nep-cdm New Economics Papers
on Collective Decision-Making
Issue of 2015‒05‒22
ten papers chosen by
Stan C. Weeber, McNeese State University

  1. Game Form Representation for Judgement and Arrovian Aggregation By Schoch, Daniel
  2. How Falsifiable is the Collective Model? a New Test with an Application to Monogamous and Bigamous Households in Burkina Faso By Anyck Dauphin; Bernard Fortin; Guy Lacroix
  3. How asymmetric funding of parties can lead to political polarization By Köppl Turyna, Monika
  4. Ancestral kinship patterns substantially reduce the negative effect of increasing group size on incentives for public goods provision By Hannes Rusch
  5. Drug Prices and Pressure Group Activities in the German Health Care Market: An Application of the Becker Model By Anne Maria Busch
  6. Citizen participation and social dialogue: journalistic culture in Russia By Maria Anikina
  7. What Makes People Go to War? Defensive Intentions Motivate Retaliatory and Preemptive Intergroup Aggression By Böhm, Robert; Rusch, Hannes; Gürerk, Özgür
  8. Cooperation and Discrimination Within and Across Language Borders: Evidence from Children in a Bilingual City By Angerer, Silvia; Glätzle-Rützler, Daniela; Lergetporer, Philipp; Sutter, Matthias
  9. Network (Mis)Alignment, Technology Policy and Innovation: The Tale of Two Brazilian Cities By Janaina Pamplona da Costa
  10. Drug Prices, Rents, and Votes in the German Health Care Market: An Application of the Peltzman Model By Anne Maria Busch

  1. By: Schoch, Daniel
    Abstract: Judgement aggregation theory provides us by a dilemma since it is plagued by impossibility results. For a certain class of logically interlinked agendas, full independence for all issues leads to Arrovian dictatorship. Since independence restricts the possibility of strategic voting, it is nevertheless a desirable property even if only partially fulfilled. We explore a “Goldilock” zone of issue-wise sequential aggregation rules which offers just enough independence not to constrain the winning coalitions among different issues, but restrict the possibilities of strategic manipulation. Perfect Independence, as we call the associated axiom, characterises a gameform like representation of the aggregation function by a binary tree, where each non-terminal node is associated with an issue on which all voters make simultaneous decisions. Our result is universal insofar as any aggregation rule satisfying independence for sufficiently many issues has a game-form representation. One corollary of the game form representation theorem implies that dictatorial aggregation rules have game-form representations, which can be “democratised” by simply altering the winning coalitions at every node.
    Keywords: Judgment aggregation; Arrow’s theorem; Escape-routes; Game form
    JEL: D70 D71
    Date: 2015–01–24
  2. By: Anyck Dauphin; Bernard Fortin; Guy Lacroix
    Abstract: Collective rationality is seldom if ever rejected in the literature, raising doubt about its falsifiability. We show that the standard approach to test the collective model with distribution factors may yield misleading inference. We generalize the model and provide an appropriate test procedure to assess its validity. Our new approach extends to households that include more than two decision-makers (e.g., polygamous households, adult children). We investigate household consumption decision-making within monogamous and bigamous households in Burkina Faso. Using the standard testing approach, collective rationality within monogamous households is not rejected. Using our proposed test procedure, collective rationality is however rejected for monogamous households. Furthermore, our test also rejects collective rationality for bigamous households. We conclude that the household efficiency does yield empirically falsifiable restrictions despite being scarcely rejected in the literature.
    Keywords: Collective model, Distribution factors, Rationality, Efficiency, Polygamy
    JEL: D1 D7 J12
    Date: 2015
  3. By: Köppl Turyna, Monika
    Abstract: This work analyzes the impact of asymmetric financial constraints on the platforms of parties using a formal model of elections. Main results show that when a party faces a tight financial constraint the platform chosen in equilibrium is further away from its ideal point compared to the case when the campaign expenses are not limited. Moreover, we have shown that the platform of the party which is facing a tighter financial constraint is further away from its ideal point than of the opponent. These results show the theoretical foundations for the empirical observations made, about the impact of public funding of parties on their platforms.
    Keywords: campaign finance, polarization, endogenous valence, public funding
    JEL: D72 D78
    Date: 2015–04–01
  4. By: Hannes Rusch
    Abstract: Phenomena like meat sharing in hunter-gatherers, self-sacrifice in intergroup conflicts, and voluntary contribution to public goods provision in laboratory experiments have led to the development of numerous theories on the evolution of altruistic in-group beneficial behavior in humans. Many of these theories abstract away from the effects of kinship on the incentives for public goods provision, though. Here, it is investigated analytically how genetic relatedness changes the incentive structure of that paradigmatic game which is conventionally used to model and experimentally investigate collective action problems: the linear public goods game. Using recent anthropological data sets on relatedness in 61 contemporary hunter-gatherer and horticulturalist societies the relevant parameters of this model are then estimated. It turns out that the kinship patterns observed in these societies substantially reduce the negative effect of increasing group size on incentives for public goods provision. It is suggested, therefore, that renewed attention should be given to inclusive fitness theory in the context of public goods provision also in sizable groups, because its explanatory power with respect to this central problem in the evolution of human cooperativeness and altruism might have been substantially underrated.
    Keywords: public goods, inclusive fitness, altruism, relatedness, kinship
    JEL: B15 C72 D64 H41
    Date: 2015–05–03
  5. By: Anne Maria Busch (Leuphana University Lueneburg, Germany)
    Abstract: This article analyzes the shifts of power relation and influence between pharmaceutical industry (producers), pharmacies, and social health insurers (SHI) in Germany based on drug prices. Since the health care reform of 2004, these interest groups have negotiated fees and discounts among each other without any intervention from the government. These negotiations and resulting amendments to the original law express the shift of power of the involved groups, which can be explained with the Becker (1983) model. As a result, a trend becomes apparent, which shows a slight increase in political pressure on the part of SHI and a big decrease of political pressure on the part of pharmacies and producers. This reflects the cost control trend in combination with the empowerment incentives for SHI. The last years have shown increased competition between the interest groups, resulting in more balanced power relations. Nevertheless, the most powerful group is still the producer group and the influence of SHI is still very low.
    Keywords: interest groups, political pressure, health care market, regulation
    JEL: D78 I39 D72 I18
    Date: 2015–05
  6. By: Maria Anikina (Lomonosov Moscow State University)
    Abstract: Proposed paper is based on results of empirical studies of Russian journalists realized within the frames of two projects – “Journalism in Change - Professional Journalistic Cultures in Poland, Russia and Sweden” (2011-2014) and “Media Systems in Flux: The Challenge of the BRICS Countries” (2012-2016) – searching journalism doctrines in last decades. Sociological studies let to discuss the potential of social dialogue from media perspective, to formulate assumptions about the readiness of journalistic community to organize and support citizen activity. The quantitative survey of 500 journalists from different Russian regions in “Journalism in change…” project clarifies that such factors as the chance to hold social service, to supply social demand are valued relatively low when respondents reflecting the roles of journalism in society and the choice of a working place. Factor analysis shows that integrated factor related to social development is weaker than the factor related to creative growth of a journalist (the indicators are 3,7 and 3,83 out of 5 – respectively). Results show that Russian journalists do not give high estimations to such social functions as public opinion formation, social mobilization of people etc. Moderate orientation to citizen participation differentiates journalistic culture in Russia from professional cultures in European countries. The qualitative study of 48 journalists working in traditional and online media located Moscow region in “Media Systems in Flux…” project allows to stress that metropolitan journalists stay quite passive in civic life. Only few respondents are the members of NGOs, parties or social movements what indirectly confirms weak inclination to realize any social activity except information one. Since 83% of respondents from online media 54% of traditional ones have positive attitude to citizen activity and protests, general attitude to social movements of last years in Russia among journalists is moderate: “If we speak about protests of 2011-2012 I am tolerant” (male, old media). Discussion about the protests represents the opposition that exists in journalistic culture. The differentiation between political positions, personal and professional viewpoints is obvious: “We understand that politics is superficial issue. There are things fastening us stronger” (male respondent, traditional media). Often people describe the protests from professional point, stress professional aspect of journalist’s participation in citizen movements.The paper argues that in current context in Russia journalists form specific type of professional culture combining the tendency to creative development with peculiar civic positions what in certain sense impedes social dialogue in Russian public sphere.
    Keywords: journalistic culture, social dialogue, social roles of media, empirical studies, participation
  7. By: Böhm, Robert; Rusch, Hannes; Gürerk, Özgür
    Abstract: Although humans qualify as one of the most cooperative animal species, the scale of violent intergroup conflict among them is unparalleled. Explanations of the underlying motivation to participate in an intergroup conflict, however, remain unsatisfactory. While previous research shows that intergroup conflict increases ‘in-group love’, it fails to identify robust triggers of ‘out-group hate’. Here, we present a controlled laboratory experiment, which demonstrates that ‘out-group hate’ can be provoked systematically. We find direct and causal evidence that the intention to protect the in-group is not only a crucial motivator of ‘out-group hate’ in defensive reactions, but also promotes preemptive offensive actions against out-group threat. Hence, the strength of ‘out-group hate’ depends on whether the own group is perceived to be on the offensive or the defensive side of the conflict. This finding improves our understanding of the escalation of intergroup conflicts and may have important implications for their prevention, as we find in our experiment that removing out-group threat substantially reduces intergroup aggression, leading to full peace.
    Keywords: intergroup conflict; parochial altruism; in-group love; out-group hate; defense
    JEL: B52 C92 N40
    Date: 2015–04–09
  8. By: Angerer, Silvia (IHS Carinthia); Glätzle-Rützler, Daniela (University of Innsbruck); Lergetporer, Philipp (Ifo Institute for Economic Research); Sutter, Matthias (University of Cologne)
    Abstract: We present experimental evidence from a bilingual city in Northern Italy on whether the language spoken by a partner in a prisoner's dilemma game affects behavior and leads to discrimination. Running a framed field experiment with 828 six- to eleven-year old primary school children in the city of Meran, we find that cooperation generally increases with age, but that the gap between cooperation among in-group members and cooperation towards children speaking another language is considerable and increasing with age. This gap is due to both, in-group favoritism and language group discrimination.
    Keywords: cooperation, discrimination, language, children, experiment
    JEL: C91 C93 D03
    Date: 2015–05
  9. By: Janaina Pamplona da Costa (State University of Campinas, Department of Science and Technology Policy)
    Abstract: This article addresses network alignment through an investigation of network governance (coordination) and structure, and examines how regional level network governance and structure influence the effectiveness of technology policy to improve local firms’ innovativeness in a developing country context. It examines whether network governance and structure have a consistent influence on firms’ innovative performance in developing country regions with different levels of socio-economic development. The empirical evidence is based on case studies of the Campinas and Recife regional software networks in Brazil and the innovative performance of the participating local firms. We find that adoption of a general technology policy prescription and formation of networks to improve firm-level innovation and regional catch-up should involve careful consideration of the intended effects: membership of a network may not be a necessary condition for improved innovation at firm level.
    Keywords: network alignment; network governance; Brazilian software industry; innovation networks; technology policy effectiveness; regional development
    Date: 2015–05
  10. By: Anne Maria Busch (Leuphana University Lueneburg, Germany)
    Abstract: Using the health care reform of 2004 as an experience, the reaction of consumers (insured persons) and producers (pharmaceutical industry) based on electoral behavior and relating to drug prices and copayments imposed on drugs is analyzed. The changes in prices and medications after this reform make it to a natural choice. For the analysis, the interest group model by Peltzman (1976) is applied to the German health care market. The vote-maximizing government has to find the optimal combination of rent and price of regulation. As a result, the vote-maximizing outcome is determined by a price level which reflects the interests of consumers as well as the pharmaceutical industry. The analysis of the reaction of consumers related to the co-payment rules of 2004 leads to the hypothesis that the regulator, and finally the pharmaceutical industry, sets drug prices in a way that they are ranging from 5 to 50 Euro. Prices between 50 and 100 Euro are possible as well, reflecting a balance of power facing the pharmaceutical industry. Producers who had accepted the 1989 reference price had an incentive to increase their price while lowering their sales volume.
    Keywords: German health care market, interest groups, political pressure, lobbyism
    JEL: D72 D78 I39
    Date: 2015–05

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