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on Collective Decision-Making |
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Issue of 2008‒05‒05
eight papers chosen by |
| By: | Christopher Blattman |
| Abstract: | What is the political legacy of violent conflict? This paper presents evidence for a link between war, violence and increased individual political participation and leadership among former combatants and victims of violence, and uses this link to understand the deeper determinants of individual political behavior. The setting is northern Uganda, where rebel recruitment methods generated quasi-experimental variation in who became a rebel conscript and who did not. Original survey data shows that the exogenous element of conscription (by abduction) leads to significantly greater political participation later in life. The principal determinant of this increased political participation, moreover, appears to be war violence experienced. Meanwhile, abduction and violence do not appear to affect multiple non-political types of community participation. I show that these patterns are not easily explained by models of participation based on simple rational preferences, social preferences, mobilization by elites, or information availability. Only ‘expressive’ theories of participation appear consistent with the patterns observed, whereby exposure to violence augments the value a person places on the act of political expression itself. The mplications for general theories of political participation are discussed. |
| Keywords: | violence, political participation, Uganda |
| Date: | 2008–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cgd:wpaper:138&r=cdm |
| By: | Jordi Blanes i Vidal; Clare Leaver |
| Abstract: | Tenured public officials such as judges are often thought to be indifferent to the concerns of the elctorate and, as a result, potentially lacking in discipline but unlikely to pander to public opinion. We investigate this proposition empirically using data on promotion decisions taken by senior English judges between 1985 and 2005. Throughout this period the popular view was one of ill-disciplined elitism: senior judges were alleged to be favouring candidates from elite backgrounds over their equally capable non-elite counterparts. We find no evidence of such ill-discipline; most of the unconditional difference in promotion prospects between the two groups can simply be explained by differences in promotion-relevant characteristics. However, exploiting an unexpected proposal to remove control over promotions from the judiciary, we do find evidence of pandering. When faced by the prospect of losing autonomy, senior judges began to favour non-elite candidates, as well as candidates who were unconnected to members of the promotion committee. Our finding that tenured public officials can display both the upsides and downsides of electoral accountability has implications for the literature on political agency, as well as recent constitutional reforms. |
| Keywords: | Electoral Accountability, Judges, Promotion Decisions |
| JEL: | H11 J44 J45 J70 |
| Date: | 2008 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:oxf:wpaper:390&r=cdm |
| By: | Soubeyran, R. |
| Abstract: | Does a disadvantaged candidate always choose an extremist program? When does a less competent candidate have an incentive to move to extreme positions in order to differentiate himself from the more competent candidate? Recent works answer by the affirmative (Groseclose 1999, Ansolabehere and Snyder 2000, Aragones and Palfrey 2002, 2003). We consider a two candidates electoral competition over public consumption, with a two dimensional policy space and two dimensions of candidates heterogeneity. In this setting, we show that the conclusion depends on candidates relative competences over the two public goods and distinguish between two types of advantages (an absolute advantage and comparative advantage in providing the two public goods). ...French Abstract : Cet article traite de l'entrée dans une industrie dans laquelle les firmes partagent une réputation collective. Premièrement, nous montrons que l'entrée libre n'est pas socialement optimale, il existe un besoin de régulation à travers l'imposition d'un standard minimum de qualité (par exemple). Deuxièmement, nous montrons qu'un standard minimum de qualité peut inciter des firmes à entrer sur le marché. Contrairement à la pensée commune, un standard minimum de qualité ne doit pas être toujours considéré comme une barrière à l'entrée. |
| Keywords: | CANDIDATE QUALITY; EXTREMISM; PUBLIC GOODS CONSUMPTION |
| JEL: | C72 D72 |
| Date: | 2008 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:umr:wpaper:200801&r=cdm |
| By: | Christoph A. Schaltegger; Lars P. Feld |
| Abstract: | The fiscal commons problem is one of the most prominent explanations of excessive spending in political economics. The more fragmented a government, the higher its spending. In this paper we investigate to what extent this problem can be mitigated by different fiscal or constitutional insti-tutions. We distinguish between two variants of fragmented governments: cabinet size and coali-tion size. In addition, we analyze whether constitutional rules for executive and legislature as well as formal fiscal restraints shape the size of government and how different rules interact with fragmentation in determining government size. The empirical analysis of the role of fragmented governments for fiscal policy outcomes is based on a panel of 26 Swiss cantons from 1980-1998. The results indicate that the number of ministers in the cabinet is negatively associated with fiscal discipline. Furthermore, fiscal referendums effectively restrict the size of government, while for-mal fiscal restraints more effectively restrict the fiscal commons problem. (This is a thoroughly revised version of Crema WP Nr. 2004-15) |
| Keywords: | Fragmentation; Fiscal Policy; Referendums; Legislative Rules; Formal fiscal restraints |
| JEL: | E61 E63 H61 |
| Date: | 2008–04 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cra:wpaper:2008-10&r=cdm |
| By: | Dirk Bergemann (Cowles Foundation, Yale University); Stephen Morris (Dept. of Economics, Princeton University) |
| Abstract: | In a general interdependent preference environment, we characterize when two payoff types can be distinguished by their rationalizable strategic choices without any prior knowledge of their beliefs and higher order beliefs. We show that two types are strategically distinguishable if and only if they satisfy a separability condition. The separability condition for each agent essentially requires that there is not too much interdependence in preferences across agents. A social choice function -- mapping payoff type profiles to outcomes -- can be robustly virtually implemented if there exists a mechanism such that every equilibrium on every type space achieves an outcome arbitrarily close to the social choice function: this definition is equivalent to requiring virtual implementation in iterated deletion of strategies that are strictly dominated for all beliefs. The social choice function is robustly measurable if strategically indistinguishable types receive the same allocation. We show that ex post incentive compatibility and robust measurability are necessary and sufficient for robust virtual implementation. |
| Keywords: | Mechanism design, Virtual implementation, Robust implementation, Rationalizability, Ex-post incentive compatibility |
| JEL: | C79 D82 |
| Date: | 2007–06 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cwl:cwldpp:1609r&r=cdm |
| By: | Maskin, Eric S. (Institute for Advanced Studies) |
| Abstract: | Eric S. Maskin delivered his Prize Lecture on 8 December 2007 at Aula Magna, Stockholm University. He was introduced by Professor Jorgen Weibull, Chairman of the Economics Prize Committee. |
| Keywords: | Mechanism Design; |
| JEL: | D02 |
| Date: | 2007–12–08 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ris:nobelp:2007_004&r=cdm |
| By: | Committee, Nobel Prize (Nobel Prize Committee) |
| Abstract: | Scientific Background, The Nobel Prize in Economic Sciences 2007. Economic transactions take place in markets, within firms and under a host of other institutional arrangements. Some markets are free of government intervention while others are regulated. Within firms, some transactions are guided by market prices, some are negotiated, and yet others are dictated by management. Mechanism design theory provides a coherent framework for analyzing this great variety of institutions, or "allocation mechanisms", with a focus on the problems associated with incentives and private information. |
| Keywords: | Mechanism Design; Asymmetric Information |
| JEL: | D02 |
| Date: | 2007–10–15 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ris:nobelp:2007_002&r=cdm |
| By: | Maskin, Eric S. (Institute for Advanced Studies); Myerson, Roger B. (University of Chicago) |
| Abstract: | Interview with the Laureates in Economics Eric S. Maskin and Roger B. Myerson, 6 December 2007. The interviewer is Adam Smith, Editor-in-Chief of Nobelprize.org. |
| Keywords: | Mechanism Design; |
| JEL: | D02 |
| Date: | 2007–12–06 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ris:nobelp:2007_005&r=cdm |