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on Collective Decision-Making |
| By: | Galasso, Vincenzo (USI Università della Svizzera Italiana); Nannicini, Tommaso (Bocconi University) |
| Abstract: | This paper investigates the differential response of male and female voters to competitive persuasion in political campaigns. During the 2011 municipal elections in Milan, a sample of eligible voters was randomly divided into three groups. Two were exposed to the same incumbent's campaign but to different opponent's campaigns, with either a positive or a negative tone. The third – control – group received no electoral information. The campaigns were administered online and consisted of a bundle of advertising tools (videos, texts, slogans). Stark gender differences emerge. Negative advertising increases men's turnout, but has no effect on women. Females, however, vote more for the opponent and less for the incumbent when they are exposed to the opponent's positive campaign. Exactly the opposite occurs for males. Additional tests show that our results are not driven by gender identification with the candidate, ideology, or other voter's observable attributes. Effective strategies of persuasive communication should thus take gender into account. Our results may also help to reconcile the conflicting evidence on the effect of negative vs. positive advertising, as the average impact may wash out when aggregated across gender. |
| Keywords: | gender differences, political campaigns, competitive persuasion |
| JEL: | D72 J16 M37 |
| Date: | 2013–07 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps:dp7483&r=cdm |
| By: | Luís Francisco Aguiar-Conraria (Universidade do Minho - NIPE); Pedro C. Magalhães (University of Lisbon, Social Sciences Institute); Christoph A. Vanberg (Alfred-Weber-Institut, University of Heidelberg) |
| Abstract: | In most instances of collective decision-making, it cannot be expected that all persons who are entitled to vote will end up doing so. This has led institutional designers, out of concerns with the “legitimacy” of decisions, to introduce quorum requirements. A prominent example of this can be found in the context of direct democracy mechanisms, such as referenda and initiatives. We discuss the results of an experiment about the consequences of such quora. We show that quora lead to overall decreases in participation rates, dramatically increasing the likelihood of full-fledged electoral boycotts on the part of status quo supporters. |
| Date: | 2013 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nip:nipewp:14/2013&r=cdm |
| By: | Angel Solano-Garcia (Globe and Department of Economic Theory and Economic History, University of Granada.) |
| Abstract: | This paper analyzes the political economy of income redistribution when voters are concerned about tax compliance. We consider a two stagemodel where there is a two party competition over the tax rate in the first stage and voters decide about their level of tax compliance in the second stage. We model political competition à la Wittman with the ideology of parties endogenously determined at equilibrium. We calibrate the model for an average of EU-27 countries. Numerical simulations provide the tax rates proposed by the two parties and the level of tax compliance. We find that a decrease in confidence in tax morale, and an increase in parties’ uncertainty about the preferences of the median voter increase the probability that the party offering the lowest income tax will win and decrease tax compliance. |
| Keywords: | tax evasion, ideological parties, income redistribution, ethical voters. |
| JEL: | D72 H26 |
| Date: | 2013–07–09 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:gra:wpaper:13/06&r=cdm |
| By: | Quoc-Anh Do (Département d'économie); Yen-Teik Lee; Bang Dang Nguyen |
| Abstract: | Using the network of university classmates among corporate directors and politicians and the regression discontinuity design of close gubernatorial elections from 1999 to 2010, we identify the positive and significant impact of social-network based political connections on firm value. Firms connected to elected governors increase value by 1.36% on average surrounding the election date. Political connections are more valuable in a state with a higher level of regulation and corruption, in smaller firms, and in firms dependent on external finance. Firms connected to election winners invest more, earn better operating performance, hold more cash, and enjoy better long-term stock performance. |
| Keywords: | Political connection; firm value; social network; close election; gubernatorial election; regression discontinuity design. |
| JEL: | G3 G28 G30 G34 G38 |
| Date: | 2013–03 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:spo:wpmain:info:hdl:2441/7o52iohb7k6srk09n0dcia0po&r=cdm |
| By: | Tristan Auvray (CEPN - Centre d'Economie de l'Université Paris Nord - Université Paris XIII - Paris Nord - CNRS : UMR7234); Olivier Brossard (LEREPS - Laboratoire d'Etude et de Recherche sur l'Economie, les Politiques et les Systèmes sociaux - Université Toulouse I [UT1] Capitole) |
| Abstract: | We reveal the non-separation of ownership and control for multiple blockholders in the French insider governance system. We show that overlapping directorships of large listed corporations are explained by their ownership connections. Both large and small stakes, from 20% to 1% of cash-flow rights or voting rights, have high explanatory power. Some shareholdings are control rather than monitoring related. We provide evidence also that cross-ownership allows CEOs to entrench themselves. Finally, we demonstrate that causality goes from ownership to interlocking directorates, for both unilateral stakes and cross-shareholdings. |
| Keywords: | Corporate Governance;Ownership networks;Board interlocks;Multiple blockholders |
| Date: | 2013–05 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:cepnwp:hal-00842582&r=cdm |
| By: | Forges, Françoise; Serrano, Roberto |
| Abstract: | This is a brief survey describing some of the recent progress and open problems in the area of cooperative games with incomplete information. We discuss exchange economies, cooperative Bayesian games with orthogonal coalitions, and issues of cooperation in non-cooperative Bayesian games. |
| Keywords: | Strategic Externalities; Non-Cooperative Bayesian Games; Cooperative Games with Orthogonal Coalitions; Exchange Economies; Informational Externalities; |
| JEL: | D82 D51 C72 C71 |
| Date: | 2013–06 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ner:dauphi:urn:hdl:123456789/8158&r=cdm |
| By: | Weeber, Stan |
| Abstract: | The mass mobilization of citizens on the Internet to support both conventional and contentious causes has been adequately documented. The Internet has proven to be a cost effective means to rally timely and widespread support for a topic of interest. Topics addressed by online citizens range from local initiatives to issues of global importance. One mobilization of interest to both social scientists and the public is the movement of online citizens seeking information about missing persons, some believed to be victims of foul play. Left mostly unexplored to date are the types of missing person cases that interest such citizens and the kinds of online tools that these people utilize to keep up with developments on the missing person case of choice. This paper is a preliminary examination of such questions. |
| Keywords: | online citizens, internet social movements, missing persons, police-community relations |
| JEL: | Z10 |
| Date: | 2013–07–15 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:48335&r=cdm |
| By: | Steven Gazzillo (Rutgers University); Barry Sopher (Rutgers University); Athena Aktipis (Arizona State University); Lee Cronk (Rutgers University) |
| Abstract: | Controversy exists about the act of giving as altruistic instead of self-interested behavior. Each side of this argument interprets similar results from similar experiments in different ways. One side argues the results show that the appearance of altruistic behavior can be explained by self-interested motives. The other side argues these results are evidence of group selection,where a group member takes an action that is harmful to itself but benefi cial to the group. We consider this question using a novel approach. We create a rich experimental environment in which subjects have the ability to cooperate to improve the group's outcome by sharing their wealth in non-compulsory, non-enforceable risk-sharing arrangements. We find that average subject behavior appears to be motivated by self-interest more than group survival. |
| Keywords: | risk sharing, experiment, resource management |
| JEL: | C9 D8 |
| Date: | 2013–01–18 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:rut:rutres:201302&r=cdm |
| By: | Muhamed Kudic |
| Abstract: | Empirical evidence on the evolution of innovation networks within high-tech industries is still scant. We investigate network formation processes by analyzing the timing of firms to enter R&D cooperations, using data on laser source manufacturers in Germany, 1990-2010. Network measures are constructed from a unique industry database that allows us to track both the formation and the termination of ties. Regression results reveal that a firm's knowledge endowment (and cooperation experience) shortens the duration to first (and consecutive) cooperation events. The previous occupation of strategic network positions is closely related to the establishment of further R&D cooperations at a swift pace. Geographic co-location produces mixed results in our analysis. |
| JEL: | O32 C41 D85 |
| Date: | 2013–07 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iwh:dispap:9-13&r=cdm |
| By: | Jesus Muñuzuri (Departamento de ingenieria de la organizacion 2 - Universidad de Sevilla (SPAIN)); Jesus Gonzalez-Feliu (LET - Laboratoire d'économie des transports - CNRS : UMR5593 - École Nationale des Travaux Publics de l'État [ENTPE] - Université Lumière - Lyon II) |
| Abstract: | Urban logistics research set off in Europe some fifteen years ago, supported by the funding efforts of the European Commission. The special morphology of European cities, with narrow streets and historical centres which had to be preserved in many cases as world heritage sites, contributed to this interest. However, the problems of urban deliveries also had to be faced in other lively and congested cities around the globe, from Japan to America or Australia. Therefore, several researchers and practitioners have developed in the last years a wide variety of methods to support the different decisions of stakeholders involved in urban logistics. This paper motivates and introduces the Special Issue of European Transport/Trasporti Europei on decision support for urban logistics. The ten proposed papers are classified and presented. |
| Keywords: | urban logistics; decision support; introduction; country-approach |
| Date: | 2013–07–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00843287&r=cdm |
| By: | Andreas Karpf (Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne - Paris School of Economics) |
| Abstract: | This article investigates whether the formation of individual inflation expectations is biased towards a consensus and is thus subject to some kind of herding behavior. Basing on the traditional Carlson-Parkin approach to quantify qualitative survey expectations and its extension by Kaiser and Spitz (2002) in an ordered probit context, a method to gain individual level inflation expectations is proposed using a Markov chain Monte Carlo Hierarchical Bayesian estimation method. This method is applied to micro survey data about inflation expectations of households from the monthly French household survey “Enquête mensuelle de conjoncture auprès des ménages - ECAMME” (January 2004 to December 2012). Finally a non-parametric test for herding behavior (Bernardt et al., 2006) is conducted on the cohort-level expectation estimates, showing that the expectation formation is not subject to a bias towards the expectation consensus. In constrast, it exhibits a strong anti-herding tendency which is consistent with the findings of other studies (Rülke and Tillmann, 2011). |
| Keywords: | Herd behavior, inflation, rational expectations. |
| JEL: | E31 E37 D12 D82 D84 |
| Date: | 2013–07 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:mse:cesdoc:13054&r=cdm |