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on Collective Decision-Making |
| By: | Vardan, Baghdasaryan; Giovanna, Iannantuoni; Valeria, Maggian |
| Abstract: | In this paper we experimentally investigate the consequences of electoral fraud on voter turnout. The experiment is based on a strategic binary voting model where voters decide whether to cast a costly vote in favour of their preferred candidate or to abstain. Minority candidate can illicitly influence the electoral process by applying ballot box stuffing. In the experiment we implement two different framings: we compare voter turnout in a neutral environment and with framed instructions to explicitly replicate elections. This approach enables to both test the model's predictions and to estimate framing effects of voting and fraud. Comparison of experimental results with theoretical predictions reveals over-voting, which is exac- erbated when fraud is applied. Moreover, turnout increases with moderate level of fraud. However, with more extensive electoral fraud, theoretical predictions are not matched. Voters fail to recognize that the existence of a relatively larger number of "agents" voting with certainty considerably decreases the benefits of voting. Importantly, framing matters, as revealed by the higher turnout of those in the majority group, against which the fraud is applied. Finally, individual level regression analysis provides evidences of strategic voting. |
| Keywords: | Laboratory experiment, Framing, Voting, Ballot rigging and Voter turnout |
| JEL: | D72 C52 C91 C92 |
| Date: | 2015–11–25 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:mib:wpaper:315&r=cdm |
| By: | Feicht, Robert (Public Administration of Bavaria); Grimm, Veronika (University of Erlangen-Nuremberg); Rau, Holger A. (University of Göttingen); Stephan, Gesine (Institute for Employment Research (IAB), Nuremberg) |
| Abstract: | We conduct multi-person one-shot ultimatum games that reflect important aspects of collective bargaining. In all treatments a proposer has to divide a pie among herself and two groups of three recipients each. She cannot discriminate within, but across groups. A committee with representatives from one or both groups takes acceptance decisions. In a 2x2 design we vary (i) representation in the decision committee (one vs. both groups) and (ii) the decision rule (unanimity vs. majority voting). We find that (i) representation of a group in the committee is crucial for receiving a significant share, (ii), proposals are balanced only if both groups have veto power (iii) negotiations often fail if the decision environment gives insufficient guidance on what an appropriate proposal is and (iv) non-binding communication substantially reduces rejection rates and proposer shares. |
| Keywords: | multi person ultimatum game, dictator game, collective decisions, experiments |
| JEL: | C92 C72 C78 J31 J52 |
| Date: | 2015–11 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps:dp9506&r=cdm |
| By: | Mitchell Hoffman; Gianmarco León; Maria Lombardi |
| Abstract: | We study a unique quasi-experiment in Austria, where compulsory voting laws are changed across Austria's nine states at different times. Analyzing all state and national elections since World War II, we show that compulsory voting laws with mild sanctions decreased abstention by roughly 50%. However, we find no evidence that this change in turnout affected government spending patterns (in levels or composition) or the political equilibrium. Individual-level data on turnout and political preferences suggest these results occur because individuals swayed to vote due to compulsory voting are more likely to be non-partisan, have low interest in politics, and are uninformed. |
| Keywords: | compulsory voting, fiscal policy, incentives to vote |
| JEL: | H10 D72 P16 |
| Date: | 2015–08 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:bge:wpaper:856&r=cdm |
| By: | Dmitry Ryvkin (Department of Economics, Florida State University); Anastasia Semykina (Department of Economics, Florida State University) |
| Abstract: | Many empirical studies investigate the relationships between economic development, inequality, and democracy survival; however, establishing causal links with naturally occurring cross-country data is problematic. We address this question in a laboratory experiment, where in democracy citizens can invest in profitable projects and vote on income taxation. In the alternative regime -- autocracy -- efficient investment levels and equitable redistribution are implemented exogenously, but there is a risk of resources being partially expropriated. Citizens can voluntarily switch from democracy to autocracy by a majority vote, which mimics recent historical examples, where voters voluntarily delegate political powers to an autocrat in exchange for a promise of high taxation and redistribution. We find that the likelihood of democracy breakdown increases with the degree of inequality but does not vary with productivity. The link between productivity and democracy survival depends critically on the degree of sophistication of the median voter. |
| Keywords: | democracy breakdown, economic productivity, inequality, voting, experiment |
| JEL: | D72 P48 C92 |
| Date: | 2015–11 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:fsu:wpaper:wp2015_11_01&r=cdm |
| By: | Koenig, Christophauthor-workplace-Name: Department of Economics University of Warwick |
| Abstract: | I study the effect of war participation on the rise of right-wing parties in Inter-war Germany. After the democratisation and surrender of Germany in 1918, 8m German soldiers of WWI were demobilised. I argue that defeat made veterans particularly sceptical about the new democratic state. Their return undermined support for democratic parties from the very beginning and facilitated the reversion to autocratic rule 15 years later. In order to quantify this effect, I construct the first disaggregated estimates of German WWI veterans since official army records were destroyed. I combine this data with a new panel of voting results from 1881 to 1933. Diff-in-Diff estimates show that war participation had a strong positive effect on support for the right-wing at the expense of socialist parties. A one standard deviation increase in veteran inflow shifted vote shares to the right by more than 2 percentage points. An IV strategy based on draft exemption rules substantiates my findings. The effect of veterans on voting is highly persistent and strongest in working class areas. Gains for the right-wing, however, are only observed after a period of Communist insurgencies. I provide suggestive evidence that veterans must have picked up especially anti- Communist sentiments after defeat, injected these into the working class and in this way eroded the future of the young democracy. |
| JEL: | P16 N44 P26 D74 D72 H56 |
| Date: | 2015 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:wrk:warwec:1079&r=cdm |
| By: | Koenig, Christoph (Department of Economics University of Warwick) |
| Abstract: | Election fraud is a pervasive feature of autocracies but often only serves lower-tier officials to cast signals of loyalty or competence to the central government in order to pursue their own interests. How much such personal interests matter for electoral fraud under autocracy has however not been studied so far. In this paper, I exploit a radical policy change in Russia which allowed the president to replace governors of the country’s 89 regions at his own will. As a result, federal elections after December 2004 were organised by two types of governors: one was handpicked by the president, the other one elected before the law change and re-appointed. Even though both types faced removal in case of bad results, the need to signal loyalty was much lower for the first type. In order to estimate the e.ect of handpicked governors on electoral fraud, I use a diff-in-diff framework over 7 federal elections between 2000 and 2012. For this time period, I use results from about 95,000 voting stations to construct a new indicator of suspicious votes for each region and election. I show that this indicator correlates strongly with incidents of reported fraud. My baseline estimates show that in territories with a handpicked governor the share of suspicious votes decreased on average by more than 10 percentage points and dropped even further if the region’s economy had done well over the past legislature. These findings suggest that governors have less need to use rigging as a signal once loyalty is assured unless faced with circumstances raising doubts about their competence. |
| JEL: | P16 P26 D72 D73 |
| Date: | 2015 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:wrk:warwec:1080&r=cdm |
| By: | Iyer, Sriya (University of Cambridge); Shrivastava, Anand (University of Cambridge) |
| Abstract: | The effect of ethnic violence on electoral results provides useful insights into voter behaviour in democratic societies. Religious riots have claimed more than 14,000 lives in India since 1950. We study the effect of Hindu-Muslim riots on election results in India. We combine data on riots, which have been geo-coded, with electoral data on state legislature elections and control variables on demographics and public goods provision to construct a unique panel data set for 16 large states in India over a 21 year period from 1981-2001. We suggest a new instrument that draws upon the random variation in the day of the week that important Hindu festivals fall on in each year, as set by a lunar calendar. The probability of a riot increases if a Hindu festival falls on a Friday, the holy day for Muslims. This allows us to isolate the causal effect of riots on electoral results. We also correct for under-reporting of riots and how they affect electoral outcomes in nearby districts. We find that riots occurring in the year preceding an election increases the vote share of the Bharatiya Janata Party by 5 to 7 percentage points in the election. |
| Keywords: | religion, elections, riots, India |
| JEL: | Z12 D72 D74 |
| Date: | 2015–11 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps:dp9522&r=cdm |
| By: | Olivier Sterck |
| Abstract: | Electoral violence is widespread in developing countries. However, its causes are poorly understood. I present a theoretical model of electoral competition in which electoral violence is more likely to emerge if (1) the electoral bases of leading parties are of similar size, implying that political competition is tight, and (2) polarization between violent supporters of leading parties is high. The relative importance of these two conditions varies with the type of electoral violence (e.g. clashes, intimidation or murders). The predictions of the model are tested and validated using a unique dataset on electoral violence during the 2010 elections in Burundi. I compare the incidence of electoral violence between neighboring municipalities, relying on the fact that neighboring municipalities more likely to have similar unobserved characteristics. In line with the theoretical model, I find that a one-standard-deviation increase in political competition induces a 35 to 66% increase in the predicted number of violent episodes. A one-standard-deviation increase in ex-rebels’ polarization induces a 40 to 50% increase in the predicted number of violent episodes. |
| Keywords: | Electoral violence; Polarization; Political competition; Demobilization; Burundi |
| JEL: | D74 H56 O12 O17 O55 |
| Date: | 2015 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:csa:wpaper:2015-19&r=cdm |
| By: | Robert C. Schmidt (Humboldt-Universitaet zu Berlin) |
| Abstract: | This paper analyzes the political economy of climate policy in a simple framework with asymmetric information between voters and politicians. Two parties are engaged in electoral competition and announce policy platforms. An environmental catastrophe (e.g., a tipping point in the climate system) is approaching with some probability that depends on the state of nature. Climate policy can reduce this probability. Each party receives a private signal about the true state of nature, whereas voters possess little information and only know the prior probability distribution. We analyze under what conditions parties can reveal their private signals truthfully to the voters under electoral competition, and when the implemented policy is optimal, given the available information. |
| Keywords: | electoral competition, signaling, climate catastrophe, voting, intuitive criterion |
| JEL: | D72 D83 Q54 |
| Date: | 2015–10–08 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:bdp:wpaper:2015015&r=cdm |
| By: | Koenig, Christoph (Department of Economics University of Warwick) |
| Abstract: | I study the effect of a formative experience on political beliefs in a distant country. This paper looks at the Chernobyl nuclear disaster of April 1986 and voters’ response in West Germany. The analysis uses a di.-in-di. estimation which exploits variation in proximity to the nearest nuclear power plant (NPP) across 301 counties. Proximity is used as proxy for the shock from perceived risk of a nuclear accident. Using data over almost 40 years and 11 elections, my results indicate that living closer to an NPP benefited the explicitly anti- and pro-nuclear parties, the Greens and the Conservatives. The findings are persistent and robust to the inclusion of several socioeconomic controls as well as checks for the validity of the identifying assumptions. The gains of the Greens are similar across social groups and in line with home-voter effects. The effect of proximity on the conservatives increases with education and the number of adolescents in their impressionable years. I argue that this can be explained by political belief formation and di.erences in assessing the economic benefits from nuclear power over the actual risk of an accident. Using variation in the scheduling of subsequent state elections, I can also show that the pro-nuclear response was stronger in counties which did not vote in the immediate aftermath of Chernobyl and thus had more time for a rational electoral choice. |
| JEL: | P16 D72 N54 H41 Q48 |
| Date: | 2015 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:wrk:warwec:1081&r=cdm |
| By: | Benjamin Bruns (Humboldt-Universitaet zu Berlin, DIW); Ronny Freier (Freie Universitaet Berlin, DIW); Abel Schumann (Stockholm School of Economics) |
| Abstract: | We study political determinants of municipality amalgamations during a boundary reform in the German state of Brandenburg, which reduced the number of municipalities from 1,489 to 421. The analysis is conducted using data on the political decision makers as well as fiscal and socio-economic variables for the municipalities. We ask whether party representation in the town council influences the merger decision. To identify the effect, we follow a dual approach and make use of different stages in the reform process. First, municipalities were initially free to choose partners. In a later phase of the reform the state legislature forced municipalities to amalgamate. We can, thus, compare voluntary to forced units. Second, we simulate potential mergers from the map of municipalities and compare voluntary mergers to those simulated units. Both approaches show that political representation matters significantly during the voluntary stage of the merger reform. |
| Keywords: | municipality mergers, political decision makers, probit analysis, geospatial analysis |
| JEL: | H10 H11 H77 |
| Date: | 2015–04–10 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:bdp:wpaper:2015009&r=cdm |
| By: | Anjula Gurtoo (Ghana Statistical Service, Economic Statistics Division, Ghana) |
| Abstract: | Over the past decade citizens have become much more involved in several aspects of policy-making and governance. Public participation in decision-making is seen to generate more accountability, better performance, strengthening of democracy, and counters the influence of powerful dominant groups. The trend is increasing worldwide, and in Japan as well. In this paper we review the nature of public participation in Japan, with the aim to understand the dynamics and nuances of participation in a country with a distinct cultural heritage. A total of 36 papers specific to public participation in Japan (versus volunteerism) are reviewed, from five English publication databases. We acknowledge several meaningful and relevant articles published only in Japanese may have got missed in the review. The paper, therefore, may not be a comprehensive representation of the dynamics of participation in Japan. Nevertheless, the paper does provide cross sectional data of various types of situations faced by the Japanese citizens and the administration, and is one of the first reviews to explore the nature and dynamics of public participation in Japan. |
| Date: | 2015–10 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iuj:wpaper:ems_2015_06&r=cdm |