nep-cdm New Economics Papers
on Collective Decision-Making
Issue of 2016‒01‒29
seven papers chosen by
Stan C. Weeber, McNeese State University

  1. Explaining Offline Participation in a Social Movement with Online Data: The Case of Observers for Fair Elections By Olessia Y. Koltsova; Galina I. Selivanova
  2. The role of non-voting in shifts in support for Italian political parties (2006-2008) By Luana Russo
  3. A simple dynamic climate cooperation model with large coalitions and deep emissions cuts By Robert C. Schmidt; Eugen Kovac
  4. Backstage – the play within a play: Utilising a dramaturgical metaphor to consider the rapid development of team culture in short-term stage crews By Sealy-O’Donnell, Sue
  5. The Many Faces of Human Sociality: Uncovering the Distribution and Stability of Social Preferences By Adrian Bruhin; Ernst Fehr; Daniel Schunk
  6. Aggregation theory and the relevance of some issues to others By Franz Dietrich
  7. Politically driven cycles in fiscal policy: In depth analysis of the functional components of government expenditures By Vítor Castro; Rodrigo Martins

  1. By: Olessia Y. Koltsova (National Research University Higher School of Economics); Galina I. Selivanova (National Research University Higher School of Economics)
    Abstract: This research investigates to which extent activity of a social movement on a social networking site is related to participation in the offline collective action. We use the data from 17 online groups representing the branches of the movement for Fair Elections in 17 districts of St.Petersburg, Russia, and compare their online parameters to real offline participation of group members in elections in the role of observers. With around 12,000 online users and over 200 offline participants, we use social network analysis and statistical analysis to obtain our results. We find that both on the group and the individual levels participation is related to online networking features and activity parameters, albeit to a modest degree, and offline leaders are especially different from the rest of the members in terms of most online features
    Keywords: social movements, online communities, social networks, participation, Russia.
    JEL: Z19
    Date: 2015
  2. By: Luana Russo
    Abstract: The 2008 Italian Parliamentary Elections showed the highest abstention rate in Italianhistory (19.5%) up until that moment (a new record was set in 2013). Even though thisabstention rate might seem quite low in comparison with some other Western democracies,it has been steadily increasing over time. Furthermore, recent research shows that theintermittent non-vote is increasing as well. The voter’s individual decision on whether or notto vote depends on the circumstances at each election, taking into consideration the type ofelection, the quality of the candidates, and so forth. By employing an ecological inferencemethod on the Italian aggregate data, this paper assesses what happened in terms ofelectoral realignment and differential abstention. It also aims to find out which parties arenow gaining or losing support from non-voters in the 2008 Parliamentary Italian elections.
    Date: 2014–12–01
  3. By: Robert C. Schmidt (Humboldt-Universitaet zu Berlin); Eugen Kovac (University of Duisburg-Essen)
    Abstract: A standard result from the game theoretic literature on international environmental agreements is that coalitions are either 'broad but shallow' or 'narrow but deep'. Hence, the stable coalition size is small when the potential welfare gains are large. We modify a standard climate coalition game by adding a – seemingly – small but realistic feature: we allow countries to delay climate negotiations until the next 'round' if a coalition forms but decides to remain inactive. It turns out that results are surprisingly different under this modication. In particular, a large coalition with deep emissions cuts forms if countries are sufficiently patient. Our results also indicate that countries should try hard to overcome coordination problems in the formation of a coalition. A more cooperative outcome may then be reached, and it may be reached more quickly.
    Date: 2015–10–26
  4. By: Sealy-O’Donnell, Sue
    Abstract: This research project asks the question of how short-term theatre production teams (stage-crew), are able to rapidly develop a strong team culture within an environment which does not allow the luxury of time for the standard stages of team culture formation. Utilising a dramaturgical metaphor as a methodological framework, allowed consideration of how these groups create trust, shared rituals and behaviours and establish self-governing tools that may benefit both the individual and the group. The research results showed evidence of four key practices which are critical to their ability to rapidly develop team culture; specific context, individual strategies, techniques that aid self-governance and emotional management. This research is beneficial not only to those studying the formation of team culture, but also the study of temporary, project and mobile teams. In addition practitioners will benefit from this research within a number of areas including, those within the creative industry, (particularly those with similar extreme time limitations), those interested in roles where physical safety necessitates the rapid development of trust and those interested in the collective nature of team development and group efficacy.
    Keywords: Dramaturgical metaphor, Team culture, Rapid team culture development, Group efficacy, Invisible workforce, Self-governance, Rituals, Emotional management, Creative industries, Theatre,
    Date: 2015
  5. By: Adrian Bruhin (University of Lausanne); Ernst Fehr (University of Zurich); Daniel Schunk (Johannes Gutenberg University of Mainz)
    Abstract: There is vast heterogeneity in the human willingness to weigh others’ interests in decision making. This heterogeneity concerns the motivational intricacies as well as the strength of other-regarding behaviors, and raises the question how one can parsimoniously model and characterize heterogeneity across several dimensions of social preferences while still being able to predict behavior over time and across situations. We tackle this task with an experiment and a structural model of preferences that allows us to simultaneously estimate outcome-based and reciprocity-based social preferences. We find that non-selfish preferences are the rule rather than the exception. Neither at the level of the representative agent nor when we allow for several preference types do purely selfish types emerge. Instead, three temporally stable and qualitatively different other-regarding types emerge endogenously, i.e., without pre-specifying assumptions about the characteristics of types. When ahead, all three types value others’ payoffs significantly more than when behind. The first type, which we denote as strongly altruistic type, is characterized by a relatively large weight on others’ payoffs – even when behind – and moderate levels of reciprocity. The second type, denoted as moderately altruistic type, also puts positive weight on others’ payoff, yet at a considerable lower level, and displays no positive reciprocity while the third type is behindness averse, i.e., puts a large negative weight on others’ payoffs when behind and behaves selfishly otherwise. We also find that there is an unambiguous and temporally stable assignment of individuals to types. Moreover, the three-type model substantially improves the (out-of-sample) predictions of individuals’ behavior across additional games while the information contained in subject-specific parameter estimates leads to no or only minor additional predictive power. This suggests that a parsimonious model with three types captures the bulk of the predictive power contained in the preference estimates.
    Keywords: Social Preferences, Heterogeneity, Stability, Finite Mixture Models
    JEL: C49 C91 D03
    Date: 2016–01–04
  6. By: Franz Dietrich (EEP-PSE - Ecole d'Économie de Paris - Paris School of Economics, CES - Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne - UP1 - Université Panthéon-Sorbonne - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)
    Abstract: I propose a relevance-based independence axiom on how to aggregate individual yes/no judgments on given propositions into collective judgments: the collective judgment on a proposition depends only on people's judgments on propositions which are relevant to that proposition. This axiom contrasts with the classical independence axiom: the collective judgment on a proposition depends only on people's judgments on the same proposition. I generalize the premise-based rule and the sequential-priority rule to an arbitrary priority order of the propositions, instead of a dichotomous premise/conclusion order resp. a linear priority order. I prove four impossibility theorems on relevance-based aggregation. One theorem simultaneously generalizes Arrow's Theorem (in its general and indifference-free versions) and the well-known Arrow-like theorem in judgment aggregation.
    Keywords: judgment aggregation,generalized Arrow theorem,generalized premise-based and sequential-priority rules,priority graph,aggregation of non-binary evalua-tions
    Date: 2015
  7. By: Vítor Castro (Faculty of Economics, University of Coimbra, and Economic Policies Research Unit (NIPE)); Rodrigo Martins (Faculty of Economics, University of Coimbra and Group for Monetary and Fiscal Studies (GEMF))
    Abstract: This article analyses the incidence of politically driven cycles on the functional components and sub-components of government expenditures over a group of 18 European countries during the period 1990-2012. An LSDVC estimator is employed in the empirical analysis. The results point out to the presence of political opportunism at aggregated and disaggregated levels of public expenditures, but no significant evidence of partisan or other political effects is found. The expenditure components that have proved to be more related to that behaviour are public services, health, education and social protection. These include items able to generate more visible outcomes to voters and, consequently, of increasing government’s chance of re-election.
    Keywords: Government Expenditures; Political Cycles; Elections; Europe, Fiscal Policy
    JEL: E60 H72 D78
    Date: 2016

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