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on Collective Decision-Making |
| By: | David Rosnick |
| Abstract: | This paper finds that a wide range of outcomes are possible in the December 6 National Assembly elections, based on current polling data; and that there is potential for significant disparity between the popular vote and the distribution of seats among the opposing parties and coalitions. The paper simulates, based on the 2010 election results, the 2015 election under various assumptions regarding the government’s share of the vote and the degree to which the opposition is fractured among different coalitions. The projections look at the percent increase in votes the opposition would need in order to secure a simple majority, three-fifths, and two-thirds majority in the Assembly. These results are potentially important because of widespread misunderstanding of the Venezuelan electoral system, and the emphasis on national polls which may differ considerably from the election results for a legislative body under the current voting system. The paper also shows how the current system of disproportional representation for sparsely populated states — similar to a combination of the U.S. Senate and House into a single chamber — will favor the government. |
| Keywords: | Latin America, elections, electoral system, Venezuela |
| JEL: | N N4 N46 |
| Date: | 2015–12 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:epo:papers:2015-23&r=cdm |
| By: | Ana Mauleon (CEREC, Saint-Louis University ?Brussels and CORE, University of Louvain, Belgium); Nils Roehl (University of Paderborn and Bielefeld University, Germany); Vincent Vannetelbosch (CORE, University of Louvain and CEREC, Saint-Louis University ?Brussels, Belgium) |
| Abstract: | The objective of the paper is to analyze the formation of social networks where individuals are allowed to engage in several groups at the same time. These group structures are interpreted here as social networks. Each group is supposed to have specific rules or constitutions governing which members may join or leave it. Given these constitutions, we consider a social network to be stable if no group is modified any more. We provide requirements on constitutions and players’ preferences under which stable social networks are induced for sure. Furthermore, by embedding many-to-many matchings into our setting, we apply our model to job markets with labor unions. To some extent the unions may provide job guarantees and, therefore, have influence on the stability of the job market. |
| Keywords: | Social Networks, Constitutions, Stability, Many-to-Many Matchings |
| JEL: | C72 C78 D85 |
| Date: | 2015–06 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:fem:femwpa:2015.59&r=cdm |
| By: | Maldonado Valera, Carlos; Palma, Andrea (Comisión Económica para América Latina y el Caribe (CEPAL) United Nations) |
| Abstract: | Although democracy is no longer the exception in Latin America, in many cases the political feasibility of major social and fiscal covenants remains a standing challenge, which explains the interest that the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) has in covering this issue, with the support of the German Agency for International Cooperation (GIZ), in the framework of the project “Social covenant for more inclusive social protection”. This paper opens a line of inquiry into analysis of the emergence of compacts and consensuses in the social policy sector, presenting a methodological proposal to conduct ex post case studies of compacts and consensuses that have emerged in this sector in democratic contexts, as well as ex ante assessments of the possibilities for a broad social accord or consensus in specific contexts. This methodological proposal is built on three case studies on major consensus-based social policy reforms in Chile, Mexico and Uruguay, which will be published in the Social Policies series. |
| Date: | 2014–06 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ecr:col041:36895&r=cdm |
| By: | Stéphane Gonzalez (Université Jean Monnet - Saint-Etienne, CES - Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne - UP1 - Université Panthéon-Sorbonne - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique); Michel Grabisch (CES - Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne - UP1 - Université Panthéon-Sorbonne - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, EEP-PSE - Ecole d'Économie de Paris - Paris School of Economics) |
| Abstract: | We consider in this paper solutions for TU-games where it is not assumed that the grand coalition is necessarily the final state of cooperation. Partitions of the grand coalition, or balanced collections together with a system of balancing weights interpreted as a time allocation vector are considered as possible states of cooperation. The former case corresponds to the c-core, while the latter corresponds to the aspiration core or d-core, where in both case, the best configuration (called a maximising collection) is sought. We study maximising collections and characterize them with autonomous coalitions, that is, coalitions for which any solution of the d-core yields a payment for that coalition equal to its worth. In particular we show that the collection of autonomous coalitions is balanced, and that one cannot have at the same time a single possible payment (core element) and a single possible configuration. We also introduce the notion of inescapable coalitions, that is, those present in every maximising collection. We characterize the class of games for which the sets of autonomous coalitions, vital coalitions (in the sense of Shellshear and Sudhölter), and inescapable coalitions coincide, and prove that the set of games having a unique maximising coalition is dense in the set of games. |
| Keywords: | cooperative game,core,balancedness,c-core,aspiration core,coalition formation,autonomous coalitions JEL Classification: C71 |
| Date: | 2015 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:cesptp:halshs-01235632&r=cdm |
| By: | Timothy Frye (National Research University Higher School of Economics); Andrei Yakovlev (National Research University Higher School of Economics) |
| Abstract: | The relative bargaining power of rulers and right-holders is thought to be a key determinant of property rights, but because it both shapes and is shaped by property rights, it is difficult to estimate the impact of bargaining power on property rights. We take advantage of a natural experiment by comparing the responses of managers interviewed just before and just after a surprising parliamentary election in Russia that weakened the relative bargaining power of the ruling party. This electoral shock had little impact on the perceived property rights of the average firm, but firms with close economic ties to the state viewed their property as more vulnerable after the election. By exploiting largely exogenous variation in the timing of survey interviews, we estimate the impact of bargaining power on property rights with greater precision. We also contribute to the literature on elections under autocracy by focusing on their economic, rather than political impacts on individuals |
| Keywords: | Elections, property rights, hostile takeover, natural experiment |
| JEL: | Z |
| Date: | 2015 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hig:wpaper:29/ps/2015&r=cdm |
| By: | Joosung Lee (University of Edinburgh, United Kingdom) |
| Abstract: | We introduce a noncooperative multilateral bargaining model for a network-restricted environment, in which players can communicate only with their neighbors. Each player strategically chooses the bargaining partners among the neighbors to buy out their communication links with upfront transfers. The main theorem characterizes a condition on network structures for efficient equilibria and shows the prevalence of strategic delays. If the underlying network is either complete or circular, then an efficient stationary subgame perfect equilibrium exists for all discount factors: all the players always try to reach an agreement as soon as practicable and hence no strategic delay occurs. In any other network, however, an efficient equilibrium is impossible for sufficiently high discount factors because some players strategically delay an agreement. We also provide an example of a Braess-like paradox, in which the more links are available, the less links are actually used. Thus, network improvements may decrease social welfare |
| Keywords: | Noncooperative Bargaining, Coalition Formation, Communication Restriction, Buyout, Network, Braess's Paradox |
| JEL: | C72 C78 D72 D74 D85 |
| Date: | 2015–06 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:fem:femwpa:2015.53&r=cdm |
| By: | Ricardo Nieva (Universidad de Lima, Lima, Peru) |
| Abstract: | We consider a standard coalitional bargaining game where once a coalition forms it exits as in Okada (2011), however, instead of alternating offers, we have simultaneous payoff demands. We focus in the producer game he studies. Each player is chosen with equal probability. If that is the case, she can choose any coalition she belongs to. However, a coalition can form if an only if payoff demands are feasible as in the Nash (1953) demand game. After smoothing the game (as in Van Damme (1991)), when the noise vanishes, when the discount factor is close to 1, and as in Okada´s (2011), the coalitional Nash bargaining solution is the unique stationary subgameperfect equilibrium. |
| Keywords: | Coalitional Bargaining, Nash Program, Simultaneous Payoff, Demands, Uncertainty |
| JEL: | C71 C72 C78 |
| Date: | 2015–07 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:fem:femwpa:2015.67&r=cdm |