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on Collective Decision-Making |
| By: | Benno Torgler; Davis Stadelmann; Marco Portmann |
| Abstract: | In Switzerland, two key church institutions – the Conference of Swiss Bishops (CSB) and the Federation of Protestant Churches (FPC) – make public recommendations on how to vote for certain referenda. We leverage this unique situation to directly measure religious organizations' power to shape human decision making. We employ an objective measure of voters' commitment to their religious organization to determine whether they are more likely to vote in line with this organization’s recommendations. We find that voting recommendations do indeed matter, implying that even in a secularized world, religion plays a crucial role in voting decisions. |
| Keywords: | Power, religion, voting, referenda, trust, rules of thumb |
| JEL: | D03 D72 D83 H70 |
| Date: | 2013–11–18 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:qut:qubewp:wp023&r=cdm |
| By: | Laurent Bouton; Paola Conconi; Francisco Pino; Maurizio Zanardi |
| Abstract: | Why are U.S. congressmen reluctant to support gun control regulations, despite the fact that most Americans are in favor of them? We argue that re-election motives can help explain why politicians often take a pro-gun stance against the interests of the majority of the electorate. We describe a model in which an incumbent politician must decide on a primary issue, which is more important to a majority of voters, and a secondary issue, which a minority cares more intensely about. We derive conditions under which the politician, when approaching re-election, will pander towards the interests of the minority on the secondary issue. To assess the evidence, we exploit the staggered structure of the U.S. Senate in which one third of members face re-election every two years and examine senators' voting behavior on gun control. In line with the model's predictions, we obtain three main results: senators are more likely to vote pro gun when they are closer to facing re-election; this behavior is driven by Democratic senators, who "flip flop" on gun control; election proximity has no impact on the voting behavior of senators who are retiring or hold safe seats. |
| Date: | 2013 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:lan:wpaper:43819146&r=cdm |
| By: | Lisa Bruttel (Department of Economics, University of Konstanz, Germany); Werner Güth (Max Planck Institute of Economics, Jena, Germany) |
| Abstract: | In the two-person sequential best shot game, first player 1 contributes to a public good and then player 2 is informed about this choice before contributing. The payoff from the public good is the same for both players and depends only on the maximal contribution. Efficient voluntary cooperation in the repeated best shot game therefore requires that only one player should contribute in a given round. To provide better chances for such cooperation, we enrich the sequential best shot base game by a third stage allowing the party with the lower contribution to transfer some of its periodic gain to the other party. Participants easily establish cooperation in the finitely repeated game. When cooperation evolves, it mostly takes the form of 'labor division,' with one participant constantly contributing and the other constantly compensating. However, in a treatment in which compensation is not possible, (more or less symmetric) alternating occurs frequently and turns out to be almost as efficient as labor division. |
| Keywords: | best shot game, coordination, transfer, experiment |
| JEL: | C71 C73 C91 |
| Date: | 2013–10–31 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:knz:dpteco:1324&r=cdm |
| By: | Jaronicki, Katharina |
| Abstract: | This paper investigates whether petition signing campaigns for popular initiatives constitute a partisan campaigning instrument by revealing potentially relevant information to the signer which increases the benefit from voting or reduces its cost. The analysis is based on the complete sample of Swiss federal initiatives between 1978 and 2000 with aggregate voting data at state level. The results suggest that initiatives collecting many signatures yield higher approval rates at the polls. Petition signing is, however, not significantly related to turnout, and is dominated by initiative-specific characteristics. To show that the relation between signatures collected and acceptance reflects a causal campaigning effect, several approaches are pursued to control for voter preferences which potentially could drive both signatures and acceptance rates. This research relates to turnout and voting literature in general, and to campaigning and voter motivation more specifically. Further, it extends a small stream of literature analyzing signature collection for initiatives. |
| Keywords: | Direct democracy, Initiatives, Signatures, Campaigning, Turnout, Voting, Information |
| JEL: | D72 D80 |
| Date: | 2013–11 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:usg:econwp:2013:33&r=cdm |
| By: | De Borger, Bruno; Proost, Stef |
| Abstract: | This paper studies the political economy of pricing and investment for excludable and congestible public goods in a federal state. Currently, we observe a wide variety of practices, ranging from federal gasoline taxes and road investment to the local supply of -- and sometimes free access to -- libraries, parking spaces and public swimming pools. The two-region model we develop allows for spill-overs between regions, it takes into account congestion, and it captures both heterogeneity between and within regions. Regional decisions are taken by majority voting; decisions at the federal level are taken either according to the principle of a minimum winning coalition or through cooperative bargaining. We have the following results. First, when users form the majority in at least one region, decentralized decision making performs certainly better than centralized decision making if spill-overs are not too large. Centralized decisions may yield higher welfare than decentralization only if users have a large majority and the infrastructure in a given region is intensively used by both local and outside users. Second, if non-users form a majority in both regions, centralized and decentralized decision making yield the same socially undesirable outcome, with prices that are much too high. Third, both bargaining and imposing uniform price restrictions across regions improve the performance of centralized decisions. Fourth, the performance of decentralized supply is strongly enhanced by local self-financing rules; it prevents potential exploitation of users within regions. Self-financing rules at the central level are not necessarily welfare-improving. Finally, the results of this paper contribute to a better understanding of actual policy-making. |
| Date: | 2013–09 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ner:leuven:urn:hdl:123456789/416349&r=cdm |
| By: | Giuseppe De Feo (: Department of Economics and Management, University of Pavia); Giacomo De Luca (University of York) |
| Abstract: | We study the impact of organized crime on electoral competition. Assuming that the mafia is able to bring votes to the supported party in exchange of money, we show that (i) the strongest party is willing to pay the highest price to secure mafia services; (ii) the volume of electoral trade with the mafia increases with political competition and with the efficiency of the mafia. Studying in detail parliamentary elections in Sicily for the period 1946- 1992, we document the significant support given by the Sicilian Mafia to the Christian Democratic party, starting at least from the 1970s. This is consistent with our theoretical predictions, as political competition became much tighter during the 1970s and the Sicilian mafia experienced an extensive centralization process towards the end of the 1960s, which increased substantially its control of the territory. We also provide evidence that in exchange for its electoral support the mafia got economic advantages for its activities in the construction industry. |
| Keywords: | electoral competition, mafia, Cosa Nostra, electoral fraud |
| JEL: | D72 K42 H42 |
| Date: | 2013–11 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pav:demwpp:demwp0057&r=cdm |
| By: | Monisankar Bishnu (Indian Statistical Institute, New Delhi); Min Wang (Peking University) |
| Abstract: | We provide a complete characterization of intergenerational welfare state with education and pension under probabilistic voting where voters internalize the general equilibrium effects materializing in their life-span. We show that as public education is introduced in the economy through the political process of voting, it always increases (reduces) the accumulation of human capital (physical capital), but strikingly, has no effect on the political equilibrium of PAYG social security tax. On the other hand, the introduction of a politically determined PAYG social security most defnitely reduces physical capital accumulation, however it will reduce the human capital accumulation if only if the public education is already present in the economy. Otherwise, it may lead to an increase in the human capital accumulation. We also demonstrate that the general equilibrium effects are crucial to sustain the social security program, and explain why the presence of PAYG social security may not provide su› cient incentive for public investment in education. Finally, we show that the simultaneous arrangement of public education and pension can increase the long-run growth if and only if the relative political weight of the old is small so that the pension program is thin, which makes the result of Boldrin and Montes (2005) study conditional on the intergenerational distribution of voting power in our political economy setup. |
| Keywords: | Education, Social security, Probabilistic voting, Markov Perfect Equilibrium, Endogenous growth |
| JEL: | E6 H3 H52 H55 D90 |
| Date: | 2013–05 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ind:isipdp:13-08&r=cdm |
| By: | Antoine CAZALS (CERDI - Centre d'études et de recherches sur le developpement international - CNRS : UMR6587 - Université d'Auvergne - Clermont-Ferrand I); Alexandre Sauquet (CERDI - Centre d'études et de recherches sur le developpement international - CNRS : UMR6587 - Université d'Auvergne - Clermont-Ferrand I) |
| Abstract: | Is there a strategically beneficial time for political leaders to make international environmental commitments? Based on the political cycles theory we argue that leaders have incentives to delay costly ratification of international environmental agreements to the post-electoral period. However, the cost of participating in these agreements are often lower for developing countries, and they may benefit from indirect gains, which may make them more prone to ratifying in the pre-electoral period. These hypotheses are empirically assessed by studying the ratification process of 48 global environmental agreements censused in the ENTRI database from 1976 to 1999. We use a duration model in which time is measured on a daily basis, enabling us to precisely identify pre- and post-electoral periods -- a significant challenge in political cycles studies. Our investigation reveals the existence of political ratification cycles that are of substantial magnitude and non-linear over the pre- and post-electoral years. |
| Keywords: | International Environmental Agreements;Political cycles;Ratification;duration model |
| Date: | 2013–11–12 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:wpaper:halshs-00903653&r=cdm |
| By: | Désirée Teobaldelli; Friedrich Schneider |
| Abstract: | We analyze, both theoretically and empirically, the influence of direct democratic institutions on the size and development of shadow economies. Our model suggests that, as the extent of direct democracy increases, implemented fiscal policies more nearly reflect the preferences of citizens and so reduce their incentives to operate in the informal sector. This theory implies a negative relationship between the extent of direct democracy and the size of the country’s shadow economy. We also theorize that direct democracy has a greater effect in reducing the informal sector when the former is at low or intermediate values and when the electoral system is characterized by a larger district magnitude. An empirical investigation of a sample of 57 democracies confirms our model’s predictions. |
| Keywords: | shadow economy, direct democratic institutions, district magnitude, good governance |
| JEL: | O17 P16 H11 H26 |
| Date: | 2013–07 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:jku:econwp:2013_16&r=cdm |
| By: | Yiannos Katsourides |
| Abstract: | The political parties in Cyprus are extremely powerful. They play a dominant role in the public as well as the private sphere, resulting in a civil society that is extremely weak. The article will address two issues. First, it will map the evolution of civil society organisations (CSOs), especially the trade unions, and their relationship with political parties. Trade unions are probably the most important and influential of the CSOs in Cyprus. Second, it will examine the relationship between political parties and trade unions in contemporary Cyprus, focusing on the changing context within which their interaction takes place, the strategies adopted by the two actors and the direction of influence between them. Research and analysis are based on interviews, surveys, party documents and other secondary literature. |
| Keywords: | Cyprus, political parties, civil society, trade unions, AKEL, DISY, PEO, SEK |
| Date: | 2013–09 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hel:greese:74&r=cdm |
| By: | Nabila Jawadi; Dominique Bonet-Fernandez |
| Abstract: | Recent research on virtual teams highlights the importance of high quality relationships to achieve high team performance. For research and development (R&D) virtual project teams, relationships characterized by cooperation and trust are expected to enhance creativity and innovation among team members. The purpose of this paper is to identify variables enabling high quality relationship building in virtual R&D teams and to analyze their influence on team performance. To this end, this study examines the effects of leadership, work organization and communication practices on the quality of the relationship between team members. The theoretical developments are illustrated through a case study of a car development project in a leading French car-making firm. Our findings show that dynamic and positive leadership plays an important role in enhancing relationships between team members. The results also highlight the importance of synchronous meetings and frequent and regular interaction to build cooperative and trusty relationships leading to high performance. |
| Keywords: | virtual R&D project teams, team performance, relationshipmanagement, leadership, communication. |
| Date: | 2013–11–14 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ipg:wpaper:40&r=cdm |
| By: | Hottenrott, Hanna; Lopes Bento, Cindy |
| Abstract: | This study analyses the effectiveness of targeted public support for R&D investment. In particular, we test whether the specific policy design aiming at incentivizing (international) collaboration and R&D in small and mediumsized firms achieves the desired objectives on input as well as output additionality. Our results show that the targeted R&D subsidies accelerate R&D spending in the private sector, and especially so in the targeted groups. Further, we differentiate between privately financed R&D and subsidyinduced R&D investment to evaluate their respective effects on innovation performance. The results confirm that the induced R&D is productive as it translates into marketable product innovations. While both types of R&D investments trigger significant output effects, we find that the effect of subsidy-induced R&D investment is higher for firms that collaborate internationally as well as for SMEs. |
| Keywords: | innovation policy; subsidies; R&D; SMEs; international collaboration; |
| Date: | 2013–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ner:leuven:urn:hdl:123456789/376331&r=cdm |
| By: | Neil Buckley; Katherine Cuff; Jeremiah Hurley; Stuart Mestelman; Stephanie Thomas; David Cameron |
| Abstract: | We empirically test the predictions of political economy models regarding public support for a publicly provided private good financed with proportional income taxes when individuals can purchase the good privately and either continue to consume public provision ('top-up') or forego public provision ('opt-out'). Our laboratory results confirm the predicted majority-preferred tax rate in the mixed financing with top-up treatment, but find significantly higher rates than predicted in the mixed financing with opt-out treatment. Using non-parametric regression analysis, we also explore the relationship between individuals' top-up and opt-out decisions and both their income levels and the implemented tax rates. |
| Keywords: | publicly provided private good, mixed financing, voting experiment |
| JEL: | H42 H44 C91 D78 |
| Date: | 2013–11 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:mcm:deptwp:2013-15&r=cdm |
| By: | Siegfried Berninghaus (Karlsruhe Institute of Technology, Institute of Economics); Stephan Schosser (University of Magdeburg, Department of Economics); Bodo Vogt (University of Magdeburg, Department of Economics) |
| Abstract: | For games of simultaneous action selection and network formation, game-theoretic behavior and experimental observations are not in line: While theory typically predicts inefficient outcomes for (anti-)coordination games, experiments show that subjects tend to play efficient (non Nash) strategy profiles. A reason for this discrepancy is the tendency to model corresponding games as one-shot and derive predictions. In this paper, we calculate the equilibria for a finitely repeated version of the Hawk-Dove game with endogenous network formation and show that the repetition leads to additional equilibria, namely the efficient ones played by human subjects. We confirm our results by an experimental study. In addition, we show both theoretically and experimentally that the equilibria reached crucially depend on the order in which subjects adjust their strategy. Subjects only reach efficient outcomes if they first adapt their action and then their network. If they choose their network first, they do not reach efficient outcomes. |
| Keywords: | Network games, Hawk/Dove games, finitely repeated game |
| JEL: | D85 C72 C73 C92 |
| Date: | 2013–11–13 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:jrp:jrpwrp:2013-048&r=cdm |
| By: | Talla Nobibon, Fabrice; Cherchye, L.; Crama, Yves; Demuynck, T.; De Rock, B.; Spieksma, Frits |
| Abstract: | This paper focuses on revealed preference tests of the collective model of household consumption. We start by showing that the decision problems corresponding to testing collective rationality are np-complete. This makes the application of these tests problematic for (increasingly available) large(r) scale data sets. We then present two approaches to overcome this negative result. First, we introduce exact algorithms based on mixed-integer programming (mip) formulations of the collective rationality tests, which can be usefully applied to medium sized data sets. Next, we propose simulated annealing heuristics, which allow for ecient testing of the collective model in the case of large data sets. We illustrate our methods by a number of computational experiments based on Dutch labor supply data. |
| Keywords: | Revealed preference axioms; Rationality; Mixed-integer programming; Global optimization; Simulated annealing; |
| Date: | 2013–09 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ner:leuven:urn:hdl:123456789/415369&r=cdm |
| By: | Marine Agogué (CGS - Centre de Gestion Scientifique - MINES ParisTech - École nationale supérieure des mines de Paris); Elsa Berthet (CGS - Centre de Gestion Scientifique - MINES ParisTech - École nationale supérieure des mines de Paris, SADAPT - Sciences pour l'Action et le Développement : Activités, Produits, Territoires - Institut national de la recherche agronomique (INRA) : UMR1048 - AgroParisTech); Tobias Fredberg (Management of Organizational Renewal and Entrepreneurship - Chalmers University of Technology); Pascal Le Masson (CGS - Centre de Gestion Scientifique - MINES ParisTech - École nationale supérieure des mines de Paris); Blanche Segrestin (CGS - Centre de Gestion Scientifique - MINES ParisTech - École nationale supérieure des mines de Paris); Martin Stoetzel (Chair of Information Systems III - University Erlangen-Nuremberg); Martin Wiener (Chair of Information Systems III - University Erlangen-Nuremberg); Anna Yström (Management of Organizational Renewal and Entrepreneurship - Chalmers University of Technology) |
| Abstract: | Research has improved our understanding of the managerial challenges inherent in exploratory intermediation. For instance knowledge brokers help to solve well-defined problems based on existing competences. But what if the relevant actor networks are not known, if there is no clear common interest, or if there are only ill-defined, wicked problems and no legitimate common place where they can be discussed? The aim of this paper is to explore these management principles for intermediation of the unknown. Can intermediaries be active when the degree of unknown is high? And if so, what can they do and how can they manage and drive collective innovation? We first build on a review of the literature to highlight common core functions of the different types of intermediaries. Then, we introduce the "degree of unknown" as a new dimension for analyzing the role of intermediaries, and we discuss whether the core functions of the intermediary could be fulfilled when the degree of unknown is very high. Our analysis is based on four different empirical case studies in Sweden, France, and Germany where these functions have been tackled in particular because of the low level of pre-existing knowledge. We describe the managerial challenges these intermediaries face in the unknown and we demonstrate examples of how they have been handled. We conclude by discussing the theoretical and empirical perspectives raised by this work. The paper contributes to the theory of innovation intermediaries by exploring the properties of a form of intermediary for which the degree of unknown is a key contingency variable, and describes management principles for such intermediaries. In this way we characterize a new role -the "intermediary of the unknown" - that may be well spread in practice but scarcely analysed in the literature. |
| Keywords: | innovation intermediaries; open innovation; collaborative innovation; degree of unknown; innovation management |
| Date: | 2013 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:journl:hal-00881577&r=cdm |
| By: | Sébastien Gand (CGS - Centre de Gestion Scientifique - MINES ParisTech - École nationale supérieure des mines de Paris); Mathias Béjean (Université Paris-Est - Université Paris-Est) |
| Abstract: | In a period of economic and legitimacy crises for firms, there is a current appeal on alternative firms to the conventional capitalist and hierarchical one, especially ones with a democratic form such as cooperatives. But for a long time the "degeneration" pattern of democratic firms, namely their economic failure or the abandonment of democratic functioning, has been pointed out. Even if such a deterministic rationale has been contested, the main difficulty for democratic firms remains their capacity to overcome degeneration crises. This paper investigates this question through the case of a 400-member democratic professional service firm, studied during three years with an intervention research method. It shows how such a firm designed organizational outcomes to a twofold crisis of performance and governance. It contributes to a better understanding of the conditions of sustainability of democratic firms by emphasizing the possibility of designing new models of cooperation, which integrate various constraints and do not compromise between antagonist logics within the firm. |
| Keywords: | Corporate Democracy; Cooperation |
| Date: | 2013 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:journl:hal-00881721&r=cdm |