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on Collective Decision-Making |
| By: | Lakomaa, Erik (Stockholm School of Economics); Korpi, Martin (The Ratio institute) |
| Abstract: | In a much cited 2008 article, Per Pettersson-Lidbom uses regression discontinuity to test for Swedish party effects on economic policies such as municipal taxation, spending and employment. We reassess the issue using the same estimator as Pettersson-Lidbom but new data on all factual coalitions, including minority coalitions as well as those previously deemed as undefined on a left and right wing political scale (constituting about 20 percent of the sample used in Pettersson-Lidbom’s study). This makes it possible to remove a systematic bias against centre-right coalitions in Pettersson-Lidbom’s study. We find that a majority of the previous findings stand, with sometimes even slightly stronger effects, but not as regards the proportional income tax rate and number of government employees per capita. Parties seem to matter for economic outcomes, but not always, and some parties more than others. |
| Keywords: | Democracy; Voting behaviour; Economic policy; Political systems |
| JEL: | C21 D72 D78 H71 H72 |
| Date: | 2014–12–31 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hhs:ratioi:0240&r=cdm |
| By: | László Á. Kóczy (Óbuda University); Balázs Sziklai (Hungarian Academy of Sciences); Péter Biró (Corvinus University) |
| Abstract: | In this paper we analyze the consequences of the fairness recommendation of the Venice Commission in allocating voting districts among larger administrative regions. This recommendation requires the size of any constituency not to differ from the average constituency size by more than a fixed limit. We show that this minimum difference constraint, while attractive per definition, is not compatible with monotonicity and Hare-quota properties, two standard requirements of apportionment rules. We present an algorithm that efficiently finds an allotment such that the differences from the average district size are lexicographically minimized. This apportionment rule is a well-defined allocation mechanism compatible with and derived from the recommendation of the Venice Commission. Finally, we compare this apportionment rule with mainstream mechanisms using real data from Hungary and the United States. |
| Keywords: | Apportionment, voting, elections, Venice Commission, proportionality, lexicographic ordering JEL Codes: C71, D72 |
| Date: | 2013–11 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pkk:wpaper:1302&r=cdm |
| By: | Salvador Barberà; Dolors Berga; Bernardo Moreno |
| Abstract: | We observe that many salient rules to allocate private goods are not only (partially) strategy-proof, but also (partially) group strategy-proof, in appropriate domains of definition. That is so for solutions to matching, division, cost sharing, house allocation and auctions, in spite of the substantive disparity between these cases. In a general framework that encompasses all of them, we remark that those strategy-proof rules share a common set of properties, which together imply their group strategy-proofness. Hence, the equivalence between the two forms of strategy-proofness is due to the underlying common structure of all these rules, irrespectively of their specific application. |
| Keywords: | matching, division, house allocation, cost sharing, auctions, strategy-proofness, richness, group strategy-proofness, joint monotonicity, respectfulness, non-bossiness |
| JEL: | C78 D71 D78 |
| Date: | 2014–12 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:bge:wpaper:801&r=cdm |
| By: | Eric Guerci Author-Name: Nobuyuki Hanaki Author-Name: Naoki Watanabe; Gabriele Esposito Author-Name: Xiaoyan Lu |
| Abstract: | We conducted a sensitivity analysis of the results of weighted voting experiments by varying two features of the experimental protocol by Montero et al. (2008): (1) the way in which the roles of subjects are reassigned in each round (random role, RR, versus fixed role, FR) and (2) the number of proposals that subjects can simultaneously approve (multiple approval, MA, versus single approval, SA). It was observed that the differences in these protocols had impacts on the relative frequencies of minimum winning coalitions as well as how negotiations proceed. Our analysis favors a protocol with FR-SA for future research, because this protocol induces subjects to commit fewer errors in their decision making than the protocol with RR-MA, and because proposal-objection dynamics are more frequently observed under FR-SA than under RR-MA. |
| Date: | 2013–12 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:tcr:wpaper:e63&r=cdm |
| By: | Shari Eli; Laura Salisbury |
| Abstract: | Beginning in the 1880s, southern states introduced pensions for Confederate veterans and widows. They continued to expand these programs through the 1920s, while states outside the region were introducing cash transfer programs for workers, poor mothers, and the elderly. Using legislative documents, application records for Confederate pensions, and county-level census and electoral data, we argue that political considerations guided the enactment and distribution of these pensions. We show that Confederate pensions programs were introduced and funded during years in which Democratic gubernatorial candidates were threatened at the ballot box. Moreover, we offer evidence that pensions were disbursed to counties in which these candidates had lost ground to candidates from alternative parties. |
| JEL: | H0 I38 N0 N41 N42 |
| Date: | 2015–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:20829&r=cdm |
| By: | Mehmet Karakaya; Bettina Klaus |
| Abstract: | We consider hedonic coalition formation games with variable sets of agents and extend the properties competition sensitivity and resource sensitivity (introduced by Klaus, 2011, for roomate markets) to hedonic coalition formation games. Then, we show that on the domain of solvable hedonic coalition formation games, the Core is characterized by coalitional unanimity and Maskin monotonicity (see also Takamiya, 2010, Theorem 1). Next, we characterize the Core for solvable hedonic coalition formation games by unanimity, Maskin monotonicity, and either competition sensitivity or resource sensitivity (Corollary 2). Finally, and in contrast to roommate markets, we show that on the domain of solvable hedonic coalition formation games, there exists a solution not equal to the Core that satisfies coalitional unanimity, consistency, competition sensitivity, and resource sensitivity (Example 2). |
| Keywords: | Coalitional Unanimity; Competition Sensitivity; Consistency; Core; Hedonic Coalition Formation; Maskin Monotonicity; Resource Sensitivity |
| JEL: | C78 D63 |
| Date: | 2015–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:lau:crdeep:15.01&r=cdm |
| By: | Mariana Llanos (GIGA German Institute of Global and Area Studies); Magna Inácio (Universidade Federal de Minas Gerais) |
| Abstract: | This paper focuses on the evolution of the institutional presidency – meaning the cluster of agencies that directly support the chief of the executive – in Argentina and Brazil since their redemocratization in the 1980s. It investigates what explains the changes that have come about regarding the size of the institutional presidency and the types of agency that form it. Following the specialized literature, we argue that the growth of the institutional presidency is connected to developments occurring in the larger political system – that is, to the political challenges that the various presidents of the two countries have faced. Presidents adjust the format and mandate of the different agencies under their authority so as to better manage their relations with the political environment. In particular, we argue that the type of government (coalition or single-party) has had consequences for the structure of the presidency or, in other words, that different cabinet structures pose different challenges to presidents. This factor has not played a significant role in presidency-related studies until now, which have hitherto mostly been based on the case of the United States. Our empirical references, the presidencies of Argentina and Brazil, and typical cases of coalitional as well as single-party presidentialism respectively all allow us to show the impact of the type of government on the number and type of presidential agencies. |
| Keywords: | Argentina, Brazil, institutional presidency, presidential office, coalition presi-dentialism, comparative political institutions |
| Date: | 2014–10 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:gig:wpaper:259&r=cdm |
| By: | Cembalo, Luigi; Pascucci, Stefano; Tagliafierro, Carolina; Caracciolo, Francesco |
| Abstract: | This paper discusses how to develop and manage integration, coordination and cooperation (collective action) in bio-energy supply chains. Farmers decision on whether or not to participate in a contract farming scheme have been investigated, particularly assessing the trade-offs between the contract attributes and their impact on the likelihood to participate. A stated preference model has been implemented where respondents were asked to choose between alternative contracts with varying attribute levels to start biomass cultivation. Results show that participation is mainly influenced by minimum price guaranteed, contract length, and re-negotiation before the end of a contract. |
| Keywords: | Bio-energy supply chain, Contract farming, Choice modelling, Italy, Industrial Organization, |
| Date: | 2014–08 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ags:eaae14:182690&r=cdm |
| By: | Mathieu Taschereau-Dumouchel (University of Pennsylvania - Wharton); Edouard Schaal (New York University) |
| Abstract: | Abstract We propose a model of coordination failures for business cycles in which agents learn to coordinate over time. The economy features an aggregate demand externality that leads to multiple equilibria under complete information. Under incomplete information, a group of informed agents receive private signals about the fundamentals of the economy, while a group of uninformed agents only observe past public realizations of aggregate demand. The economy takes a long time to recover from recessions because their coordination capital is destroyed: agents lose their ability to coordinate on the good outcome. In a recovery, informed agents wait for the uninformed to take action before resuming production, while uninformed agents infer the level of the fundamental by observing the endogenously low level of demand. As a result, uninformed agents keep pessimistic beliefs about the fundamental for an extended period of time and downturns become very protracted. The equilibrium is inefficient and we characterize optimal policy interventions. |
| Date: | 2014 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:red:sed014:723&r=cdm |
| By: | Sharma, Chanchal Kumar |
| Abstract: | The scholarly terrain of this article charts a course from the making of Nehruvian consensus to the present times. In the true spirit of a social conciliator, Nehru created a system of governance that eschewed left and right extremism. It is this system that is popularly known as Nehruvian Consensus. The mainstream argument is that the old Nehruvian consensus has collapsed but there is no consensus capable of replacing it. This may be true of Nehruvian secularism on which there was a weak consensus right from the beginning, but we must not commit the fallacy of confusing what is true of a part with what is true of the whole. There exists alternative consensus in case of economic policy and conduct of centre-state relations whereas in the case of foreign policy the form may have changed but the substance remains the same. Surprisingly, democracy in India remains resilient in spite of the crisis. |
| Keywords: | Nehruvian Consensus, Nation building, Democracy, Party system, Economic Planning, Socialism, Industrialization, Modernization, Secularism, Economic Reforms, Foreign Policy, Non-Alignment |
| JEL: | B3 B31 Z0 Z00 |
| Date: | 2013 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:61356&r=cdm |
| By: | Jongeneel, Roel; Polman, Nico |
| Abstract: | The latest reform of the CAP, CAP towards 2020, opens up the possibility to arrange agri-environmental service provision via contracting groups of farmers, rather than contracting individual farmers. The Dutch government decided to fully switch to a farmer group service provision system in 2016. The paper analyses the new organisational framework that now is derived and links it to the Dutch tradition of environmental cooperatives. Issues of collective action, transaction costs, information problems, effectiveness, accountability, and procurement efficiency are analysed in a qualitative way. It is concluded that the Dutch model is promising, although not without risks. Its implementation path seems properly chosen. However, in order to fully reap the benefits possible under the new system one need to reduce restrictions and increase incentives. |
| Keywords: | agri-environmental scheme, collective action, transaction costs, procurement, Agricultural and Food Policy, Environmental Economics and Policy, Farm Management, Institutional and Behavioral Economics, Political Economy, |
| Date: | 2014–10 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ags:eaae14:186674&r=cdm |
| By: | Dimitrios Xefteris |
| Abstract: | It is known that multidimensional Downsian competition fails to admit an equilibrium in pure strategies unless very stringent conditions on the distribution of voters’ bliss points are imposed (Plott 1967). This paper revisits this problem considering that the two vote share maximizing candidates are differentiated. That is, candidates strategically decide positions only in some of the n dimensions while in the rest their positions are assumed to be fixed. These fixed dimensions may be viewed as candidates’ immutable characteristics (race, religion, culture, etc.). We find that if candidates are sufficiently differentiated - if in the fixed dimensions their positions are sufficiently different - then a unique Nash equilibrium in pure strategies is guaranteed to exist for any distribution of voters’ bliss points. Perhaps more importantly, we show that this is true even if there exists a unique fixed dimension and candidates instrumentally decide their positions in all other n-1 dimensions. |
| Keywords: | electoral competition, multidimensional model, equilibrium existence, differentiated candidate |
| Date: | 2015–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ucy:cypeua:01-2015&r=cdm |
| By: | Meyer, Rachel |
| Abstract: | In a context of increasing globalization and neoliberal restructuring and with labor's power diminishing vis-à-vis employers, American workers have turned in recent years to community-based campaigns targeting local government. These mobilizations have received considerable attention from scholars who see this emerging community orientation as a significant strategic innovation. This study, alternatively, focuses on the subjective and ideological consequences of such mobilizations for those engaged in protest. In particular, it seeks to extend social movement theory regarding the transformative impact of collective action by asking: how do distinct forms of collective action bring about particular kinds of consciousness and identity among participants? Scholars rooted in a variety of traditions ? from theorists of ?post-industrial? society and ?new? social movements to state theorists and geographers ? have suggested that identities fostered at the local level are characterized by a ?defensive,? ?introverted,? or ?retrospective? quality. This study examines a local mobilization, the case of a living wage campaign in Chicago, which deviates from these expectations. Through an analysis of interviews with participants, I find that instead of spurring defensiveness the campaign engendered a citizenship identity that was both active and inclusive. In explaining why my findings diverge from existing theories of identity formation, my analysis highlights three conceptual deficiencies in the literature with respect to (1) the distinction between local versus transnational collective action, (2) the relationship between social movement goals/tactics and outcomes, and (3) the prioritization of ?new? social movements over the labor movement. Examining the citizenship identities that developed during Chicago's living wage campaign is instructive, finally, for understanding the sources of counter-hegemonic subjectivity within a broader context of eroding citizenship rights and a dominant market fundamentalist ideology. More generally, this analysis paves the way for a more productive engagement among theories of social movements, citizenship, labor, and globalization. |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:qsh:wpaper:226771&r=cdm |