New Economics Papers
on Collective Decision-Making
Issue of 2013‒11‒16
27 papers chosen by
Stan C. Weeber, McNeese State University

  1. The dark side of the vote: Biased voters, social information, and information aggregation through majority voting By Morton, Rebecca B.; Piovesan, Marco; Tyran, Jean-Robert
  2. Political Motivations and Electoral Competition: Equilibrium Analysis and Experimental Evidence By Michalis Drouvelis; Alejandro Saporiti; Nicolaas J. Vriend
  3. Path-Breakers: How Does Women’s Political Participation Respond to Electoral Success By Sonia Bhalotra; Irma Clots-Figueras; Lakshmi Iyer
  4. Happy Voters By Liberini, Federica; Redoano, Michela; Proto, Eugenio
  5. Sitting on the fence: Pork - barrels and democratization under threat of conflict. The case of Ghana, 1996 - 2004 By Mesplé-Somps, Sandrine; André, Pierre
  6. Attribution Error in Economic Voting: Evidence from Trade Shocks By Rosa C. Hayes; Masami Imai; Cameron A. Shelton
  7. Does being Elected Increase Subjective Entitlements? Evidence from the Laboratory By Arne Robert Weiss; Irenaeus Wolff
  8. The Power of Coalitions: Participation and Governance in California’s Public-Private Welfare State By Eaton, Charlie; Weir, Margaret
  9. Rhetoric in legislative bargaining with asymmetric information By Chen, Ying; Eraslan, Hülya
  10. Alternating or compensating? An experiment on the repeated sequential best shot game By Lisa Bruttel; Werner GŸth
  11. Ideology and endogenous constitutions By Riboni, Alessandro
  12. Trust and Manipulation in Social Networks. By Manuel Förster; Ana Mauleon; Vincent Vannetelbosch
  13. Should EU Citizens Living in other Member States Vote there in National Elections? By Catriona Seth
  14. In search of consensus: The role of accounting in the definition and reproduction of dominant interests By Farjaudon, Anne-Laure; Morales, Jérémy
  15. Over-caution of large committees of experts By Midjord, Rune; Rodríguez Barraquer, Tomás; Valasek, Justin
  16. Cooperative Games with Incomplete Information : Some Open Problems By Forges, Françoise; Serrano, Roberto
  17. Residential Parking in Vibrant City Districts By Inga Molenda; Gernot Sieg
  18. The Impact of Worker Bargaining Power on the Organization of Global Firms. By Carluccio, J.; Bas, M.
  19. Inequality Dynamics and the Politics of Redistribution By Tetsuo Ono
  20. National Parties, Political Processes and the EU democratic deficit: The Problem of Europarties Institutionalization. By Fabio Sozzi
  21. The organization of political parties and the politics of bureaucratic reform By Cruz, Cesi; Keefer, Philip
  22. Fairness through the Lens of Cooperative Game Theory: An Experimental Approach By Geoffroy de Clippel; Kareen Rozen
  23. An allocation rule for dynamic random network formation processes. By Jean-François Caulier; Michel Grabisch; Agnieszka Rusinowska
  24. The discursive legitimation of political regimes: A network perspective By Haunss, Sebastian; Schneider, Steffen
  25. Determinants of Spain’s decision to leave the European Monetary Union By Antonio Estella
  26. When Ideas Trump Interests: Preferences, World Views, and Policy Innovations By Dani Rodrik
  27. Coalition Formation in General Apex Games By Dominik Karos

  1. By: Morton, Rebecca B.; Piovesan, Marco; Tyran, Jean-Robert
    Abstract: We experimentally investigate information aggregation through majority voting when some voters are biased. In such situations, majority voting can have a dark side, that is, result in groups making choices inferior to those made by individuals acting alone. In line with theoretical predictions, information on the popularity of policy choices is beneficial when a minority of voters are biased, but harmful when a majority is biased. In theory, information on the success of policy choices elsewhere de-biases voters and alleviates the inefficiency. However, in the experiment, providing social information on success is ineffective and does not de-bias voters. --
    Keywords: Condorcet Jury Theorem,information aggregation,majority voting,social information
    JEL: C92 D7 D02 D03
    Date: 2013
  2. By: Michalis Drouvelis (University of Birmingham); Alejandro Saporiti (University of Manchester); Nicolaas J. Vriend (Queen Mary, University of London)
    Abstract: classical one-dimensional election game with two candidates. These candidates are interested in power and ideology, but their weights on these two motives are not necessarily identical. Apart from obtaining the well known median voter result and the two-sided policy differentiation outcome, the paper uncovers the existence of two new equilibrium configurations, called 'one-sided' and 'probabilistic' policy differentiation, respectively. Our analysis shows how these equilibrium configurations depend on the relative interests in power (resp., ideology) and the uncertainty about voters' preferences. The theoretical predictions are supported by the data collected from a laboratory experiment, as we observe convergence to the Nash equilibrium values at the aggregate as well as at the individual levels in all treatments, and the comparative statics effects across treatments are as predicted by the theory.
    Keywords: Electoral competition, Power, Ideology, Uncertainty, Nash equilibrium, Experimental evidence.
    JEL: C72 C90 D72
    Date: 2013–10
  3. By: Sonia Bhalotra; Irma Clots-Figueras; Lakshmi Iyer
    Abstract: This paper analyzes the effect of a woman’s electoral victory on women’s subsequent political participation. Using the regression discontinuity afforded by close elections between women and men in India’s state elections, we find that a woman winning office leads to a large and significant increase in the share of female candidates from major political parties in the subsequent election. This stems mainly from an increased probability that previous women candidates contest again, an important margin in India where a substantial number of incumbents do not contest re-election. There is no significant entry of new female candidates, no change in female or male voter turnout and no spillover effects to neighboring areas. Further analysis points to a reduction in party bias against women candidates as the main mechanism driving the observed increase in women’s candidacy.
    Date: 2013–11–13
  4. By: Liberini, Federica (ETH, Zurich); Redoano, Michela (University of Warwick); Proto, Eugenio (University of Warwick)
    Abstract: In this paper we investigate whether or not recent initiatives taken by governments and international organizations to come up with indicators of SubjectiveWell Being (SWB) to inform policy makers go in the same direction as citizens expectations on what policy makers should do. We test retrospective voting hypotheses by using standard measures of SWB as a proxy for utility instead of the commonly used indicators of economic and …nancial circumstances. Using the British Household Panel Survey Data we …nd that citizens who are satis…ed with their life are more likely to cast their vote in favour of the ruling party, even taking into account ideological preferences. We show that SWB in‡uences voting decision even when the event a¤ecting the SWB is beyond the government’s control, like the spouse death.
    Keywords: Wellbeing, Political Competition, Swing Voter Hypothesis, Retrospective Voting.
    Date: 2013
  5. By: Mesplé-Somps, Sandrine; André, Pierre
    Abstract: This paper studies political competition in the case of a democratization process. We present an illustrative model describing political competition when the opposition threatens the stability of the country. In some cases, our model predicts the government should invest in opposition districts to avoid political agitation. This contrasts with existing literature on established democracies, where public funds usually target ruling, party supporters or electorally tight districts. We empirically observe the first democratic changeover in Ghana in 2000. Implement- ing a diff-in-diff strategy, we find that districts with a leading political party member appear to receive slightly more public funds when their party is not in charge. This phenomenon is found in urban areas and in areas that vote the most for this leading member’s party. Hence it occurs in places with the potential for political agitation.
    Keywords: Public goods; Elections; Politics; Ghana;
    JEL: D72 O55 R53
    Date: 2013–04
  6. By: Rosa C. Hayes (Federal Reserve Bank of New York); Masami Imai (Department of Economics, Wesleyan University); Cameron A. Shelton (Claremont McKenna College)
    Abstract: This paper exploits the international transmission of business cycles to examine the prevalence of attribution error in economic voting in a large panel of countries from 1990-2009. We find that voters, on average, exhibit a strong tendency to oust incumbent governments during an economic downturn, regardless of whether the recession is home-grown or merely imported from trading partners. However, we find important heterogeneity in the extent of attribution error. A split sample analysis shows that countries with more experienced voters, more educated voters, and possibly more informed voters—all conditions which have been shown to mitigate other voter agency problems—do better in distinguishing imported from domestic growth.
    Keywords: Economic voting; Political agency problem
    JEL: E3 E6
    Date: 2013–10
  7. By: Arne Robert Weiss (Department of Economics, University of Köln, Germany); Irenaeus Wolff (Department of Economics, University of Konstanz, Germany and TWI Kreuzlingen, Switzerland)
    Abstract: In Geng, Weiss, and Woff (2011), we pointed to the possibility that a voting mechanism may create or strengthen an entitlement effect in political-power holders relative to a random-appointment mechanism. This comment documents that such an effect, if it exists, is not robust.
    Keywords: Elections, Electoral Campaigns, Dictator Game, Social Distance, Entitlement, Experiment
    JEL: D72 D03 C91
    Date: 2013–10–31
  8. By: Eaton, Charlie; Weir, Margaret
    Abstract: Between 1980 and 2010 California’s health care policy field shifted from a business-dominated, closed-door pattern of decision making to an open political arena in which a wide-ranging and diversely resourced coalition advocating on behalf of beneficiaries had become an accepted partner in policymaking. This article examines this transformation, considering its broader implications for the political dynamics of the public-private welfare state and the role of advocacy groups in defending beneficiary interests. Our argument emphasizes coalition-building, probing not just which interests combine forces, but also showing how coalitions can expand over time and build their range of capabilities. We focus on three processes that build effective coalitions to influence public private policymaking: 1) an initial link that joins previously unconnected groups in umbrella organizations; 2) resource expansion that enlarges the engaged base by funding more diverse groups and expanding alliances with those organizations; 3) institutionalization of coalitional engagement by changing the rules of the game using such policy levers as regular hearings, provisions for participation, and transparency.  We conclude by showing how these capabilities have positioned California to implement the Affordable Care Act and consider the implications for other states.
    Keywords: Social and Behavioral Sciences
    Date: 2013–08–02
  9. By: Chen, Ying; Eraslan, Hülya
    Abstract: We analyze a three-player legislative bargaining game over an ideological and a distributive decision. Legislators are privately informed about their ideological intensities, i.e., the weight placed on the ideological decision relative to the weight placed on the distributive decision. Communication takes place before a proposal is offered and majority rule voting determines the outcome. We show that it is not possible for all legislators to communicate informatively. In particular, the legislator who is ideologically more distant from the proposer cannot communicate informatively, but the closer legislator may communicate whether he would \compromise "or flight" on ideology. Surprisingly, the proposer may be worse off when bargaining with two legislators (under majority rule) than with one (who has veto power), because competition between the legislators may result in less information conveyed in equilibrium. Despite separable preferences, the proposer is always better off making proposals for the two dimensions together.
    Date: 2013–01–01
  10. By: Lisa Bruttel; Werner GŸth
    Abstract: In the two-person sequential best shot game, first player 1 contributes to a public good and then player 2 is informed about this choice before contributing. The payoff from the public good is the same for both players and depends only on the maximal contribution. Efficient voluntary cooperation in the repeated best shot game therefore requires that only one player should contribute in a given round. To provide better chances for such cooperation, we enrich the sequential best shot base game by a third stage allowing the party with the lower contribution to transfer some of its periodic gain to the other party. Participants easily establish cooperation in the finitely repeated game. When cooperation evolves, it mostly takes the form of ''labor division'', with one participant constantly contributing and the other constantly compensating. However, in a treatment in which compensation is not possible, (more or less symmetric) alternating occurs frequently and turns out to be almost as efficient as labor division.
    Keywords: best shot game, coordination, transfer, experiment
    Date: 2013
  11. By: Riboni, Alessandro
    Abstract: We study a legislature where decisions are made by playing an agenda-setting game. Legislators are concerned about their electoral prospects but they are also genuinely concerned for the legislature to make the correct decision. We show that when ideological polarization is positive but not too large (and the status quo is extremely inefficient), institutions in which the executive has either no constraints (autocracy) or many constraints (unanimity) are preferable to democracies that operate under an intermediate number of constraints (simple majority rule). When instead ideological polarization is large (and the status quo is only moderately inefficient), simple majority turns out to be preferable.
    Keywords: Majority rule; Position-taking preferences; Ideological polarization; Strategic interactions; Agenda-setting game;
    JEL: D7 D02
    Date: 2013
  12. By: Manuel Förster (CORE - Université Catholique de Louvain et Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne); Ana Mauleon (CORE - Université Catholique de Louvain et CEREC - Université Saint-Louis - Bruxelles); Vincent Vannetelbosch (Università di Trento and LEM Scuola Superiore Sant'Anna)
    Abstract: We investigate the role of manipulation in a model of opinion formation where agents have opinions about some common question of interest. Agents repeatedly communicate with their neighbors in the social network, can exert some effort to manipulate the trust of others, and update their opinions taking weighted averages of neighbors' opinions. The incentives to manipulate are given by the agents' preferences. We show that manipulation can modify the trust structure and lead to a connected society, and thus, make the society reaching a consensus. Manipulation fosters opinion leadership, but the manipulated agent may even gain influence on the long-run opinions. In sufficiently homophilic societies, manipulation accelerates (slows down) convergence if it decreases (increases) homophily. Finally, we investigate the tension between information aggregation and spread of misinformation. We find that if the ability of the manipulating agent is weak and the agents underselling (overselling) their information gain (lose) overall influence, then manipulation reduces misinformation and agents converge jointly to more accurate opinions about some underlying true state.
    Keywords: Social networks, trust, manipulation, opinion leadership, consensus, Wisdom of crowds.
    JEL: D83 D85 Z13
    Date: 2013–09
  13. By: Catriona Seth
    Abstract: The core right of EU citizenship is freedom of movement within the territory of the Union. But EU citizens who live in a member state other than their homeland cannot vote in the national elections of that country unless they first acquire its citizenship through naturalisation. In several member states they also lose their right to vote in national elections of their country of origin when they have lived abroad for too long. A group of EU citizens has started a European Citizens' Initiative to propose EU citizens should have the franchise to vote in national elections of their country of residence. This working paper collects all the contributions to a EUDO CITIZENSHIP forum debate on this proposal. While all authors agree that the loss of democratic participation rights due to the exercise of free movement rights is contrary to the spirit of EU citizenship, they disagree to a certain extent on what the right answer to this problem is: should EU citizens vote in their countries of origin, of residence, or be given a choice? Should third country nationals be included in a broader electoral reform? How will it be possible to convince a sufficient number of EU citizens of this intiative, given the disappointing turnout rates in European Parliament elections?
    Date: 2012–07–03
  14. By: Farjaudon, Anne-Laure; Morales, Jérémy
    Abstract: This article examines the role of accounting in the manufacture of consensus. Consensus building is often considered a central value for rational decision-making and management. However, more than a democratic confrontation of vantage points, the quest for consensus is a way to discourage conflict and resistance. Our main argument is that accounting and consensus play central roles in processes of definition and the social reproduction of dominant interests. Accounting acts to promote some stakes and strategies (and silence others), as if they were collective and disinterested, which makes them more powerful in debates that deny struggles and asymmetries in positions of power, as well as increases legitimacy by creating an illusion of participation. We illustrate these processes through a case study in which we document the intersection between two fields of knowledge, marketing and accounting, that compete for a monopoly on the definition of value and the ability to speak for the organisation. This analysis draws on Bourdieu's conceptualisation of symbolic domination to highlight how powerful actors secure influence while avoiding contestation. Accounting produces symbolic violence that consolidates asymmetries in positions of power by shaping what is consensual and what is not so that dominant interests are reproduced with the consent of those who have most to lose in the process.
    Keywords: Consensus; Symbolic domination; Brand valuation; Intellectual capital; Management control;
    JEL: M31 M41
    Date: 2013
  15. By: Midjord, Rune; Rodríguez Barraquer, Tomás; Valasek, Justin
    Abstract: We provide an explanation for why committees may behave over-cautiously. A committee of experts makes a decision on a proposed innovation on behalf of 'society'. Each expert's signal about the innovation's quality is generated by the available evidence and the best practices of the experts' common discipline, which is only indirectly related to the true state of the world. In addition to a payoff linked to the adequateness of the committee's decision, each expert receives a disesteem payoff if he/she voted in favor of an ill-fated innovation. No matter how small the disesteem payoffs are, information aggregation fails in large committees: under any majority rule, the committee rejects the innovation almost surely. -- Wir bieten eine Erklärung für die Frage an, warum Gremien unter bestimmten Umständen übervorsichtig agieren. Ein Expertengremium entscheidet stellvertretend für 'die Gesellschaft' über eine ihm vorgeschlagene Innovation. Die Bewertung der Qualität dieser Innovation durch jeden Experten erfolgt auf der Grundlage dessen, was in der gemeinsamen Disziplin als allgemein evident und als 'best practice' angesehen wird. Beides korreliert jedoch nur indirekt mit der tatsächlichen Qualität der Innovation. Neben der Entlohnung, die von der Qualität der Entscheidung des Komitees abhängt, enthält der Nutzen eines jeden Experten eine negative Komponente, z. B. in Form von Geringschätzung, falls er / sie für eine erfolglose Innovation votiert hat. Dabei zeigt sich, dass in großen Gremien das Aggregieren von Informationen scheitert, egal wie klein die negative Nutzenkomponente sein mag: unter jeder beliebigen Mehrheitsregel lehnt das Gremium die Innovation mit an Sicherheit grenzender Wahrscheinlichkeit ab.
    Keywords: Committees,Information aggregation,Disesteem payoffs
    JEL: D71 D72
    Date: 2013
  16. By: Forges, Françoise; Serrano, Roberto
    Abstract: This is a brief survey describing some of the recent progress and open problems in the area of cooperative games with incomplete information. We discuss exchange economies, cooperative Bayesian games with orthogonal coalitions, and issues of cooperation in non-cooperative Bayesian games.
    Keywords: Strategic Externalities; Non-Cooperative Bayesian Games; Cooperative Games with Orthogonal Coalitions; Exchange Economies; Informational Externalities;
    JEL: D82 D51 C72 C71
    Date: 2013–06
  17. By: Inga Molenda (Institute of Transport Economics, Muenster); Gernot Sieg (Institute of Transport Economics, Muenster)
    Keywords: residential parking, urban vitality, love of variety, local decision-making
    JEL: R41 R48 D61 D72
    Date: 2013–09
  18. By: Carluccio, J.; Bas, M.
    Abstract: In this paper, I study how the CEO's election can be biased if some directors in the board belong to the same network. I use a static Bayesian game. Directors want to elect the best candidate but they also want to vote for the winner. In that context, results show that, when no candidate is part of the network, boards with a network perform better in electing the right candidate. On the other hand, it becomes detrimental for stockholders if one candidate is part of the network. Indeed, compared to a situation where there are no interconnections between directors, the directors who are members of a network vote more often for the candidate they think is best, rather than for the one they think might win. The ones who are not part of the network follow their lead. Thus the network has power on the result of the election and therefore limits the power of the future CEO.
    Keywords: worker bargaining power, firm-boundaries, intra-firm trade.
    JEL: F14 J51
    Date: 2013
  19. By: Tetsuo Ono (Graduate School of Economics, Osaka University)
    Abstract: This paper analyzes the political economy of public education and lump-sum transfer in an overlapping-generation model of a two-class society in which the dy- namics of inequality is driven by the accumulation of human capital. The two redistributive policies are determined by voting, while private education which sup- plements public education is purchased individually. The model, which includes two-dimensional voting, demonstrates the following two types of stable steady-state equilibria which are in line with the evidence: a high-inequality equilibrium with government spending in favor of public education, and a low-inequality equilibrium with government spending in favor of lump-sum transfer.
    Keywords: Public education, political economy, inequality
    JEL: D72 D91 I24
    Date: 2013–10
  20. By: Fabio Sozzi
    Abstract: In classical party democracy, elections serve as an “instrument of democracy†(Powell 2000): they are the mechanism to connect policy preferences of the electors (within the electoral arena) to the political production (within the legislative arena). At the European level the linkage seems to be lost because the political actors performing in the two arena are not the same and the logics of behaviour are quite different. The EU calls for truly “Europarties†to become more democratic in its procedural and substantive prerequisites and this entails not only a progressive emancipation of party structures at European level but also an integration between them. In fact, we will have full Europarties only when the two party structures at EU level are either independent from national parties and linked to each other: if intra- and extra- parliamentary faces become really European and connected entities, legislators will be accountable to voters and, consequently, democratic deficit will decline. The main aims of this paper are, firstly, to investigate if and to what extent political parties at European level are able to perform the electoral and legislative functions in the two separated arena and, secondly, if intra- and extra- parliamentary faces of the Europarties are still separated or, rather, have become integrated. In other words, I will delineate the process of institutionalization of the Europarties looking at their progressive autonomy from national parties and systemness/integration at European level (Panebianco 1988).
    Keywords: political parties
    Date: 2013–03–01
  21. By: Cruz, Cesi; Keefer, Philip
    Abstract: Bureaucratic reform is a priority of donor organizations, including the World Bank, but is notoriously difficult to implement. In many countries, politicians have little interest in the basic financial and personnel management systems that are essential to political oversight of bureaucratic performance. To explain this, this paper presents a new perspective on the political economy of bureaucracy. Politicians in some countries belong to parties that are organized to allow party members to act collectively to limit leader shirking. This is particularly the case with programmatic parties. Such politicians have stronger incentives to pursue public policies that require a well-functioning public administration. Novel evidence offers robust support for this argument. From a sample of 439 World Bank public sector reform loans in 109 countries, the paper finds that public sector reforms are more likely to succeed in countries with programmatic political parties.
    Keywords: Public Sector Economics,Public Sector Management and Reform,Public Sector Expenditure Policy,Public Sector Corruption&Anticorruption Measures,Intergovernmental Fiscal Relations and Local Finance Management
    Date: 2013–11–01
  22. By: Geoffroy de Clippel (Dept. of Economics, Brown University); Kareen Rozen (Cowles Foundation, Yale University)
    Abstract: This paper experimentally investigates cooperative game theory from a normative perspective. Subjects designated as Decision Makers express their view on what is fair for others, by recommending a payoff allocation for three subjects (Recipients) whose substitutabilities and complementarities are captured by a characteristic function. We show that axioms and solution concepts from cooperative game theory provide valuable insights into the data. Axiomatic and regression analysis suggest that Decision Makers' choices can be (noisily) described as a convex combination of the Shapley value and equal split solution. A mixture model analysis, examining the distribution of Just Deserts indices describing how far one goes in the direction of the Shapley value, reveals heterogeneity across characteristic functions. Aggregating opinions by averaging, however, shows that the societal view of what is fair remains remarkably consistent across problems.
    Keywords: Cooperative game theory, Fairness, Experiment
    JEL: D63 D03 C71 C91
    Date: 2013–11
  23. By: Jean-François Caulier (Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne); Michel Grabisch (Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne - Paris School of Economics); Agnieszka Rusinowska (Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne - Paris School of Economics)
    Abstract: Most allocation rules for network games presented in the literature assume that the network structure is fixed. We put explicit emphasis on the construction of networks and examine the dynamic formation of networks whose evolution across time periods is stochastic. Time-series of networks are studied that describe processes of network formation where links may appear or disappear at any period. Moreover, convergence to an efficient network is not necessarily prescribed. Transitions from one network to another are random and yield a Markov chain. We propose the link-based allocation rule for such dynamic random network formation processes and provide its axiomatic characterization. By considering a monotone game and a particular (natural) network formation process we recover the link-based flexible network allocation rule of Jackson.
    Keywords: Dynamic networks, network game, link-based allocation rule, Markov chain, characterization.
    JEL: C71 D85
    Date: 2013–08
  24. By: Haunss, Sebastian; Schneider, Steffen
    Abstract: In this working paper, we treat legitimacy and legitimation as interactive, discursive and relational concepts: Legitimacy is socially constructed in the public spheres of (democratic) political regimes, that is, in discursive exchanges of political elites and citizens about the acceptability of these regimes. Legitimacy claims and assessments establish a link between regimes and their institutions on the one hand, and normative benchmarks on the other. Hence they may be examined with the help of discourse network analysis - a novel application of network analysis whose rationale and potential are illustrated on the basis of a corpus of legitimation statements gleaned from German and US quality newspapers. Our method enables us to discover and visualize the structures of legitimation discourses - prominent speaker types, privileged legitimation criteria and discourse coalitions - and to offer some conjectures on the link between discourses and the institutional arrangements of the German and US polities. -- Dieses Arbeitspapier behandelt Legitimität und Legitimation als interaktive, diskursive und relationale Konzepte: Legitimität wird in den Öffentlichkeiten (demokratischer) politischer Regimes, also in einem diskursiven Austausch von politischen Eliten und Bürgern über die Akzeptabilität politischer Herrschaft, sozial konstruiert. In Legitimitätsbehauptungen und -bewertungen wird eine Verbindung zwischen Regimes und ihren Institutionen auf der einen und normativen Kriterien auf der anderen Seite hergestellt. Diese können mit Hilfe der Diskursnetzwerkanalyse untersucht werden; Logik und Potential dieser neuen Anwendung der Netzwerkanalyse werden auf der Basis eines Korpus von Legitimationsstatements aus deutschen und US-amerikanischen Qualitätszeitungen illustriert. Unsere Methode erlaubt es, die Strukturen von Legitimationsdiskursen - etwa prominente Sprechertypen, privilegierte Legitimationskriterien und Diskurskoalitionen - aufzudecken und zu visualisieren; daraus lassen sich schließlich auch Erkenntnisse über die Verbindung zwischen Diskursen und politischen Institutionenarrangements in Deutschland und den USA ableiten.
    Date: 2013
  25. By: Antonio Estella
    Abstract: Spain is the Member State of the European Union whose public opinion is most in favour to exit the Eurozone. In this context, there is a growing social and political debate on this issue in this Member State. This paper analyses at a theoretical level the main economic and socio political determinants that Spain would face if it were considering to take a decision to leave the EMU.
    Keywords: Spain
    Date: 2013–07–09
  26. By: Dani Rodrik
    Abstract: The contemporary approach to political economy is built around vested interests – elites, lobbies, and rent-seeking groups which get their way at the expense of the general public. The role of ideas in shaping those interests is typically ignored or downplayed. Yet each of the three components of the standard optimization problem in political economy – preferences, constraints, and choice variables – rely on an implicit set of ideas. Once the manner in which ideas enter these frameworks is made explicit, a much richer and more convincing set of results can be obtained. In particular, new ideas about policy—or policy entrepreneurship—can exert an independent effect on equilibrium outcomes even in the absence of changes in the configuration of political power.
    JEL: F5 P16
    Date: 2013–11
  27. By: Dominik Karos
    Abstract: We generalize the class of apex game by combining a winning coalition of symmetric minor players with�a collection of apex sets which can form winning coalitions only together with a fixed quota of minor players.� By applying power indices to these games and their subgames we generate players' preferences over coalitions which we use to define a coalition formation game.� We focus on strongly monotonic power indices and investigate under which conditions on the initial general apex game there are core stable coalitions in the resulting coalition formation game.� Besides several general results, we develop condition for the Shapley-Shubik index, the Banzhaf index, and the normalized Banzhaf index in particular.� It turns out that many statements can be easily verified for arbitrary collections of apex sets.� Nevertheless, we give some relations between the collection of apex sets and the set of core stable coalitions.
    Keywords: Apex Games, Core Stability, Hedonic Games, Strong monotony
    JEL: C71 G34
    Date: 2013–10–28

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