New Economics Papers
on Collective Decision-Making
Issue of 2012‒07‒08
five papers chosen by

  1. Monetary policy deliberations: Commitee size and votig rules By Vincent Maurin; Jean-Pierre Vidal
  2. Rebellion against Reason? A Study of Expressive Choice and Strikes By Christa Brunnschweiler; Colin Jennings; Ian MacKenzie
  3. Foreign aid and political influence of the development assistance committee countries By Pincin, Jared
  4. Composition of Public Education Expenditures and Human Capital Accumulation By Katsuyuki Naito; Keigo Nishida
  5. Random Dictatorship Domains By Shurojit Chatterji; Arunava Sen; Huaxia Zeng

  1. By: Vincent Maurin (European University Institute, Via Roccettini, 9, 50014 Fiesole Florenz, Italy;); Jean-Pierre Vidal (European Central Bank, Kaiserstrasse 29, D-60311 Frankfurt am Main, Germany.)
    Abstract: How large should a monetary policy committee be? Which voting rule should a monetary policy committee adopt? This paper builds on Condorcets jury threorem to analyse the relationships between com- mittee size and voting rules in a model where policy discussions are subject to a time constraint. It suggests that in large committees ma- jority voting is likely to enhance policy outcomes. Under unanimity (consensus) it is preferable to limit the size of the committee. Finally, supermajority voting rules are social contrivances that contribute to policy performance in a more uncertain environment, when initial pol- icy proposals are less likely to be correct, or when payo¤s are asym- metric. JEL Classification: D71, D78, D81, E58.
    Keywords: Collective decision‐making, optimal committee sizing, deliberations, voting rules.
    Date: 2012–05
  2. By: Christa Brunnschweiler (Norwegian University of Science and Technology, and OxCarre, University of Oxford); Colin Jennings (Department of Economics, University of Strathclyde); Ian MacKenzie (ETH Zurich)
    Abstract: In this paper we challenge the conventional view that strikes are caused by asymmetric information regarding fiÂ…rm proÂ…tability such that union members are uninformed. Instead, we build an expressive model of strikes where the perception of unfairness provides the expressive beneÂ…t of voting for a strike. The model predicts that larger union size increases both wage offers and the incidence of strikes. Furthermore, while asymmetric information is still important in causing strikes, we Â…nd that it is the employer who is not fully informed about the level of emotionality within the union, thereby contributing to strike incidence. An empirical test using UK data provides support for the predictions. In particular, union size has a positive effect on the incidence of strikes and other industrial actions even when asymmetric information regarding proÂ…tability is controlled for.
    Keywords: strikes; fairness; expressive voting
    JEL: D03 D72 J52
    Date: 2012–06
  3. By: Pincin, Jared
    Abstract: This paper empirically examines whether voting coincidence in the United Nations General Assembly increases between donors and recipients after foreign aid is distributed. It extends previous literature by expanding the donor countries considered and by testing the long-run political influence of aid. The results show that Canada, France, Spain, and the United Kingdom exhibit a positive relationship between voting coincidence and aid distribution. The results also show a positive relationship between voting coincidence and aid for the United States, but only in the long run when the yearly panels are collapsed into three-year averages. The latter result may provide an explanation for why previous studies find mixed results as to whether the United States uses aid for political support. The results are robust to the inclusion of measures of economic power, military power, dependence on foreign support, and international trade patterns. Keywords
    Keywords: Official Development Assistance (ODA); UN General Assembly; voting coincidence
    JEL: F35
    Date: 2012–06–14
  4. By: Katsuyuki Naito (Institute of Economic Research, Kyoto University); Keigo Nishida (Graduate School of Economics, Kyoto University)
    Abstract: This paper provides a simple theory to study how the allocation of public funds between primary and higher education affects human cap- ital accumulation. The allocation is endogenously determined through majority voting. Public funding for higher education is not supported when a majority is poor. In some cases, higher education starts to be realized as a majority of individuals accumulate enough human capital through primary edu- cation. Although the emergence of higher education can accelerate aggregate human capital accumulation, it widens income inequality because the very poor are excluded from higher ed- ucation and the declined budget share for primary education decreases its quality.
    Keywords: Public Education, Economic Development, Income Inequality, Majority Voting
    JEL: D72 O11 O15 O40
    Date: 2012–06
  5. By: Shurojit Chatterji (School of Economics, Singapore Management University); Arunava Sen (Indian Statistical Institute, New Delhi, India.); Huaxia Zeng (Singapore Management University, Singapore.)
    Abstract: A domain of preference orderings is a random dictatorship domain if every strategy- proof random social choice function satisfying unanimity dened on the domain, is a random dictatorship. Gibbard (1977) showed that the universal domain is a random dictatorship domain. We investigate the relationship between dictatorial and random dictatorship domains. We show that there exist dictatorial domains that are not ran- dom dictatorship domains. We provide stronger versions of the linked domain condition (introduced in Aswal et al. (2003)) that guarantee that a domain is a random dicta- torship domain. A key step in these arguments that is of independent interest, is a ramification result that shows that under certain assumptions, a domain that is a ran- dom dictatorship domain for two voters is also a random dictatorship domain for an arbitrary number of voters.
    Date: 2012–06

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