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on Collective Decision-Making |
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Issue of 2010‒06‒04
thirteen papers chosen by |
| By: | László Á. Kóczy (Óbuda University) |
| Abstract: | While they use the language of game theory the known measures of a priory voting power are hardly more than statistical expectations assuming the random behaviour of the players. Focusing on normalised indices we show that rational players would behave dierently from the indices' predictions and propose a model that captures such strategic behaviour. In our model players do not automatically participate in every winning coalition they are members of, but have the possibility to block the formation of such a coalition. The strategic use of such blocks can increase voting power, when the latter is dened over the game with the remaining winning coalitions. In our model players do not automatically participate in every winning coalition they are members of, but have the possibility to block the formation of such a coalition. The strategic use of such blocks can increase voting power, when the latter is defined over the game with the remaining winning coalitions. |
| Keywords: | Banzhaf index, Shapley-Shubik index, a priori voting power, rational players. |
| Date: | 2010 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pkk:wpaper:1001.rdf&r=cdm |
| By: | Fabien Lange (Óbuda University); László Á. Kóczy (Óbuda University) |
| Abstract: | A voting situation is given by a set of voters and the rules of legislation that determine minimal requirements for a group of voters to pass a motion. A priori measures of voting power, such as the Shapley-Shubik index and the Banzhaf value, show the influence of the individual players. We used to calculate them by looking at marginal contributions in a simple game consisting of winning and losing coalitions derived from the rules of the legislation. We introduce a new way to calculate these measures directly from the set of minimal winning coalitions. This new approach logically appealing as it writes measures as functions of the rules of the legislation. For certain classes of games that arise naturally in applications the logical shortcut drastically simplifies calculations. The technique generalises directly to all semivalues. Keywords. Shapley-Shubik index, Banzhaf index, semivalue, minimal winning coalition, Möbius transform. |
| Keywords: | Shapley-Shubik index, Banzhaf index, semivalue, minimal winning coalition, Möbius transform. |
| Date: | 2010 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pkk:wpaper:1002.rdf&r=cdm |
| By: | Healy, Andrew J. (Loyola Marymount University); Malhotra, Neil (Stanford University); Mo, Cecilia H. (Stanford University) |
| Abstract: | According to what criteria do citizens make political decisions, and what do these criteria say about democratic competence? An impressive body of evidence suggests that voters competently evaluate diagnostic information such as macroeconomic trends and their personal financial circumstances to reward good performance while ridding themselves of leaders who are corrupt, incompetent, or ineffective. However, what if some voters' personal emotional reactions to events completely unrelated to public affairs influence their voting decisions? The conflation of personal emotions with political cognition challenges traditional conceptions of citizen competence and democratic accountability. We explore whether emotional reactions unrelated to incumbent performance affect voting behavior by assessing the electoral impact of local college football games, events that government has nothing to do with and for which no government response would be expected. On average, a win before Election Day causes the incumbent to receive about one percentage point more of the vote, with the effect being larger for teams with stronger fan support. We corroborate these aggregate-level results with a survey conducted during the 2009 NCAA Men's College Basketball Tournament, where we find that sports-induced emotional change affects approval of President Obama and assessments of the health of the country. Voters' decisions and attitudes are thus shown to depend considerably on events that affect their personal level of happiness even when those events are entirely disconnected from government activity. Our results provide new evidence on the significant limitations of the electorate's capacity to hold elected officials accountable for their actions. |
| Date: | 2009–07 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ecl:stabus:2034&r=cdm |
| By: | Enriqueta Aragones; Santiago Sanchez-Pages |
| Abstract: | This paper analyzes the problem that an incumbent faces during the legislature when deciding how to react to popular initiatives or policy proposals coming from different sources. We argue that this potential source of electoral disadvantage that the incumbent obtains after being elected can jeopardize the reelection possibilities of the incumbent. We analyze the decision of the incumbent when facing reelection and we characterize the conditions under which the advantages that the incumbent obtains can overcome the disadvantages. Finally, we use the results of this analysis to discuss some implications of the use of mechanisms of direct democracy like referenda and popular assemblies on electoral competition. |
| Keywords: | Incumbency advantage, Referenda, Popular initiatives, Elections. |
| JEL: | D7 H1 |
| Date: | 2010–03 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:edn:esedps:194&r=cdm |
| By: | Jinhui Bai and Roger Lagunoff (Department of Economics, Georgetown University) |
| Abstract: | This paper adopts a \revealed preference" approach to the question of what can be inferred about bias in a political system. We model an innite horizon, dynamic economy and its political system from the point of view of an \outside observer." The observer sees a nite sequence of policy data, but does not observe the underlying distribution of political power that produced this data. Neither does he observe the preference prole of the citizenry.The observer makes inferences about distribution of political power as if political power were derived from a wealth-weighted voting system with weights that can vary across states. The weights determine the nature and magnitude of the wealth bias. Positive weights on relative income in any period indicate an \elitist" bias in the political system whereas negative weights indicate a \populist" one. We ask: what class of weighted systems can rationalize the policy data as weighted majority outcomes each period? We show that without further knowledge, all forms of bias are possible: any policy data can be shown to be rationalized by any system of wealth-weighted voting. An additional single crossing restriction on preferences can, however, rule out certain weighting systems. We then augment policy data with polling data and show that the set of rationalizing wealth-weights are bounded above and below, thus ruling out extreme biases. In some cases, polls can provide information about the change in political inequality across time. Classification-JEL Codes: C73, D63, D72, D74, H11 |
| Keywords: | wealth-bias, elitist bias, populist bias, weighted majority winner, rationalizing weights, "Anything Goes Theorem" |
| Date: | 2010–05–10 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:geo:guwopa:gueconwpa~10-10-01&r=cdm |
| By: | Stefano Gagliarducci (Faculty of Economics, University of Rome "Tor Vergata"); Tommaso Nannicini (Bocconi University) |
| Abstract: | The wage paid to politicians affects both the choice of citizens to run for an elective office and the performance of those who are appointed. First, if skilled individuals shy away from politics because of higher opportunities in the private sector, an increase in politicians’ pay may change their mind. Second, if the reelection prospects of incumbents depend on their in-office deeds, a higher wage may foster performance. We use data on all Italian municipal governments from 1993 to 2001 and test these hypotheses in a quasi-experimental framework. In Italy, the wage of a mayor depends on population size and sharply rises at different thresholds. We apply a regression discontinuity design to the only threshold that uniquely identifies a wage increase—5,000 inhabitants—to control for unobservable town characteristics. Exploiting the existence of a two-term limit, we further disentangle the composition from the incentive component of the effect of the wage on performance. Our results show that a higher wage attracts more educated candidates, and that better paid politicians size down the government machinery by improving internal efficiency. Importantly, most of this performance effect is driven by the selection of competent politicians, rather than by the incentive to be reelected. |
| Keywords: | political selection, efficiency wage, term limit, regression discontinuity. |
| JEL: | M52 D72 J45 H70 |
| Date: | 2010–05–28 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:rtv:ceisrp:162&r=cdm |
| By: | Salvador Barberà |
| Abstract: | This paper surveys the literature on strategy-proofness from a historical perspective. While I discuss the connections with other works on incentives in mechanism design, the main emphasis is on social choice models. This article has been prepared for the Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare, Volume 2, Edited by K. Arrow, A. Sen and K. Suzumura |
| Keywords: | Strategy-proofness, Social Choice, Dominant Strategies, Domain Restrictions, Voting |
| JEL: | D7 D51 C7 H41 |
| Date: | 2010–01–19 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:aub:autbar:828.10&r=cdm |
| By: | Salvador Barberà; Dolors Berga; Bernardo Moreno |
| Abstract: | We characterize the set of all individual and group strategy-proof rules on the domain of all single-dipped preferences on a line. For rules defined on this domain, and on several of its subdomains, we explore the implications of these strategy-proofness requirements on the maximum size of the rules' range. We show that when all single-dipped preferences are admissible, the range must contain two alternatives at most. But this bound changes as we consider different subclasses of single-dipped preferences: we provide examples of subdomains admitting strategy-proof rules with larger ranges. We establish exact bounds on the maximal size of strategy-proof functions on each of these domains, and prove that the relationship between the sizes of the subdomains and those of the ranges of strategy-proof functions on them need not be monotonic. Our results exhibit a sharp contrast between the structure of strategy-proof rules defined on subdomains of single-dipped preferences and those defined on subsets of single-peaked ones. |
| Keywords: | strategy-proof, group strategy-proof, binary range rules, single-dipped |
| JEL: | D71 |
| Date: | 2009–12–31 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:aub:autbar:801.09&r=cdm |
| By: | Wiberg, Magnus (Ministry of finance) |
| Abstract: | Current research has found ambiguous results with respect to the effects of the type of electoral regime on trade policy. The present paper proposes a solution to this indeterminacy. It is shown that the equilibrium level of trade protection can be relatively higher, as well as lower, under a majoritarian electoral rule compared to proportional representation. The equilibrium outcome is shown to depend on the number of voters in swing districts who own a factor specific to the exporting industry in relation to those who possess claims to the specific input employed by the import-competing sector. It is further argued that political rents are lower (higher) under majoritarian elections if there are more factor owners in the swing districts with stakes in the exporting (import-competing) industry. |
| Keywords: | Endogenous Tariff Formation; Trade Policy; Electoral Rules |
| JEL: | D72 F13 |
| Date: | 2010–05–27 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hhs:sunrpe:2010_0008&r=cdm |
| By: | Frederik Herzberg (Institute of Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University) |
| Abstract: | It is known that a combination of the Maccheroni-Marinacci-Rustichini (2006) axiomatisation of variational preferences with the Föllmer-Schied (2002,2004) representation theorem for concave monetary utility functionals provides an (individual) decision-theoretic foundation for convex risk measures. The present paper is devoted to collective decision making with regard to convex risk measures and addresses the existence problem for non-dictatorial aggregation functions of convex risk measures - in the guise of variational preferences - satisfying Arrow-type rationality axioms (weak universality, systematicity, Pareto principle). We prove an impossibility result for finite electorates, viz. a variational analogue of Arrow's impossibility theorem. For infinite electorates, the possibility of rational aggregation of variational preferences (i.e. convex risk measures) depends on a uniform continuity condition for the variational preference profiles: We shall prove variational analogues of both Campbell's impossibility theorem and Fishburn's possibility theorem. Methodologically, we adopt the model-theoretic approach to aggregation theory inspired by Lauwers-Van Liedekerke (1995). In an appendix, we apply the Dietrich-List (2010) analysis of logical aggregation based on majority voting to the problem of variational preference aggregation. The fruit is a possibility theorem, but at the cost of considerable and - at least at first sight - rather unnatural restrictions on the domain of the variational preference aggregator. |
| Keywords: | variational preference representation, convex risk measure, multiple priors preferences, Arrow-type preference aggregation, judgment aggregation, abstract aggregation theory, model theory, first-order predicate logic, ultrafilter, ultraproduct |
| JEL: | D71 G11 |
| Date: | 2010–05 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:bie:wpaper:432&r=cdm |
| By: | Javier Gardeazabal |
| Abstract: | In this paper we study the response of vote shares to economic fluctuations and conflict. Spain seems to be the ideal niche for a case study like this since it has experienced both phenomena during the last decades. Recent Spanish democratic history has witnessed four complete economic cycles, with deep recessions and pronounced booms. During this period, there has been a nationalistic conflict with terrorist manifestation. We use Spanish provincial data from the ten congressional elections since the end of Franco's dictatorship. Vote shares at provincial level are modeled as fractional responses to unemployment, inflation, terrorism assassinations, turnout and other factors. The statistical model used, a fractional probit, specifies conditional means of district and election unobserved effects as linear functions of the covariates. Estimates of National Partial Effects (NPE), i.e. the effect on national vote shares of changes in unemployment, inflation and terrorism are statistically significant and quantitatively important. In addition, vote shares respond to participation rates and these also depend on economic factors and terrorism, thus creating an endogeneity problem. The expected margin of victory is then used as instrument for turnout. |
| Keywords: | vote shares, turnout, fractional probit, partial effects, unemployment, terrorism |
| JEL: | C23 P16 |
| Date: | 2010 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:diw:diweos:diweos33&r=cdm |
| By: | Larsson, Anna (Dept. of Economics, Stockholm University); Parente, Stephen (University of Illinois) |
| Abstract: | A large literature documents that autocratic regimes have not, on average, outperformed democratic regimes, although they do display greater variance in economic performance. At the same time, no long-lived autocracy currently is rich whereas every long-lived democracy is. This paper puts forth a theory to account for these observations. The theory rests on the idea that autocratic leaders are heterogenous in their preferences and the idea that special interest groups can successfully lobby a democratic regime for policies that delay industrialization. We show that an elite landed class chooses to democratize society only after the economy has accumulated enough wealth. |
| Keywords: | Autocracy; Democracy; Landed Elites; Growth Miracles; Vested Interests |
| JEL: | O10 P16 |
| Date: | 2010–05–27 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hhs:sunrpe:2010_0007&r=cdm |
| By: | Baron, David P. (Stanford University); Hirsch, Alexander V. (Stanford University) |
| Abstract: | This paper presents a theory of common agency lobbying in which policy-interested lobbies can first influence the choice of a governing coalition and then influence the legislative bargaining over policies. Equilibria can involve active lobbying at both stages of the governing process. Contributions can also be made to defeat a policy proposal, and although those contributions are never successful they can influence coalition choice. The equilibrium policy in the legislative bargaining stage is efficient given the coalition selected, but the equilibrium coalition need not be efficient. Lobbying can also lead to the preservation of the status quo and lobby-induced gridlock. An example is presented to identify the multiplicity of equilibria and provide a full characterization of an equilibrium. |
| Date: | 2009–07 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ecl:stabus:2031&r=cdm |