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on Collective Decision-Making |
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Issue of 2008‒11‒11
eight papers chosen by |
| By: | Rebecca Morton (New York University); Jean-Robert Tyran (Department of Economics, University of Copenhagen) |
| Abstract: | We examine abstention when voters in standing committees are asymmetrically informed and there are multiple pure strategy equilibria-swing voter's curse (SVC) equilibria where voters with low quality information abstain and equilibria when all participants vote their information. When the asymmetry in information quality is large, we find that voting groups largely coordinate on the SVC equilibrium which is also Pareto Optimal. However, we find that when the asymmetry in information quality is not large and the Pareto Optimal equilibrium is for all to participate, significant numbers of voters with low quality information abstain. Furthermore, we find that information asymmetry induces voters with low quality information to coordinate on a non-equilibrium outcome. This suggests that coordination on "letting the experts" decide is a likely voting norm that sometimes validates SVC equilibrium predictions but other times does not. |
| Date: | 2008–11 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:kud:kuiedp:0825&r=cdm |
| By: | Giuseppe Russo |
| Abstract: | The claim that "skilled immigration is welcome" is often associated to the increasing adoption of selective immigration policies. I study the voting over differentiated immigration policies in a two-country, three-factor one-period model where there exist skilled and unskilled workers, migration decisions are endogenous, enforcing immigration restriction is costly, and natives dislike unskilled immigration. According to my findings, decisions over border closure are made to protect the median voter when her capital endowment is sufficiently small. Therefore I argue that the professed favour for skilled immigration veils the protection for the insiders. This result is confirmed by the observation that entry is rationed for both skilled and unskilled workers. Moreover, immigration aversion helps to explain the existence of entry barriers for unskilled workers in countries where the majority of voters is skilled. |
| Keywords: | Selective immigration policies, multidimensional voting, Condorcet winner. |
| JEL: | D72 F22 J18 |
| Date: | 2008–10–24 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:eei:rpaper:eeri_rp_2008_14&r=cdm |
| By: | Matthias Wrede (Faculty of Business Administration and Economics, Philipps Universitaet Marburg) |
| Abstract: | This paper analyzes inter- and intraregional redistribution in a centralized state using the citizen-candidate model. It focuses on conflicting interests among regions and among citizens of varying mobility. If discrimination with respect to place of residence and degree of mobility is possible, diversity of interests is high. Under the plurality rule and with sincere voting, the largest socioeconomic group of citizens supplies the winning candidate and discriminates against all other groups. However, if discrimination with respect to the degree of mobility is constrained, mobile citizens may gain power and interregional redistribution is reduced. |
| Keywords: | Voting, mobility, inter- and intraregional redistribution, discrimination |
| JEL: | D7 H1 H7 |
| Date: | 2008 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:mar:magkse:200817&r=cdm |
| By: | Jan Marc Berk; Beata Bierut |
| Abstract: | Monetary Policy Committees differ in the way the interest rate proposal is prepared and presented in the policy meeting. In this paper we show analytically how different arrangements could affect the voting behaviour of individual MPC members and therefore policy outcomes. We then apply our results to the Bank of England and the Federal Reserve. A general finding is that when MPC members are not too diverse in terms of expertise and experience, policy discussions should not be based on pre-prepared policy options. Instead, interest rate proposals should arise endogenously as a majority of views expressed by the members, as is the case at the Bank of England and appears to be the case in the FOMC under Chairman Bernanke. ( |
| Keywords: | monetary policy committee; voting; Bank of England; Federal Open Market Committee |
| JEL: | F15 F42 J60 |
| Date: | 2008–11 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:dnb:dnbwpp:184&r=cdm |
| By: | Bruno S. Frey; Benno Torgler |
| Abstract: | In the course of history, a large number of politicians have been assassinated. Rational choice hypotheses are developed and tested using panel data covering more than 100 countries over a period of 20 years. Several strategies, in addition to security measures, are shown to significantly reduce the probability of politicians being attacked or killed: extended institutional and governance quality, democracy, voice and accountability, a well functioning system of law and order, decentralization via the division of power and federalism, larger cabinet size and strengthened civil society. There is also support for a contagion effect. |
| Keywords: | Assassinations, rational choice, governance, democracy, dictatorship, deterrence, protection. |
| JEL: | D01 D70 K14 K42 Z10 |
| Date: | 2008–10 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zur:iewwpx:391&r=cdm |
| By: | Rainald Borck; Katharina Wrohlich |
| Abstract: | We analyse preferences for public, private or mixed provision of childcare theoretically and empirically. We model childcare as a publicly provided private good. Richer households should prefer private provision to either pure public or mixed provision. If public provision redistributes from rich to poor, they should favour mixed over pure public provision, but if public provision redistributes from poor to rich, the rich and poor might favour mixed provision while the middle class favour public provision ('ends against the middle'). Using estimates for household preferences from survey data, we find no support for the ends-against-the-middle result. |
| Keywords: | Childcare, redistribution, political preferences, public provision of private goods |
| JEL: | J13 D72 H42 D19 |
| Date: | 2008 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:diw:diwsop:diw_sp140&r=cdm |
| By: | Atif Mian; Amir Sufi; Francesco Trebbi |
| Abstract: | We examine the determinants of congressional voting behavior on two of the most significant pieces of federal legislation in U.S. economic history: the American Housing Rescue and Foreclosure Prevention Act of 2008 and the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008. We find evidence that constituent interests and special interests influence voting patterns during the crisis. Representatives from districts experiencing an increase in mortgage default rates are significantly more likely to vote in favor of the AHRFPA. They are precise in responding only to mortgage related constituent defaults, and are significantly more sensitive to defaults of their own-party constituents. Increased campaign contributions from the financial services industry is associated with a higher likelihood of voting in favor of the EESA, a bill which transfers wealth from tax payers to the financial services industry. We also examine the trade-off between politician ideology and constituent and special interests, and find that conservative politicians are less responsive to constituent and special interest pressure. This latter finding suggests that politicians, through ideology, can commit against intervention even during severe crises. |
| JEL: | D72 G21 L51 |
| Date: | 2008–11 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:14468&r=cdm |
| By: | Berdugo, Binyamin |
| Abstract: | This paper analyses leadership and charisma within the framework of social choice. In societies that lack formal institutional authorities, the power of leaders to coerce is limited. Under such conditions, we find that social outcomes will depend not only on policy preferences but also on how a leader's ability to transform voluntary efforts into some public good are conceived by other society members. The paper has three main results: (1) institutionalized and uninstitutionalized societies that have identical characteristics might have different political equilibria (namely, they might choose different leaders and different policies); (2) under imperfect information regarding individuals' abilities, social choice may be biased toward less competent but more charismatic leaders; and (3) in uninstitutionalized societies, less competent, more charismatic leaders can achieve more in terms of social goals and welfare than can more competent and less charismatic ones. |
| Keywords: | Candidates; Charisma; Leadership; Public Goods ; Voting |
| JEL: | D71 D72 D82 |
| Date: | 2008–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:11408&r=cdm |