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on Collective Decision-Making |
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Issue of 2012‒05‒29
thirteen papers chosen by |
| By: | Rogers, Todd T |
| Abstract: | How accurate are people when predicting whether they will vote? These self-predictions are used by political scientists to proxy for political motivation, and by public opinion researcher to predict election outcomes. Phone surveys from three elections, including one survey experiment, are analyzed to compare respondents’ pre-election vote intention with their actual voting behavior using administrative records (N=29,403). Unsurprisingly, many who predict that they will vote actually do not vote. More surprisingly, many who predict that they will not vote actually do vote (29% to 56%). Records of past voting behavior predicts turnout substantially better than self-prediction. Self-prediction inaccuracy is not caused by lack of cognitive salience of past voting, or by inability to recall past voting. Moreover, self-reported recall of turnout in one past election predicts future turnout just as well as self-prediction. We discuss implications for political science research, behavioral prediction, election administration policy, and public opinion. |
| Date: | 2012 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hrv:hksfac:7779639&r=cdm |
| By: | Santiago Sanchez-Pages (University of Edinburgh); Marco Faravelli (School of Economics, University of Queensland, Australia) |
| Abstract: | Proponents of proportional electoral rules often argue that majority rule depresses turnout and may lower welfare due to the ?tyranny of the majority? problem. The present paper studies the impact of electoral rules on turnout and social welfare. We analyze a model of instrumental voting where citizens have private information over their individual cost of voting and over the alternative they prefer. The electoral rule used to select the winning alternative is a combination of majority rule and proportional rule. Results show that these two arguments against majority rule do not hold in this set up. Social welfare and turnout increase with the weight that the electoral rule gives to majority rule when the electorate is expected to be split, and they are independent of the electoral rule employed when the expected size of the minority group tends to zero. However, more proportional rules can increase participation within the minority group. This effect is stronger the smaller the minority group. We then conclude that majority rule fosters overall turnout and increases social welfare, whereas proportional rule fosters the participation of minority groups. |
| Keywords: | Costly voting, Incomplete information, Majority rule, Proportional rule, Turnout. |
| Date: | 2012–05–16 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:edn:esedps:213&r=cdm |
| By: | Kwiek, Maksymilian |
| Abstract: | A committee is choosing from two alternatives. If required supermajority is not reached, voting is repeated indefinitely, although there is a cost of delay. Under suitable assumptions the equilibrium analysis provides a sharp prediction. The result can be interpreted as a generalization of the seminal median voter theorem known from the simple majority case. If supermajority is required instead, then the power to select the outcome moves from the median voter to the more extreme voters. Normative analysis indicates that the simple majority is not constrained efficient because it does not reflect the strengths of voters' opinion. Even if unanimity is a bad voting rule, voting rules close to unanimity may be efficient. The more likely it is to have a very many almost indifferent voters and some very opinionated ones, the more stringent supermajority is required for efficiency |
| Date: | 2012–01–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:stn:sotoec:1110&r=cdm |
| By: | E Bracco |
| Abstract: | This paper proposes a theory of socially optimal districting in a legislative-election model with endogenous party platforms. We generalize the model of Coate and Knight (2007), allowing parties to strategically condition their platforms on the districting. The socially optimal districting re ects the ideological leaning of the population, so that parties internalize voters' preferences in their policy platforms. The optimal seat-vote curve is unbiased when voters are risk-neutral, and -contrary to previous findings-biased against the largest partisan group when voters are risk-averse. The model is then calibrated by an econometric analysis of the elections of U.S. State legislators during the 1990s. |
| Date: | 2011 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:lan:wpaper:1794&r=cdm |
| By: | Gabrielle Demange (PSE - Paris-Jourdan Sciences Economiques - CNRS : UMR8545 - Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales (EHESS) - Ecole des Ponts ParisTech - Ecole Normale Supérieure de Paris - ENS Paris - INRA, EEP-PSE - Ecole d'Économie de Paris - Paris School of Economics - Ecole d'Économie de Paris) |
| Abstract: | The paper presents the problem of choosing the representatives in an assembly when the whole electoral region is subdivided into electoral districts. Because of the two dimensions, geographical (districts) and political (parties), the problem is called bi-apportionment. The main focus of the paper is to discuss fairness and proportionality axioms as well as their implementation. |
| Keywords: | Party Proportional Representation ; Power Indics ; (Bi-) Apportionment ; (Bi-) Divisor Methods ; Fair Shares |
| Date: | 2011–11 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:wpaper:halshs-00644439&r=cdm |
| By: | Russo, Antonio |
| Abstract: | We study the political economy of urban traffic policy. We consider a city and its suburbs. The city decides, by majority voting, on a parking charge in the Central Business District (CBD) and restrictions on road space dedicated to cars. City and suburbs vote on road pricing in the CBD. Results include the following. When the majority of city voters prefers cars to public transport sufficiently more than the average voter, car charges and space restrictions are smaller than optimal. If the suburbs' voters have stronger preferences for cars than the city's, road pricing has the lowest political support among the instruments we consider. Tax exporting and imperfect government coordination may inflate total charges. This is welfare enhancing if it compensates for voters' opposition to car restraining policies. Earmarking charge revenues for public transport is welfare enhancing only if they are topped up by extra funds from a national government. |
| Keywords: | Road pricing; parking charges; majority voting; multiple government |
| Date: | 2012–05 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:tse:wpaper:25844&r=cdm |
| By: | Matthias Dahm (Department d'Economia and CREIP, Universitat Rovira i Virgili); Amihai Glazer (Department of Economics, University of California-Irvine) |
| Abstract: | This paper addresses the puzzle of why redistributive legislation, which benefits a small minority, may pass with overwhelming majorities. It models a legislature in which the same agenda setter serves for two periods, showing how he can exploit a legislature (completely) in the first period by promising future benefits to legislators who support him. In equilibrium, a large majority of legislators vote for the first-period proposal because they thereby maintain the chance of belonging to the minimum winning coalition in the future. Legislators may therefore approve policies by large majorities, or even unanimously, that benefit few, or even none, of them. The results are robust: some institutional arrangements, such as super-majority rules or sequential voting, limit but do not eliminate the agenda setter's power to exploit the legislature; other institutions such as secret voting do not limit his power. |
| Keywords: | Agenda Setting; Legislation; Voting |
| JEL: | D72 |
| Date: | 2012–05 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:irv:wpaper:111211&r=cdm |
| By: | Gabrielle Demange (PSE - Paris-Jourdan Sciences Economiques - CNRS : UMR8545 - Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales (EHESS) - Ecole des Ponts ParisTech - Ecole Normale Supérieure de Paris - ENS Paris - INRA, EEP-PSE - Ecole d'Économie de Paris - Paris School of Economics - Ecole d'Économie de Paris) |
| Abstract: | The paper presents the problem of choosing the representatives in an assembly when the whole electoral region is subdivided into electoral districts. Because of the two dimensions, geographical (districts) and political (parties), the problem is called bi-apportionment. Often the allocation of seats to districts is pre-determined and furthermore distorted ---meaning that the ratios of the number of assigned seats to population size vary significantly across districts. The paper surveys proposed bi-apportionment methods with a focus on the conflict that may arise between party-proportional representation under district distortions. |
| Keywords: | Party-proportional representation ; (bi-)apportionment ; (bi-)divisor methods ; fair shares |
| Date: | 2011–10 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:wpaper:halshs-00623031&r=cdm |
| By: | Saint-Paul, Gilles; Ticchi, Davide; Vindigni, Andrea |
| Abstract: | We develop a theory of endogenous political entrenchment in a simple two-party dynamic model of income redistribution with probabilistic voting. A partially self-interested left-wing party may implement (entrenchment) policies reducing the income of its own constituency, the lower class, in order to consolidate its future political power. Such policies increase the net gain that low-skill agents obtain from income redistribution, which only the Left (but not the Right) can credibly commit to provide, and therefore may help offsetting a potential future aggregate ideological shock averse to the left-wing party. We demonstrate that political entrenchmen by the Left occurs only if incumbency rents are sufficiently high and that low-skill citizens may vote for this party even though they rationally expect the adoption of these policies. We also discuss the case where the left-wing party may have the incentive to ex-ante commit to not pursue entrenchment policies once in power. Finally, we show that, in a more general framework, the entrenchment policies can be implemented also by the right-wing party. The comparative statics analyzes the effects of state capacity, a positive bias of voters for one party and income inequality on the incentives of the incumbent party to pursue entrenchment policies. The importance of our theory for constitutionally legislated term limits is also discussed. The theory sheds light on why left-wing parties or politicians often support liberal immigration policies of unskilled workers, are sometime in favor of free trade with less developed economies and of globalization more generally, or fail to reform plainly |
| Keywords: | checks and balances; constituencies; inefficient redistribution; inequality; political entrenchment; political rents; state fiscal capacity |
| JEL: | D72 P16 |
| Date: | 2012–05 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:8960&r=cdm |
| By: | Martin Halla; Alexander F. Wagner; Josef Zweimüller |
| Abstract: | This paper explores one potentially important channel through which immigration may drive support for extreme right-wing parties: the presence of immigrants in one’s neighborhood. We study the case of the Freedom Party of Austria (FPÖ). Under the leadership of Jörg Haider, this party increased its share of votes from less than 5 percent in the early 1980s to 27 percent by the year 1999. Using past regional settlement patterns as a source of exogenous variation, we find a significantly positive effect of the residential proximity of immigrants on FPÖ votes, explaining roughly a quarter of the cross-community variance in FPÖ votes. It is the presence of low- and medium-skilled immigrants that drives this result; high-skilled immigrants have no (or even a negative) effect on FPÖ votes. |
| Keywords: | Immigration, political economy, voting |
| JEL: | P16 J61 |
| Date: | 2012–05 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:jku:econwp:2012_05&r=cdm |
| By: | Quoc-Anh Do (School of Economics, Singapore Management University); Yen-Teik Lee (Department of Finance, Lee Kong Chian School of Business, Singapore Management University); Bang Dang Nguyen (Finance and Accounting Group, Judge Business School, University of Cambridge); Kieu-Trang Nguyen (SPEA, Indiana University) |
| Abstract: | This paper investigates the impact of social-network based political connections on firm value. We focus on the networks of university classmates and alumni among directors of U.S. public firms and congressmen. Comparing firms connected to elected versus defeated politicians in the Regression Discontinuity Design of close elections from 2000 to 2008, we provide evidence that political connections enhance firm value. However, the value of political connections varies in a more complex way than expected. While connections to powerful members of the Senate generate strong positive impact on firm value, connections to newly elected congressmen are less valuable to firms than connections to state-level politicians defeated in those elections. As a result, a director’s connection to an elected congressman causes a Weighted Average Treatment Effect on Cumulative Abnormal Returns of -2.65% surrounding the election date. Our results are robust and consistent through various specifications, parametric and nonparametric, with different outcome measures and social network definitions, and across many subsamples. Overall, our study identifies the value of political connections through social networks, uncovers its variation across different politicians’ backgrounds, and stresses the importance of state-level political connections. |
| Keywords: | Corruption; Accountability; Population Concentration; Capital Cities; US State Politics; Media; Turnout; Campaign Contributions; Public Good Provision |
| JEL: | D72 D73 L82 R12 R50 |
| Date: | 2012–05 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:siu:wpaper:22-2012&r=cdm |
| By: | Raymond Fisman; Florian Schulz; Vikrant Vig |
| Abstract: | We study the wealth accumulation of Indian parliamentarians using public disclosures required of all candidates since 2003. Annual asset growth of winners is on average 3 to 6 percentage points higher than runners-up. By performing a within-constituency comparison where both runner-up and winner run in consecutive elections, and by looking at the subsample of very close elections, we rule out a range of alternative explanations for differential earnings of politicians and a relevant control group. The ``winner's premium" comes from parliamentarians holding positions in the Council of Ministers, with asset returns 13 to 29 percentage points higher than non-winners. The benefit of winning is also concentrated among incumbents, because of low asset growth for incumbent non-winners. |
| JEL: | D72 D73 D78 |
| Date: | 2012–05 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:18095&r=cdm |
| By: | Karp, Larry (University of California, Berkeley. Dept of agricultural and resource economics); Simon, Leo (University of California, Berkeley. Dept of agricultural and resource economics) |
| Abstract: | We examine the size of stable coalitions in a participation game that has been used to model international environmental agreements, cartel formation, R&D spillovers, and monetary policy. The literature to date has relied on parametric examples; based on these examples, a consensus has emerged that in this kind of game, the equilibrium coalition size is small, except possibly when the potential benefits of cooperation are also small. In this paper, we develop a non-parametric approach to the problem, and demonstrate that the conventional wisdom is not robust. In a general setting, we identify conditions under which the equilibrium coalition size can be large even when potential gains are large. Contrary to previously examined leading special cases, we show that reductions in marginal abatement costs in an international environmental game can increase equilibrium membership, and we provide a measure of the smallest reduction in costs needed to support a coalition of arbi- trary size. |
| Keywords: | stable coalitions, participation games, international environmental agreement, climate agreement, trans-boundary pollution, investment spellovers |
| JEL: | C72 H4 Q54 |
| Date: | 2012–02 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:are:cudare:1127&r=cdm |