|
on Collective Decision-Making |
| By: | Tim Powlowski (University of Tübingen); Dennis Coates (UMBC) |
| Abstract: | There is a rich literature addressing the paradox of not voting and election turnout from both theoretical and empirical perspectives. By taking advantage of a unique dataset from an “experimental” setting, this paper is the first to estimate the utility that drives the “civic duty” or the habit for voting. Consistent with the general turnout literature, education level, marital status, household size, and distance all affect the persistence of voter participation. |
| Keywords: | voting participation; election turnout; travel distance; travel cost. |
| Date: | 2013–06 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:umb:econwp:1305&r=cdm |
| By: | Liu, Yanxu; Sims, Charles |
| Abstract: | This study investigates a spatial externality common in invasive species control decisions made by multiple, spatially-connected decision makers (i.e., individual landowners, state and federal agencies, etc.). The externality arises due to the different spatial considerations of decision-makers which drives a wedge between individual and social damages, and results in a suboptimal level of individual control. The number of decision makers, the size of individual parcels, and the spatial configuration of small and large parcels influence the severity of the externality and consequently the insufficiency of privately supplied invasive species control. To internalize the externality, this paper provides a corrective mechanism in which individuals compensate invaded individuals for control actions that preserve uninvaded areas. These results shed light on the coordination problem in transboundary invasive species issues. |
| Keywords: | Agricultural and Food Policy, Environmental Economics and Policy, |
| Date: | 2013 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ags:aaea13:151293&r=cdm |
| By: | Goeschl, Timo; Jarke, Johannes |
| Abstract: | This paper studies monitoring and punishment behavior by second and third parties in a cooperation experiment with endogenous information structures: Players are uninformed whether the target player cooperated or defected at the cooperation stage, but can decide to resolve the information imperfection at non-negative cost at the punishment stage. We examine how monitoring and punishment respond to changes in monitoring costs, and exploit the evidence to gain new insights about commonalities and differences between second and third party behavior. We establish three effects of positive monitoring costs relative to the zero-cost baseline and find that each one affects third parties differently than second parties: A «direct punishment cost effect» (the supply of non-strategic punishment decreases), a «blind punishment effect» (players punish without resolving the information imperfection) and a «diffusion effect» (defectors make up a smaller share of the punished and receive weaker punishment). The first effect affects third parties less, the other two more. As a result, third party punishment leads to increasingly weaker incentives for cooperation relative to second party punishment as monitoring costs rise. In addition, the differences between second and third parties suggest the presence of a «pure role effect»: Taking into account elicited beliefs and risk preferences, third parties punish differently from second parties, not just more weakly. |
| Keywords: | monitoring; punishment; sanctions; information; cooperation |
| Date: | 2013–06–26 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:awi:wpaper:0545&r=cdm |
| By: | Björn Bartling; Florian Engl; Roberto A. Weber |
| Abstract: | This paper studies whether people can avoid punishment by remaining willfully ignorant about possible negative consequences of their actions for others. We employ a laboratory experiment, using modified dictator games in which a dictator can remain willfully ignorant about the payoff consequences of his decision for a receiver. A third party can punish the dictator after observing the dictator’s decision and the resulting payoffs. On the one hand, willfully ignorant dictators are punished less if their actions lead to unfair outcomes than dictators who reveal the consequences before implementing the same outcome. On the other hand, willfully ignorant dictators are punished more than revealing dictators if their actions do not lead to unfair outcomes. We conclude that willful ignorance can circumvent blame when unfair outcomes result, but that the act of remaining willfully ignorant is itself punished, regardless of the outcome. |
| Keywords: | Willful ignorance, third party punishment, dictator game, fairness |
| JEL: | C91 D63 |
| Date: | 2013–06 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zur:econwp:125&r=cdm |
| By: | Naoki Funai |
| Abstract: | In this paper, we provide a theoretical prediction of the way in which adaptive players behave in the long run in games with strict Nash equilibria. In the model, each player picks the action which has the highest assessment, which is a weighted average of past payoffs. Each player updates his assessment of the chosen action in an adaptive manner. Almost sure convergence to a Nash equilibrium is shown under one of the following conditions: (i) that, at any non-Nash equilbrium action profile, there exists a player who can find another action which gives always better payoffs than his current payoff, (ii) that all non-Nash equilibrium action profiles give the same payoff. We show almost sure convergence to a Nash equilibrium in the following games: pure coordination games; the battle of the sexes games; the stag hunt game; and the first order static game. In the game of chicken and market entry games, players may end up playing a maximum action profile. |
| Keywords: | Adaptive Learning, Coordination Games |
| JEL: | C72 D83 |
| Date: | 2013–06 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:bir:birmec:13-14&r=cdm |
| By: | Griewald, Yuliana; Rauschmayer, Felix |
| Abstract: | Using the capability approach, we analyse a recent conflict around nature conservation in the city of Leipzig, Germany. Following its concept of flood protection, a state authority felled thousands of trees in a highly popular nature protection area, which culminated in public protests and lawsuits against the state authority. This analysis has a twofold aim: (1) to better understand the conflict at hand, and (2) to explore the advantages and limitations of using the capability approach for addressing such a nature-related conflict involving collective actors. Our analysis of the actors' positions and interplay between them goes along the lines of the capability approach and gives insight into the conflict from a freedoms perspective. We use qualitative research methods to examine the case, relying upon semi-structured interviews with key stakeholders as well as a document analysis. The capability approach offers a freedom-agency lens and proves to be helpful in analysing the conflict; however, to understand the case better, certain process-specific variables absent from a typical capability formation framework have to be considered as well. -- Wir benutzen den Capability- (Verwirklichungschancen-)Ansatz, um einen kürzlichen Naturschutzkonflikt in der Stadt Leipzig zu analysieren. Hier ließ eine staatliche Verwaltung im Rahmen ihres Konzepts von Hochwasserschutz Tausende Bäume in einem sehr beliebten Schutzgebiet fällen, was Proteste von Bürgern und Naturschutzverbänden auslöste. Unsere Analyse hat ein doppeltes Ziel: Wir wollen sowohl den Konflikt als auch die Vorzüge und Grenzen des Capability-Ansatzes besser verstehen, einen solchen naturbezogenen Konflikt mit kollektiven Akteuren anzugehen. Unsere Analyse der Akteurspositionen und -zusammenhänge vollziehen wir demzufolge an der Struktur des Capability-Ansatzes, was Einblick in den Konflikt aus einer freiheitsbetonenden Perspektive verschafft. Wir benutzen qualitative Forschungsmethoden um den Fall zu untersuchen, genauer gesagt: halbstrukturierte Interviews mit zentralen Stakeholdern wie auch eine Dokumentenanalyse. Der Capability-Ansatz bietet einen Blickwinkel, der Freiheit und menschliches Handeln in den Mittelpunkt stellt und sich als fruchtbar bei der Analyse des Konflikts erweist. Um alle wesentlichen Aspekte erfassen zu können, müssen jedoch weitere Variablen hinzugefügt werden, die typischerweise bei Capability-Analysen fehlen. |
| Date: | 2013 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:ufzdps:72013&r=cdm |
| By: | Jo, Tae-Hee |
| Abstract: | Grounded in the methodological commitments shared by various traditions in heterodox economics, this paper explores going enterprises’ cooperative actions to control markets through social networks. It is argued that 1) market institutions are created and controlled by business enterprises and the state, that 2) competition and cooperation among business enterprises are two sides of the same coin, that 3) competition is regulated, and hence that 4) market instability is managed, if not eliminated, by those who control the market. Such arguments lead to the managed competition thesis that encompasses corporate governance, market governance, and market regulation in an integrative manner. |
| Keywords: | Market control, managed competition, uncertainty, instability |
| JEL: | B5 D40 |
| Date: | 2013–07–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:47936&r=cdm |
| By: | Beath, Andrew; Christia, Fotini; Enikolopov, Ruben |
| Abstract: | Using data from a field experiment in 500 villages, this paper studies how local institutions affect the quality of governance, as measured by aid distribution outcomes. In villages where elected councils exist and manage distributions, aid targeting improves. However, if the distribution is not clearly assigned to either the council or customary leaders, the creation of elected councils increases embezzlement and makes decision-making less inclusive. Requiring that women manage the distribution jointly with customary leaders also increases embezzlement. Thus, while elected councils can improve governance, overlapping mandates between new and existing institutions may result in increased rent-seeking. |
| Keywords: | Social Accountability,Governance Indicators,National Governance,Housing&Human Habitats,Peri-Urban Communities |
| Date: | 2013–06–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:wbk:wbrwps:6510&r=cdm |
| By: | Oberfichtner, Michael |
| Abstract: | Using a large linked employer-employee dataset from Germany, the author investigates workers' decision to introduce a works council as an exit-voice consideration. Thereby, the author explores the collective voice face of introductions, while previous studies focus on the monopoly aspect. Controlling for unobserved plant heterogeneity, council introductions are more likely if workers have high plant-specific human capital or earn high wages, whereas no association between the labor market situation and introductions shows up. The findings on human capital and wages are consistent with the idea that workers trade off introducing a council against exit as well as with workers trying to protect an existing distribution of rents. Redoing the analysis for a sample of plants in which it is less relevant for workers to protect themselves against management decisions yields similar results supporting the voice interpretation. -- Mit einem umfangreichen kombinierten Betriebs-Beschäftigten-Datensatz für Deutschland betrachtet diese Arbeit die Entscheidung, einen Betriebsrat zu gründen, als ein Abwägen von Exit und Voice. Damit untersucht sie mögliche Voiceaspekte von Betriebsratsgründungen, während sich frühere Arbeiten auf Monopolaspekte konzentrieren. Bei Berücksichtigung unbeobachteter Heterogenität sind Betriebsratsgründungen wahrscheinlicher, wenn die Beschäftigten über hohes betriebsspezifisches Humankapital verfügen oder das Lohnniveau im Betrieb hoch ist. Es zeigt sich jedoch kein Zusammenhang mit der Arbeitsmarktsituation. Die Ergebnisse zu Löhnen und Humankapital sind sowohl mit einem Abwägen von Exit und Voice vereinbar als auch mit dem Versuch der Beschäftigten, eine bestehende Verteilung von Renten abzusichern. Bei einer getrennten Analyse für Betriebe, in denen es für Beschäftigte weniger relevant ist, sich gegen Entscheidungen der Unternehmensführung zu schützen, werden ähnliche Ergebnisse gefunden, was die Voiceinterpretation stützt. |
| Keywords: | co-determination,works councils,works council introductions,workers' voice |
| JEL: | J53 |
| Date: | 2013 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:faulre:83&r=cdm |
| By: | Sonia R. Bhalotra; Guilhem Cassan; Irma Clots-Figueras; Lakshmi Iyer |
| Abstract: | This paper investigates whether the religious identity of state legislators in India influences development outcomes, both for citizens of their religious group and for the population as a whole. To allow for politician identity to be correlated with constituency level voter preferences or characteristics that make religion salient, we use quasi-random variation in legislator identity generated by close elections between Muslim and non-Muslim candidates. We find that increasing the political representation of Muslims improves health and education outcomes in the district from which the legislator is elected. We find no evidence of religious favoritism: Muslim children do not benefit more from Muslim political representation than children from other religious groups. |
| JEL: | H41 I15 J13 P16 |
| Date: | 2013–06 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:19173&r=cdm |
| By: | James Lake (Southern Methodist University); Maia Linask (University of Richmond) |
| Abstract: | When governments impose a quota or tariffs on imports, it is well known that the resulting rents and revenues trigger costly rent-seeking and revenue-seeking activities by economic agents. The competition for rents/revenues is welfare-reducing and may be economically more significant than the efficiency losses resulting from the quota/tariff induced resource reallocation. We show that repeated interaction among players can support a socially desirable form of collusion, i.e. cooperation, that eliminates wasteful rent- and revenue-seeking expenditures. Aggregate outcomes are equivalent under tariffs and quotas if cooperation arises. However, the conditions under which cooperation arises differ by policy: that is, quotas and tariffs are only near-equivalent. Indeed, in contrast to Krueger (1974), this near-equivalence result suggests that quotas may be superior to tariffs since cooperative elimination of revenue-seeking is easier than cooperative elimination of rent-seeking. |
| Keywords: | Rent-seeking, revenue-seeking, equivalence, near-equivalence, quotas |
| JEL: | C73 D72 F13 |
| Date: | 2013–06 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:smu:ecowpa:1305&r=cdm |
| By: | Vera Trapmann; Guglielmo Meardi |
| Abstract: | This article describes the evolution of social dialogue and collective bargaining in Poland between 2008 and 2012, arguing that the effects of the crisis have been asymmetrical in two ways. First, while Poland is the only EU country to have avoided recession in macroeconomic terms, the crisis has actually disproportionately affected labour through higher unemployment and worsening employment conditions. Secondly, in a decentralized system like the Polish one, effects of the crisis have differed by sector. Sectors exposed to international competition such as the automotive and steel sectors have suffered from job losses and major restructuring, while services and construction have withstood better. While social dialogue has been temporarily re-legitimized during the crisis, it plays only a sporadic role and a flexible, unsecure employment system remains in place. |
| Keywords: | Trade unions, Collective bargaining, Poland, Crisis |
| JEL: | J5 |
| Date: | 2013–06–21 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cel:dpaper:13&r=cdm |
| By: | Larson, Ronald B.; Brown, Anna K. |
| Abstract: | Integrating the concerns of stakeholders into the decision process can be particularly important when adopting a new technology. Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) offers many potential benefits to the healthcare industry. However, hospital administrators who are examining this technology may not be considering the concerns of some secondary stakeholders (e.g, patients). A consumer survey found that support for two RFID applications in hospitals varied both across respondents and across applications. Privacy attitudes and behaviors were linked with RFID support levels. Increased two-way communications between healthcare management and both primary and secondary stakeholders may help improve the technology adoption decisions. |
| Keywords: | Institutional and Behavioral Economics, Research and Development/Tech Change/Emerging Technologies, |
| Date: | 2013 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ags:aaea13:150975&r=cdm |