nep-cdm New Economics Papers
on Collective Decision-Making
Issue of 2015‒08‒19
ten papers chosen by
Stan C. Weeber, McNeese State University

  1. Strategic Voting under Committee Approval: A Theory By Jean-François Laslier; Karine Van Der Straeten
  2. Trusting Former Rebels: An Experimental Approach to Understanding Reintegration after Civil War By Goone Beekman; Stephen Cheung; Ian Levely
  3. Local government cooperation at work: A control function approach By Zineb Abidi; Edoardo Di Porto; Angela Parenti; Sonia Paty
  4. Conditional Cooperation and Betrayal Aversion By Cubitt, Robin; Gächter, Simon; Quercia, Simone
  5. The Anti-Paradox of Cooperation: Diversity Pays! By Finus, Michael; McGinty, Matthew
  6. Forms of Democracies and Financial Development By Pierre MANDON; Clément MATHONNAT
  7. Rethinking the role of scenarios: Participatory scripting of low-carbon scenarios for France By Sandrine Mathy
  8. Social connectedness improves co-ordination on individually costly, efficient outcomes By Attanasi, Giuseppe; Hopfensitz, Astrid; Lorini, Emiliano; Moisan, Frédéric
  9. Get inspired by the global South : peasant-led ecodevelopment strategies in Nicaragua By Renaud Metereau
  10. Democratic and efficient foreign policy? Parliamentary diplomacy and oversight in the 21st century and the post-Lisbon role of the European Parliament in shaping and controlling EU foreign policy By Péter Bajtay

  1. By: Jean-François Laslier (PSE - Paris-Jourdan Sciences Economiques - CNRS - Institut national de la recherche agronomique (INRA) - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - ENS Paris - École normale supérieure - Paris - École des Ponts ParisTech (ENPC), EEP-PSE - Ecole d'Économie de Paris - Paris School of Economics); Karine Van Der Straeten (Institute for Advanced Study Toulouse - Institute for Advanced Study Toulouse, TSE - Toulouse School of Economics - Toulouse School of Economics)
    Abstract: We propose a theory of strategic voting under “Commitee Approval”: a fixed-sized commitee of M members is to be elected; each voter votes for as many candidates as she wants, and the M candidates with the most votes are elected. We assume that voter preferences are separable and that there exists a tiny probability that any vote might be misrecorded. We show that best responses involve voting by pairwise comparisons. Two candidates play a critical role: the weakest expected winner and the strongest expected loser. Expected winners are approved if and only if they are preferred to the strongest expected loser and expected losers are approved if and only if they are preferred to the weakest expected winner. At equilibrium, if any, a candidate is elected if and only if he is approved by at least half of the voters. With single-peaked preferences, an equilibrium always exists, in which the first M candidates according to the majority tournament relation are elected.
    Date: 2015–06
  2. By: Goone Beekman (Wageningen University, Development Economics Group, P.O. Box 8130, 6700 EW Wageningen, Netherlands); Stephen Cheung (The University of Sydney, School of Economics, Merewether Building H04, Sydney NSW 2006, Australia); Ian Levely (Institute of Economic Studies, Faculty of Social Sciences, Charles University in Prague, Smetanovo nábreží 6, 111 01 Prague 1, Czech Republic)
    Abstract: We study cooperation within and between groups in the laboratory, comparing treatments in which two groups have previously been (i) in conflict with one another, (ii) in conflict with a different group, or (iii) not previously exposed to con flict. We model conflict using an inter-group Tullock contest, and measure its effects upon cooperation using a multi-level public good game. We demonstrate that con flict increases cooperation within groups, while decreasing cooperation between groups. Moreover, we find that cooperation between groups increases in response to an increase in the effciency gains from cooperation only when the two groups have not previously interacted.
    Keywords: within- and between-group cooperation; inter-group confl ict; group identity; multi-level public good experiment; Tullock contest; other-regarding preferences
    JEL: C92 D64 D74 H41
    Date: 2015–06
  3. By: Zineb Abidi (CREM - Centre de Recherche en Economie et Management - CNRS - Université de Caen Basse-Normandie - UR1 - Université de Rennes 1); Edoardo Di Porto (University of Naples Federico II [Naples] - University of Naples Federico II); Angela Parenti (IMT Institute of Advanced Studies); Sonia Paty (GATE Lyon Saint-Étienne - Groupe d'analyse et de théorie économique - CNRS - UCBL - Université Claude Bernard Lyon 1 - UL2 - Université Lumière - Lyon 2 - Université Jean Monnet - Saint-Etienne - PRES Université de Lyon - ENS Lyon - École normale supérieure - Lyon)
    Abstract: Abstract.We analyze voluntary coalition formation using a unique panel data for 1,056 municipalities in the French region of Brittany between 1995 and 2002. We use a control function approach to develop a binary discrete choice model with spatial interactions. We find that a municipality’s decision to cooperate over the provision local public goods depends on the decisions of its neighbours. Comparison with spatial econometrics models (SAR and Durbin) shows that the decision to cooperate is over estimated by these more traditional models. The results are in line with the recent applied spatial economics literature but are derived for a discrete choice model setting.
    Date: 2014
  4. By: Cubitt, Robin (University of Nottingham); Gächter, Simon (University of Nottingham); Quercia, Simone (University of Bonn)
    Abstract: We investigate whether there is a link between conditional cooperation and betrayal aversion. We use a public goods game to classify subjects by type of contribution preference and by belief about the contributions of others; and we measure betrayal aversion for different categories of subject. We find that, among conditional cooperators, only those who expect others to contribute little to the public good are significantly betrayal averse, while there is no evidence of betrayal aversion for those who expect substantial contributions by others. This is consistent with their social risk taking in public goods games, as the pessimistic conditional cooperators tend to avoid contribution to avoid exploitation, whereas the optimistic ones typically contribute to the public good and thus take the social risk of being exploited.
    Keywords: exploitation aversion, betrayal aversion, trust, conditional cooperation, public goods game, free riding, experiments
    JEL: H41 C91 C72 D03
    Date: 2015–07
  5. By: Finus, Michael; McGinty, Matthew
    Abstract: This paper considers the stability and success of a pubic good agreement. We allow for any type and degree of asymmetry regarding benefits and costs. We ask the question whether asymmetry and which type and degree of asymmetry is conducive to cooperation? We employ a simple non-cooperative game-theoretic model of coalition formation and derive analytical solutions for two scenarios: an agreement without and with optimal transfers. A central message of the paper is that asymmetry does not have to be an obstacle for successful cooperation but can be an asset. We qualify and reverse two central results in the literature. Firstly, the paradox of cooperation, known since Barrett (1994) and reiterated by many others afterwards, stating that under those conditions when cooperation would matter most, stable agreements achieve only little. Secondly, a kind of "coalition folk theorem", known (without proof) in the literature for a long time, stating that without transfers, stable coalitions will be smaller with asymmetric than symmetric players. We show that even without transfers the grand coalition can be stable if there is a negative covariance between benefit and cost parameters with massive gains from cooperation. Moreover, with transfers, many distributions of benefit and cost parameters lead to a stable grand coalition, again, some of them implying huge gains from cooperation. Stability and success greatly benefit from a very skewed asymmetric distribution of benefit and costs, i.e. diversity pays!
    Keywords: public good provision; coalition formation; asymmetry; externalities; transfers
    Date: 2015
  6. By: Pierre MANDON (CERDI - Centre d'études et de recherches sur le developpement international - CNRS - Université d'Auvergne - Clermont-Ferrand I); Clément MATHONNAT (CERDI - Centre d'études et de recherches sur le developpement international - CNRS - Université d'Auvergne - Clermont-Ferrand I)
    Abstract: The empirical literature on the political economy of finance emphasizes the importance of political institutions as crucial determinants of financial development and shows that democratic regimes are positively and robustly correlated with financial development. By using a three years periodic panel of 140 countries over 1984-2007, we show that democratic regimes appear to be significantly and positively correlated with financial development, but the opposition between democracies and dictatorships is not sufficient to account for differentials in financial development between countries. Indeed, our results highlight a significant and highly heterogeneous relationship between democratic regimes and financial development since the positive effect induced by democracies on financial development is explained by the presence of specific democratic political institutions, namely: parliamentary form of government and to a lesser extent federal state form. Thus, democracies seem to better foster financial development if its constitutional arrangement allows horizontal flexibility and vertical stability in the political decision-making process.
    Date: 2014–11–19
  7. By: Sandrine Mathy (équipe EDDEN - PACTE - Politiques publiques, ACtion politique, TErritoires - CNRS - Grenoble 2 UPMF - Université Pierre Mendès France - IEPG - Sciences Po Grenoble - Institut d'études politiques de Grenoble - Grenoble 1 UJF - Université Joseph Fourier, CIRED - Centre International de Recherche sur l'Environnement et le Développement - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - AgroParisTech - CIRAD - Centre de coopération internationale en recherche agronomique pour le développement - École des Ponts ParisTech (ENPC) - CNRS)
    Abstract: This article considers the usefulness of low-carbon scenarios in public decision-making. They may be useful as a product-oriented trajectory. The scenarios on the agenda of the 2013 Energy Debate in France belong to this category. But a scenario may also be process-oriented, in the sense that its scripting process helps build consensus and a minimum level of agreement. We have scripted scenarios using a codevelopment method, involving about 40 stakeholders from the private and public sectors, and from the state: NGOs, consumer groups, trade unions, banks and local authorities. They selected policies they considered acceptable for achieving 75% greenhouse gases emission reductions in 2050. These policies were then integrated in the Imaclim-R-France technico-economic simulation model, as part of a high or moderate acceptability scenario. In the first case emissions were cut by between 58% and 72% by 2050; in the second case by between 68% and 81%, depending on the energy price assumptions. All these measures benefited jobs and economic growth, swiftly and durably cutting household spending on energy services. This offers a solid basis for gaining acceptability for low carbon trajectories; the process constitutes also a framework for consolidating collective learning centering on the acceptability of climate policies.
    Date: 2015–02
  8. By: Attanasi, Giuseppe; Hopfensitz, Astrid; Lorini, Emiliano; Moisan, Frédéric
    Keywords: Social ties, Group identity, Coordination, Experiment
    JEL: C72 C91 C92
    Date: 2015
  9. By: Renaud Metereau (CREG - Centre de recherche en économie de Grenoble - Grenoble 2 UPMF - Université Pierre Mendès France)
    Abstract: Get inspired by the global South: Peasant-led ecodevelopment strategies in Nicaragua. R. Metereau * Summary The current context gives forces to alternative development pathways. Some still have to be invented; others just have to be reminded. The ecodevelopment heuristic framework draws some characteristics of self-reliant, culturally adapted and environmentally sustainable approaches of development. The Peasant-led cooperative movement in Nicaragua, organized in a multi-scale network, struggles for food sovereignty and poverty alleviation. In this struggle, peasant cooperative networks have been building their own alternative development pathways. This paper seeks to highlight the existence of an ecodevelopment project beyond the peasant-led cooperative movement. Following a qualitative data analysis, motivations for cooperation and collective action are identified. The resulting motivation panel demonstrate the presence of political and socio-ecological aims. Their structural significance for the cooperative movement is thus set out.
    Abstract: Le contexte actuel favorise l’émergence de stratégies alternatives de développement. Certaines doivent encore être inventées ; d’autres doivent seulement être rappelées. Le cadre heuristique de l’Ecodéveloppement précise quelques caractéristiques d’une approche du développement reposant notamment sur l’autonomie, le respect des spécificités culturelles, la soutenabilité environnementale. Le mouvement coopératif mené par les paysans au Nicaragua, adossé à une organisation coopérative multi-niveau, lutte pour la souveraineté alimentaire et l’amélioration des conditions de vie. Dans cette lutte, les réseaux de coopératives paysannes construisent leurs propres trajectoires alternatives de développement. Cette communication vise à mettre en évidence l’existence d’un projet d’écodéveloppement porté par le mouvement coopératif paysan. Procédant à une analyse qualitative des données de terrain, les motivations à la coopération et à l’action collective sont identifiées. Le panorama motivationnel ainsi construit permet de révéler des motivations d’ordre politique et socio-écologique. Leur signification pour la structuration du mouvement coopératif et alors explicitée.
    Date: 2015–05–20
  10. By: Péter Bajtay
    Abstract: In the post-Cold War international system, parliaments have gained a particular place in the dense network of international relations, traditionally monopolised by executives. Parliaments are increasingly expected to contribute to resolving complex foreign policy and international issues impacting more and more on citizens’ lives. The paper reflects on the gradual parliamentarisation of an EU polity so much dominated by Member States: foreign policy. It analyses the nature of the European Parliament’s actorhood in international relations, the EP’s emerging role in EU foreign policy as well as the tools and powers available to exert influence on the Union’s decisions and relations. It finally concludes that EU foreign policy can become efficient and democratic at the same time in the process of building an EU „representative democracy”.
    Keywords: European Parliament, EU foreign policy, parliamentary diplomacy, parliamentary control, international relations
    Date: 2015–02

This nep-cdm issue is ©2015 by Stan C. Weeber. It is provided as is without any express or implied warranty. It may be freely redistributed in whole or in part for any purpose. If distributed in part, please include this notice.
General information on the NEP project can be found at For comments please write to the director of NEP, Marco Novarese at <>. Put “NEP” in the subject, otherwise your mail may be rejected.
NEP’s infrastructure is sponsored by the School of Economics and Finance of Massey University in New Zealand.