New Economics Papers
on Collective Decision-Making
Issue of 2008‒12‒01
ten papers chosen by

  1. Proximity in coalition building By Julien Reynaud; Fabien Lange; Lukasz Gatarek; Christian Thimann
  2. Proportional power is free from paradoxes By László Á. Kóczy
  3. Engaging the public in nanotechnology? Three visions of public engagement By Brice Laurent
  4. Preference aggregation theory without acyclicity: The core without majority dissatisfaction By Kumabe, Masahiro; Mihara, H. Reiju
  5. The Problem of Maintaining Compliance within Stable Coalitions: Experimental Evidence By McEvoy, David M.; Murphy, James J.; Spraggon, John M.; Stranlund, John K.
  6. How Politics Influence State-owned Banks - the Case of German Savings Banks By Oliver Vins
  7. Oil and the duration of dictatorships By Jesus Crespo Cuaresma; Harald Oberhofer; Paul Raschky
  8. The bargaining set in strategic market games By Nicholas Ziros
  9. Sewing Resistance: Transnational Organizing, Anti-Sweatshop Activism, and Labor Rights in the US-Caribbean Basin Apparel Industry (1990-2005) By Cesar Rodrigeuz-Garavito
  10. Values on regular games under Kirchhoff’s laws By Fabien Lange; Michel Grabisch

  1. By: Julien Reynaud (European Central Bank); Fabien Lange (Budapest Tech); Lukasz Gatarek (European Central Bank); Christian Thimann (European Central Bank)
    Abstract: Voting power methodology offers insights to understand coalition building in collective decision making. This paper proposes a new measure of voting power inspired from Banzhaf (1965) accounting for the proximity between voters by capturing how often they appear in winning coalitions together. Using this proximity index, we introduce a notion of relative linkages among coalition participants as determinant of coalition building. We propose an application to the governance structure of the International Monetary Fund, with linkages being represented by bilateral volumes of trade between voters. The results are able to explain several important features of the functioning of this particular voting body, and may be useful for other applications in international politics.
    Keywords: voting power index, coalition building, International Monetary Fund, linkage, proximity
    JEL: C71 F33
    Date: 2007
  2. By: László Á. Kóczy (Budapest Tech)
    Abstract: We modify the story behind the Shapley-Shubik power index and apply it to a legislative body. The resulting proportional index may be trivial, but is free from the paradoxical behaviour observable with standard power indices. The widespread use of this index may in fact be the reason for these \paradoxes".
    Keywords: a priori voting power, paradox of large size,paradox of new members, paradox of quarrelling members, Gamson's Law.
    JEL: C71 D72
    Date: 2008–05
  3. By: Brice Laurent (Centre de Sociologie de l'Innovation, Ecole des Mines de Paris)
    Abstract: Presents a case study on public participation in controversies on nanotechnologies in France, and proposes an analytical typology.
    Keywords: Science and technology studies, public participation, democracy, controversies, political sociology, nanotechnology, France
    JEL: O30 O33 D70 D74 Q55 Z00
    Date: 2008–11
  4. By: Kumabe, Masahiro; Mihara, H. Reiju
    Abstract: Acyclicity of individual preferences is a minimal assumption in social choice theory. We replace that assumption by the direct assumption that preferences have maximal elements on a fixed agenda. We show that the core of a simple game is nonempty for all profiles of such preferences if and only if the number of alternatives in the agenda is less than the Nakamura number of the game. The same is true if we replace the core by the core without majority dissatisfaction, obtained by deleting from the agenda all the alternatives that are non-maximal for all players in a winning coalition. Unlike the core, the core without majority dissatisfaction depends only onthe players' sets of maximal elements and is included in the union of such sets. A result for an extended framework gives another sense in which the core without majority dissatisfaction behaves better than the core.
    Keywords: Core; Nakamura number; kappa number; simple games; voting games; maximal elements; acyclic preferences; limit ordinals
    JEL: D71 C71 C02
    Date: 2008–11–24
  5. By: McEvoy, David M.; Murphy, James J.; Spraggon, John M.; Stranlund, John K.
    Abstract: This study examines the performance of stable cooperative coalitions that form to provide a public good when coalition members have the opportunity to not comply with their commitments. A stable coalition is one in which no member wishes to leave and no non-member wishes to join. To counteract the incentive to violate their commitments, coalition members fund a third-party enforcer. This leads to the theoretical conclusion that stable coalitions are larger (and provide more of a public good) when their members must finance enforcement relative to when compliance is ensured without the need for costly enforcement. However, our experiments reveal that giving coalition members the opportunity to violate their commitments while requiring them to finance enforcement to maintain compliance reduces the overall provision of the public good. The decrease in the provision of the public good is attributed to an increase in the participation threshold for a theoretically stable coalition to form and to significant levels of noncompliance. When we abandon the strict stability conditions and require all subjects to join a coalition for it to form, the average provision of the public good increases significantly.
    Keywords: stable coalitions, self-enforcing agreements, compliance, enforcement, public goods, Environmental Economics and Policy, Institutional and Behavioral Economics, Public Economics, H41, C92,
    Date: 2008–07
  6. By: Oliver Vins
    Abstract: This paper is one of the first to analyse political influence on state-owned savings banks in a developed country with an established financial market: Germany. Combining a large dataset with financial and operating figures of all 457 German savings banks from 1994 to 2006 and information on over 1,250 local elections during this period we investigate the change in business behavior around elections. We find strong indications for political influence: the probability that savings banks close branches, lay-off employees or engage in merger activities is significantly reduced around elections. At the same time they tend to increase their extraordinary spendings, which include support for social and cultural events in the area, on average by over 15%. Finally, we find that savings banks extend significantly more loans to their corporate and private customers in the run-up to an election. In further analyses, we show that the magnitude of political influence depends on bank specific, economical and political circumstances in the city or county: political influence seems to be facilitated by weak political majorities and profitable banks. Banks in economically weak areas seem to be less prone to political influence.
    JEL: D72 D78 G21 G28 H70
    Date: 2008–11
  7. By: Jesus Crespo Cuaresma; Harald Oberhofer; Paul Raschky
    Abstract: This paper develops a simple model that analyses the relationship between a country’s oil endowment and the duration of its autocratic leader. The dictator uses the rents from oil extraction for both personal gain and to pay-off potential opposition and chooses an optimal level of oil exploitation. A group of kingmakers, on the other side, decides whether to stage a coup d’état and establish a new dictator. The relationship between oil endowment and the duration of the dictatorial regime is modulated by the price of oil. Applying an empirical survival model on data for the duration of 106 dictatorships supports the predictions of the theoretical model.
    Keywords: Natural resources, dictatorship, political economy, duration.
    JEL: Q34 D72 H11
  8. By: Nicholas Ziros
    Abstract: We present the bargaining set of an economy, where trades among groups of individuals are conducted via the Shapley-Shubik mechanism. Then we prove that in atomless economies the allocations resulting from this equilibrium notion are competitive.
    Keywords: Strategic market games, Bargaining set, Competition
    Date: 2008–11
  9. By: Cesar Rodrigeuz-Garavito (University of the Andes)
    Abstract: Transnational activism is today at the center of scholarly and political debates on globalization. After two decades of relatively uncontested expansion of neoliberal policies and institutions, the last decade has witnessed a veritable explosion of networks, coalitions, movements, and other types of cross-border collective action that embody the seeds of counter-hegemonic globalization (Evans 2006; Santos 2004).
    Date: 2008–08
  10. By: Fabien Lange (Budapest Tech); Michel Grabisch (Centre d’Economie de la Sorbonne)
    Abstract: In cooperative game theory, the Shapley value is a central notion defining a rational way to share the total worth of a game among players. In this paper, we address a general framework leading to applications to games with communication graphs, where the set of feasible coalitions forms a poset where all maximal chains have the same length. We first show that previous definitions and axiomatizations of the Shapley value proprosed by Faigle and Kern, and Bilbao and Edelman still work. Our main contribution is then to propose a new axiomatization avoiding the hierarchical strength axiom of Faigle and Kern, and considering a new way to define the symmetry among players. Borrowing ideas from electric networks theory, we show that our symmetry axiom and the classical efficiency axiom correspond actually to the two Kirchhoff’s laws in the resistor circuit associated to the Hasse diagram of feasible coalitions. We finally work out a weak form of the monotonicity axiom which is satisfied by the proposed value.
    Keywords: Regular set systems; regular games; Shapley value; probabilistic efficient values; regular values; Kirchhoff’s laws.
    Date: 2006

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