|
on Collective Decision-Making |
|
Issue of 2008‒05‒24
eight papers chosen by |
| By: | Albert Solé-Ollé (Universitat de Barcelona (UB); Institut d'Economia de Barcelona (IEB); CESifo); Pilar Sorribas-Navarro (Universitat Barcelona (UB); Institut d'Economia de Barcelona (IEB)) |
| Abstract: | In this paper we test the hypothesis that intergovernmental grants allocated to co-partisans buy more political support than grants allocated to local governments controlled by opposition parties. We use a rich Spanish database containing information about the grants received by 617 municipalities during the period 1993-2003 from two different upper-tier governments (Regional and Upper-local), as well as data of municipal voting behaviour at three electoral contests held at the different layers of government during this period. Therefore, we are able to estimate two different vote equations, analysing the effects of grants given to aligned and unaligned municipalities on the vote share of the incumbent party/parties at the regional and local elections. We account for the endogeneity of grants by instrumenting them with the average amount of grants distributed by upper-layer governments. The results suggest that grants given to co-partisans buy some political support, but that grants given to opposition parties do not bring any votes, suggesting that the grantee reaps as much political credit from intergovernmental grants as the grantor |
| Keywords: | Voting, parties, grants. |
| JEL: | C72 D72 |
| Date: | 2008 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ieb:wpaper:2008/5/doc2008-2&r=cdm |
| By: | Klaus Bettina; Klijn Flip (METEOR) |
| Abstract: | We consider one-to-one, one-sided matching (roommate) problems in which agents can either be matched as pairs or remain single. We introduce a so-called bi-choice graph for each pair of stable matchings and characterize its structure. Exploiting this structure we obtain as a corollary the “lonely wolf” theorem and a decomposability result. The latter result together with transitivity of blocking leads to an elementary proof of the so-called stable median matching theorem, showing how the often incompatible concepts of stability (represented by the political economist Adam Smith) and fairness (represented by the political philosopher John Rawls) can be reconciled for roommate problems. Finally, we extend our results to two-sided matching problems. |
| Keywords: | Economics (Jel: A) |
| Date: | 2008 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:dgr:umamet:2008009&r=cdm |
| By: | Sanna Nurmikko |
| Abstract: | We focus on political violence as a mechanism that allows the political leader to fight off opposition and increase his chances of re-election. In a collusive equilibrium, the leader allocates a bribe to the army, and the latter responds by producing political violence. Such an equilibrium is more likely, the larger are the public resources available to the leader; the lower is army’s potential punishment and salary offered by the opposition regime; the more severe is the incumbent’s potential punishment; and when the political leader is sufficiently patient, but the army is shortsighted enough. |
| Date: | 2008–05–12 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:esx:essedp:652&r=cdm |
| By: | Jose Apesteguia; Miguel A. Ballester |
| Abstract: | A choice function is sequentially rationalizable if there is an ordered collection of asymmetric binary relations that identifies the selected alternative in every choice problem. We propose a property, F-consistency, and show that it characterizes the notion of sequential rationalizability. F-consistency is a testable property that highlights the behavioral aspects implicit in sequentially rationalizable choice. Further, our characterization result provides a novel tool with which to study how other behavioral concepts are related to sequential rationalizability, and establish a priori unexpected implications. In particular, we show that the concept of rationalizability by game trees, which, in principle, had little to do with sequential rationalizability, is a refinement of the latter. Every choice function that is rationalizable by a game tree is also sequentially rationalizable. Finally, we show that some prominent voting mechanisms are also sequentially rationalizable. |
| Keywords: | Individual rationality, Rationalizability, Consistency, Bounded rationality, Behavioral economics, Voting |
| JEL: | B41 D01 |
| Date: | 2008–05 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:upf:upfgen:1089&r=cdm |
| By: | Bali Swain, Ranjula (Department of Economics); Varghese, Adel (IFMR & Texas A & M University) |
| Abstract: | We evaluate the effect of Self Help Group participation on a long term impact parameter, namely asset creation. Indian Self Help Groups (SHGs)are unique in that they are mainly NGO-formed microfinance groups but later funded by commercial banks. The results reveal that longer membership in SHGs positively impacts asset creation, robust to various asset specifications. With longer participation in SHGs, members move away from pure agriculture as an income source towards other sources such as livestock income. Training by NGOs positively impacts asset creation but the type of SHG linkage per se has no effect. |
| Keywords: | Asset creation; microfinance; impact; Self Help Groups |
| JEL: | G21 I32 O12 |
| Date: | 2008–05–19 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hhs:uunewp:2008_005&r=cdm |
| By: | Margo Bergman; G. Dirk Mateer; Michael Reksulak; Jonathan C. Rork; Rick K. Wilson; David Zirkle |
| Abstract: | The authors detail an urban economics experiment that is easily run in the classroom. The experiment has a flexible design that allows the instructor to explore how congestion, zoning, public transportation, and taxation levels determine the bid-rent function. Heterogeneous agents in the experiment compete for land use utilizing a simple auction mechanism. Using the data that is collected, a bid-rent function is derived, and the experimental treatment is altered over the course of three sessions to uncover core concepts in urban economics. Moreover, this provides a tangible experience that can be used to help undergraduates relate to urban issues such as the steep rent gradient found around many larger colleges and universities. |
| JEL: | A22 R1 C9 |
| Date: | 2008–05 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:exc:wpaper:2008-09&r=cdm |
| By: | Bøg, Martin |
| Abstract: | This paper considers the problem of a decision maker who is faced with a dynamic decision problem with several alternatives, and additionally can engage in prior consultation on one of the alternatives. Information received from others is coarse. When consulting on an alternative that the decision maker is pre-disposed to, she either consults someone that shares precisely her convictions, or she consults someone who is more ”picky” than herself. Optimality depends on the attractiveness of alternatives; when another alternative becomes sufficiently attractive the decision maker prefers a picky contact. When the decisionmaker consults on a lower ranked alternative, optimal consulting depends non-monotonically on the value of the alternative she is pre-disposed to. For high and low values of the pre-disposed alternative she prefers to consult someone with her own convictions, but for medium values she prefers to consult a picky contact. Finally a decision maker may prefer to consult on a lower ranked alternative. |
| Keywords: | bandit problem; observational learning; heterogeneity |
| JEL: | D83 C7 |
| Date: | 2006–12–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:8773&r=cdm |
| By: | Christoph Engel (Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, Bonn) |
| Abstract: | Much of behavioural research, both in economics and in psychology, is limited in one respect: it tests isolated individuals. In many practically relevant situations, there are discernible actors, but these actors are not individuals. Rather firms, regulatory bodies, associations, countries or international organisations become active. The social problem at hand is best understood if one attributes judgement and decision making to higher level aggregates of individuals. Which elements from the rich body of behavioural evidence transfer to these corporate actors? Are there other deviations from the predictions of the rational choice model, not present or studied in individuals? This paper surveys the empirical literature from experimental economics, psychology, sociology and law. While some building blocks, like the behaviour of managers and of ad hoc groups, are relatively well understood, our knowledge about the effects of more elaborate internal structure on the dealings of corporate actors with the outer world is still relatively limited. |
| Keywords: | Behaviour, Firms, Organizations, Associations, Groups |
| JEL: | C92 D21 D23 K22 L20 |
| Date: | 2008–05 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:mpg:wpaper:2008_23&r=cdm |