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on Collective Decision-Making |
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Issue of 2010‒12‒18
eleven papers chosen by |
| By: | Aymeric Lardon (GATE Lyon Saint-Etienne - Groupe d'analyse et de théorie économique - CNRS : UMR5824 - Université Lumière - Lyon II - Ecole Normale Supérieure Lettres et Sciences Humaines) |
| Abstract: | The purpose of this article is to analyze a class of voting games in which externalities are present. We consider a society in which coalitions can be formed and where a finite number of voters have to choose among a set of alternatives. A coalition is winning if it can veto any proposed alternative. In our model, the veto power of a coalition is dependent on the coalition formation of the outsiders. We show that whether or not the core is non-empty depends crucially on the expectations of each coalition regarding outsiders' behavior when it wishes to veto an alternative. On the one hand, if each coalition has pessimistic expectations, then the core is non-empty if and only if the dimension of the set of alternatives is equal to one. On the other hand, if each coalition has optimistic expectations, the non-emptiness of the core is not ensured. |
| Keywords: | voting games; externalities; core |
| Date: | 2010 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00544034_v1&r=cdm |
| By: | Albert Sole-Olle; Elisabet Viladecans-Marsal (Universitat de Barcelona) |
| Abstract: | We analyze whether local land supply is influenced by the degree of political competition, and interpret the findings as being indicative of the influence wielded by land development lobbies. We use a new database including both political and land supply data for more than 2,000 Spanish municipalities for the period 2003-2007. In Spain, land use policies are largely a local responsibility with municipalities having periodically to pass compre- hensive land use plans. The main policy variable in these plans, and the one analyzed here, is the amount of land classified for potential development. We measure local political competition as the margin of victory of the incumbent government. We instrument this variable using the number of votes obtained by parties represented in local government when standing at the first national legislative elections following the re-establishment of democracy, and the number of votes they actually obtained regionally at the national legislative elections. The results indicate that stiffer political competition does indeed reduce the amount of new land designated for development. This effect is found to be most marked in suburbs, in towns with a high percent of commuters and homeowners, and in municipalities governed by the left. |
| Keywords: | urban growth controls, political economy, land use regulations |
| JEL: | Q15 R52 H7 |
| Date: | 2010 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:bar:bedcje:2010248&r=cdm |
| By: | Susanne Lohmann |
| Date: | 2010–12–10 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cla:levarc:197&r=cdm |
| By: | Fernanda Leite Lopez de Leon (School of Economics, University of East Anglia) |
| Abstract: | This paper documents the electoral advantage of candidates who have a newspaper endorsement republished on Election Day in comparison to other endorsed candidates. I provide evidence that this advantage is not driven by a selection effect, suggesting that it is instead explained by readers deciding how to vote based on endorsements read on Election Day. I reject some other mechanisms that could explain the influence of this endorsement, but the advice provided on the day of the election. Moreover, candidates that have a different political orientation from their endorsing newspapers benefit more from this endorsement than other candidates. These results are based on a newly-compiled dataset matching county-level data of 826 endorsed candidates election results with newspaper and county characteristics. |
| Date: | 2010–12–11 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:uea:aepppr:2010_21&r=cdm |
| By: | Sirchenko, Andrei |
| Abstract: | This paper provides empirical evidence in favor of prompter and more detailed release of Monetary Policy Council's voting records, not published by National Bank of Poland before subsequent MPC meeting. The study shows that voting records, if they were available, could improve predictability of upcoming policy decisions. They reveal strong and robust predictive content as a supplementary factor after controlling for MPC policy bias and responses to inflation, real activity, exchange rates and financial market information. The voting patterns contain information not embedded in the market expectations of future policy, as revealed by the spreads and moves in the market interest rates, and even explicit forecasts of the next policy decision, made by market analysts in Reuters surveys before each policymaking meeting. Moreover, the direction of dissent explains the direction of private sector forecast bias. These findings are based on real-time data and voting patterns only, without knowledge of policymakers' names attached to each vote |
| Keywords: | monetary policy, interest rate, predictability, voting, real-time data |
| Date: | 2010–12–05 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cdl:ucsdec:1672194&r=cdm |
| By: | Axel Dreher (University of Goettingen,Germany, CESifo, Germany, IZA, Germany, and KOF Swiss Economic Institute, Switzerland); Jan-Egbert Sturm (KOF Swiss Economic Institute, ETH Zurich, Switzerland); James Raymond Vreeland (Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service and the Department of Government, Georgetown University, Washington, DC) |
| Abstract: | We investigate whether elected members of the United Nations Security Council receive favorable treatment from the International Monetary Fund (IMF), analyzing panel data on the level of conditionality attached to (a maximum of) 314 IMF arrangements with 101 countries over the period of 1992 to 2008. We find a negative relationship. Security Council members receive about 30 percent fewer conditions attached to the loans that they receive from the IMF. We conclude that conditionality is softer for these countries because the major shareholders of the IMF desire influence over the Security Council. |
| Keywords: | IMF, UN Security Council, Voting, Aid, Conditionality |
| JEL: | O19 O11 F35 |
| Date: | 2010–07 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:kof:wpskof:10-262&r=cdm |
| By: | Fernanda Leite Lopez de Leon (School of Economics, University of East Anglia) |
| Abstract: | This paper investigates the determinants of newspapers' provision for political endorsements. I empirically examine the role of newspapers' political preferences and market competition on newspapers' decision. Regression results suggest that market competition inhibits newspapers from making endorsements. Results from a simple model show that newspapers' ideology determine their endorsements, turning partisan papers more likely to make political recommendations and more likely to endorse challengers than non-partisan newspapers. |
| Date: | 2010–12–11 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:uea:aepppr:2010_22&r=cdm |
| By: | Martin J Osborne; Rabee Tourky |
| Date: | 2010–12–09 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cla:levarc:506439000000000050&r=cdm |
| By: | Stephen Hansen; Thomas R Palfrey; Howard Rosenthal |
| Date: | 2010–12–10 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cla:levarc:101&r=cdm |
| By: | Matthew Haag; Roger Lagunoff |
| Date: | 2010–12–09 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cla:levarc:506439000000000043&r=cdm |
| By: | Linda Molm |
| Date: | 2010–12–10 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cla:levarc:184&r=cdm |