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on Collective Decision-Making |
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Issue of 2012‒06‒25
eighteen papers chosen by |
| By: | Falck, Oliver; Gold, Robert; Heblich, Stephan |
| Abstract: | This paper analyses the effect of information disseminated by the Internet on voting behavior. We address endogeneity in Internet availability by exploiting regional and technological peculiarities of the preexisting voice telephony network that hinder the roll-out of fixed-line broadband infrastructure for high-speed Internet. We find small negative effects of Internet availability on voter turnout, and no evidence that the Internet systematically benefits single parties. Robustness tests including placebo estimations from the pre-Internet era confirm our results. We relate differences in the Internet effect between national and local elections to a crowding out of national but not local newspapers. |
| Keywords: | Elections; Political Economy; Instrumental Variables; Mass Media; Inte rnet |
| Date: | 2012–04 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:stl:stledp:2012-07&r=cdm |
| By: | Juan Luis Jiménez (Department of Applied Economic Analysis. University of Las Palmas de Gran Canaria); Carmen García (Department of Applied Economic Analysis. University of Las Palmas de Gran Canaria) |
| Abstract: | political corruption at the local level boomed as well. In fact, it increased from 7 publicly denounced cases from 1999-2003 to at least 180 in the last legislative period (2007-2011). In this paper, we explore this phenomenon in two related ways: how it has affected voting results and political participation, and whether the wrongdoing of local politicians has undermined the voters’ confidence in them. We constructed a socioeconomic municipality database that matched polling results and corruption cases and then estimated a voting-share equation by difference-in-difference and matching techniques. Our results confirm that the voters’ attitude towards corruption is significantly different with respect to parties on the right or the left. In fact, after an imputation in a local corruption case, abstention increases by an average 1.8 percentage points, left-parties’ voting share is reduced by approximately 2 percentage points, while right-parties’ share increases approximately 3 points. However, if the imputed candidate stands for re-election again, right-parties voting share is reduced by 4.4 points, but right-wing corruption at superior levels also increases voting share. |
| Keywords: | Voters’ attitude; Political parties. JEL classification: D02; D73; P16. |
| Date: | 2012–06 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ira:wpaper:201212&r=cdm |
| By: | Markussen, Thomas (University of Copenhagen); Reuben, Ernesto (Columbia University); Tyran, Jean-Robert (University of Copenhagen) |
| Abstract: | The ability of groups to implement efficiency-enhancing institutions is emerging as a central theme of research in economics. This paper explores voting on a scheme of intergroup competition, which facilitates cooperation in a social dilemma situation. Experimental results show that the competitive scheme fosters cooperation. Competition is popular, but the electoral outcome depends strongly on specific voting rules of institutional choice. If the majority decides, competition is almost always adopted. If likely losers from competition have veto power, it is often not, and substantial gains in efficiency are foregone. |
| Keywords: | tournament, competition, public goods, cooperation, voting |
| JEL: | D72 J33 H41 |
| Date: | 2012–06 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps:dp6620&r=cdm |
| By: | Jose Apesteguia; Miguel Ballester; Yusufcan Masatlioglu |
| Abstract: | We offer complete characterizations of the equilibrium outcomes of two prominent agenda voting institutions that are widely used in the democratic world: the amendment, also known as the Anglo-American procedure, and the successive, or equivalently the Euro-Latin procedure. Our axiomatic approach provides a proper understanding of these voting institutions, and allows comparisons between them, and with other voting procedures. |
| Keywords: | Strategic Voting, Agendas, Committees, Institutions, Axioms |
| JEL: | C72 D02 D71 D72 |
| Date: | 2012–02 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:upf:upfgen:1302&r=cdm |
| By: | Gersbach, Hans; Müller, Markus |
| Abstract: | This paper analyzes optimal re-election bars when incumbents gain socially valuable experience in office. We develop a two-period model in which the output of a public good depends on an office-holder's effort, ability and experience. When campaigning for election to an open seat in the first period, candidates can make binding offers of the minimum share of the votes they must obtain to be re-elected in the second period, should they win in the first. We prove that, in equilibrium, both candidates offer the same vote-share threshold, that it exceeds 50 percent, and that it is socially optimal. The higher threshold increases the expected effort over both periods and tends to raise the expected level of ability of office-holders in the second. Together, these effects outweigh the expected loss of incumbents' acquired experience, which results from their reduced chances of getting re-elected with the higher bar. The socially optimal vote threshold is increasing in the value of experience. All of the above conclusions would hold if the optimal threshold were set instead by law. |
| Keywords: | elections; experience; incumbency advantage; political contracts; vote-share thresholds |
| JEL: | D7 D82 H4 |
| Date: | 2012–06 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:9005&r=cdm |
| By: | Enriqueta Aragonès; Micael Castanheira; Marco Giani |
| Abstract: | Politics must tackle multiple issues at once. In a first-best world, political competition constrains parties to prioritize issues according to the voters' true concerns. In the real world, the opposite also happens: parties manipulate voter priorities by emphasizing issues selectively during the political campaign. This phenomenon, known as priming, should allow parties to pay less attention to the issues that they intend to mute. We develop a model of endogenous issue ownership in which two vote-seeking parties (i) invest to attract voters with "better" policy proposals and (ii) choose a communication campaign to focus voter attention on specific issues. We identify novel feedbacks between communication and investment. In particular, we find that stronger priming effects can backfire by constraining parties to invest more resources in all issues, including the ones they would otherwise intend to mute. We also identify under which conditions parties prefer to focus on their "historical issues" or to engage in issue stealing. Typically, the latter happens when priming effects are strong, and historical reputations differentiates parties less. |
| Keywords: | party strategy, salience, issue selection and ownership, priming |
| JEL: | D72 H11 |
| Date: | 2012–06–12 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:aub:autbar:903.12&r=cdm |
| By: | Enriqueta Aragonès; Micael Castanheira; Marco Giani |
| Abstract: | Politics must tackle multiple issues at once. In a first-best world, political competition constrains parties to prioritize issues according to the voters’ true concerns. In the real world, the opposite also happens: parties manipulate voter priorities by emphasizing issues selectively during the political campaign. This phenomenon, known as priming, should allow parties to pay less attention to the issues that they intend to mute. We develop a model of endogenous issue ownership in which two vote-seeking parties (i) invest to attract voters with “better†policy proposals and (ii) choose a communication campaign to focus voter attention on specific issues. We identify novel feedbacks between communication and investment. In particular, we find that stronger priming effects can backfire by constraining parties to invest more resources in all issues, including the ones they would otherwise intend to mute. We also identify under which conditions parties prefer to focus on their “historical issues†or to engage in issue stealing. Typically, the latter happens when priming effects are strong, and historical reputations differentiates parties less. |
| Keywords: | party strategy, salience, issue selection and ownership, priming |
| JEL: | D72 H11 |
| Date: | 2012–06 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:bge:wpaper:641&r=cdm |
| By: | Henning, Christian H.C.A.; Petri, Svetlana |
| Keywords: | Research Methods/ Statistical Methods, |
| Date: | 2012 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ags:aaea12:124881&r=cdm |
| By: | Henning, Christian H.C.A.; Seide, Laura |
| Keywords: | Institutional and Behavioral Economics, International Relations/Trade, |
| Date: | 2012 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ags:aaea12:124949&r=cdm |
| By: | Christa N. Brunnschweiler (Norwegian University of Science and Technology, Norway and OxCarre, University of Oxford, U.K.); Colin Jennings (University of Strathclyde, U.K.); Ian A. MacKenzie (ETH Zurich, Switzerland) |
| Abstract: | In this paper we challenge the conventional view that strikes are caused by asymmetric information regarding firm profitability such that union members are uninformed. Instead, we build an expressive model of strikes where the perception of unfairness provides the expressive benefit of voting for a strike. The model predicts that larger union size increases both wage offers and the incidence of strikes. Furthermore, while asymmetric information is still important in causing strikes, we find that it is the employer who is not fully informed about the level of emotionality within the union, thereby contributing to strike incidence. An empirical test using UK data provides support for the predictions. In particular, union size has a positive effect on the incidence of strikes and other industrial actions even when asymmetric information regarding profitability is controlled for. |
| Keywords: | strikes, expressive voting |
| JEL: | D03 D72 J52 |
| Date: | 2012–06 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:eth:wpswif:12-162&r=cdm |
| By: | Jørn Rattsø (Norwegian University of Science and Technology); Rune J. Sørensen (Norwegian Business School (BI)) |
| Abstract: | Government enterprises are vulnerable to political intervention and influence of various interest groups. The theoretical literature emphasizes the role multiple and conflicting goals that distorts incentives and accountability. We offer empirical evidence of the importance of the political ownership with respect to internal and external interests in the enterprise. Our theoretical starting point is a veto player model of the relationship between two political parties and an interest group. The interest groups can exploit conflict between two political parties regarding the goals of the enterprise, and they can hold back the capacity to reform and restructure the enterprise. The empirical analyses are based on a survey questionnaire to board members and CEOs of the major government enterprises in Norway. The survey offers enterprise-specific measures of party agreement/conflict and interest group influence. The estimates suggest that political conflict increases interest group influence, both internal and external, and thereby holds back restructuring of the enterprise. Furthermore, when current revenues come from government grants, interest group influence tends to be extensive. In an extension of the analysis we show that media attention implies that board members are held more accountable. |
| Keywords: | Veto Player, Interest Group, Political Conflict, Corporate Governance |
| Date: | 2012–03 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:tut:cccrwp:2012-02-ccr&r=cdm |
| By: | Jensen, Christa; Lacombe, Donald; Mcintyre, Stuart |
| Abstract: | The Conservative Party emerged from the 2010 United Kingdom General Election as the largest single party, but their support was not geographically uniform. In this paper, we estimate a hierarchical Bayesian spatial probit model that tests for the presence of regional voting effects. This model allows for the estimation of individual region-specic effects on the probability of Conservative Party success, incorporating information on the spatial relationships between the regions of the mainland United Kingdom. After controlling for a range of important covariates, we find that these spatial relationships are significant and that our individual region-specic effects estimates provide additional evidence of North-South variations in Conservative Party support. |
| Keywords: | United Kingdom General Election, Bayesian hierarchical modelling, spatial econometrics, |
| Date: | 2012 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:edn:sirdps:323&r=cdm |
| By: | PAULO BARELLI; SRIHARI GOVINDAN; ROBERT WILSON |
| Date: | 2012–06–16 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cla:levarc:786969000000000445&r=cdm |
| By: | Geys, Benny; Mause, Karsten |
| Abstract: | Members of parliament in many countries are legally permitted to execute (un)paid jobs in addition to their political mandate. It is often argued that such moonlighting activities are unproblematic for the chain of democratic delegation and accountability as long as outside interests/earnings are disclosed to citizen-principals; the latter may then sanction (perceived) misconduct through the ballot box. Using principal-agent theory as an analytical framework and the German national parliament as a case study, this paper discusses why the accountability mechanisms of moonlighting disclosure and electoral control are often impaired in practice. We also illustrate that these concerns generalise beyond the German setting. -- |
| Date: | 2012 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:wzbfff:spii2012105&r=cdm |
| By: | Le Breton, Michel (Toulouse School of Economics); Lepelley, Dominique (CEMOI, Université de la Réunion); Smaoui, Hatem (CEMOI, Université de la Réunion) |
| Abstract: | The main purpose of this paper is to estimate the probability of casting a decisive vote for a class or random electorate models encompassing the celebrated IC and IAC models. The emphasis is on the impact of correlation across votes on the order of magnitude of this event. Our proof techniques use arguments from probability theory on one hand and the geometry of convex polytopes on the other hand. |
| JEL: | D71 D72 |
| Date: | 2012–06 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:tse:wpaper:25866&r=cdm |
| By: | Binswanger, J. (Tilburg University); Prüfer, J. (Tilburg University) |
| Date: | 2012 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ner:tilbur:urn:nbn:nl:ui:12-5117897&r=cdm |
| By: | Goucha, T |
| Abstract: | In this paper we introduce basic notions of new economic model where preference relations on commodities set are represented by a group action on Euclidean space instead of utility function. Conditions that ensure the existence of individual demand functions and a general equilibrium in the setting of exchange economy are examined. |
| Keywords: | General equilibrium; Preference Relations; Group theory |
| JEL: | D50 D51 C62 |
| Date: | 2012–05–12 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:39337&r=cdm |
| By: | Klaus Abbink (Department of Economics, Monash University, Clayton, Australia); David Masclet (University of Rennes 1, CREM-CNRS, France); Daniel Mirza (Université François Rabelais de Tours, France) |
| Abstract: | In this paper, we study the determinants of inter-groups conflicts, focusing our attention on the role of inequality aversion. First, we experimentally investigate whether inequality is a driving force of inter-group conflicts. Second, we investigate the factors that make preferences for conflict translate into actions. Inter-group conflicts require both coordination and necessary financial material resources. Our experiment consists of a two-stage game. First, subjects play a proportional rent-seeking game to share a prize. In a second stage players can coordinate with the other members of their group to reduce (“burn”) the other group members’ payoff. Treatments differ in the degree of social inequality set between the two groups by attributing to some subjects (the advantaged group) a larger share of the price than other subjects (the disadvantaged group) for the same amount of effort. We observe frequent conflicts, where, as expected, disadvantaged groups “burn” more money than advantaged groups. Surprisingly, however the frequency of conflicts decreases with the degree of inequality. Our data allow us to identify resignation as the driving force behind this phenomenon. |
| Keywords: | Design of experiments, Experimental economics, Social Inequality, Conflicts |
| JEL: | D72 C91 |
| Date: | 2012–03 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:tut:cccrwp:2012-07-ccr&r=cdm |