nep-cdm New Economics Papers
on Collective Decision-Making
Issue of 2015‒01‒09
seventeen papers chosen by
Stan C. Weeber, McNeese State University

  1. Is There Gender Bias Among Voters ?Evidence from the Chilean Congressional Elections By Francisco Pino
  2. Collective choices under ambiguity By Maria Vittoria Levati; Stefan Napel; Ivan Soraperra
  3. Voting and Peer Effects: Experimental Evidence from Mozambique By Marcel Fafchamps; Ana Vaz; Pedro C. Vicente
  4. Overlapping political budget cycles in the legislative and the executive By Foremny, Dirk; Freier, Ronny; Moessinger, Marc-Daniel; Yeter, Mustafa
  5. The Perverse Consequences of Policy Restrictions in the Presence of Asymmetric Information By Rafael Hortala-Vallve; Valentino Larcinese; Stephanie Rickard
  6. Measuring the extent and implications of corporate political connections in prewar Japan By Tetsuji Okazaki; Michiru Sawada
  7. PОLITICAL МАRKETING – NЕGATIV CAMPAING By Ljubisa Stojmirović , Aleksandra Stojković , Tomislav Nikolić
  8. Electoral effects on the composition of public spending and revenue: evidence from a large panel of countries By Atsuyoshi Morozumi; Francisco José Veiga; Linda Gonçalves Veiga
  9. Contributing to Public Goods as Individuals versus Group Representatives: Evidence of Gender Differences By Hauge, Karen Evelyn; Røgeberg, Ole
  10. Cultural Differences and Institutional Integration By Luigi Guiso; Helios Herrera; Massimo Morelli
  11. Estimating the Preferences of Central Bankers : An Analysis of Four Voting Records By Eijffinger, S.C.W.; Mahieu, R.J.; Raes, L.B.D.
  12. Beyond Radicalism and Resignation: The Competing Logics for Public Participation in Policy Decisions By Rikki Dean
  13. Decision support methodologies in public policy formulation By Monique Borges; Eduardo Castro; João Marques
  14. Preferential Trading Agreements and Economic Reforms in Developing Countries By Leonardo Baccini; Johannes Urpelainen
  15. Games on concept lattices: Shapley value and core. By Ulrich Faigle; Michel Grabisch; Andres Jiménez-Losada; Manuel Ordóñez
  16. Demographic Transition and Rise of Modern Representative Democracy By Namasaka, Martin
  17. A Competitive Partnership Formation Process By Andersson, T.; Gudmundsson, J.; Talman, A.J.J.; Yang, Z.

  1. By: Francisco Pino
    Abstract: I exploit the unique institution of gender-segregated voting booths in Chile, allowingthe use of actual voting data, instead of self-reported surveys, to test for genderbias among voters. Overall I find evidence of a small but significant negative genderbias: women overall are less likely than men to vote for female candidates. The effect ismainly driven by center-right voters. Selection, candidates’ quality and districts’ characteristicsdo not explain away the results. This evidence does not question whetherfemale leaders have an effect on economic outcomes, but rather the mechanism throughwhich this effect takes place.
    Keywords: gender; voting; electoral system; discrimination; political economy
    JEL: D72 J16 O54
    Date: 2014–12
  2. By: Maria Vittoria Levati (Department of Economics (University of Verona)); Stefan Napel (University of Bayreuth); Ivan Soraperra (Department of Economics (University of Verona))
    Keywords: Ambiguity aversion, majority voting, dictatorship
    JEL: C91 C92 D71 D81
    Date: 2014–08
  3. By: Marcel Fafchamps; Ana Vaz; Pedro C. Vicente
    Abstract: Voter education campaigns often aim to increase voter particpation and political accountability. We follow randomized interventions implemented nationwide during the 2009 Mozambican elections using a free newspaper, leaflets, and text messaging. We investigate whether treatment effects were transmitted through social networks (kinship and chatting) and geographical proximity. For individuals personally targeted by the campaign, we estimate the reinforcement effect of proximity to other targeted individuals. For untargeted individuals, we estimate the diffusion of the campaign depending on a proximity to targeted individuals. We find evidence for both effects, similar across the different treatments and across the different connectedness measures. We observe that the treatments worked through the networks by raising the levels of information and interest about the election, in line with the average treatment effects of voter education on voter participation. We interpret this result as a free riding effect, likely to occur for costly actions. JEL codes:
    Date: 2013
  4. By: Foremny, Dirk; Freier, Ronny; Moessinger, Marc-Daniel; Yeter, Mustafa
    Abstract: We advance the literature on political budget cycles by testing separately for cycles in expenditures for elections in the legislative and the executive. Using municipal data, we can separately identify these cycles and account for general year effects. For the executive branch, we show that it is important whether the incumbent re-runs. To account for the potential endogeneity associated with this decision, we apply a unique instrumental variables approach based on age and pension eligibility rules. We find sizable and significant effects in expenditures before council elections and before joint elections when the incumbent re-runs.
    Keywords: election cycles,municipal expenditures,council and mayor elections,instrumental variables approach
    JEL: H11 H71 H72 H74
    Date: 2014
  5. By: Rafael Hortala-Vallve; Valentino Larcinese; Stephanie Rickard
    Abstract: Institutions can limit governments' policy options. Such restrictions are usually commended as solutions to time inconsistency problems or coordination failures. However, policy constraints can have important drawbacks and these disadvantages have generally been overlooked to date. When institutional constraints tie the governments' hands, citizens have fewer incentives to be informed about politics and participate in collective decision making. In effect, policy restrictions lower the private returns from political information. A fiscal policy restriction, for example, may decrease redistribution by lowering poorer voters' acquisition of political information. We find support for our prediction in a controlled laboratory experiment.
    Date: 2013–12
  6. By: Tetsuji Okazaki; Michiru Sawada
    Abstract: This paper investigates the extent, determinants, and implications of the political connections of firms at the peak of democracy in prewar Japan, identifying a firm as politically connected if one of its directors was simultaneously a member of the House of Representatives. We analyze the data of publicly traded companies in the periods before and after the 1928 and 1930 general elections. It is found that almost 20 % of publicly traded companies had political connections through politician directors. Regressions analyses reveal that smaller or badly performing firms and firms in the electric utilities and railroad industries, where government licenses were important, were more likely to have political connections. Furthermore, we find that the stock returns of firms that had new political connections improved from the pre-election period to the post-election period.
    Date: 2014–11
  7. By: Ljubisa Stojmirović , Aleksandra Stojković , Tomislav Nikolić (Belgrade Business School)
    Abstract: It is common for political parties and certain individuals that during the election campaign they try to use a negative campaign in order to achieve a certain advantage over their rivals. What are the effects of such campaigns, whether they are successful or even counter-productive. The authors of these paper present specified case in order to show the result of such a campaign.
    Keywords: campaigns, political marketing, parties, the media, voters...
    JEL: D72 L82 M31
    Date: 2014–04
  8. By: Atsuyoshi Morozumi (University of Nottingham, CFCM); Francisco José Veiga (Universidade do Minho - NIPE); Linda Gonçalves Veiga (Universidade do Minho - NIPE)
    Abstract: This paper examines the effects of elections on central governments’ fiscal policy conducts. We construct a unique database of disaggregated spending and revenue series at the central government level, for a panel of up to 107 countries over the 1975-2010 period. Using this data, we show that under some specific political environments, incumbents generate political budget cycles, predominantly by increasing current, rather than capital, spending and reducing taxes, most often income taxes. However, when democracies are matured, in election years, central governments reallocate their expenditure and revenue components, without changing their total levels. Specifically, they reallocate spending from capital spending to grants to other government units, while reducing income taxes and increasing consumption taxes instead.
    Keywords: Political budget cycles; Spending and revenue composition; Central government; Opportunism
    JEL: E6 D7 H5
    Date: 2014
  9. By: Hauge, Karen Evelyn (Ragnar Frisch Centre for Economic Research,); Røgeberg, Ole (Ragnar Frisch Centre for Economic Research,)
    Abstract: We report evidence from a laboratory experiment comparing contributions in public good games played as individuals to contributions made as group representatives. We find that women alter their behaviour more than men. The change is in an out-group friendly direction: while men’s contributions are largely similar across the two treatments, women increase their contributions by 40% on average as group representatives. The results are consistent with empirical research from labour markets suggesting that female corporate leaders emphasize stakeholders beyond the shareholders to a larger extent than men, and they are in line with stereotypes commonly held regarding male and female leaders.
    Keywords: responsibility; group representative; gender; public good game; laboratory experiment
    JEL: C91 H41 J16
    Date: 2014–07–30
  10. By: Luigi Guiso; Helios Herrera; Massimo Morelli
    Abstract: If citizens of different countries belonging to an economic union adhere to different and deeply rooted cultural norms, when these countries interact their leaders may find it impossible to agree on efficient policies, especially in hard times. Political leaders’ actions are bound to express policies that do not violate these norms. This paper provides a simple positive theory and a compelling case study of the importance of cultural clashes when economies integrate, as well as a normative argument about the desirability of institutional integration. Namely, we argue that a political union, with a common institutions and enforcement of rules, is a solution which is most beneficial the greater is cultural diversity in an economic union. JEL Classification: D72 Keywords: Cultural Norms, Institutions, Crisis Mismanagement.
    Date: 2014
  11. By: Eijffinger, S.C.W. (Tilburg University, Center For Economic Research); Mahieu, R.J. (Tilburg University, Center For Economic Research); Raes, L.B.D. (Tilburg University, Center For Economic Research)
    Abstract: Abstract: This paper analyzes the voting records of four central banks (Sweden, Hungary, Poland and the Czech Republic) with spatial models of voting. We infer the policy preferences of the monetary policy committee members and use these to analyze the evolution in preferences over time and the differences in preferences between member types and the position of the Governor in different monetary policy committees.
    Keywords: Ideal points; Voting records; Central Banking; NBP; CNB; MNB; Riksbank
    JEL: E58 E59 C11
    Date: 2013
  12. By: Rikki Dean
    Abstract: From the World Bank to the Occupy Movement, support for greater citizen participation in social policy decisions has become ubiquitous. This paper argues that existing typologies of participation are problematic in that they do not recognise the plurality of competing participatory logics that explain this rise in support for participation from groups with such divergent world views. Participatory practice is constructed in multiple ways, and each construction can only be understood with reference to the normative conception of societal organisation it encompasses. However, existing typologies take one of two approaches: either they assume one particular normative bias and categorise participatory forms as accordingly legitimate or illegitimate (for instance, Arnstein's ladder), or they categorise by institutional design features without reference to the broader social and political ideology that informs the use of these designs. This paper draws on Grid-Group Cultural Theory to outline an alternative approach. Participatory practice is categorised along two intersecting dimensions: sociality, the extent to which participation is solidaristic or agonistic, and negotiability, the extent to which participatory spaces are prescribed or negotiated. From these dimensions four archetypes of participation are derived, each with its own participatory logic, conception of the participant, preferred institutional forms, and links to broader social and political philosophies.
    Keywords: public participation, citizen engagement, participatory democracy, deliberative democracy, participatory governance, choice, voice, bureaucracy, health policy, housing policy, social exclusion policy, participation typology, Grid-Group Cultural Theory
    Date: 2014–12
  13. By: Monique Borges; Eduardo Castro; João Marques
    Abstract: A decision problem is relatively complex and broadly involves two distinct moments, i) information gathering and ii) use of available information and decision-making. In the first case one can discuss the potential of rigorous methods (statistical analysis and modelling) commonly used to enable and improve the collection, analysis and interpretation of the most relevant data. On the second case it is important to note that the existing information may not be enough, it is not always possible to combine and organize (objective and subjective) information and that decisions are highly subject to contexts of high uncertainty. This paper develops this issue focusing on the regional and local development decision-making process, acknowledging the need to complement objective information based on statistical data and modelling with unstructured and non-rigorous rule of thumb information and opinions generated by experts. In the specific context of regional and local public policies it is reasonable to assume that there is a considerable body of information disseminated by different actors and experts, although distributed in a fragmented and asymmetric manner. This information is insufficient to support the decision-making process when used individually, but can provide better results if experts obtain synergies through an interactive process. Simultaneously their decisions are conditioned by the evolution of exogenous variables that they cannot predict. If, on the one hand, the application of formal models (supported on quantitative data) may be unsatisfactory because they are conditioned by the available information, and are not able to include subjective (but technically) informed knowledge, nor the volatility and uncertainty of the future, on the other hand, the application of more informal methods (based, for example, in scenario analysis or expert panels) may lead to biased results, as a consequence of opinions being strongly influenced by individual preferences and perceptions. This paper is based on the assumption that public decision-making needs to be more i) transparent, as it demands prioritization, budgeting and resource allocation; ii) accountable, as it involves alternative choices; iii) participated, as it requires the combination of formal and informal relationships between different agents and iv) future oriented, as it supports strategic approaches. Therefore it presents and discusses a methodological framework that combines technically informed subjectivity with more rigorous models. In other words, it explores the combination of several decision-making methods, such as foresight techniques, multi-criteria and cost-benefit approaches.
    Keywords: Decision-making; public policy formulation; foresight;
    JEL: D81
    Date: 2014–11
  14. By: Leonardo Baccini (Princeton University, Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs); Johannes Urpelainen (Columbia University)
    Abstract: How do domestic politics influence the formation of international institutions, and what are the effects of international institutions on domestic politics? In this policy paper, we examine how leaders use preferential trading agreements (PTAs) with the European Union and the United States to promote liberal economic policies. We argue that under democratization, new leaders would benefit the most from credible commitment and side payments to compensate vulnerable domestic constituencies for their losses. Our empirical analysis shows that under democratization, leader change greatly increases the probability that the government of a developing country begins treaty negotiations. We also demonstrate that PTAs induce liberalization in different sectors of the economy.
    Keywords: trading agreements, developing countries, economic reforms
  15. By: Ulrich Faigle (Universität zu Köln - Mathematisches Institut); Michel Grabisch (Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne - Paris School of Economics); Andres Jiménez-Losada (University of Seville - Escuela Superior de Ingenieros); Manuel Ordóñez (University of Seville - Escuela Superior de Ingenieros)
    Abstract: We introduce cooperative TU-games on concept lattices, where a concept is a pair (S,S') with S being a subset of players or objects, and S' a subset of attributes. Any such game induces a game on the set of players/objects, which appears to be a TU-game whose collection of feasible coalitions is a lattice closed under intersection, and a game on the set of attributes. We propose a Shapley value for each type of game, axiomatize it, and investigate the geometrical properties of the core (nonemptiness, boundedness, pointedness, extremal rays).
    Keywords: Cooperation game, restricted cooperation, concept lattice, core, Shapley value.
    JEL: C71
    Date: 2014–10
  16. By: Namasaka, Martin
    Abstract: By focusing solely on the institutional reforms and changes in the political leadership that precede political liberalisation, studies on the determinants of democracy have often overlooked the influence of demographic factors such as population age structure as a catalyst for and reflection of a host of changes in societies that can affect governance and stability of liberal democracy. It is not surprising, noting the recent revolutions such as the Arab spring and the Egyptian Uprising , that numerous research now tends to spotlight the so called youth bulge and how they tend to either support authoritarian regimes or sustain liberal democracies as a result of youth-led democracy movements as witnessed in Costa Rica, India, Jamaica and South Africa (Cincotta, R. (2008/09).
    Keywords: Demographic Transition, Democracy, Population Growth in Sub-Saharan Africa, Perspectives on the Demographic Transition, Youth Bulge, Second and Third Demographic Transition, China and India, Demographic Transition and Economic Growth and Demographic Responses, Fertility Decline and the Demographic Transition, Population and Development, Population and National Security, Demographic Transition and Changing Sex Roles
    JEL: J1 J11 J13 O1 O40 O47
    Date: 2014–11–22
  17. By: Andersson, T.; Gudmundsson, J.; Talman, A.J.J. (Tilburg University, Center For Economic Research); Yang, Z.
    Abstract: A group of heterogenous agents may form partnerships in pairs. All single agents as well as all partnerships generate values. If two agents choose to cooperate, they need to specify how to split their joint value among one another. In equilibrium, which may or may not exist, no agents have incentives to break up or form new partnerships. This paper proposes a dynamic competitive adjustment process that always either finds an equilibrium or exclusively disproves the existence of any equilibrium in finitely many steps. When an equilibrium exists, partnership and revenue distribution will be automatically and endogenously determined by the process. Moreover, several fundamental properties of the equilibrium solution and the model are derived.
    Keywords: Partnership formation; adjustment process; equilibrium; assignment market
    JEL: C62 C72 D02
    Date: 2013

This nep-cdm issue is ©2015 by Stan C. Weeber. It is provided as is without any express or implied warranty. It may be freely redistributed in whole or in part for any purpose. If distributed in part, please include this notice.
General information on the NEP project can be found at For comments please write to the director of NEP, Marco Novarese at <>. Put “NEP” in the subject, otherwise your mail may be rejected.
NEP’s infrastructure is sponsored by the School of Economics and Finance of Massey University in New Zealand.