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on Collective Decision-Making |
| By: | Vincenzo Galasso; Tommaso Nannicini |
| Abstract: | We analyze political selection in a closed list proportional system where parties have strong gate-keeping power, which they use as an instrument to pursue votes. Parties face a trade-off between selecting loyal candidates or experts, who are highly valued by the voters and thus increase the probability of winning the election. Voters can be rational or behavioral. The former care about the quality mix of the elected candidates in the winning party, and hence about the ordering on the party list. The latter only concentrate on the quality type of the candidates in the top positions of the party list. Our theoretical model shows that to persuade rational voters parties optimally allocate loyalists to safe seats and experts to uncertain positions. Persuading behavioral voters instead requires to position the experts visibly on top of the electoral list. Our empirical analysis, which uses data from the 2013 National election in Italy—held under closed list proportional representation—and from independent pre-electoral polls, is overall supportive of voters’ rational behavior. Loyalists (i.e., party officers or former members of Parliament who mostly voted along party lines) are overrepresented in safe positions, and, within both safe and uncertain positions, they are ranked higher in the list. JEL codes: D72, D78, P16. Keywords: political selection, electoral rule, closed party lists. |
| Date: | 2014 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:igi:igierp:526&r=cdm |
| By: | Rebecca Morton (Department of Politics, New York University); Jean-Robert Tyran (Department of Economics, Copenhagen University) |
| Abstract: | We investigate experimentally the effects of corrupt experts on information aggregation in committees. We find that non-experts are significantly less likely to delegate through abstention when there is a probability that experts are corrupt. Such decreased abstention, when the probability of corrupt experts is low, actually increases information efficiency in committee decision-making. However, if the probability of corrupt experts is large, the effect is not sufficient to offset the mechanical effect of decreased information efficiency due to corrupt experts. Our results demonstrate that the norm of “letting the expert decide” in committee voting is influenced by the probability of corrupt experts, and that influence can have, to a limited extent, a positive effect on information efficiency. |
| Keywords: | Information aggregation, Voting, Asymmetric information, Swing voter's curse |
| JEL: | C92 D71 D72 D81 D82 |
| Date: | 2014–09–07 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:kud:kuiedp:1418&r=cdm |
| By: | Raffaella SANTOLINI (Universit… Politecnica delle Marche, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche e Sociali); David BARTOLINI (Universit… Politecnica delle Marche, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche e Sociali) |
| Abstract: | The present work looks at the role of political institutions - political regimes and electoral rules - in determining the performance of the government to define and implement sound policies for the economy. The results of the empirical investigation on a panel of 80 democracies over the period 1996-2011, show an important impact of the political regime on the performance of the government - the presidential regimes reduces the quality of the government -, while electoral rules do not matter. However, the analysis shows that the interaction between political regimes and electoral rules plays a crucial role for the quality of the government. In particular, a presidential regime improves the government performance when associated with a majoritarian rule, while worsens it when combined with a proportional rule. |
| Keywords: | electoral rule, government eectiveness, political system, regulatory quality |
| JEL: | D72 H11 |
| Date: | 2014–09 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:anc:wpaper:405&r=cdm |
| By: | Craig Brett (Mount Allison University); John A Weymark (Vanderbilt University) |
| Abstract: | Majority voting over the nonlinear tax schedules proposed by a continuum of citizen candidates is considered. The analysis extends the finite-individual model of Röell (unpublished manuscript, 2012). Each candidate proposes the tax schedule that is utility maximal for him subject to budget and incentive constraints. Each of these schedules is a combination of the maxi-min and maxi-max schedules along with a region of bunching in a neighborhood of the proposer's type. Techniques introduced by Vincent and Mason (1967, NASA Contractor Report CR-744) are used to identify the bunching region. As in Röell's model, it is shown that individual preferences over these schedules are single-peaked, so the median voter theorem applies. In the majority rule equilibrium, marginal tax rates are negative for low-skilled individuals and positive for high-skilled individuals except at the endpoints of the skill distribution where they are typically zero. |
| Keywords: | bunching, citizen candidates, ironing, majority voting, nonlinear income taxation |
| JEL: | H2 D7 |
| Date: | 2014–09–26 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:van:wpaper:vuecon-sub-14-00011&r=cdm |
| By: | Jan Zapal |
| Abstract: | The paper proves, by construction, the existence of Markovian equilibria in a model of dynamic spatial legislative bargaining. Players bargain over policies in an infinite horizon. In each period, a majority vote takes place between the proposal of a randomly selected player and the status-quo, the policy last enacted. This determines the policy outcome that carries over as the status-quo in the following period; the status-quo is endogenous. Proposer recognition probabilities are constant and discount factors are homogeneous. The construction relies on simple strategies determined by strategic bliss points computed by the algorithm we provide. A strategic bliss point is the policy maximizing the dynamic utility of a player with ample bargaining power. Relative to a bliss point, the static utility ideal, a strategic bliss point is a moderate policy. Moderation is strategic and germane to the dynamic environment; players moderate in order to constrain the future proposals of opponents. Moderation is a strategic substitute; when a player's opponents do moderate, she does not, and when they do not moderate, she does. We prove that the simple strategies induced by the strategic bliss points computed by the algorithm deliver a Stationary Markov Perfect equilibrium. Thus we prove its existence in a large class of symmetric games with more than three players and (possibly with slight adjustment) in any three-player game. Because the algorithm constructs all equilibria in simple strategies, we provide their general characterization, and we show their generic uniqueness. Finally, we analyse how the degree of moderation changes with changes in the model parameters, and we discuss the dynamics of the equilibrium policies. |
| Keywords: | dynamic decision-making; endogenous status-quo; spatial bargaining; legislative bargaining; |
| JEL: | C73 C78 D74 D78 |
| Date: | 2014–08 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cer:papers:wp515&r=cdm |
| By: | Planko; Jacqueline Cramer; Maryse Chappin; Marko Hekkert |
| Abstract: | The implementation of innovative sustainability technologies often requires far reaching changes of the macro environment in which the innovating firms operate. Strategic management literature describes that firms who want to commercialize an innovative technology can collaborate in networks or industry clusters to build up a favourable environment for their technology. This increases the chances of successful diffusion and adoption of the technology in society. However, the strategic management literature does not offer advice on how to strategically build up this supportive external environment. We fill this gap with complementary insights from the technological innovation systems literature. We introduce the concept of strategic collective system building. Collective system building describes processes and activities networks of actors can strategically engage in to collectively build up a favourable environment for their innovative sustainability technology. Furthermore, we develop a strategy framework for collective system building. To underpin the theoretical analysis empirically, we conducted a case study in the Dutch smart grids field. The resulting strategy framework consists of four key areas for strategy making: technology development and optimization, market creation, socio-cultural changes and coordination. Each of these key strategic areas is composed of a set of system building activities. |
| Keywords: | System building; technological innovation systems; strategic collaboration; collective strategy; sustainability innovation |
| Date: | 2014–09 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:uis:wpaper:1403&r=cdm |
| By: | Swarnodeep Homroy; Kwok Tong Soo |
| Abstract: | Using data on a student group project in which groups are exogenously formed, we examine the potential productivity gains from employing work-teams which are diverse in terms of gender, nationality and ability. We find no significant effect of diversity on overall team performance, except when the team members are from different socio-cultural backgrounds. More importantly, we find that students who have worked in more diverse teams experience a subsequent improvement in individual productivity. These individual productivity gains hold for both domestic and foreign students, and for students of different levels of ability. Our results suggest a mechanism by which diversity enhances individual and collective performance. |
| Keywords: | Group composition, diversity, performance |
| Date: | 2014 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:lan:wpaper:65528509&r=cdm |
| By: | Biniam E. Bedasso |
| Abstract: | This paper seeks to offer an economic explanation for the emergence of democracy in societies with high income inequality and narrow middle-class such as Apartheid South Africa. The presence of a credible threat of capital flight is shown to render democracy less unpleasant to the elites by making future tax concessions possible. However, inequality should be sufficiently low for the poor to have enough incentive to concede less redistribution to avoid capital flight. The development of the finance sector in South Africa in the later years of Apartheid made the exit option a major part of the democratic bargain. |
| Keywords: | democratization, capital mobility, inequality, South Africa, Africa |
| JEL: | P16 O55 |
| Date: | 2014 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:rza:wpaper:458&r=cdm |
| By: | William C. Horrace (Syracuse University); Xiaodong Liu (University of Colorado at Boulder); Eleonora Patacchini (Cornell University, EIEF and CEPR) |
| Abstract: | We consider a production function model that transforms worker inputs into outputs through peer effect networks. The distinguishing features of this production model are that the network is formal and observable through worker scheduling, and selection into the network is done by a manager. We discuss identification and suggest a variety of estimation techniques. In particular, we tackle endogenity issues arising from selection into groups and exposure to common group factors by employing a polychotomous Heckman-type selection correction. We illustrate our method using data from the Syracuse University Menís Basketball team, where at any point in time the coach selects a lineup and the players interact strategically to win games. |
| Date: | 2014 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:eie:wpaper:1406&r=cdm |