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on Collective Decision-Making |
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Issue of 2008‒03‒25
fourteen papers chosen by |
| By: | Akramov, Kamiljon T.; Qureshi, Sarfraz; Birner, Regina; Khan, Bilal Hasan |
| Abstract: | "Decentralization has the potential to improve the accountability of government and lead to a more efficient provision of public services. However, accountability requires broad groups of people to participate in local government. Thus, voter turnout at local government elections is an important component of government accountability. This study used survey data on the 2005 local government elections in Pakistan to analyze the impact of electoral mechanisms, the credibility of elections, and voters' socioeconomic characteristics on voter turnout. The rational-choice perspective is applied to develop the specifications of the empirical model. The empirical analysis is based on a series of standard and multilevel random-intercept logistic models. Our important findings reveal that (1) voter turnout is strongly associated with the personal and social gratifications people derive from voting; (2) the preference-matching ability of candidates for local government positions is marginal; and (3) the introduction of direct elections of the district nazims—a key position in local government—might improve electoral participation and thus create a precondition for better local government accountability. The findings also suggest that less educated people, farmers, and rural people are more likely to vote." Authors' Abstract |
| Keywords: | Decentralization, local government elections, political participation, voter turnout, Public service provision, Governance, |
| Date: | 2008 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:fpr:ifprid:754&r=cdm |
| By: | Ascensión Andina-Díaz (Department of Economic Theory, Universidad de Málaga) |
| Abstract: | This paper examines the incentives of ideological media outlets to acquire costly information in a context of asymmetric information between political parties and voters. We consider two market structures: a monopoly media market and a duopoly one. We show that if each party has the support of a media, either party has the same probability of winning the election. However, if just one of the parties has the support of the media, the results might well change, as this party will get into office with a higher probability than the other party. We also analyze voters' welfare in this context and show that the important aspect is whether a media industry exists, and not the number of media outlets. |
| Keywords: | Election, Accountability, Media, Bias |
| JEL: | D72 D82 |
| Date: | 2008–03 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:mal:wpaper:2008-6&r=cdm |
| By: | Mirabelle Muuls; Dimitra Petropoulou |
| Abstract: | This paper develops an infinite-horizon, political agency model with a continuum of political districts, in which incumbent politicians can improve their re-election probability by attracting swing voters in key states through strategic trade protection. A unique equilibrium is shown to exist where incumbents build a reputation of protectionism through their policy decisions. We show that strategic trade protection is more likely when protectionist swing voters have a lead over free-trade supports in states with relatively strong electoral competition that represent a larger proportion of Electoral College votes. US data is used to test the hypothesis that industrial concentration in swing and decisive states is an important determinant of trade protection of that industry. The empirical findings provide support for the theory and highlight an important, and previously overlooked, determinant of trade protection in the US Electoral College. |
| Keywords: | Political Economy, Elections, Electoral College, Swing States, Trade Policy |
| JEL: | D72 D78 F13 R12 |
| Date: | 2007 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:oxf:wpaper:372&r=cdm |
| By: | Ticchi, Davide (University of Urbino); Vindigni, Andrea (Princeton University) |
| Abstract: | Many episodes of extension of franchise in the 19th and especially in the 20th century occurred during or in the aftermath of major wars. Motivated by this fact, we offer a theory of political transitions which focuses on the impact of international conflicts on domestic political institutions. We argue that mass-armies, which appeared in Europe after the French Revolution, are an effective military organization only if the conscripted citizens are willing to put effort in fighting wars, which in turn depends on the economic incentives that are provided to them. The need to provide such incentives implies that an oligarchy adopting a mass-army may voluntarily decide to promise some amount of income redistribution to its citizens, conditionally on satisfactory performance as soldiers. When the elite cannot credibly commit to provide an incentive-compatible redistribution, they may cope with the moral hazard problem of the citizens-soldiers only by relinquishing political power to them through the extension of franchise. This is because democracy always implements a highly redistributive fiscal policy, which makes fighting hard incentive-compatible for the citizens-soldiers. We show that a transition to democracy is more likely to occur when the external threat faced by an incumbent oligarchy is in some sense intermediate. A very high external threat allows the elite to make credible commitments of future income redistribution in favor of the citizens, while a limited external threat makes optimal for the elite not making any (economic or political) concession to the masses. Some historical evidence consistent with our theory is also provided. |
| Keywords: | autocracy, democracy, wars, redistribution |
| JEL: | P16 H11 |
| Date: | 2008–03 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps:dp3397&r=cdm |
| By: | James M. Snyder, Jr.; David Strömberg |
| Abstract: | In this paper we estimate the impact of press coverage on citizen knowledge, politicians' actions, and policy. We find that a poor fit between newspaper markets and political districts reduces press coverage of politics. We use variation in this fit due to redistricting to identify the effects of reduced coverage. Exploring the links in the causal chain of media effects -- voter information, politicians' actions and policy -- we find statistically significant and substantively important effects. Voters living in areas with less coverage of their U.S. House representative are less likely to recall their representative's name, and less able to describe and rate them. Congressmen who are less covered by the local press work less for their constituencies: they are less likely to stand witness before congressional hearings, to serve on constituency-oriented committees (perhaps), and to vote against the party line. Finally, this congressional behavior affects policy. Federal spending is lower in areas where there is less press coverage of the local members of congress. |
| JEL: | D72 H5 L82 |
| Date: | 2008–03 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:13878&r=cdm |
| By: | Ascensión Andina-Díaz (Department of Economic Theory, Universidad de Málaga) |
| Abstract: | This paper analyzes an election game where self-interested politicians can exploit the lack of information that voters have about candidates' preferred policies in order to pursue their own agendas. In such a setup, we study the incentives of newspapers to acquire costly information, and how competition among the media affect such incentives. We show that the higher the number of potential readers and/or the lower the cost or investigating, the more the newspapers investigate. We also show that the readers' purchasing habits play a crucial role in the model. More specifically, we show that if the readers always buy a newspaper, media competition favors information disclosure; whereas if they just buy a newspaper in the case news are uncovered, competition is not so desirable. |
| Keywords: | Media competition, Political accountability, Information |
| JEL: | D72 D82 |
| Date: | 2008–03 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:mal:wpaper:2008-5&r=cdm |
| By: | John Duggan (W. Allen Wallis Institute of Political Economy, 107 Harkness Hall, University of Rochester, Rochester, NY 14627-0158); César Martinelli (Centro de Investigación Económica, Instituto Tecnológico Autónomo de México) |
| Abstract: | We formalize the concept of media slant as a relative emphasis on di¤erent issues of political interest by the media, and we illustrate the e¤ects of the media choice of slant on political outcomes and economic decisions in a rational expectations model. In a two-candidate elec- tion, if the media is biased in favor of the underdog, then it will put more emphasis on issues with a large electoral impact, hoping that the news will deliver an upset victory. Whether citizens are better o¤ with media biased in favor of the underdog or the frontrunner de- pends on the importance of choosing the .right.candidate for citizens versus the impact of political news on the private economic decisions of voters. Balanced media, giving each issue equal coverage, may be worse for voters than partisan media. |
| Date: | 2008–03 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:roc:wallis:wp54&r=cdm |
| By: | Andrea Goldstein; Federica Marzo |
| Abstract: | The long-term decline in political instability continued in 2006 and armed conflicts, though still widespread, have diminished. Multiparty elections have taken place in several African countries and progress towards participative democracy is encouraging. Progress in economic governance is still insufficient, with corruption continuing to hamper socio-economic development. |
| Date: | 2007–05 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:oec:devaac:45-en&r=cdm |
| By: | Acemoglu, Daron; Ticchi, Davide; Vindigni, Andrea |
| Abstract: | We investigate how nondemocratic regimes use the military and how this can lead to the emergence of military dictatorships. Nondemocratic regimes need the use of force in order to remain in power, but this creates a political moral hazard problem; a strong military may not simply work as an agent of the elite but may turn against them in order to create a regime more in line with their own objectives. The political moral hazard problem increases the cost of using repression in nondemocratic regimes and in particular, necessitates high wages and policy concessions to the military. When these concessions are not su¢ cient, the military can take action against a nondemocratic regime in order to create its own dictatorship. A more important consequence of the presence of a strong military is that once transition to democracy takes place, the military poses a coup threat against the nascent democratic regime until it is reformed. The anticipation that the military will be reformed in the future acts as an additional motivation for the military to undertake coups against democratic governments. We show that greater inequality makes the use of the military in nondemocratic regimes more likely and also makes it more di¢ cult for democracies to prevent military coups. In addition, greater inequality also makes it more likely that nondemocratic regimes are unable to solve the political moral hazard problem and thus creates another channel for the emergence of military dictatorships. We also show that greater natural resource rents make military coups against democracies more likely, but have ambiguous e¤ects on the political equilibrium in nondemocracies (because with abundant natural resources, repression becomes more valuable to the elite, but also more expensive to maintain because of the more severe political moral hazard problem that natural resources induce). Finally, we discuss how the national defense role of the military interacts with its involvement in domestic politics. |
| Keywords: | coups, democracy, military, nondemocracy, political economy, political transitions |
| JEL: | H2 N10 N40 P16 |
| Date: | 2008–03 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:uca:ucapdv:100&r=cdm |
| By: | Acemoglu, Daron (MIT); Ticchi, Davide (University of Urbino); Vindigni, Andrea (Princeton University) |
| Abstract: | We investigate how nondemocratic regimes use the military and how this can lead to the emergence of military dictatorships. Nondemocratic regimes need the use of force in order to remain in power, but this creates a political moral hazard problem; a strong military may not simply work as an agent of the elite but may turn against them in order to create a regime more in line with their own objectives. The political moral hazard problem increases the cost of using repression in nondemocratic regimes and in particular, necessitates high wages and policy concessions to the military. When these concessions are not sufficient, the military can take action against a nondemocratic regime in order to create its own dictatorship. A more important consequence of the presence of a strong military is that once transition to democracy takes place, the military poses a coup threat against the nascent democratic regime until it is reformed. The anticipation that the military will be reformed in the future acts as an additional motivation for the military to undertake coups against democratic governments. We show that greater inequality makes the use of the military in nondemocratic regimes more likely and also makes it more difficult for democracies to prevent military coups. In addition, greater inequality also makes it more likely that nondemocratic regimes are unable to solve the political moral hazard problem and thus creates another channel for the emergence of military dictatorships. We also show that greater natural resource rents make military coups against democracies more likely, but have ambiguous effects on the political equilibrium in nondemocracies (because with abundant natural resources, repression becomes more valuable to the elite, but also more expensive to maintain because of the more severe political moral hazard problem that natural resources induce). Finally, we discuss how the national defense role of the military interacts with its involvement in domestic politics. |
| Keywords: | coups, democracy, military, nondemocracy, political economy, political transitions |
| JEL: | H2 N10 N40 P16 |
| Date: | 2008–03 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps:dp3392&r=cdm |
| By: | Hatipoglu, Ozan; Ozbek , Gulenay |
| Abstract: | In this paper we analyze a general equilibrium model in which agents choose to be employed in formal or in the informal sector. The formal sector is taxed to provide income subsidies and the level of redistribution is determined endogenously through majority voting. We explore how the demand for redistribution determined by majority voting interacts with the incentive to work in the untaxed informal market. We also investigate how different levels of the informal sector wage can explain simultaneous changes in the size of the informal sector and level of redistribution. The model is simulated to produce qualitative results to illustrate the differences between economies with different distributional features. The model accounts for the different sizes of informal sector and income redistribution in Mexico and United States. |
| Keywords: | Informal Sector; Income Redistribution; Median Voter |
| JEL: | H20 D3 J20 |
| Date: | 2008–03–20 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:7857&r=cdm |
| By: | Bard Harstad |
| Abstract: | I investigate when a exible bargaining agenda, where side payments are possible, facilitates cooperation in a context with strategic delegation. On the one hand, allowing side payments may be necessary when one partys participation constraint otherwise would be violated. On the other, with side payments each principal appoints a delegate that values the project less, since this increases her bargaining power. Reluctant agents, in turn, implement too few projects. I show that side payments are bad if the heterogeneity is small while the uncertainty and the typical value of the project are large. With a larger number of parties there may be a stalemate without side payments, but delegation becomes more strategic as well, and cooperation decreases in either case. |
| Keywords: | Collective action, side transfers, bargaining agenda, strategic delegation, issue linkages |
| JEL: | C78 D78 F53 H77 |
| Date: | 2007–09 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nwu:cmsems:1452&r=cdm |
| By: | Pablo Amoros (Department of Economic Theory, Universidad de Málaga) |
| Abstract: | The unequivocal majority of a social choice rule F is the minimum number of agents that must agree on their best alternative in order to guarantee that this alternative is the only one prescribed by F. If the unequivocal majority of F is larger than the minimum possible value, then some of the alternatives prescribed by F are undesirable (there exists a different alternative which is the most preferred by more than 50% of the agents). Moreover, the larger the unequivocal majority of F, the worse these alternatives are (since the proportion of agents that prefer the same different alternative increases). We show that the smallest unequivocal majority compatible with Maskin-monotonicity is n-((n-1)/m), where n=3 is the number of agents and m=3 is the number of alternatives. This value represents no less than 66.6% of the population. |
| Keywords: | Maskin-monotonicity; Majority; Condorcet winner |
| JEL: | C70 D78 |
| Date: | 2008–03 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:mal:wpaper:2008-3&r=cdm |
| By: | Mana Komai; Philip J. Grossman (Department of Economics, St. Cloud State University) |
| Abstract: | Recent theoretical and experimental work suggests that leading by example can induce full cooperation in collective actions. Our experimental study suggests that leading by example loses its effectiveness in large groups. Our interpretation is that the discrepancy between the leaders’ incentives and those of an individual follower increases with group size. On one hand, leaders become more pivotal in larger groups and thus eager to participate. On the other hand, followers become more marginal in larger groups and thus more eager to free ride. Under these circumstances, leading by example becomes too weak to overcome the strong free riding problem. |
| Keywords: | Leading by example, Free-riding, Cooperation, Group size |
| Date: | 2008–03 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:scs:wpaper:0806&r=cdm |