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on Collective Decision-Making |
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Issue of 2011‒02‒12
seven papers chosen by |
| By: | MORENO-TERNERO, Juan D. (Universidad de Malaga, Spain; Universidad Pablo de Olavide, Seville, Spain; Université catholique de Louvain, CORE, B-1348 Louvain-la-Neuve, Belgium) |
| Abstract: | We analyze the problem of choosing the most appropriate method for apportioning taxes in a democracy. We consider a simple theoretical model of taxation and restrict our attention to piece-wise linear tax methods, which are almost ubiquitous in advanced democracies world- wide. We show that if we allow agents to vote for any method within a rich domain of piece-wise linear methods, then a majority voting equilibrium exists. Furthermore, if most voters have income below mean income then each method within the domain can be supported in equilibrium. |
| Keywords: | voting, taxes, majority, single-crossing, Talmud |
| JEL: | D72 H24 |
| Date: | 2010–12–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cor:louvco:2010080&r=cdm |
| By: | Hangartner, Dominik; Schmid, Lukas |
| Abstract: | Why do some people go to the polling station, sometimes up to several times a year, while others always prefer to stay at home? This question has launched a wide theoretical debate in both economics and political science, but convincing empirical support for the different models proposed is still rare. The basic rational voting model of Downs (1957) predicts zero participation because each individual vote is extremely unlikely to be pivotal. One prominent modification of this model is the inclusion of a civic duty term into the voter's utility function (Riker and Ordeshook, 1968) which has been the basis of structural ethical voting models such as Coate and Conlin (2004) and Feddersen and Sandroni (2006). Another branch of structural models looks at informational asymmetries among citizens (Feddersen and Pesendorfer, 1996, 1999). This paper tests the implications of these two branches of structural models by exploiting a unique variability in compulsory voting laws in Swiss federal states. By analyzing a newly compiled comparative data set covering the 1900-1950 period, we find large positive effects of the introduction of compulsory voting laws on turnout. Along with the arguably exogenous treatment allocation, several specification and placebo tests lend support to a causal interpretation of this result. The findings of this study lend support to the ethical voting models since citizens do react to compulsory voting laws only if it is enforced with a fee. At the same time, the informational aspect of non-voting is questioned as „new" voters do not delegate their votes. |
| Keywords: | Compulsory Voting; Voter Turnout; Structural Voting Models |
| JEL: | D72 |
| Date: | 2010–09–15 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:28510&r=cdm |
| By: | Eileen Fumagalli (IEFE - Bocconi University); Gaia Narciso (Department of Economics, Trinity College Dublin) |
| Abstract: | The impact of political institutions on policy outcomes has gained much attention in the literature over the last years. The aim of this paper is to test whether the impact of constitutions on economic outcomes is direct. By introducing citizens' political participation, rather than politicians' incentives, as the driving force connecting institutions to policy outcomes, we empirically show that voter turnout is the channel through which forms of government affect economic policies. We provide evidence of the existence of two relationships. First, presidential regimes appear to be related to lower voter participation in national elections. Second, higher voter participation induces an increase in government expenditure, total revenues, welfare state spending, and budget deficit. We conclude that forms of government affect policy outcomes only through voter turnout. |
| Keywords: | Electoral rule, form of government, voter participation, policy outcomes |
| JEL: | D72 E60 H00 |
| Date: | 2011–02 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:tcd:tcduee:tep0211&r=cdm |
| By: | Sandro Brusco (Department of Economics, Stony Brook University); Marcin Dziubinski (Institute of Informatics, Faculty of Mathematics, Informatics and Mechanics, Warsaw University, Banacha 2, 02-097 Warsaw, Poland.); Jaideep Roy (Department of Economics, University of Birmingham, Edgbaston, Birmingham B15 2TT, UK.) |
| Abstract: | We consider the Hotelling-Downs model with n >= 2 oce seeking candidates and runo voting. We show that Nash equilibria in pure strategies always exist and that there are typically multiple equilibria, both convergent (all candidates are located at the median) and divergent (candidates locate at distinct positions), though only divergent equilibria are robust to free entry. Moreover, two-policy equilibria exist under any distribution of voters' ideal policies, while equilibria with more than two policies exist generically but under restrictive conditions that we characterize. In this sense, our analysis suggests that two-policy equilibria are the most prominent outcomes. |
| Keywords: | Downs, Free Entry, Runoff System, Equilibrium |
| JEL: | J61 J70 J31 I20 D01 D70 |
| Date: | 2010–09 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nys:sunysb:10-02&r=cdm |
| By: | Thomas Markussen; Louis Putterman; Jean-Robert Tyran |
| Abstract: | Entrusting the power to punish to a central authority is a hallmark of civilization. We study a collective action dilemma in which self-interest should produce a sub-optimal outcome absent sanctions for non-cooperation. We then test experimentally whether subjects make the theoretically optimal choice of a formal sanction scheme that costs less than the surplus it makes possible, or instead opt for the use of informal sanctions or no sanctions. Most groups adopt formal sanctions when they are of deterrent magnitude and cost a small fraction (10%) of the potential surplus. Contrary to the standard theoretical prediction, however, most groups choose informal sanctions when formal sanctions are more costly (40% of the surplus). Being adopted by voting appears to enhance the efficiency of both informal sanctions and non-deterrent formal sanctions. |
| Keywords: | formal sanctions, informal sanctions, experiment, voting, cooperation, punishment. |
| Date: | 2011 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:bro:econwp:2011-4&r=cdm |
| By: | Jean-Robert Tyran; Kenju Kamei; Louis Putterman |
| Abstract: | The sanctioning of norm-violating behavior by an effective formal authority is an efficient solution for social dilemmas. It is in the self-interest of voters and is often favorably contrasted with letting citizens take punishment into their own hands. Allowing informal sanctions, by contrast, not only comes with a danger that punishments will be misapplied, but also should have no efficiency benefit under standard assumptions of self-interested agents. We experimentally investigate the relative effectiveness of formal vs. informal sanctions in the voluntary provision of public goods. Unsurprisingly, we find that effective formal sanctions are popular and efficient when they are free to impose. Surprisingly, we find that informal sanctions are often more popular and more efficient when effective formal sanctions entail a modest cost. The reason is that informal sanctions achieve more efficient outcomes than theory predicts, especially when the mechanism is chosen by voting. |
| JEL: | C92 C91 D71 H41 |
| Date: | 2011–02 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:vie:viennp:1104&r=cdm |
| By: | Grégoire Rota-Graziosi (CERDI - Centre d'études et de recherches sur le developpement international - CNRS : UMR6587 - Université d'Auvergne - Clermont-Ferrand I) |
| Abstract: | We consider as endogenous the choice of the delegation' rule in a political integration process between two countries. We study three potential types of delegation: strong, weak or no delegation, this last case corresponding to a referendum. We show that populations decide to bind themselves by delegating the national policy decision to a "powerfull conservative representative", in order to improve their bargaining position. These non-cooperative behaviors of countries when they decide on their delegation rule induce negative political externalities between countries, which cancel the gains achieved by the internalization of economic externalities in the case of political integration. We then propose two extensions. First, we assume a pre-play game where the countries choose whether or not to initiate political integration. Secondly, we examine the consequences of ratification by referendum. We conclude that a Pareto improvement of the political integration process would be to specify within the international treaty itself the means for its ratification; more precisely, to incorporate a formal ratification procedure, corresponding to an ex post referendum. |
| Keywords: | Delegation;International Agreements;Nash Bargaining Solution;Political Integration;Ratification;Referendum |
| Date: | 2011–02–03 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:wpaper:halshs-00562632&r=cdm |