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on Collective Decision-Making |
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Issue of 2011‒09‒22
five papers chosen by |
| By: | Finan, Frederico S. (University of California, Berkeley); Schechter, Laura (University of Wisconsin-Madison) |
| Abstract: | While vote-buying is common, little is known about how politicians determine who to target. We argue that vote-buying can be sustained by an internalized norm of reciprocity. Receiving money engenders feelings of obligation. Combining survey data on vote-buying with an experiment-based measure of reciprocity, we show that politicians target reciprocal individuals. Overall, our findings highlight the importance of social preferences in determining political behavior. |
| Keywords: | vote-buying, reciprocity, redistributive politics, voting, social preferences |
| JEL: | H0 |
| Date: | 2011–09 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps:dp5965&r=cdm |
| By: | Michalis Drouvelis; Alejandro Saporiti; Nicolaas J Vriend |
| Abstract: | We study both theoretically and experimentally the complete set of Nash equilibria of a classical one-dimensional, majority rule election game with two candidates, who might be interested in power as well as in ideology, but not necessarily in the same way. Apart from obtaining the well known median voter result and the two-sided policy differentiation outcome, the paper uncovers the existence of two new equilibrium configurations, called 'one-sided' and probabilistic' policy differentiation, respectively. Our analysis shows how these equilibrium configurations depend on the relative interests in power (resp., ideology) and the uncertainty about voters' preferences. The theoretical predictions are supported by the data collected from a series of laboratory experiments, as we observe convergence to the Nash equilibrium values at the aggregate as well as the individual levels in all treatments, and the comparative statics effects across treatments are as prediced by the theory. |
| Keywords: | Electoral competition, Power, Ideology, Uncertainty, Nash equilibrium |
| JEL: | C72 C90 D7 |
| Date: | 2011–08 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:bir:birmec:11-15&r=cdm |
| By: | Gabrielle Demange (PSE - Paris-Jourdan Sciences Economiques - CNRS : UMR8545 - Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales (EHESS) - Ecole des Ponts ParisTech - Ecole Normale Supérieure de Paris - ENS Paris - INRA, EEP-PSE - Ecole d'Économie de Paris - Paris School of Economics - Ecole d'Économie de Paris) |
| Abstract: | The paper presents the problem of choosing the representatives in an assembly when the whole electoral region is subdivided into electoral districts. Because of the two dimensions, geographical (districts) and political (parties), the problem is called bi-apportionment. Often the allocation of seats to districts is pre-determined and furthermore distorted ---meaning that the ratios of the number of assigned seats to population size vary significantly across districts. The paper surveys proposed bi-apportionment methods with a focus on the conflict that may arise between party-proportional representation under district distortions. |
| Keywords: | Party-proportional representation ; (bi-)apportionment ; (bi-)divisor methods ; fair shares |
| Date: | 2011–09 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:psewpa:halshs-00623031&r=cdm |
| By: | Bernd Hayo (University of Marburg); Pierre-Guillaume Méon (University of Brussels) |
| Abstract: | This paper aims at discovering the decision rule the Governing Council of the ECB uses to set interest rates. We construct a Taylor rule for each member of the council and for the euro area as a whole, and aggregate the interest rates they produce using several classes of decision-making mechanisms: chairman dominance, bargaining, consensus, voting, and voting with a chairman. We test alternative scenarios in which individual members of the council pursue either a national or a federal objective. We then compare the interest-rate path predicted by each scenario with the observed euro area’s interest rate. We find that scenarios in which all members of the Governing Council are assumed to pursue Euro-area-wide objectives are dominated by scenarios in which decisions are made collectively by a council consisting of members pursuing national objectives. The best-performing scenario is the one in which individual members of the Governing Council follow national objectives, bargain over the interest rate, and their weights are based on their country’s share of the zone’s GDP. |
| Keywords: | European Central Bank, Monetary Policy Committee, Decision rules |
| JEL: | D70 E43 E58 F33 |
| Date: | 2011 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:mar:magkse:201135&r=cdm |
| By: | Fischer, Justina |
| Abstract: | This paper asks whether trust in political institutions depends on individual’s political leaning and the political ideology of the national government. We employ information on 140'000 individuals in 30 democratic OECD countries from the World Values Survey, 1981 – 2007, and estimate so-called micro-based pseudo-panel two-way fixed effects models. Distinguishing between extreme and moderate versions of leftist and rightist political leaning, our estimates reveal that political trust increases non-linearly in the degree of individual’s conservatism. We also find that political leaning is not instrumental to improving one's own socio-economic situation, thus rather constituting an expressive behavior. If government ideology matches individual’s political preferences, trust in political institutions is increased. In contrast, the ‘apolitical’ appears to distrust the political system as such. We also find evidence for a symmetric, but incomplete convergence of party ideologies to the median voter position. Implications for vote abstention are discussed. |
| Keywords: | political trust; government ideology; political leaning; World Values Survey |
| JEL: | H11 D72 Z13 |
| Date: | 2011–09–12 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:33344&r=cdm |