of the properties of alternative voting procedures. On the theoretical front, these models can provide a more satisfactory microfoundation for the emergence and/or stability of a specific configuration of parties or candidates under different voting procedures. On the empirical front these models offer a better account of the stylized facts about elections, particularly when it comes to explaining the cases where Duverger's propositions apply and the cases where they do not. We also point to shortcomings of these models and propose some directions for future research. |
| Keywords: | Voting rules; Candidates; Polarization; Duverger's law; Duverger's hypothesis |
| JEL: | C72 D72 H11 |
| Date: | 2016–02 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:adl:wpaper:2016-02&r=cdm |
| By: | Igor Gurkov (National Research University Higher School of Economics) |
| Abstract: | What role can collective action by foreign investors play in an environment characterized by incomplete institutions? We study this question by looking on foreign business associations in the Russian Federation. By interviewing 17 foreign business associations and conducting an online survey of their member firms, we find that business associations play an important welfare-enhancing role in providing a series of support and informational services. However, they do not play a significant role in lobbying the collective interests of their member firms, especially in the current political context in Russia where since the start of the Ukraine crisis the business community seems to have suffered a general loss of influence on political decision making |
| Keywords: | multinational corporations, Russia, subsidiary mandate, foreign direct investments |
| JEL: | F21 F23 D24 |
| Date: | 2016 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hig:wpaper:50man2016&r=cdm |
| By: | Anne Vancaelemont (DRM - Dauphine Recherches en Management - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - Université Paris IX - Paris Dauphine) |
| Abstract: | The present paper seeks to contribute to the understanding of the role played by materiality in institutional work (Lawrence and Suddaby, 2006). To do so, we consider practices as a key point to define institutions (Greenwood et al., 2008) and to understand agency (Bourdieu, 1992; 1996). Doing so, we follow Neo-Institutional Theory recent additions to the institutional work literature and take part in an emerging movement of renewed attention towards (micro-)practices and materiality (Zietsma & Lawrence, 2010; Jones & Massa, 2013; Gawker & Phillips, 2013 ; Raviola & Norbäck, 2013). In particular, our study investigates how objects (either physical or not) play a role in institutional work through practices. ! Thanks to a field case study of the French recorded music industry (1994-2014), based on observation data, secondary data and interviews gathered in four sub-cases, we deliver narratives of how objects together with actors, shape micro-practices - therefore emergent patterns of practices, and play an active role in creating, maintaining or disrupting institutionalized practices at the field level. First, our case reveals that objects relate to other objects and material practices within what we call « objects and practices groupings », as components. A so called grouping is both a process and the result of that process. It constitute the level where institutional work is enacted. Second, our study suggests the addition of two specific kinds of component objects in the researcher toolbox to investigate materiality: bridge objects and community objects. They play different roles in institutional work. The former enables the importation of useful object resources (from another grouping). The latter seams to play a crucial role in micro- practices transformation into collective practices at the macro level. Last but not least, our study leads to a sensitive consideration of material practices. Indeed, the audio form of objects influences actors decisions and practices. Yet, these decisions and practices also depend subjectively on actors skills to learn and evaluate the given audio form. All in all, the present paper shows how materiality (objects and practices groupings) empower actors, either classic organizations such as companies or more informal groups of actors such as consumers, shape their decisions and practices and enable them to take an active part in the institutional work. That object grouping empowerment can be described as a process of social, economic and cultural capital acquisition. |
| Keywords: | Neo-Institutional Theory,Creative Industry,Materiality,Practices |
| Date: | 2015–06–04 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:journl:hal-01267723&r=cdm |
| By: | Iaryczower, Matias; Oliveros, Santiago |
| Abstract: | We consider a class of dynamic collective action problems in which either a single principal or two competing principals vie for the support of members of a group. We focus on the dynamic problem that emerges when agents negotiate and commit their support to principals sequentially. A danger for the agents in this context is that a principal may be able to succeed by exploiting competition among members of the group. Would agents benefit from introducing competition between opposing principals? We show that when principals’ policies provide value to the agents, competition actually reduces agents’ welfare. |
| Date: | 2015 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:esx:essedp:14459&r=cdm |
| By: | Hans Haller; Britta Hoyer |
| Abstract: | Social psychology studies the “common enemy effectâ€, the phenomenon that members of a group work together when they face an opponent, although they otherwise have little in common. An interesting scenario is the formation of an information network where group members individually sponsor costly links. Suppose that ceteris paribus, an outsider appears who aims to disrupt the information flow within the network by deleting some of the links. The question is how the group responds to this common enemy. We address this question for the homogeneous connections model of strategic network formation, with two-way flow of information and without information decay. For sufficiently low linkage costs, the external threat can lead to a more connected network, a positive common enemy effect. For very high but not prohibitively high linkage costs, the equilibrium network can be minimally connected and efficient in the absence of the external threat whereas it is always empty and inefficient in the presence of the external threat, a negative common enemy effect. |
| Keywords: | strategic network formation, strategic network disruption, common enemy effect. |
| Date: | 2015 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:vpi:wpaper:e07-49&r=cdm |
| By: | Daniela Di Cagno; Arianna Galliera; Werner Güth; Luca Panaccione |
| Abstract: | Similar to Fischbacher and Gachter (2010) we try to understand and explain the motivation of participants when contributing to a public good. In the Hybrid Public Good experiment each of two interacting contributors chooses an independent contribution level and three adjusted contribution levels when (s)he, as the only adjusting player, learns that the other’s independent contribution is smaller, equal or larger than the own one. We systematically vary the probability that one player can adjust, based on such qualitative information, but maintain that no adaptation at all and adaptation by only one occurs with positive probability. Adaptation is framed in two ways, once by additively changing the own independent contribution and once by stating new contribution levels. Surprisingly, there is a strong framing effect which increases with experience. Reacting to coinciding independent contributions implies impressive conformity in contributing. Reacting to higher, respectively lower independent contributions implies average upward, and, more strongly, downward adaptation. |
| Keywords: | Public goods, experiments, voluntary contribution mechanism |
| JEL: | C91 C72 H41 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:lui:cesare:1504&r=cdm |
| By: | Jordi Brandts; Arno Riedl |
| Abstract: | We use laboratory experiments to study the causal effects of favorable and unfavorable competitive market experience on cooperation in a subsequent social dilemma game. The issues we study are part of the broader topic of whether there are behavioral spillovers between different spheres of social interactions. Market interaction takes place in a continuous double auction market in which one side of the market obtains the larger part of the surplus. We examine the efficiency of subsequent cooperation for pairs of market-winners, market-losers and mixed pairs and study both the cases where interaction in the social dilemma is with others from the same market, 'market-partners', and where it is with others from another market, 'market-strangers', and compare it with benchmark behavior in a stand-alone social dilemma game. We find that in market-partners, market experience has adverse effects on the efficiently of cooperation on both market-winner and market-loser pairs. In market-strangers, pairs of market-winners manage to cooperate more efficiently. These results indicate that it is not market experience per se that lowers the ability to cooperate. Rather, having competed for scarce resources on the same side of the market makes it difficult to overcome the social dilemma and positive market experience fosters cooperation only for those who did not have to compete with each other. We also show that differences in cooperation cannot be explained by ex-ante income differences and find that market experience also affects subjective well-being and social value orientation. |
| Keywords: | competition, cooperation, experiments |
| JEL: | A13 C92 D30 J50 M50 |
| Date: | 2015–12 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:bge:wpaper:868&r=cdm |
| By: | L. Becchetti; G. Corrado; V. Pelligra; F. Rossetti |
| Abstract: | We investigate players’ preferences in a multiplayer prisoner’s dilemma by comparing results from a direct (satisfaction based) and an indirect (choice based) approach. Both approaches provide strong evidence of preference heterogeneity, with players who cooperate above median being less affected in their choice by monetary payoffs vis-à-vis the public good component. The combination of a legality frame plus a conformity information design reduces further the relative preference (satisfaction) for the non-cooperative choice for such players. Our findings support the hypothesis that (part of the) players have, in addition to the standard self-interest component, an other-regarding preference argument that is further satisfied in the legality frame plus conformity design. |
| Keywords: | Analysis of Collective Decision-Making, Corruption, Laboratoty Experiment, Legality Game, Redistribution, conformity |
| JEL: | C92 D7 D73 H2 |
| Date: | 2016 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cns:cnscwp:201604&r=cdm |