New Economics Papers
on Collective Decision-Making
Issue of 2013‒05‒05
five papers chosen by
Stan C. Weeber, McNeese State University

  1. Protests and Beliefs in Social Coordination in Africa By Marc Sangnier; Yanos Zylberberg
  2. Contagious Cooperation, Temptation, and Ecosystem Collapse By Andries Richter; Daan van Soest; Johan Grasman
  3. MODERN ANTI-CAPITALISTIC IDEOLOGIES By Konstantin Yanovsky; Ilia Zatcovetzky; Sergei Zhavoronkov; Ekaterina Reva
  4. How does geographical mobility of inventors influence network formation? By Ernest Miguelez
  5. Corporate main bank decision By Höwer, Daniel

  1. By: Marc Sangnier (Aix-Marseille University (Aix-Marseille School of Economics), CNRS & EHESS); Yanos Zylberberg (CREI, Universitat Pompeu Fabra)
    Abstract: Leaders’ misbehaviors may durably undermine the credibility of the state. Using individual level survey in the aftermath of geo-localized social protests in Africa, we find that trust in monitoring institutions and beliefs in social coordination strongly evolve after riots, together with trust in leaders. As no signs of social unrest can be recorded before, the social conflict can be interpreted as a sudden signal sent on a leader’s action from which citizens extract information on the country’s institutions. Our interpretation is the following. Agents lend their taxes to a leader with imperfect information on the leader’s type and the underlying capacity of institutions to monitor her. A misbehavior is then interpreted as a failure of institutions to secure taxes given by citizens and makes agents (i) reluctant to contribute to the state effort, (ii) skeptical about the contributions of others.
    Keywords: Social conflicts, norms of cooperation, trust, institutions.
    JEL: D74 D83 H41 O17
    Date: 2013–04
  2. By: Andries Richter (Centre for Ecological and Evolutionary Synthesis (CEES), University of Oslo, Norway, and Department of Mathematical Statistical Methods, Wageningen University, the Netherlands); Daan van Soest (Department of Spatial Economics and IVM, VU University Amsterdam, Department of Economics, Tilburg University, the Netherlands); Johan Grasman (Department of Mathematical and Statistical Methods, Wageningen University, the Netherlands)
    Abstract: Real world observations suggest that social norms of cooperation can be effective in overcoming social dilemmas such as the joint management of a common pool resource – but also that they can be subject to slow erosion and sudden collapse. We show that these patterns of erosion and collapse emerge endogenously in a model of a closed community harvesting a renewable natural resource in which individual agents face the temptation to overexploit the resource, while a cooperative harvesting norm spreads through the community via interpersonal relations. We analyze under what circumstances small changes in key parameters (including the size of the community, and the rate of technological progress) trigger catastrophic transitions from relatively high levels of cooperation to widespread norm violation – causing the social-ecological system to collapse.
    Keywords: Social Norms, Common Pool Resource, Co-Evolution, Resilience, Alternative Stable States
    JEL: C73 D62 D64 Q20
    Date: 2013–04
  3. By: Konstantin Yanovsky (Gaidar Institute for Economic Policy); Ilia Zatcovetzky (Samuel Neaman Institute for Advanced Studies in Science and Technology, Technion (Israel)); Sergei Zhavoronkov (Gaidar Institute for Economic Policy); Ekaterina Reva (Gaidar Institute for Economic Policy)
    Abstract: Ideology is pretty efficient machinery to decrease collective action's costs. People not need to communicate or even to be familiar one another to participate the joint action, to support the policy or resist the same. The chapter studies the impact which new ideologies of the 21st century (feminism, multiculturalism, and so on) have had on those institutions, through which the Western world has become wealthy and free.
    Keywords: ideology, collective actions, coordination costs, religion; ideologies' competition
    JEL: D74 N10 P16
    Date: 2013
  4. By: Ernest Miguelez (World Intellectual Property Organization, Economics and Statistics Division, Geneva, Switzerland)
    Abstract: The goal of this paper is to assess the influence of spatial mobility of knowledge workers on the formation of ties of scientific and industrial collaboration across European regions. Co-location has been traditionally invoked to ease formal collaboration between individuals and firms, since tie formation costs increase with physical distance between partners. In some instances, highly-skilled actors might become mobile and bridge regional networks across separate locations. This paper estimates a fixed effects logit model to ascertain precisely whether there exists a ‘previous co-location premium’ in the formation of networks across European regions.
    Keywords: inventors’ mobility, technological collaborations, co-location, European regions, panel data
    JEL: C8 J61 O31 O33 R0
    Date: 2013–04
  5. By: Höwer, Daniel
    Abstract: Do firms select their main bank relationship according to their risk or risk preferences? Relationship banking is attractive for high risk firms since it improves their access to finance and provides liquidity insurance. Low risk firms instead may not want to bear the additional costs. I employ a nested logit model to study the determinants of the main bank relationship decision by newly established German firms. I find that firms that ask for bank support in case of financial distress are more likely to choose a relationship-oriented bank, such as a public or cooperative bank. Cost sensitive firms are more likely to choose a private bank. But I find no evidence that firms select a bank according to ex ante risk. Transaction oriented banks are not able to attract low risk firms. --
    Keywords: Relationship Banking,Start-up,Entrepreneurship,Financing Choice
    JEL: G21 G32 M13
    Date: 2013

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