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on Collective Decision-Making |
| By: | Denise Laroze (University of Essex); David Hugh-Jones (University of East Anglia); Arndt Leininger (Hertie School of Governance) |
| Abstract: | Bargaining and coalition building is a central part of modern politics. Typically, game-theoretic models cannot predict a unique equilibrium. One possibility is that coalitions are formed on the basis of social identity loyalty to a gender, ethnic or political in-group. We test the effect of gender, race and ideological distance on coalition formation in a majority-rule bargaining experiment. Despite the absence of any incentives to do so, we find that ideological distance significantly affects offers made to potential coalition partners. As a result, coalitions tend to be ideologically coherent, even though there is no ideological policy output. We conclude that social identity considerations can determine equilibria in coalition formation. |
| Keywords: | coalition formation, laboratory experiments, Baron and Ferejon model, legislative bargaining, social identity |
| Date: | 2015–09–03 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:uea:ueaeco:2015_03&r=cdm |
| By: | Mostapha Diss (GATE Lyon Saint-Étienne - Groupe d'analyse et de théorie économique - ENS Lyon - École normale supérieure - Lyon - UL2 - Université Lumière - Lyon 2 - UCBL - Université Claude Bernard Lyon 1 - Université Jean Monnet - Saint-Etienne - PRES Université de Lyon - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique); Patrizia Pérez-Asurmendi (PRESAD - PReferencias, Elección Social y Ayuda a la Decisión - UNIVERSIDAD DE VALLADOLID, SEED - Social Equilibrium and Economic Decisions - Universidad Pública de Navarra) |
| Abstract: | The main criticism to the aggregation of individual preferences under majority rules refers to the possibility of reaching inconsistent collective decisions from the election process. In these cases, the collective preference includes cycles and even could prevent the election of any alternative as the collective choice. The likelihood of consistent outcomes under a class of majority rules constitutes the aim of this paper. Specifically, we focus on majority rules that require certain consensus in individual preferences to declare an alternative as the winner. Under majorities based on difference of votes, the requirement asks to the winner alternative to obtain a difference in votes with respect to the loser alternative taking into account that individuals are endowed with weak preference orderings. Same requirement is asked to the restriction of these rules to individual linear preferences.. Abstract The main criticism to the aggregation of individual preferences under majority rules refers to the possibility of reaching inconsistent collective decisions from the election process. In these cases, the collective preference includes cycles and even could prevent the election of any alternative as the collective choice. The likelihood of consistent outcomes under a class of majority rules constitutes the aim of this paper. Specifically, we focus on majority rules that require certain consensus in individual preferences to declare an alternative as the winner. Under majorities based on difference of votes, the requirement asks to the winner alternative to obtain a difference in votes with respect to the loser alternative taking into account that individuals are endowed with weak preference orderings. Same requirement is asked to the restriction of these rules to individual linear preferences. Keywords Majorities based on difference of votes · Probability · Transitivity · Triple-acyclicity. |
| Keywords: | Majorities based on difference of votes,Probability,Transitivity,Triple-acyclicity |
| Date: | 2015 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:wpaper:halshs-01241996&r=cdm |
| By: | Pau Balart (Universidad Carlos III de Madrid); Subhasish Modak Chowdhury (University of East Anglia); Orestis Troumpounis (Lancaster University) |
| Abstract: | We provide a theoretical link between the two most prominent ways of modelling individual and collective contests as proposed by Tullock (1980) and Nitzan (1991) respectively. By introducing Nitzan's sharing rule as a way of modeling individual contests we obtain a contest success function nesting a standard Tullock contest and a fair lottery. We first provide an equivalence result between the proposed contest and Tullock's contest for the two-player set-up. We then employ this nested contest as a way of introducing noise in multi-player contests when in the Tullock contest a closed form solution for the equilibrium in pure strategies does not exist. We conclude by comparing the proposed contest with the existing ones in the literature. |
| Keywords: | individual contest, collective contest, equivalence |
| JEL: | C72 D72 D74 |
| Date: | 2015–11–06 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:uea:ueaeco:2015_07&r=cdm |
| By: | Myerson,Roger B. |
| Abstract: | A review of the history of the United States from its colonial origins shows how America's successful development has always been guided by two basic principles: representative democracy, and a proper division of power between national and subnational governments. The United States of America was established as an independent nation by a congress of delegates from 13 provincial assemblies, each of which consisted of representatives elected by their communities. Since colonial times, local democratic rights have attracted immigrants to help build new towns in the growing nation. Responsible local governments in America have had the power and the incentive to make local public investments for developing prosperous communities. Democratic competition in America has been strengthened by the ability of successful local leaders to become competitive candidates for higher offices. But in spite of America's example, many nations since the French Revolution have instead been drawn to centralized democracy, as national elites may prefer to centralize power around themselves. America's successful growth ultimately depended on its citizens'basic understanding that their welfare and security were enhanced by a balanced federal division of power between their elected local governments and the higher sovereign government of their nation. |
| Keywords: | Parliamentary Government,Political Systems and Analysis,Population Policies,Politics and Government,Public Sector Corruption&Anticorruption Measures |
| Date: | 2015–12–11 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:wbk:wbrwps:7512&r=cdm |
| By: | Gaudeul, Alexia; Giannetti, Caterina |
| Abstract: | We study in the laboratory the impact of private information revelation on the selection of partners when forming individual networks. Our experiment combines a "network game" and a "public-good game". In the network game, individuals decide with whom to form a link with, while in the public-good game they decide whether or not to contribute. The variations in our treatments allow us to identify the effect of revealing one´s name on the probability of link formation. Our main result suggests that privacy mechanisms affect partner selection and the consequent structure of the network: when individuals reveal their real name, their individual networks are smaller but their profits are higher. This indicates that the privacy costs of revealing personal information are compensated by more productive links. |
| Keywords: | privacy,social networks,public goods,trust |
| JEL: | D12 D85 |
| Date: | 2015 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:cegedp:269&r=cdm |
| By: | David Hugh-Jones (University of East Anglia); Carlo Perroni (University of Warwick) |
| Abstract: | We examine why heterogeneous communities may fail to provide public goods. Current work characterizes sanctioning free-riders as an undersupplied public good. We argue that often free-riders can be punished by the coordinated action of a group. This punishment can be profitable, and need not be undersupplied. But the power to expropriate defectors can also be used to expropriate outgroups. Heterogeneous societies may be inefficient because minorities, rather than free-riders, are expropriated. Even if this is not so, groups' different beliefs about the reasons for expropriation may make the threat of punishment less effective at preventing free-riding. We illustrate our theory with evidence from California mining camps, contemporary India, and US schools. In a public goods experiment using minimal groups and a profitable punishment institution, outgroups were more likely to be punished, and reacted differently to punishment than ingroup members. |
| Keywords: | group coercion, social heterogeneity |
| JEL: | H1 H4 N4 D02 |
| Date: | 2015–04–02 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:uea:ueaeco:2015_04&r=cdm |
| By: | Éric Langlais; Marie Obidzinski |
| Abstract: | In this paper, we analyze how political competition affects the designof public law enforcement policies. Assuming that the cost of enforcement is linear, criminals'type is uniformally distributed, and society's wealth is large enough, the article arrives at two main conclusions: 1) electoral competition entails no loss of efficiency at equilibrium for both minor and major offenses (e.g. minor offenses are not enforced, while major ones are fully deterred); 2) different distortions arises at equilibrium for the intermediate offenses: enforcement expenditures for small offenses are lower than the optimal level, such that the issue of under-deterrence is exacerbated; in contrast, for larger offenses, enforcement measures are higher, and there is more deterrence than what efficiency requires. We show that these results also holds under more general assumptions (convex costs of enforcement, a general cdf of illegal bene.ts, a lower society's wealth), excepted that full deterrence of major offenses is not achievable. |
| Keywords: | public law enforcement, deterrence, monetary sanctions, electoral competition. |
| JEL: | D72 D73 H1 K14 K23 K4 |
| Date: | 2015 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:drm:wpaper:2015-40&r=cdm |