nep-cdm New Economics Papers
on Collective Decision-Making
Issue of 2015‒08‒07
twelve papers chosen by
Stan C. Weeber, McNeese State University

  1. The Political Legacy of Entertainment TV By Durante, Ruben; Pinotti, Paolo; Tesei, Andrea
  2. The Welfare State and Migration:Coalition-formation dynamics By Assaf Razin
  3. Negative Voters: Electoral Competition with Loss-Aversion By Lockwood, Ben; Rockey, James
  4. Shapley Allocation — the effect of Services on Diversification By Peter Mitic; Bertrand K. Hassani
  5. Producer Attitudes Toward Mandatory Agricultural Marketing Organizations: Evidence from the California Fresh Peach and Nectarine Industry By Plakias, Zoe T.; Goodhue, Rachael E.; Williams, Jeffrey
  6. On-stie Experience Effect on the Preferences of Interest Groups for Forest Management By Li, Xiaoshu; Boyle, Kevin J.; Holmes, Thomas; LaRouche, Genevieve
  7. Information Networks and Their Role in Threshold Public Goods Games: An Experimental Study By Kreitmair, Ursula W.; Banerjee, Simanti; Walker, James M.
  8. Sharing a River with Downstream Externalities By Sarina Steinmann und Ralph Winkler
  9. "Thou shalt not leech" Are digital pirates conditional cooperators? By Wojciech Hardy; Michal Krawczyk; Joanna Tyrowicz
  10. Mislabelling in Collective Labels: an experimental analysis By Bonroy, Olivier; Garapin, Alexis; Hamilton, Stephen F.; Souza Monteiro, Diogo M.
  11. Informal low-cost methods for increasing enrollment of environmentally sensitive lands in farmland conservation programs: An experimental study By Banerjee, Simanti; Shortle, James S.
  12. Procrastination and projects By Külpmann, Philipp

  1. By: Durante, Ruben; Pinotti, Paolo; Tesei, Andrea
    Abstract: We investigate the political impact of entertainment television in Italy over the past thirty years by exploiting the staggered introduction of Silvio Berlusconi's commercial TV network, Mediaset, in the early 1980s. We find that individuals in municipalities that had access to Mediaset prior to 1985 - when the network only featured light entertainment programs - were significantly more likely to vote for Berlusconi's party in 1994, when he first ran for office. This effect persists for almost two decades and five elections, and is especially pronounced for heavy TV viewers, namely the very young and the old. We relate the extreme persistence of the effect to the relative incidence of these age groups in the voting population, and explore different mechanisms through which early exposure to entertainment content may have influenced their political attitudes.
    Keywords: entertainment; Italy; political participation; television; voting
    JEL: D72 L82 Z13
    Date: 2015–07
  2. By: Assaf Razin (tel aviv university)
    Abstract: We develop a dynamic political-economic theory of welfare state and immigration policies, featuring three distinct voting groups: skilled work- ers, unskilled workers, and old retirees. The essence of inter - and intra- generational redistribution of a typical welfare system is captured with a proportional tax on labor income to nance a transfer in a balanced- budget manner. We provide an analytical characterization of political- economic equilibrium policy rules consisting of the tax rate, the skill com- position of migrants, and the total number of migrants. When none of these groups enjoy a majority (50 percent of the voters or more), political coalitions will form. With overlapping generations and policy-determined influx of immigrants, the formation of the political coalitions changes over time. These future changes are taken into account when policies are shaped.
    Date: 2015
  3. By: Lockwood, Ben (Department of Economics University of Warwick,); Rockey, James (University of Leicester)
    Abstract: This paper studies how voter loss-aversion affects electoral competition in a Downsian setting. Assuming that the voters’ reference point is the status quo, we show that loss-aversion has a number of effects. First, for some values of the status quo, there is policy rigidity both parties choose platforms equal to the status quo, regardless of other parameters. Second, there is a moderation effect when there is policy rigidity, the equilibrium policy outcome is closer to the moderate voters’ ideal point than in the absence of loss-aversion. In a dynamic extension of the model, we consider how parties strategically manipulate the status quo to their advantage, and we find that this increases policy rigidity. Finally, we show that with loss-aversion, incumbents adjust less than challengers to changes in voter preferences. The underlying force is that the status quo works to the advantage of the incumbent. This prediction of asymmetric adjustment is new, and we test it using elections to US state legislatures. The results are as predicted: incumbent parties respond less to shocks in the preferences of the median voter. JEL classification: electoral competition ; loss-aversion ; incumbency advantage ; platform rigidity
    Keywords: D72 ; D81
    Date: 2015
  4. By: Peter Mitic (Santander UK); Bertrand K. Hassani (CES - Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne - UP1 - Université Panthéon-Sorbonne - CNRS, Santander UK)
    Abstract: The Shapley method is applied to capital allocation in the context of a simple business model, where many business units supported by services. In this model the services are capable of either reducing the capital payable by the business units, or the opposite. A simple model of evaluating the value of coalitions is proposed, with a modification if a service is a member of the coalition. A closed form formula for the Shapley allocation to all players is derived, thus eliminating combinatorial problems.
    Date: 2015–06
  5. By: Plakias, Zoe T.; Goodhue, Rachael E.; Williams, Jeffrey
    Abstract: We examine how various producer-level and farm-level factors affect producers' support for marketing orders, focusing on the California fresh peach and nectarine industries and the 2011 referendum vote in which their marketing orders were terminated. We form hypotheses regarding the effects of different factors. We then employ marketing order referendum voting data and additional data collected via a producer survey to test these hypotheses empirically. Some of our results conform to our predictions. For example, we find that producers with greater production of peaches and nectarines were less likely to vote for continuance of the marketing order. However, some results did not conform to our predictions. We found that gross income from farming and related activities to be insignificant and producers with some organic production or some direct sales are both more likely to vote for continuation. Our results suggests important dimensions of differentiation between producers for policymakers, regulators and industries to consider as they ponder the future of marketing orders.
    Keywords: marketing order, referendum, voting, producer heterogeneity, peaches, nectarines, Agribusiness, Agricultural and Food Policy, Industrial Organization, Political Economy, D72, L51, Q13, Q18,
    Date: 2015
  6. By: Li, Xiaoshu; Boyle, Kevin J.; Holmes, Thomas; LaRouche, Genevieve
    Abstract: Forest owners and environmental activists are two groups who actively influence the design of forest management policies. These interest groups have more knowledge and experience with the forest. However, these interest groups may not represent the preferences of the general public for forest management. In the research here we conduct a stated-preference survey to investigate if the preferences for forest management policies differ between two forest interest groups and the general public. And we provide an on-site treatment during the survey to check how the information about forest ecosystem got from an on-site experience would affect their preferences. The results show that the preferences are significantly different between each group in both the pretest survey and post-test survey. All their preferences have not significantly changed after the forest walk.
    Keywords: stated preferences, on-site experience, forest management, interest groups, Environmental Economics and Policy,
    Date: 2014
  7. By: Kreitmair, Ursula W.; Banerjee, Simanti; Walker, James M.
    Abstract: In this study, we employ laboratory economic experiments to explore the role information networks play in the collective provision of threshold or provision point public goods. Threshold public goods are those for which a target or threshold level of funds must be raised to make provision possible or economically viable. Many public goods exhibit this characteristic as they may only be provided in discrete quantities. Thresholds or provision points are particularly relevant to environmental public goods, given non-linear ecological processes. In a broader context, the study of contribution behavior for threshold public goods also provides valuable insights into fundraising activities of both national and local profit and not-for-profit agencies, which typically involve provision points. On the basis of a 2x2 full factorial treatment design we test the following hypotheses: 1) Given LOW endowments, localized information will be less effective than full contribution information in meeting the provision point. 2) Given HIGH endowments local information will be as effective as full information to meet the threshold contribution level. 3) In cases where the threshold is met, group members are more likely to make identical contributions in the COMPLETE treatments than in the LOCAL treatments.
    Keywords: Experimental Economics, Behavioral Economics, Networks, Information, Environmental Economics and Policy, Institutional and Behavioral Economics, Public Economics,
    Date: 2015
  8. By: Sarina Steinmann und Ralph Winkler
    Abstract: We consider the problem of efficient emission abatement in a multi polluter setting, where agents are located along a river in which net emissions accumulate and induce negative externalities to downstream riparians. Assuming a cooperative transferable utility game, we seek welfare distributions that satisfy all agents' participation constraints and, in addition, a fairness constraint implying that no coalition of agents should be better off than it were if all non-members of the coalition would not pollute the river at all. We show that the downstream incremental distribution, as introduced by Ambec and Sprumont (2002), is the only welfare distribution satisfying both constraints. In addition, we show that this result holds true for numerous extensions of our model.
    Keywords: Downstream externalities; downstream incremental distribution; optimal emission abatement; river pollution
    JEL: C71 D62 Q53
    Date: 2015–07
  9. By: Wojciech Hardy (Faculty of Economic Sciences, University of Warsaw); Michal Krawczyk (Faculty of Economic Sciences, University of Warsaw); Joanna Tyrowicz (Faculty of Economic Sciences, University of Warsaw; National Bank of Poland)
    Abstract: In this project we investigate willingness to share and download cultural content by implementing a novel "piracy game" modelled after standard public good games. Subjects' decisions have real consequence, as they are rewarded with individual "transfer" on a file-sharing service. We find that willingness to share depends positively on the sharing by others. Interestingly, however, this tendency does not seem to be associated with reciprocity or other-regarding social preferences. We employ several measures of sharing - from self-reporting to experimental - and incorporate to the analysis other factors which may explain the autonomous willingness to share, irrespective of the group effects. We find that conditional cooperation in content sharing is fairly prevalent, but unrelated to personality traits, attitude towards risk, attitude towards the other, marginal valuation, as well as socio-demographic characteristics.
    Keywords: digital piracy, Big Five, public goods, laboratory experiment
    JEL: C92 D63
    Date: 2015
  10. By: Bonroy, Olivier; Garapin, Alexis; Hamilton, Stephen F.; Souza Monteiro, Diogo M.
    Keywords: label, public policy, collective action game, experimental economics, agricultural economics., Agribusiness, Agricultural and Food Policy, Industrial Organization, Research Methods/ Statistical Methods, Risk and Uncertainty, C72, C92, Q18,
    Date: 2015–05
  11. By: Banerjee, Simanti; Shortle, James S.
    Abstract: In this paper we study the role of informal low-cost interventions such as providing information about behavior of one’s peer group, as a mechanism to improve the performance of farmland conservation programs. We focus on a specific policy that has high ecological significance because of its emphasis on spatially coordinated land uses – the Agglomeration Bonus. Prior research has indicated that strategic uncertainty within the economic environment of the Agglomeration Bonus (resembling a coordination game with multiple payoff ranked Nash Equilibria) can lead to coordination failure and limited spatial coordination on the payoff efficient strategy (that corresponds to the land use with higher ecosystem benefits). High levels of strategic uncertainty can be a result of large community sizes where landowners’ actions are interdependent, limited information about others’ behavior and conservative payoffs that may make coordination riskier and less attractive. In this context, we consider a laboratory experiment in which we reduce participants’ strategic uncertainty by varying the amount of information available to them. In control sessions, groups of 12 individuals (arranged on a circular local network on which every individual has 2 strategic neighbors) participate in an Agglomeration Bonus game and receive payoffs and information about both their neighbors’ actions. In the treatment sessions, in addition to this information, subjects are also informed about the choices of all members of the group (including their own and their strategic neighbors’ actions). Additionally, we reduce the group size from 12 to 8 subjects to further decrease game strategic uncertainty. Our results indicate that more information in smaller groups significantly improves the likelihood of making the efficient choice. However, repeated interaction leads to a reduction in the likelihood of choosing the efficient action unless both neighbors make the same choice. Analysis of group level spatial patterns indicate no significant treatment effect with increase in instances of coordination failure over time. Thus our treatment implementation while successful in increasing the likelihood of efficient choices, does not ensure that these choices are by adjacent individuals which is necessary for environmental successes. Thus, informal mechanisms that involve providing information about one’s social peers is not expected to improve policy performance even if individuals interact with each other in smaller groups. Additional mechanisms are needed to maintain the positive effect of information and incentivize spatially contiguous efficient land use choices in the long run.
    Keywords: Agglomeration Bonus, Ecosystem Services, Information, Local Networks, Spatial Coordination, Strategic Uncertainty, Environmental Economics and Policy, Institutional and Behavioral Economics, Land Economics/Use, Q57, Q24, D83, D85, C72, C91, C92,
    Date: 2015
  12. By: Külpmann, Philipp (Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University)
    Abstract: In this paper I analyze a dynamic moral hazard problem in teams with imperfect monitoring in continuous time. In the model, players are working together to achieve a breakthrough in a project while facing a deadline. The effort needed to achieve such a breakthrough is unknown but players have a common prior about its distribution. Each player is only able to observe their own effort, not the effort of others. I characterize the optimal effort path for general distributions of breakthrough efforts and show that, in addition to free-riding, procrastination arises. Furthermore, in this model, procrastination is not a result of irrational behavior and is even present in the welfare-maximizing solution.
    Keywords: Procrastination, Public good provision , Moral hazard in teams
    Date: 2015–07–29

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