New Economics Papers
on Collective Decision-Making
Issue of 2013‒06‒30
nineteen papers chosen by
Stan C. Weeber, McNeese State University

  1. Strategic voting and happiness By Francesca Acacia; Maria Cubel
  2. Dominance Solvable Approval Voting Games By Sébastien Courtin; Matias Nùnez
  3. Voting under the Threat of Secession: Accommodation vs. Repression. By Anesi, Vincent; De Donder, Philippe
  4. Cooperation under Democracy and Authoritarian Norms By Björn Vollan; Yexin Zhou; Andreas Landmann; Biliang Hu; Carsten Herrmann-Pillath
  5. Co-managing common pool resources: Do formal rules have to be adapted to traditional ecological norms? By Björn Vollan; Sebastian Prediger; Markus Frölich
  6. Democracy, Dictatorship and the Cultural Transmission of Political Values By Ticchi, Davide; Verdier, Thierry; Vindigni, Andrea
  7. Politics and IMF Conditionality By Axel Dreher; Jan-Egbert Sturm; Raymond Vreeland
  8. Single-Basined Choice By Walter Bossert; Hans Peters
  9. A concise axiomatization of a Shapley-type value for stochastic coalition processes. By Ulrich Faigle; Michel Grabisch
  10. The Governance Model of the Portuguese Maritime Ports: What Future? By Moreira, Paulo Pires
  11. Firm voluntary measures for environmental changes, eco-innovations and CSR : Empirical analysis based on data surveys By Christian Le Bas; Nicolas Poussing
  12. Mixed Extensions of Decision Problems under Uncertainty By Pierpaolo Battigalli; Simone Cerreia-Vioglio; Fabio Maccheroni; Massimo Marinacci
  13. On application of multi-criteria decision making with ordinal information in elementary education By Mazurek, Jiří
  14. Structural change, collective action, and social unrest in 1930s Spain By Jordi Domènech Feliu; Thomas Jeffrey Miley
  15. Social Influence and the Matthew Mechanism: The Case of an Artificial Cultural Market By Bask, Miia; Bask, Mikael
  16. Assessing the Benefits of Social Networks for Organizations - Report on the first phase of the SEA-SoNS Project By René van Bavel; Aaron Martin
  17. Networks, proximities and inter-firm knowledge exchanges By E. Marrocu; S. Usai; R. Paci
  18. Market Oriented Advisory Services through Women Advisory Service Providers in Punjab, India: The Case of value addition through food processing By Meena, M.S.; Singh, K.M.
  19. (Un)stable vertical collusive agreements By Jean J. Gabszewicz; Skerdilajda Zanaj

  1. By: Francesca Acacia (University of Edinburgh); Maria Cubel (University of Barcelona & IEB)
    Abstract: In this paper we extend the research on happiness and spatial theory of voting by exploring whether strategic and sincere voting affect subjective well-being. We conduct the analysis with data on a large sample of individuals over 50 elections in 16 OECD countries. The results of the analysis show the existence of a negative effect of strategic voting on subjective well-being. In addition, the likelihood of being satisfied decreases when individuals vote strategically for a political party that wins the electoral race. Furthermore, when we analyse separately left-wing and right-wing voters, we find that the described effect holds for left-wing voters but no for right-wing voters. We discuss this evidence in the light of expressive voting theory (Hilman, 2010) and lack of empathy with future selves (Kahneman and Thaler, 1991). Our results are robust to different measures of strategic voting and subjective well-being.
    Keywords: Happiness, life satisfaction, strategic voting, political ideology
    JEL: D72 D03 I31
    Date: 2013
  2. By: Sébastien Courtin; Matias Nùnez (Universit´e de Cergy-Pontoise, THEMA, UMR CNRS 8184; Universit´e de Cergy-Pontoise, THEMA, UMR CNRS 8184)
    Abstract: This work provides necessary and sufficient conditions for the dominance solvability of approval voting games. Our conditions are very simple since they are based on the approval relation, a binary relation between the alternatives. We distinguish between two sorts of dominance solvability and prove that the most stringent one leads to the election of the set of CondorcetWinners whereas this need not be the case for the weak version.
    Keywords: Approval voting, Strategic voting, Dominance-solvability, Condorcet Winner
    JEL: C72 D71 D72
    Date: 2013
  3. By: Anesi, Vincent; De Donder, Philippe
    Date: 2013–07
  4. By: Björn Vollan; Yexin Zhou; Andreas Landmann; Biliang Hu; Carsten Herrmann-Pillath
    Abstract: There is ample evidence for a “democracy premium”. Laws that have been implemented via election lead to a more cooperative behavior compared to a top-down approach. This has been observed using field data and laboratory experiments. We present evidence from Chinese students and workers who participated in public goods experiments and a value survey. We find a premium for top-down rule implementation stemming from people with stronger individual values for obeying authorities. When participants have values for obeying authorities, they even conform to non-preferred rule. Our findings provide strong evidence that the efficiency of political institutions depends on societal norms.
    Keywords: Deterrent effect of legal sanctions, expressive law, authoritarian norms, public goods, democratic voting, China
    JEL: A13 C92 D02 D72 H41
    Date: 2013–06
  5. By: Björn Vollan; Sebastian Prediger; Markus Frölich
    Abstract: We examine the effectiveness of three democratically chosen rules that alleviate the coordination and cooperation problems inherent in collectively managed common-pool resources. In particular we investigate how rule effectiveness and rule compliance depends on the prevailing local norms and ecological values held by resource users. For this purpose, we employ a framed field experiment that is based on a rangeland model for semi-arid regions and carried out with communal farmers in Namibia and South Africa. Participants could vote for three ‘best practice’ management rules found in many places around the world that are discussed for implementation in the study area: (temporary) private property rights, rotational grazing or limitation of livestock numbers. All rules were designed in a way that facilitated cooperation or coordination of actions. The focus of this study lies on the interactions between these rules and prevalent ecological norms exhibited in the rounds prior to rule implementation. In contrast to previous lab experimental studies, we find that democratic voting of rules is not sufficient for high rule compliance and an overall enhancement in cooperation. Rules turned out to be inefficient if they were in conflict with the prevalent ecological norm.
    Keywords: field laboratory experiment, rule compliance, ecological norms, common-pool resource, adaptive co-management, Southern Africa
    JEL: C71 C92 Q24
    Date: 2013–06
  6. By: Ticchi, Davide (IMT Lucca); Verdier, Thierry (Paris School of Economics); Vindigni, Andrea (IMT Lucca)
    Abstract: We develop a theory of endogenous regimes transitions (with a focus on democratic consolidation), which emphasizes the role of political culture and of its interaction with political institutions. Political culture reflects the extent of individual commitment across citizens to defend democracy against a potential military coup, and it is an endogenous state variable of the model along with formal political institutions. We focus on two agencies of political socialization: the family and the state. Parents invest resources in order to transmit their own political values (commitment to democracy) to their children. The state invests resources in public indoctrination infrastructures. The model displays two-way complementarities between political regimes and political culture diffusion. Consolidated democracy emerges when sufficiently many people are committed to democracy. Otherwise the model features persistent fluctuations in and out of democracy as well as cycles of political culture. Importantly, the politico-economic equilibrium may exhibit a persistent (although declining) incongruence between political institutions and political culture, which tends to evolve more slowly than formal institutions.
    Keywords: political culture, socialization, democracy, military, nondemocracy, political economy, political transitions, institutional consolidation, path dependency
    JEL: P16 H11 H26 H41
    Date: 2013–06
  7. By: Axel Dreher (KOF Swiss Economic Institute, ETH Zurich, Switzerland); Jan-Egbert Sturm (KOF Swiss Economic Institute, ETH Zurich, Switzerland); Raymond Vreeland (Georgetown University, Washington D.C.)
    Abstract: Bailouts sponsored by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) are famous for their conditionality: in return for continued installments of desperately needed loans, governments must comply with austere policy changes. Many have suggested, however, that politically important countries face rather weak stringency. Obstacles to testing this hypothesis include finding a measure of political importance that is not plagued by endogeneity and obtaining data on IMF conditionality. We propose to measure political importance using temporary membership on the United Nations Security Council and analyze a newly available dataset on the level of conditionality attached to (a maximum of) 314 IMF arrangements with 101 countries over the 1992 to 2008 period. We find a negative relationship: Security Council members receive about 30 percent fewer conditions. This suggests that the major shareholders of the IMF trade softer conditionality in return for political influence over the Security Council.
    Keywords: IMF, UN Security Council, Voting, Aid, Conditionality
    JEL: O19 O11 F35
    Date: 2013–06
  8. By: Walter Bossert; Hans Peters
    Abstract: Single-basined preferences generalize single-dipped preferences by allowing for multiple worst elements. These preferences have played an important role in areas such as voting, strategy-proofness and matching problems. We examine the notion of singlebasinedness in a choice-theoretic setting. In conjunction with independence of irrelevant alternatives, single-basined choice implies a structure that conforms to the motivation underlying our definition. We also establish the consequences of requiring single-basined choice correspondences to be upper semicontinuous, and of the revealed preference relation to be Suzumura consistent.
    Keywords: Single-basinedness, choice correspondences, independence of irrelevant alternatives, upper semicontinuity, Suzumura consistency
    JEL: D11 D71
    Date: 2013
  9. By: Ulrich Faigle (Universität zu Köln - Mathematisches Institut); Michel Grabisch (Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne - Paris School of Economics)
    Abstract: The Shapley value is defined as the average marginal contribution of a player, taken over all possible ways to form the grand coalition N when one starts from the empty coalition and adds players one by one. In a previous paper, the authors have introduced an allocation scheme for a general model of coalition formation where the evolution of the coalition of active players is ruled by a Markov chain and need not finish with the grand coalition. This note provides an axiomatization which is weaker than the one in the original paper but allows a much more transparent correctness proof. Moreover, the logical independence of the axioms is proved.
    Keywords: Coalitional game, coalition formation process, Shapley value.
    JEL: C71
    Date: 2013–06
  10. By: Moreira, Paulo Pires
    Abstract: According to news published recently, "the (Portuguese) government prepares to announce the creation of a new institutional body, in the domain of the Ministry of Economy, which will be responsible for making policy decisions and the organization of the port sector (...) this new public entity will outline all the maritime and political strategy, as an integrated perspective”. In: Transportes em Revista, 15-05-2013. Now that is a bit entrenched in the collective subconscious talking about sea and ports as part of the miracle(s) that must occur as to get out from economic and social torpor (terms that risk however to be trivialized by echoes reproduced within a growing number of players), one have to identify at first hand of what we are actually talking about.
    Keywords: Port governance
    JEL: R58
    Date: 2013–06–19
  11. By: Christian Le Bas (GATE Lyon Saint-Etienne - Groupe d'analyse et de théorie économique - CNRS : UMR5824 - Université Lumière - Lyon II - École Normale Supérieure - Lyon); Nicolas Poussing (CEPS/INSTEAD - Centre d'Etudes de Populations, de Pauvreté et de Politiques Socio-Economiques / International Networks for Studies in Technology, Environment, Alternatives, Development - Centre d'Etudes de Populations, de Pauvreté et de Politiques Socio-Economiques / International Networks for Studies in Technology, Environment, Alternatives, Development)
    Abstract: Despite the increased strategic importance of environmental innovation on the one hand and corporate social responsibility on the other, there are still few studies that show firm voluntary measures create a primary determinant of environmental changes. First, we clarify the meaning of voluntary measures and CSR. Second, we utilize a survey carried out in Luxemburg on firm CSR practices jointly with the Community Innovation Survey 2008 (CIS 2008). We merge them and show through the estimation of a probit model that CSR is an important factor that explains environmental innovation. Thanks to a question from CIS 2008 we can contribute to the literature by developing a new indicator measuring the scale of the positive impacts on the environment coming from the firm technological innovation capacity. A negative binomial regression enables us to estimate a significant and positive effect of CSR and firm value on this scale.
    Keywords: environmental innovation; corporate social responsibility; Community Innovation Survey 2008; innovation impacts on the environment
    Date: 2013–06–24
  12. By: Pierpaolo Battigalli; Simone Cerreia-Vioglio; Fabio Maccheroni; Massimo Marinacci
    Abstract: In a decision problem under uncertainty, a decision maker considers a set of alternative actions whose consequences depend on uncertain factors outside his control. Following Luce and Raiffa (1957), we adopt a natural representation of such situation that takes as primitives a set of conceivable actions A, a set of states S and a consequence function from actions and states to consequences in C. With this, each action induces a map from states to consequences, or Savage act, and each mixed action induces a map from states to probability distributions over consequences, or Anscombe-Aumann act. Under a consequentialist axiom, preferences over pure or mixed actions yield corresponding preferences over the induced acts. The most common approach to the theory of choice under uncertainty takes instead as primitive a preference relation over the set of all Anscombe-Aumann acts (functions from states to distributions over consequences). This allows to apply powerful convex analysis techniques, as in the seminal work of Schmeidler (1989) and the vast descending literature. This paper shows that we can maintain the mathematical convenience of the Anscombe-Aumann framework within a description of decision problems which is closer to applications and experiments. We argue that our framework is more expressive, it allows to be explicit and parsimonious about the assumed richness of the set of conceivable actions, and to directly capture preference for randomization as an expression of uncertainty aversion.
    Date: 2013
  13. By: Mazurek, Jiří
    Abstract: In the Czech Republic each elementary or secondary school decides which textbook will be used for a given class and a given subject of education. As a supply of textbooks is wide, a selection of the most suitable textbook by a teacher is a typical case of multi-criteria decision making situation where an evaluation of different textbooks on selected criteria is rather ordinal in nature than cardinal: it is not possible to assign textbooks some numerical value with regard to criteria such as content, comprehensibility, adequacy to children’s age and knowledge, etc. (with the exception of textbook’s price), but textbooks can be ranked from the best to the worst by such criteria, and the best textbook can be found by a new and simple mathematical method developed for this purpose in this paper. The aim of the paper is to show how this multi-criteria decision making method with ordinal information can be used for the selection of the most appropriate textbook for elementary science education, because a right choice of a textbook plays an important role in children’s education. And we shall not forget that decisions made today influence the world tomorrow, and the World of Tomorrow is also a World of Our (well-educated) Children.
    Keywords: elementary education; multi-criteria decision making; ordinal information
    JEL: C61 D89
    Date: 2013–06–24
  14. By: Jordi Domènech Feliu; Thomas Jeffrey Miley
    Abstract: The Spanish 2nd Republic (1931-1936) witnessed one of the fastest and deepest processes of popular mobilization in interwar Europe, generating a decisive reactionary wave that brought the country to the Civil War (1936-1939). We show in the paper that both contemporary comment and part of the historiography makes generalizations about the behaviour of the working classes in the period that stress idealistic, re-distributive and even religious motives to join movements of protest. In some other cases, state repression, poverty, and deteriorating living standards have been singled out as the main determinants of participation. This paper uses collective action theory to argue that key institutional changes and structural changes in labour markets were crucial to understand a significant part of the explosive popular mobilization of the period. We argue first that, before the second Republic, temporary migrants had been the main structural limitation against the stabilization of unions and collective bargaining in agricultural labour markets and in several service and industrial sectors. We then show how several industries underwent important structural changes since the late 1910s which stabilized part of the labour force and allowed for union growth and collective bargaining. In agricultural labour markets or in markets in which unskilled temporary workers could not be excluded, unions benefitted from republican legislation restricting temporary migrations and, as a consequence, rural unions saw large gains membership and participation. Historical narratives that focus on state repression or on changes in living standards to explain collective action and social conflict in Spain before the Civil War are incomplete without a consideration of the role of structural changes in labour markets from 1914 to 1931.
    Keywords: Structural change, Social conflict, Labour markets, Spain, Civil War, Interwar Europe, Migration, 2nd Republic
    JEL: N14 N34 N44 P16 J21 J43 J51 J52 J53 J61 J88
    Date: 2013–06
  15. By: Bask, Miia (Department of Sociology); Bask, Mikael (Department of Economics)
    Abstract: We show that the Matthew effect, or Matthew mechanism, was present in the artificial cultural market Music Lab when social influence between individuals was allowed, whereas this was not the case when social influence was not allowed. We also sketch on a class of social network models, derived from social influence theory, that may gener-ate the Matthew effect. Thus, we propose a theoretical framework that may explain why the most popular songs were much more popular, and the least popular songs were much less popular, than when disallowing social influence between individuals.
    Keywords: Matthew effect; Music Lab; social influence; social network
    JEL: C31 C65 Z19
    Date: 2013–06–26
  16. By: René van Bavel (European Commission – JRC - IPTS); Aaron Martin (OECD)
    Abstract: The first phase of the SEA-SoNS ("Assessing the Benefits of Social Networks on Organizations”) project aimed to analyse the current market situation for a limited number of social media stakeholders, to identify and analyse best practices for these selected stakeholders, and to define and prioritise relevant policy options. It was observed that while social media technologies present several potential benefits to organisations, there are considerable challenges and bottlenecks affecting adoption that may warrant policy intervention. To accomplish the objective of developing suitable policy options, the project undertook a range of research and data collection activities, including: • An exhaustive and critical review of the academic, business and policy literature on the organisational use of social networking tools and social media platforms, as well as regular engagement with academic experts in this area • A scoping workshop hosted in Brussels in March 2012, at which the IPTS engaged various stakeholders and social media experts to identify and prioritise the major opportunities and challenges for organizational adoption and deployment of social networking and social media platforms • Ten semi-structured interviews with both technology providers (supply side) and organisational adopters (demand side), to understand and assess their perspectives on the organisational benefits of social technologies, the attendant challenges, best practices, and the wider policy environment • An online 'animation' of stakeholders whereby a larger number of users and experts (n=50) were able to reflect on the main benefits and bottlenecks as regards business and public administration use of social technologies, and to feed these insights into our parallel research activities • A brainstorming workshop in early June 2012, held in Seville, the main objective of which was to distil and synthesise the most important benefits, challenges, best practices, and policy options that emerged from the literature review, stakeholder interviews, and online stakeholder animation • A presentation at the Digital Agenda Assembly (DAA) 2012 that summarised our research to date and focused mainly on policy options for Europe in the area of small and medium-sized enterprise (SME) adoption of social media technologies – and, in particular, how these technologies can help to facilitate economic growth and job creation
    Keywords: Social Networks, Social Media, SME, Adoption, Organizations
    JEL: M15 L38 L86 O33
    Date: 2012–12
  17. By: E. Marrocu; S. Usai; R. Paci
    Abstract: Building on previous literature providing extensive evidence on flows of knowledge generated by inter-firm agreements, in this paper we aim to analyse how the occurrence of such collaborations is driven by the multi-dimensional proximity among participants and by their position within firms’ network. More specifically, we assess how the likelihood that two firms set up a partnership is influenced by their bilateral geographical, technological, organizational, institutional and social proximity and by their position within networks in terms of centrality and closeness. Our analysis is based on agreements in the form of joint ventures or strategic alliances, announced over the period 2005-2012, in which at least one partner is localised in Italy. We consider the full range of economic activities and this allow us to offer a general scenario and to specifically investigate the role of technological relatedness across different sectors. The econometric analysis, based on the logistic framework for rare events, yielded three noteworthy results. First, all the five dimensions of proximity jointly exert a positive and relevant effect in determining the probability of inter-firm knowledge exchanges, signalling that they are complementary rather than substitute channels. Second, the higher impact on probability is due to the technological proximity, followed by the geographical one, while the other proximities (social, institutional and organizational) have a limited effect. Third, we find evidence on the positive role played by networks, through preferential attachment and transitivity effects, in enhancing the probability of inter-firm agreements.
    Keywords: networks, joint ventures, proximities, knowledge flows, strategic alliances
    JEL: R12 O33 O31 L14
    Date: 2013
  18. By: Meena, M.S.; Singh, K.M.
    Abstract: Inclusion of women in scientific and technological endeavors and realizing women’s intellectual potential is a big challenge as they play a decisive role in many facets of agricultural sector in India. Self-help groups (SHGs) have emerged as an effective mechanism for empowerment through group action. Capacity building through training programmes has a positive impact for motivating the rural women to adopt the food preservation technologies which improved the knowledge level significantly. In pluralistic extension system in India public extension plays an important role. Central Institute of Post-Harvest Engineering & Technology (CIPHET-a unit of Indian Council of Agricultural Research, Ministry of Agriculture, New Delhi), made efforts to support the public extension system through commercialization of processing technologies through social capital, capacity building and transfer of processing technologies among peer members and other rural women. The present case study documents the methods adopted by the Women Advisory Services Providers in providing advisory services to Women Self Help Groups in Punjab state of India in food processing sector and thereby making them socially and economically empowered.
    Keywords: Self Help Groups, Market Oriented Advisory Service, Gender empowerment
    JEL: O14 O15 O17 Q12 Q13 Q16
    Date: 2013–06–25
  19. By: Jean J. Gabszewicz (CORE, Université Catholique de Louvain, Belgique); Skerdilajda Zanaj (CREA, Université de Luxembourg)
    Abstract: In this paper, we extend the concept of stability to vertical collusive agreements, involving downstream and upstream firms, using a setup of successive Cournot oligopolies. We show that a stable vertical agreement always exists: the unanimous vertical agreement involving all downstream and upstream firms. Thus, stable vertical collusive agreements exist even for market structures in which horizontal cartels would be unstable. We also show that there are economies for which the unanimous agreement is not the only stable one.
    Keywords: collusion, stability, vertical agreement.
    JEL: D43 L13
    Date: 2013

This issue is ©2013 by Stan C. Weeber. It is provided as is without any express or implied warranty. It may be freely redistributed in whole or in part for any purpose. If distributed in part, please include this notice.
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