|
on Collective Decision-Making |
| By: | Francesco De Sinopoli; Giovanna Iannantuoni; Elena Manzoni; Carlos Pimienta |
| Abstract: | We introduce a model with strategic voting in a parliamentary election with proportional representation and uncertainty about voters’ preferences. In any equilibrium of the model, most voters only vote for those parties whose positions are extreme. In the resulting parliament, a consensus government forms and the policy maximizing the sum of utilities of the members of the government is implemented. |
| Keywords: | Proportional Election, Strategic Voting, Legislative Bargaining |
| JEL: | C72 D72 |
| Date: | 2014–12 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:mib:wpaper:288&r=cdm |
| By: | Elena V. Sirotkina (National Research University Higher School of Economics) |
| Abstract: | Does limited competition promote voting stability and party system institutionalization? Since Russian political parties face administrative impediments to participating in elections, only those who adapt to the changing rules remain in the game. Thus, voters have a limited number of parties to support and with no alternatives they might tend to stick to their choice. In this paper, I take stability in electoral support as an indicator of party system institutionalization and test whether limited competition in non-democratic Russia leads to voting stability and party system institutionalization. Empirical evidence is taken from the Russian State Duma elections in 2003-2011. |
| Keywords: | institutionalization, Russian parties, elections, voting geography. |
| JEL: | D72 |
| Date: | 2014 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hig:wpaper:15/ps/2014&r=cdm |
| By: | Zohal Hessami (Department of Economics, University of Konstanz, Germany) |
| Abstract: | Do incentives and policy choices of public officials depend on whether they are appointed by an elected body or directly elected by voters? I investigate this question using the example of state grants for highly visible municipal investment projects. To attract these grants, mayors must prepare and submit applications to the state government. My identification strategy exploits a natural experiment in a German state where mayor elections were gradually introduced. The difference-in-differences estimation results show that elected mayors attract 7 to 8% more investment grants from the state tier in election years, while for appointed mayors there is no cycle. Results based on hand-collected data for individual mayors exclude alternative transmission channels such as changes in (self-)selection of mayors or partisan alignment in grant allocation. |
| Keywords: | Mayor elections; local government; electoral incentives; pork-barrel politics; intergovernmental grants |
| JEL: | D72 H72 H77 |
| Date: | 2014–12–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:knz:dpteco:1423&r=cdm |
| By: | David Stadelmann; Marco Portmann; Reiner Eichenberger |
| Abstract: | We analyze political representation of preferences of different income groups by matching referendum outcomes for low, middle, and high-income voters with individual legislators' decisions on identical policy proposals. Results indicate that legislators more closely represent preferences of rich voters than preferences of middle-income and poor voters, and legislators are more responsive towards the rich. Preferences of low, middle, and high-income voters are, however, correlated. Representation of income groups varies according to legislators' party affiliations. |
| Keywords: | Income; policy decisions; representation; voting; referenda; political behavior |
| JEL: | D72 H70 |
| Date: | 2014–12 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cra:wpaper:2014-19&r=cdm |
| By: | Yuriy O. Guyvoronskiy (National Research University Higher School of Economics); Svetlana A. Karandashova (National Research University Higher School of Economics); Elena V. Sirotkina (National Research University Higher School of Economics); Anastasia Y. Shishorina (National Research University Higher School of Economics) |
| Abstract: | Does the level of party system institutionalization influence high-level incumbents’ electoral support within subnational authoritarianism? Is it possible to ensure incumbent electoral success only with manipulative electoral practices? To what extent does this and other factors contribute to the incumbents’ landslide victory? Contrary to scholarly thought in this field, this paper argues that manipulative practices are not the only determinant of incumbents’ electoral success in an authoritarian regime. They are also insufficient. The research is based on the results Russian gubernatorial elections in 2012-2013 |
| Keywords: | party system institutionalization, incumbent, electoral authoritarianism, governor elections, regional regimes |
| JEL: | D72 |
| Date: | 2014 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hig:wpaper:17/ps/2014&r=cdm |
| By: | Carroll, Daniel R. (Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland); Dolmas, James (Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas); Young, Eric R. (University of Virginia) |
| Abstract: | We study the tax systems that arise in a once-and-for-all majority voting equilibrium embedded within a macroeconomic model of inequality. We find that majority voting delivers (i) a small set of outcomes, (ii) zero labor income taxation, and (iii) nearly zero transfers. We find that majority voting, contrary to the literature developed in models without idiosyncratic risk, is quite powerful at restricting outcomes; however, it also delivers predictions inconsistent with observed tax systems. |
| Keywords: | Political Economy; Essential Set; Voting; Inequality; Incomplete Markets |
| JEL: | D52 D72 E62 |
| Date: | 2015–01–07 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:fip:fedcwp:1442&r=cdm |
| By: | Kobayashi, Katsuya; Tasnádi, Attila |
| Abstract: | We build a multiple hierarchical model of a representative democracy in which, for instance, voters elect county representatives, county representatives elect district representatives, district representatives elect state representatives, and state representatives elect a prime minister. We use our model to show that the policy determined by the final representative can become more extreme as the number of hierarchical levels increases because of increased opportunities for gerrymandering. Thus, a sufficiently large number of voters gives a district maker an advantage, enabling her to implement her favorite policy. We also show that the range of implementable policies increases with the depth of the hierarchical system. Consequently, districting by a candidate in a hierarchical legislative system can be viewed as a type of policy implementation device. |
| Keywords: | electoral systems, median voter, gerrymandering, council democracies. |
| JEL: | D72 |
| Date: | 2014–12–17 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cvh:coecwp:2014/19&r=cdm |
| By: | Ljubisa Stojimirović, Aleksandra Stojković, Tomislav Nikolić (Belgrade Business Schol, Belgrade) |
| Abstract: | Political parties belong to organizational systems and they must be guided. Defining the aims, the way they are put in practice, constant control, management team choice, cooperation with the environment are just some of the activities political party management is involved in. Management efficiency depends on how long and in what way political party is going to last. Successful management can lead political party to unexpected heights (achievements). |
| Keywords: | management, political party, objectives, controls, team |
| JEL: | I I |
| Date: | 2014–09 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:esb:casdrg:2014-206&r=cdm |
| By: | Jurajda, Štepán (CERGE-EI); Münich, Daniel (CERGE-EI) |
| Abstract: | We measure the importance of candidate characteristics listed on ballots for a candidate's position on a slate, for preferential votes received by a candidate, and, ultimately, for getting elected. We focus on the effects of gender, various types of academic titles, and also several novel properties of candidates' names. Using data on over 200 thousand candidates competing in recent Czech municipal board and regional legislature elections, and conditioning on slate fixed effects, we find ballot cues to play a stronger role in small municipalities than in large cities and regions, despite the general agreement on higher candidate salience in small municipalities. We also quantify the election advantage of a slate being randomly listed first on a ballot. |
| Keywords: | low-information elections, ballot order effects, name properties |
| JEL: | D72 D83 |
| Date: | 2014–12 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps:dp8691&r=cdm |
| By: | Assaf Razin; Efraim Sadka; Benjarong Suwankiri |
| Abstract: | We develop a dynamic political-economic theory of welfare state and immigration policies, featuring three distinct voting groups: skilled workers, unskilled workers, and old retirees. The essence of inter- and intra-generational redistribution of a typical welfare system is captured with a proportional tax on labor income to finance a transfer in a balanced-budget manner. We characterize political-economic equilibrium policy rules consisting of the tax rate, the skill composition of migrants, and the total number of migrants. When none of these groups enjoy a majority (50 percent of the voters or more), political coalitions will form. With overlapping generations and policy-determined influx of immigrants, the formation of the political coalitions changes over time. These future changes are taken into account when policies are shaped. The paper characterizes the evolution of the political coalitions that implement welfare state and migration policies. |
| JEL: | F22 H0 |
| Date: | 2014–12 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:20806&r=cdm |
| By: | Jan Karremans |
| Abstract: | The last European elections of 2014 were characterized by a concrete effort to increase public participation to the European political debate. However the overall electoral turnout remained disappointingly low. In this paper I deal with the problem of the formation of a European electorate and argue that a better representation on the European integration dimension should substantially contribute to the formation of a transnational electorate. Often, there is the fear that European political conflict framed on this dimension would lead to a radical bipolar conflict between pro- and anti-EU parties. In this paper I show that, if citizens’ preferences are properly represented, this does not have to be the case. What I show is that citizens’ preferences on European integration are distributed in three roughly equivalent blocs: pro-EU, anti-EU and a neutral position. The point I make is that a proper representation of the neutral position should ensure that the conflict does not become too radical, as the parties representing the neutral position would be the necessary coalition partners of both pro- and anti-EU parties. An important shortcoming of the current European parliament, I argue, is that the neutral position on European integration is not represented and that consequently there is a disproportionate high presence of pro-EU parties. This misrepresentation in the long run may increase the public appeal of Euro-sceptic parties. The data on which my argument is based are from the 2014 Eurobarometer survey. |
| Keywords: | European Parliament |
| Date: | 2014–10–29 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:erp:euirsc:p0408&r=cdm |
| By: | Popov, Vladimir |
| Abstract: | Why even after the dramatic increase in inequality in the 1990s and after the emergence and enrichment of “oligarchs”, the alternative (leftist, social democratic) economic policies that could have improved material and social wellbeing of the majority of the population is not supported by this majority? It is argued that in immature democracies (without efficient restrictions for the participation of private capital in politics) mass media and electoral campaigns are controlled by the rich, so there is vicious circle: market reforms and private property create the class of the wealthy “oligarchs” that are not only interested in these reforms, but also have power to maintain their political and economic might through mass media and democratic elections. The return of public opinion to the “norm” so that it reflects interests of the majority is possible only if mass media and political process are separated from private capital and private financing. |
| Keywords: | Public opinion, transition from socialism to capitalism, inequalities, elections, mass media |
| JEL: | H00 P26 P3 |
| Date: | 2014–12–24 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:60915&r=cdm |
| By: | Brian Gill; Brandon Coffee-Borden; Kristin Hallgren |
| Keywords: | Conceptual Framework, Data Driven Decision Making, Education |
| JEL: | I |
| Date: | 2014–06–02 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:mpr:mprres:c811d94086af410aa2cf67190626c66f&r=cdm |
| By: | Stefano Caria; Marcel Fafchamps |
| Abstract: | We play a one-shot public good game in rural India between farmers connected by an exogenous star network. Contributions by the centre of the star reach more players and have a larger impact on aggregate payoffs than contributions by the spoke players. Yet, we find that the centre player contributes just as much as the average of the spokes. We elicit expectations about the decisions of the centre player and, in randomly selected sessions, we disclose the average expectation of the farmers in the network. Farmers match the disclosed values frequently and do so more often when the monetary cost of making a contribution is reduced. However, disclosure is not associated with higher contributions. Our results support the predictions of a model of other-regarding preferences where players care about the expectations of others. This model is helpful to understand barriers to improvement in pro-social behaviour when groups expect low pro-sociality. |
| Date: | 2014 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:csa:wpaper:2014-33&r=cdm |
| By: | Elie Michel |
| Abstract: | Radical right parties in Western Europe have traditionally shown little support for redistributive policies and have thus been typically classified as economically right wing. Yet, they are contesting the votes of a (formerly) key electorate of the social democratic parties: the working class, who supports welfare redistribution. In this study, we argue and empirically demonstrate that radical right parties have adapted their programmatic preferences to this key segment of electorate by progressively promoting redistributive policies. For our analyses we use mixed methods and rely on a combination of data sources. Firstly, we assess the salience of welfare issues in the manifestos of major West European radical right parties over the last three decades based on CMP data. Secondly, we examine their positions on welfare issues based on recent euandi data. Thirdly, we analyse the most recent manifestos of two successful radical right parties (Austrian FPÖ and French FN) qualitatively. Our findings show that for a majority of radical right parties welfare state expansion has become a salient issue, and that they do not position themselves anymore on the right regarding redistributive issues; however, these parties promote a specific kind of solidarity: exclusive solidarity. |
| Keywords: | political parties |
| Date: | 2014–12–16 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:erp:euirsc:p0417&r=cdm |
| By: | Shyam Gouri Suresh; Scott Jeffrey |
| Abstract: | We simulate a theoretical model of opinion dynamics that captures the effects of social pressures that compel individuals to publicly conform to the party line even when they disagree with it privately. We observe various interesting patterns of opinion formation and other consequences, including polarization within and between parties and marginalization of extremists. We find that our simple framework can explain certain features of recent data such as the influence of parties on individual opinions and the increasing polarization of the polity. |
| Keywords: | Opinion Dynamics, Polarization, Agent-Based, Overton Window |
| JEL: | D7 C63 |
| Date: | 2014–12 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:dav:wpaper:14-06&r=cdm |
| By: | Claudia Keser; Andreas Markstädter; Martin Schmidt |
| Abstract: | In a public-good experiment with heterogeneous endowments, we investigate if and how the contribution level as well as the previously observed “fair-share” rule of equal contributions relative to one’s endowment (Hofmeyr et al., 2007; Keser et al., 2014) may be influenced by minimum-contribution requirements. We consider three different schedules: FixMin, requiring the same absolute contributions, RelMin, requiring the same relative contributions, and ProgMin, requiring minimum contributions that progressively increase with the endowment. We find that minimum contributions exert norm-giving character and may lead to an increase in average group contributions. This is especially true for the progressive schedule. On the individual level, this schedule leads to higher relative contributions by the wealthier players and thus violates the “fair-share” norm. On the group level, it leads to the highest contribution level and the lowest inequality in total profits as measured by the Gini index. <P> |
| Keywords: | Experimental economics, public goods, heterogeneous endowments, mandatory minimum contributions, norms, |
| JEL: | C92 D63 H41 |
| Date: | 2014–12–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cir:cirwor:2014s-47&r=cdm |