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on Collective Decision-Making |
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Issue of 2009‒04‒18
eight papers chosen by |
| By: | Hans-Jörg Trenz |
| Abstract: | This article addresses the critical issue of how constitutional designing of the EU is related to the expression of collective identities. A European collective identity is perceived in terms of the discursive representation of the underlying demos of a European democracy. Against the common view that holds the self-identified political community as prior and independent of constitutional designing, it is claimed that democracy rather operates through the identification of popular subjectness. The demos is signified and recognised as distinct and internally coherent through democratic practice. In the empirical part, it is tested out to what extent public debates on EU constitution-making were linked to the identification of popular subjectness. By drawing on a comparative media survey of constitutional debates from 2002-2007, the paper distinguishes different markers of collective identities (national, European or multiple) that were used for representing and signifying democratic subjects in the EU. |
| Keywords: | Constitution for Europe; democracy; European identity; European public space; media |
| Date: | 2009–04–15 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:erp:reconx:p0041&r=cdm |
| By: | Weese, Eric |
| Abstract: | Political coalition formation games can describe the formation and dissolution of nations, as well as the creation of coalition governments, the establishment of political parties, and other similar phenomena. These games have been studied from a theoretical perspective, but the models have not been used extensively in empirical work. This paper presents a method of estimating political coalition formation models with many-player coalitions, and then applies this method to the recent heisei municipal amalgamations in Japan to estimate structural coeffients that describe the behaviour of municipalities. The method enables counterfactual analysis, which in the Japanese case shows that the national government could increase welfare via a counter-intuitive policy involving transfers to richer municipalities conditional on their participation in a merger. |
| Keywords: | Coalition Formation, Municipal Mergers, Japan |
| JEL: | C71 H77 |
| Date: | 2008–12 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hit:ccesdp:5&r=cdm |
| By: | Fleurbaey, Marc; Tadenuma, Koichi |
| Abstract: | We propose the concept of a universal social ordering, defined on the set of pairs of an allocation and a preference profile of any finite population. It is meant to unify evaluations and comparisons of social states with populations of possibly different sizes with various characteristics. The universal social ordering not only evaluates policy options for a given population but also compares social welfare across populations, as in international or intertemporal comparisons of living standards. It also makes it possible to evaluate policy options which affect the size of the population or the preferences of its members. We study how to extend the theory of social choice in order to select such orderings on a rigorous axiomatic basis. Key ingredients in this analysis are attitudes with respect to population size and the bases of interpersonal comparisons. |
| Keywords: | social choice, universal social orderings, maximin principle, interpersonal comparisons |
| JEL: | D63 D71 |
| Date: | 2009–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hit:ccesdp:9&r=cdm |
| By: | Dietrich Franz; List Christian (METEOR) |
| Abstract: | According to standard rational choice theory, as commonly used in political science and economics, an agent''s fundamental preferences are exogenously fixed, and any preference change over decision options is due to Bayesian information learning. Although elegant and parsimonious, this model fails to account for preference change driven by experiences or psychological changes distinct from information learning. We develop a model of non-informational preference change.Alternatives are modelled as points in some multidimensional space, only some of whose dimensions play a role in shaping the agent''s preferences.Any change in these `motivationally salient'' dimensions can change the agent''s preferences. How it does so is described by a new representation theorem. Our model not only captures a wide range of frequently observed phenomena, but also generalizes some standard representations of preferences in political science and economics. |
| Keywords: | mathematical economics; |
| Date: | 2009 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:dgr:umamet:2009017&r=cdm |
| By: | Claudio Ferraz; Frederico Finan |
| Abstract: | Recent studies have emphasized the importance of the quality of politicians for good government and consequently economic performance. But if the quality of leadership matters, then understanding what motivates individuals to become politicians and perform competently in office becomes a central question. In this paper, we examine whether higher wages attract better quality politicians and improve political performance using exogenous variation in the salaries of local legislators across Brazil’s municipal governments. The analysis exploits discontinuities in wages across municipalities induced by a constitutional amendment defining caps on the salary of local legislatures according to municipal population. Our main findings show that higher wages increases political competition and improves the quality of legislators, as measured by education, type of previous profession, and political experience in office. In addition to this positive selection, we find that wages also affect politicians’ performance, which is consistent with a behavioral response to a higher value of holding office. |
| JEL: | D72 D78 J33 |
| Date: | 2009–04 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:14906&r=cdm |
| By: | Stefano Gagliarducci; M. Daniele Paserman |
| Abstract: | This paper studies gender interactions within hierarchical organizations using a large data set on the duration of Italian municipal governments elected between 1993 and 2003. A municipal government can be viewed as a hierarchy, whose stability over time depends on the degree of cooperation between and within ranks. We find that in municipalities headed by female mayors, the probability of early termination of the legislature is higher. This result persists and becomes stronger when we control for municipality fixed effects as well as non-random sorting of women into municipalities using regression discontinuity in gender-mixed electoral races decided by a narrow margin. The likelihood that a female mayor survives until the end of her term is lowest when the council is entirely male, and in regions with less favorable attitudes towards working women. The evidence is suggestive that female mayors are less able at fostering cooperation among men, or alternatively, that men are more reluctant to be headed by women. Other interpretations receive less support in the data. Our results may provide an alternative explanation for the underrepresentation of women in leadership positions. |
| JEL: | J16 M54 |
| Date: | 2009–04 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:14893&r=cdm |
| By: | Yann Bramoullé; Bernard Fortin |
| Abstract: | In a social network, agents have their own reference group that may influence their behavior. In turn, the agents' attributes and their behavior affect the formation and the structure of the social network. We survey the econometric literature on both aspects of social networks and discuss the identification and estimation issues they raise. |
| Keywords: | Social network, peer effects, identification, network formation, pair-wise regressions, separability, mutual consent |
| JEL: | D85 L14 Z13 C3 |
| Date: | 2009 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:lvl:lacicr:0913&r=cdm |
| By: | Matthias Sutter; Peter Lindner; Daniela Platsch |
| Abstract: | This paper examines the influence of third-party observation and third-party reward on behavior in an experimental prisoner’s dilemma (PD) game. Whereas the existing literature on third-party intervention as a means to sustain social norms has dealt almost exclusively with third-party punishment, we show that both third-party observation and third-party reward have positive effects on cooperation rates, compared to a treatment where no third party is involved. Third-party reward is more effective in increasing cooperation than third-party observation. However, rewards are given too late to prevent a steady downward trend of cooperation rates. |
| Keywords: | Social norms, third-party reward, third-party observation, prisoner’s dilemma experiment |
| JEL: | C72 C91 |
| Date: | 2009–04 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:inn:wpaper:2009-08&r=cdm |