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on Collective Decision-Making |
| By: | Florian Schuett (University of Tilburg); Amedeo Piolatto (Universidad de Alicante) |
| Abstract: | We build a framework linking competition in the media market to political participation. Media outlets report on the ability of candidates running for office and compete for audience through their choice of slant. Citizens consume news only if the expected utility of being informed about candidates' ability is sufficiently large for their group collectively. Our results can reconcile seemingly contradictory empirical evidence showing that entry in the media market can either increase or decrease turnout. While information pushes up independent turnout, partisans adjust their turnout to the ability of their preferred candidate, and on average they vote less when informed. |
| Keywords: | Demand for news, Electoral turnout, Group-rule utilitarianism, Media bias. |
| JEL: | D72 L82 |
| Date: | 2014–03 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ivi:wpasad:2014-03&r=cdm |
| By: | Valentino Larcinese |
| Abstract: | What are the political consequences of introducing de jure political equality? Does it change patterns of political representation and the identity of elected legislators? This paper uses an important electoral reform passed in 1912 in Italy to provide evidence on these questions. The reform trebled the electorate (from slightly less than three million to 8.650.000) leaving electoral rules and district boundaries unchanged. By exploiting differences in enfranchisement rates across electoral districts we identify the effect of franchise extension on various political outcomes. Enfranchisement increased the vote share of left-wing social reformers but had no impact on their parliamentary representation, no impact on parliamentary representation of aristocracy and traditional elites and no effect on political competition. We show that left-wing parties decreased their vote shares and were systematically defeated in key swing districts. We document elite's effort to minimize the political impact of the reform and, in particular, we show that the Vatican's secret involvement in the post-reform electoral campaign had a substantial impact on voting results, although formerly and newly enfranchised voters were equally affected. We relate our results to economic theories of democratization, which appear to be only partially compatible with our evidence. Keywords: democratization, voting, electoral competition, inequality, swing districts, political violence, Vatican, socialism. JEL code: D72 |
| Date: | 2014 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:igi:igierp:512&r=cdm |
| By: | Javier Rivas (Department of Economics University of Bath); Carmelo Rodríguez-Álvarez (Departamento de Fundamentos del Análisis Económico II (Economía Cuantitativa) Facultad de Ciencias Económicas y Empresariales Universidad Complutense de Madrid; Instituto Complutense de Analisis Economico (ICAE) Facultad de Ciencias Económicas y Empresariales Universidad Complutense de Madrid) |
| Abstract: | We analyse committees of voters who take a decision between two options as a two- stage process. In a discussion stage, voters share non-verifiable information about a private signal concerning what is the best option. In a voting stage, votes are cast and one of the options is implemented. We introduce the possibility of leadership whereby a certain voter, the leader, is more influential than the rest at the discussion stage even though she is not better informed. We study information transmission and characterize the effects of the leader on the deliberation process. We find, amongst others, that both the quality of the decision taken by the committee and how truthful voters are at the discussion stage depends non-monotonically on how influential the leader is. In particular, although a leader whose influence is weak does not disrupt the decision process of the committee in any way, a very influential leader is less disruptive than a moderately influential leader. |
| Keywords: | Committees; Information Aggregation; Leadership; Voting. |
| JEL: | D71 D72 D82 |
| Date: | 2013–11 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ucm:doicae:1404&r=cdm |
| By: | Andrea Tesei; Paolo Pinotti (Università Bocconi); Ruben Durante (Département d'économie) |
| Abstract: | We investigate the long-term impact of early exposure to Berlusconi’s commercial TV network, Mediaset, on voting behavior and civic engagement in Italy. To do so, we exploit differences in Mediaset signal reception across Italian municipalities due to the network’s staggered introduction over the national territory and to idiosyncratic geomorphological factors. We find that municipalities exposed to Mediaset prior to 1985 exhibit greater electoral support for Berlusconi’s party in 1994, when he first ran for office, relative to municipalities that were exposed only later on. This difference, estimated between 1 and 2 percentage points, is extremely robust and tends to persist in the following four elections. This effect can hardly be attributed to differential exposure to partisan news bias since, prior to 1985, content on Mediaset channels was dominated by light-entertainment programs and no news programs were broadcast until 1991, by which time the network was accessible to the entire population. Instead, we present evidence that early exposure to commercial TV was associated with a substantial decline in social capital consistent with the diffusion of a culture of individualism and civic disengagement that favored the political success of Berlusconi. |
| Keywords: | mass media, voting, civic engagement |
| JEL: | L82 D72 Z13 |
| Date: | 2013–06 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:spo:wpmain:info:hdl:2441/7o52iohb7k6srk09n8t4pad92&r=cdm |
| By: | M. Neuenkirch, P. Siklos (LCERPA) |
| Abstract: | Monetary policy decisions are typically taken after a committee has deliberated and voted on a proposal. However, there are well-known risks associated with committee-based decisions. In this paper we examine the record of the shadow Monetary Policy Council in Canada. Given the structure of the committee, how decision-making takes place, as well as the voting arrangements, the MPC does not face the same information cascades and group polarization risks faced by actual decision-makers in central bank monetary policy councils. We find a considerable diversity of opinion about the recommended future path of interest rates inside the MPC. Beginning with the explicit forward guidance provided by the Bank of Canada market determined forward rates diverge considerably from the recommendations implied by the MPC. There is little evidence that the Bank and the MPC coordinate their future views about the interest rate path. However, it is difficult to explain the basis on which median voter inside the MPC, as well as doves and hawks on the committee, change their views about future changes in policy rates. This implies that there remain challenges in understanding the evolution of future interest rate paths over time. |
| Keywords: | Bank of Canada, central bank communication, committee behaviour, monetary policy committees, shadow councils, Taylor rules |
| JEL: | E43 E52 E58 E61 E69 |
| Date: | 2014–03–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:wlu:lcerpa:wm0066&r=cdm |
| By: | Emilio Guterriez; Ruben Durante (Département d'économie) |
| Abstract: | We investigate the relationship between inter-jurisdictional cooperation and law enforcement in Mexico. Exploiting a Regression Discontinuity Design in close municipal elections, we study how improved opportunities for cooperation in crime prevention among neighboring municipalities - proxied by their degree of political alignment - may result in lower rates of violent crime. We find that municipalities in which the party in power in the majority of neighboring jurisdictions barely won experience significantly lower homicide rates during the mayor’s mandate than those in which it barely lost. This effect is sizeable and independent of which party is in power in the neighboring municipalities. |
| Keywords: | Crime; Mexico; Party Affiliation; Cooperation |
| Date: | 2013–10 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:spo:wpecon:info:hdl:2441/6ggbvnr6munghes9oaso1e0k4&r=cdm |
| By: | Robert Böhm (RWTH Aachen University, Germany); Gary Bornstein (Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Israel); Hannes Koppel (Heidelberg University, Germany) |
| Abstract: | We investigate experimentally the underlying motivations and individual dierences with regard to the participation in between-group conflict in nested social dilemmas. In our nested social dilemmas, the collective is divided into two groups, and individuals allocate tokens between a private, a group-specific, and a collective good. We vary the marginal per capita return of the group-specific and collective good in order to manipulate the motivational within- and between group conflicts. A first experiment shows that a between-group conflict leads to within-group cooperation and particularly individuals with positive other-regarding preferences (prosocials) react to a between-group conflict by contributing to the group-specific good. Hence, paradoxically, individuals with positive other-regarding preferences may foster between-group conflicts. A second experiment reveals that prosocials' contributions to the group-specific or collective good vary as a function of the personal costs of within-group versus collective cooperation, supporting the weighted average social preference theory by Charness and Rabin (2002). |
| Keywords: | between-group conflict, nested social dilemma, other-regarding preferences, local and global public goods |
| JEL: | C72 C92 H41 |
| Date: | 2014–03–31 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:jrp:jrpwrp:2014-011&r=cdm |
| By: | Ali T. Akarca (University of Illinois at Chicago); Aysýt Tansel (Middle East Technical University) |
| Abstract: | During last sixty years, Turkish population moved from one province to another at the rate of about 7-8 percent per five-year interval. As a consequence of this massive internal migration, population residing in a province other than the one they were born in increased from 12 percent in 1950 to 39 percent in 2011. Impact of this population instability on provincial turnout rates in 2011 parliamentary election is studied, controlling for the effects of other socio-economic, demographic, political and institutional factors. Consequences of migration both at destinations and origins are considered. According to robust regressions estimated, the relationship between turnout and education is inverse U-shaped, and between turnout and age, U-shaped. The latter reflects generational differences as well. Large population, large number parliament members to be elected from a constituency, participation by large number of parties, and existence of a dominant party depress the turnout rate. A percentage increase in the proportion of emigrants among the people born in a province reduces turnout rate in that province by 0.13 percentage points, while a percentage increase in the ratio of immigrants in the population of a province reduces it by 0.06 percentage points. However, at destinations where large numbers of immigrants from different regions are concentrated, the opportunity afforded to immigrants to elect one of their own, reduces the latter adverse impact significantly and in some cases turns it to positive. |
| Keywords: | Election turnout, internal migration, political participation, Turkey, voter behavior. |
| Date: | 2014 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:tek:wpaper:2014/4&r=cdm |
| By: | Quoc-Anh Do (Département d'économie); Kieu-Trang Nguyen (London School of Economics); Anh N. Tran (Indiana University Bloomington) |
| Abstract: | Although patronage politics in democracies has been studied extensively, it is less understood in undemocratic regimes, where a large proportion of the world's population resides. To fill this gap, our paper studies how government officials in authoritarian Vietnam direct public resources toward their hometowns. We manually collect an exhaustive panel dataset of political promotions of officials from 2000 to 2010 and estimate their impact on public infrastructure in their rural hometowns. We obtain three main results. First, promotions of officials improve a wide range of infrastructure in their hometowns, including roads, markets, schools, radio stations, clean water and irrigation. This favoritism is pervasive among officials across different ranks, even among those without budget authority, suggesting informal channels of influence. Second, in contrast to pork-barrel politics in democratic parliaments, elected legislators have no power to exercise favoritism. Third, only home communes receive favors, while larger and more politically important home districts do not. This suggests that favoritism is likely motivated by officials’ social preferences for their hometowns rather than by political considerations. |
| Date: | 2013–03 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:spo:wpecon:info:hdl:2441/6ggbvnr6munghes9ocpp7f52o&r=cdm |
| By: | Eliasson, Jonas (KTH); Börjesson, Maria (KTH); Odeck, James (NTNU, Trondheim); Welde, Morten (NTNU, Trondheim) |
| Abstract: | We explore how benefit-cost efficiency and electoral support affect road investment decisions in Sweden and Norway. In Norway, neither benefits nor costs seem to affect project selection. In Sweden, civil servants’ decisions are strongly affected by projects’ benefit-cost ratios, with a stronger effect for more expensive projects, while politicians’ decisions are only weakly affected, and only for small projects. In both countries, governments tend to favour investments in regions where they enjoy strong local electoral support. Using cost efficiency as a final selection criterion seems to filter out many inefficient projects already at an early stage of the planning process. We argue that even if political decisionmakers are apparently mostly governed by other concerns than cost efficiency, civil servants at the administrations should not shy away from preparing efficient project suggestions for decisionmakers to choose from. |
| Keywords: | Cost benefit analysis; Project appraisal; Public decision making; Transport investments |
| JEL: | H43 R42 R48 |
| Date: | 2014–04–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hhs:ctswps:2014_006&r=cdm |
| By: | Fuchs, Alan; Rodriguez-Chamussy, Lourdes |
| Abstract: | The paper estimates the effects on presidential election returns in Mexico of a government climatic contingency transfer that is allocated through rainfall-indexed insurance. The analysis uses the discontinuity in payments that slightly deviate from a pre-established threshold, based on rainfall accumulation measured at local weather stations. It turns out that voters reward the incumbent presidential party for delivering drought relief compensation. The paper finds that receiving indemnity payments leads to significantly greater average electoral support for the incumbent party of approximately 7.6 percentage points. The analysis suggests that the incumbent party is rewarded by disaster aid recipients and punished by non-recipients. The paper contributes to the literature on retrospective voting by providing evidence that voters evaluate government actions and respond to disaster spending. |
| Keywords: | Hazard Risk Management,Global Environment Facility,Natural Disasters,Technology Industry,Rural Poverty Reduction |
| Date: | 2014–04–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:wbk:wbrwps:6836&r=cdm |
| By: | Sidartha Gordon (Département d'économie); Olivier Bochet (University of Bern); René Saran |
| Abstract: | We consider collective decision problems given by a profile of single-peakedpreferences defined over the real line and a set of pure public facilities to be located on the line. In this context, Bochet and Gordon (2012) provide a large class of priority rules based on efficiency, object-population monotonicity and sovereignty. Each such rule is described by a fixed priority ordering among interest groups. We show that any priority rule which treats agents symmetrically - anonymity - , respects some form of coherence across collective decision problems - reinforcement - and only depends on peak information - peak-only -, is a weighted majoritarian rule. Each such rule defines priorities based on the relative size of the interest groups and specific weights attached to locations. We give an explicit account of the richness of this class of rules. |
| Keywords: | Multiple Public Facilities; Priority Rules; Weighted Majori- tarian Rules; Object-Population Monotonicity; Sovereignty; Reinforcement; Anonymity. |
| Date: | 2013–10 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:spo:wpmain:info:hdl:2441/6ggbvnr6munghes9oc5kng5b4&r=cdm |
| By: | Talia Bar (University of Connecticut); Vidya Atal (Montclair State University); Sidartha Gordon (Département d'économie) |
| Abstract: | We examine project adoption decisions of firms constrained in the number of projects they can handle at once. Adoption requires a commitment for a period of uncertain duration, restricting the firm in subsequent periods. Capacity constraints create a “fear of commitment” — some positive return projects are not adopted. In the sequential move dynamic game, the second mover sometimes adopts projects that were rejected by the first, even when both firms are symmetric and equally informed. We study the e§ects of competition on the fear of commitment, and compare the jointly optimal adoption decision to the behavior of strategic non-cooperative firms. |
| Keywords: | adoption, project selection, commitment, Markov perfect equilibrium |
| JEL: | L10 L13 D21 |
| Date: | 2013–07 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:spo:wpmain:info:hdl:2441/7o52iohb7k6srk09n8t8j8cil&r=cdm |
| By: | Bruno Amable (Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne & Institut Universitaire de France) |
| Abstract: | This paper analyses the French political crisis since the late 1970s by investigating the links between the social structure and the economic policy expectations of the electorate. To this end, data on post-electoral survey are used to estimate structural models of political support to political parties for 1978 and 2012, and the estimation results are used to propose an analysis of the French crisis. The enduring French political crisis is found to be the expression of contradictions between the economic policies implemented by the successive governments and the existence of a dominant social bloc, i.e. a coalition of social groups that would politically support the dominant political strategy. Since 1978, both the right and the left have failed to find a solution to the contradictions between the policies they implemented and the expectations of their social bases, which are themselves inhabited by tensions and contradictions that evolve with the structure of French capitalism. The failure of all governing coalitions so far is a new expression of that of the “modernists” to take into account the expectations of the popular classes. |
| Keywords: | France, political crisis, political economy, social base. |
| JEL: | P16 |
| Date: | 2014–03 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:mse:cesdoc:14023&r=cdm |
| By: | Messan Agbaglah (Département d'économique, Université de Sherbrooke) |
| Abstract: | We introduce the game in cover function form, which is a bargaining game of sequential offers for endogenous overlapping coalitions. This extension of games in partition function form removes the restriction to disjoint coalitions. We discuss the existence of equilibria, and we develop an algorithm to compute equilibrium outcomes, under some conditions. We define the key properties that overlapping coalition structures must verify to uniquely identify networks. We show that each network is defined as an equilibrium outcome of a game in cover function form. Our results bridge the two strands of literature devoted to the formation networks and coalitions. |
| Keywords: | Overlapping coalitions, Bargaining, Network formation, Coalition formation, Game in cover function form, Symmetric game |
| JEL: | C72 C78 D62 D85 |
| Date: | 2014–03 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:shr:wpaper:14-02&r=cdm |
| By: | Francis Bloch (EEP-PSE - Ecole d'Économie de Paris - Paris School of Economics - Ecole d'Économie de Paris); Gabrielle Demange (EEP-PSE - Ecole d'Économie de Paris - Paris School of Economics - Ecole d'Économie de Paris, PSE - Paris-Jourdan Sciences Economiques - CNRS : UMR8545 - École des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales (EHESS) - École des Ponts ParisTech (ENPC) - École normale supérieure [ENS] - Paris - Institut national de la recherche agronomique (INRA)); Rachel Kranton (EEP-PSE - Ecole d'Économie de Paris - Paris School of Economics - Ecole d'Économie de Paris, PSE - Paris-Jourdan Sciences Economiques - CNRS : UMR8545 - École des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales (EHESS) - École des Ponts ParisTech (ENPC) - École normale supérieure [ENS] - Paris - Institut national de la recherche agronomique (INRA)) |
| Abstract: | Why do people spread rumors? This paper studies the transmission of possibly false information---by rational agents who seek the truth. Unbiased agents earn payoffs when a collective decision is correct in that it matches the true state of the world, which is initially unknown. One agent learns the underlying state and chooses whether to send a true or false message to her friends and neighbors who then decide whether or not to transmit it further. The papers hows how a social network can serve as a filter. Agents block messages from parts of the network that contain many biased agents; the messages that circulate may be incorrect but sufficiently informative as to the correct decision. |
| Keywords: | Bayesian updating ; Rumors ; Misinformation ; Social networks |
| Date: | 2014–03 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:psewpa:halshs-00966234&r=cdm |
| By: | Alexey Kushnir; Alexandru Nichifor |
| Abstract: | We introduce a simple two-stage game of endogenous network formation and information sharing for reasoning about the optimal design of social networks like Facebook or Google+. We distinguish between unilateral and bilateral connections and between targeted and collective information sharing. Agents value being connected to other agents and sharing and receiving information. We consider multiple utility specifications. We show that the game always has an equilibrium in pure strategies and then we study how the network design and the utility specifications affect welfare. Surprisingly, we find that in general, targeted information sharing is not necessarily better than collective information sharing. However, if all agents are either "babblers" or "friends", irrespective of whether the network is unilateral or bilateral, in equilibrium, targeted information sharing yields higher welfare than collective information sharing. |
| Keywords: | Networks, network formation, unilateral connections, bilateral connections, targeted information sharing, collective information sharing, Google, Facebook, babblers, friends |
| JEL: | D85 C72 C62 |
| Date: | 2014–04 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zur:econwp:152&r=cdm |
| By: | Haavelmo, Trygve (Dept. of Economics, University of Oslo); Bjerkholt, Olav (Dept. of Economics, University of Oslo) |
| Abstract: | The memo consists of six papers on a common theme: applying economic analysis to subjects at the time, 1972, considered non-economic. The first paper considers changes in preferences. The second considers strategies of a regime and its opposition. The third discusses collective decision making in the light of Arrow's possibility theorem and the voting paradox. The fourth discusses some problems of inefficiency in modern industrialised societies, and the onsequences on the welfare of the population. The fifth discusses some aspects of redistributive policies, and the sixth various instances of the conflict between individual and collective rationality, particularly in the case of environmental and population policies. |
| Keywords: | Welfare; government policy; relation of economics to other disciplines |
| JEL: | A12 D01 I38 |
| Date: | 2013–12–03 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hhs:osloec:2013_027&r=cdm |
| By: | Alin Halimatussadiah; Budy P. Resosudarmo; Diah Widyawati |
| Abstract: | Social capital is considered to be an important factor in economic development. It is argued that it generates a flow of (economic) benefits through collective action, by reducing free riding and increasing individual contribution. This study examines whether social capital increases individual contribution in a collective action situation. Using a classroom experiment, two games are played in a sequential manner: a trust game to measure level of trust–as a proxy for social capital–and a public goods game to measure individual contribution to collective action. In the public goods game, we apply some treatments to look at the impact of partial disclosure of a group member’s behaviour in the trust game on contributions in the public goods game. In general, the result shows that the level of social capital positively impacts individual contribution to collective action. However, we found no significant evidence to support the impact of partial disclosure of a group member's behaviour in the trust game on contributions in the public goods game. |
| Keywords: | Social Capital, Collective Action, Trust Game, Public Goods Game |
| JEL: | A14 C91 C92 |
| Date: | 2014 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pas:papers:2014-03&r=cdm |
| By: | Voß, Achim |
| Abstract: | The public management of stock pollutants is an intertemporal problem; today's optimal choice takes the behavior of future governments into account. If a government expects a successor with different environmental preferences - for instance, if Conservatives expect green successors - it must choose strategically. I model this interaction in a two-period game in which the government of each period chooses consumption as a flow variable that adds to a stock of pollution. In this setting, I analyze how the prospect of losing political power changes the incumbent's policy choice. It is shown that both the prospect of a more conservative or of a greener successor reduce present consumption. This implies that losing power in the future makes a conservative government choose a compromise policy today - which may explain why in some countries, conservative governments seem to adopt green policies. By contrast, the expected loss of power makes a green government choose a policy that appears as a radicalization of their position. -- |
| Keywords: | Stock Pollution,Political Economy of Environmental Policy,Time Inconsistency,Strategic choice of stock variables,Sequential Game,Partisan Politicians,Ideological Preferences,Green Parties |
| JEL: | Q58 D72 C72 |
| Date: | 2014 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:cawmdp:66&r=cdm |
| By: | Nabila JAWADI; Likoebe M. MARUPING; Nabila BOUKEF CHARKI |
| Abstract: | Shared leadership has emerged as an important determinant of team performance. However, the efficacy of such leadership in facilitating effective performance in distributed contexts is little understood. We extend theory by examining how shared leadership influences performance in distributed teams. Specifically, we focus on spatial, temporal, and configurational aspects of dispersion and how shared leadership enables teams to overcome the barriers posed by these forms of dispersion. We conducted a five-month study of ten distributed teams to examine shared versus concentrated leadership. Results of the study suggest that highly distributed teams achieve high performance when leadership influence in team coordination and monitoring processes is distributed across multiple team members. In contrast shared and concentrated leadership both seemed to facilitate high performance in less distributed teams. Further, we found that shared leadership in coordination processes was particularly important in facilitating effective communication patterns and, ultimately, high performance. The implications of our findings for theory are discussed. |
| Keywords: | shared leadership, team dispersion, team performance, team processes, virtual interaction. |
| Date: | 2014–03–28 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ipg:wpaper:2014-201&r=cdm |