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on Collective Decision-Making |
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Issue of 2011‒05‒14
six papers chosen by |
| By: | Wu, Haoyang |
| Abstract: | Bayesian implementation concerns decision making problems when agents have incomplete information. This paper proposes that the traditional sufficient conditions for Bayesian implementation shall be amended by virtue of a quantum Bayesian mechanism. In addition, by using an algorithmic Bayesian mechanism, this amendment holds in the macro world. More importantly, we find that the revelation principle is not always right by using the quantum and algorithmic Bayesian mechanisms. |
| Keywords: | Quantum game theory; Mechanism design; Bayesian implementation; Revelation principle. |
| JEL: | D71 D80 C72 |
| Date: | 2011–04–28 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:30653&r=cdm |
| By: | Bruno S. Frey |
| Abstract: | Gordon Tullock has been one of the most important founders and contributors to Public Choice. Two innovations are typical “Tullock Challenges”. The first relates to method: the measurement of subjective well-being, or happiness. The second relates to digital social networks such as Facebook, Twitter, or to some extent Google. Both innovations lead to strong incentives by the governments to manipulate the policy consequences. In general “What is important, will be manipulated by the government”. To restrain government manipulation one has to turn to Constitutional Economics and increase the possibilities for direct popular participation and federalism, or introduce random mechanisms. |
| Keywords: | Happiness, social networks, constitutional economics, random mechanisms, public choice |
| JEL: | D72 H10 I31 P16 D02 |
| Date: | 2011–04 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zur:econwp:015&r=cdm |
| By: | Artur Grigoryan (University of Siegen) |
| Abstract: | The paper models the incentives of a politician to delegate the decision making power in a sovereign wealth fund to an independent external manager. It formalizes the learning-e¤ects as well as the increase of transparency of the SWF and the rise of investment possibilities associated with higher transparency. It also focuses on the role of elections as a basic mechanism to control and discipline politicians. I show that the politician has incentives for strategic behaviour if voters have incomplete information about his competence. The paper also studies when the delegation of decision making power is socially optimal and under which circumstances it takes place. |
| Keywords: | DSovereign Wealth Fund (SWF), Transparency, Policy Delegation, External Management |
| JEL: | D7 E6 F3 G2 |
| Date: | 2011 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:mar:magkse:201117&r=cdm |
| By: | Marielle Brunette (Laboratoire d'Economie Forestiere, Nancy, France); Laure Cabantous (Nottingham University Business School); Stéphane Couture (Unité de Biométrie et Intelligence Artificielle (UBIA), Toulouse, France) |
| Abstract: | In this paper, we build on the emerging literature on group decision-making to study the so-called ‘group shift’ effect, i.e., groups are less risk-averse than individuals. Our study complements past research in two ways. First, we study the group shift effect under two sources of uncertainty, namely risk where probabilities are known, and ambiguity where probabilities are imprecise. Second, we study the impact of the group decision rule (unanimity and majority) on group shift. Results from a lottery-choice experiment show a general tendency for the group shift effect, regardless of the decision rule. The group shift effect, however, is found to be significant only under risk in the unanimity treatment. Our study hence provides a clear test of the effect of the decision rule on the group shift effect under both risk and ambiguity. |
| Keywords: | Collective decision, Unanimity, Majority, Preferences, Risk, Ambiguity |
| JEL: | C91 C92 |
| Date: | 2011–05–06 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:bbr:workpa:15&r=cdm |
| By: | Fortunato, Piergiuseppe; Panizza, Ugo |
| Abstract: | This paper looks at how the interaction between democracy and education affects the quality of government. It models an economy in which politicians of heterogeneous quality can run for office and shows that education has a positive effect on the quality of selected officials only if democratic institutions are in place. The model also fi…nds that democracy has positive effect on the quality of government in countries with high levels of education but that political institutions are not correlated with the quality of government in countries with low levels of education. Cross-country and panel data regressions confirm that the interaction between democracy and education is positively associated with the quality of government. |
| JEL: | D72 H11 P16 |
| Date: | 2011–04 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:uca:ucapdv:155&r=cdm |
| By: | Gaël Giraud (Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne - Paris School of Economics); Cécile Renouard (ESSEC - Business School) |
| Abstract: | Theories of justice in the spirit of Rawls and Harsanyi argue that fair-minded people should aspire to make choices for society as if in the original position, that is, behind a veil of ignorance that prevents them from knowing their own social positions. In this paper, we provide a fairly simple framework showing that preferences in front of the veil of ignorance (i.e., in face of everyday risky situations) can be entirely deduced from ethical preferences behind the veil. Moreover, by contrast with Kariv & Zame (2008), in many cases of interest, the converse is not true : Ethical decisions cannot be deduced from economic ones. This not only rehabilitates distributive theories of justice but even proves that standard decision theory in economic environments cannot be exonerated from ethical questioning. |
| Keywords: | Moral preferences, business ethics, social preferences, distributional justice, theory of justice, social choice, original position, veil of ignorance, utilitarianism, maximin principle, uncertainty. |
| JEL: | D63 |
| Date: | 2011–04 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:mse:cesdoc:11026&r=cdm |