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on Collective Decision-Making |
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Issue of 2008‒02‒02
nine papers chosen by |
| By: | Laslier, Jean-François (École Polytechnique); Weibull, Jörgen (Dept. of Economics, Stockholm School of Economics) |
| Abstract: | We consider a committee facing a binary decision under uncertainty. Each member holds some private information. Members may have different preferences and initial beliefs, but they all agree which decision should be taken in each of the two states of the world. We characterize the optimal anonymous and deterministic voting rule and provide a homogeneity assumption on preferences and beliefs under which sincere voting is a Nash equilibrium for this rule. We also provide a necessary and sufficient condition for sincere voting to be an equilibrium under any deterministic majoritarian voting rule. We show that a class of slightly randomized majoritarian voting rules make sincere voting a strict and unique pure-strategy equilibrium. A slight deontological preference for sincere voting, or ex post revelation of individual votes – ”transparency” – combined with a concern for esteem, has the same effect. |
| Keywords: | voting; condorcet; committee; jury; judgement aggregation. |
| JEL: | D71 D72 |
| Date: | 2008–01–28 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hhs:hastef:0692&r=cdm |
| By: | Tasos Kalandrakis (W. Allen Wallis Institute of Political Economy, 107 Harkness Hall, University of Rochester, Rochester, NY 14627-0158) |
| Abstract: | We derive necessary and sufficient conditions in order for a finite number of binary voting choices to be consistent with the hypothesis that voters have preferences that admit concave utility representations. When the location of the voting alternatives is known, we apply these conditions in order to derive simple, nontrivial testable restrictions on the location of voters’ ideal points, and in order to predict individual voting behavior. If, on the other hand, the location of voting alternatives is unrestricted then voting decisions impose no testable restrictions on the joint location of voter ideal points, even if the space of alternatives is one dimensional. Furthermore, two dimensions are always sufficient to represent or fold the voting records of any number of voters while endowing all these voters with strictly concave preferences and arbitrary ideal points. The analysis readily generalizes to choice situations over any finite sets of alternatives. |
| Date: | 2008–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:roc:wallis:wp51&r=cdm |
| By: | Gagliarducci, Stefano (CEMFI, Madrid); Nannicini, Tommaso (Universidad Carlos III, Madrid); Naticchioni, Paolo (Catholic University of Louvain) |
| Abstract: | In most modern democracies elected officials can work in the private sector while appointed in parliament. We show that when the political and market sectors are not mutually exclusive, a trade-off arises between the quality of elected officials and the effort they exert in political life. If high-ability citizens can keep earning money outside of parliament, they will be more likely to run for election; for the same reason, they will also be more likely to shirk once elected. These predictions are confronted with a unique dataset about members of the Italian Parliament from 1996 to 2006. The empirical evidence shows that bad but dedicated politicians come along with good but not fully committed politicians. There is in fact a non-negligible fraction of citizens with remarkably high pre-election income who are appointed in parliament. These citizens are those who gain relatively more from being elected in terms of outside income. Conversely, they are less committed to the parliamentary activity in many respects, like voting attendance and bills sponsorship. |
| Keywords: | politicians, moral hazard, adverse selection, absenteeism, outside income |
| JEL: | D72 J45 P16 |
| Date: | 2008–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps:dp3295&r=cdm |
| By: | Matteo Triossi |
| Abstract: | In a common-values election with two candidates voters receive a signal about which candidate is superior. They can acquire information that improves the precision of the signal. Electors differ in their information acquisition costs. For large electorates a non negligible fraction of voters acquires information, but the quantity of informed voters and the quality of acquired information decline so fast that information aggregation fails to obtain. |
| Keywords: | Costly Information Acquisition, Condorcet Jury Theorem. |
| JEL: | C72 D72 D82 |
| Date: | 2008 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cca:wpaper:68&r=cdm |
| By: | Ticchi, Davide; Vindigni, Andrea |
| Abstract: | Many episodes of extension of franchise in the 19th and especially in the 20th century occurred during or in the aftermath of major wars. Motivated by this fact, we offer a theory of political transitions which focuses on the impact of international conflicts on domestic political institutions. We argue that mass-armies, which appeared in Europe after the French Revolution, are an effective military organization only if the conscripted citizens are willing to put effort in fighting wars, which in turn depends on the economic incentives that are provided to them. The need to provide such incentives, implies that an oligarchy adopting a mass-army may voluntarily decide to promise some amount of income redistribution to its citizens, conditionally on satisfactory performance as soldiers. When the elite cannot credibly commit to provide an incentive-compatible redistribution, they may cope with the moral hazard problem of the citizens-soldiers only by relinquishing political power to them through the extension of franchise. This is because democracy always implements a highly redistributive fiscal policy, which makes fighting hard incentive-compatible for the citizens-soldiers. We show that a transition to democracy is more likely to occur when the external threat faced by an incumbent oligarchy is in some sense intermediate. A very high external threat allows the elite to make credible commitments of future income redistribution in favor of the citizens, while a limited external threat makes optimal for the elite not making any (economic or political) concession to the masses. Some historical evidence consistent with our theory is also provided. |
| Keywords: | Autocracy, Democracy, Wars, Redistribution |
| JEL: | D72 D74 H56 N40 P16 |
| Date: | 2007–12 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:uca:ucapdv:97&r=cdm |
| By: | Alex Coram (Robert Gordon University, Scotland, and The University of Western Australia) |
| Abstract: | Competition between political parties is a process that unfolds over time whereas formal theories of party competition have tended to take an essentially static, or one-shot, approach. This leaves some gaps in our understanding of the dynamics of campaigning. The aim of this paper is to make up some of this gap. This is done using a differential game theory model to analyse a situation in which support for a party depends on the amount spent on marketing relative to the expenditure of the other party. One of the main results is that, even when voters are not myopic, the logic of the competition forces parties to accelerate expenditure on campaigning during the period between elections. JEL Categories: C61, C72, C73, D72. |
| Keywords: | party competition, dynamics, differential games. |
| Date: | 2008–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ums:papers:2008-01&r=cdm |
| By: | Alejandro Saporiti (Economics, University of Manchester) |
| Abstract: | This paper analyzes the traditional unidimensional, two-party electoral competition game when parties have mixed motivations, in the sense that they are interested in winning the election, but also in the policy implemented after the contest. In spite of having discontinuous payoffs, this game, refer to as the hybrid election game, is shown to be payoff secure and reciprocally upper semi-continuous. Conditional payoffs, however, are not quasi-concave. Hence, the existence of a pure strategy Nash equilibrium (PSNE) is ensured only if parties have homogenous interests in power. In that case, an equilibrium not only exists, but it is also unique. Instead, if parties have heterogeneous motivations, depending upon the relationship between the electoral uncertainty, the aggregate opportunism and its distribution across parties, a psne may or may not exist. The mixed extension, however, is always better reply secure. Therefore, a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium do indeed exist. These results generalize previous existence results in unidimensional electoral competition. |
| Keywords: | Electoral competition; mixed motivations; discontinuous games; Nash equilibrium. |
| JEL: | C72 D72 D78 |
| Date: | 2007–12 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:roc:wallis:wp50&r=cdm |
| By: | Timothy Besley; Rohini Pande; Vijayendra Rao |
| Abstract: | This paper uses data on elected village councils in South India to examine thepolitical economy of public resource allocation. We find that the pattern ofpolicy-making reflects politicians' self-interest. Elected councillors benefit fromimproved personal access to public resources. In addition, the headcouncillor's group identity and residence influences public resource allocation.While electoral incentives do not eliminate politician opportunism, votersappear able to use their electoral clout to gain greater access to publicresources. |
| Keywords: | decentralization, India, Panchayat. |
| JEL: | H76 H11 O12 |
| Date: | 2007–10 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cep:stidep:49&r=cdm |
| By: | Anika Becher (GIGA Institute of African Affairs); Matthias Basedau (GIGA Institute of African Affairs) |
| Abstract: | Since the sweeping (re)introduction of multiparty systems in the early 1990s almost all sub-Saharan countries have introduced bans on ethnic or – in more general terms – particularistic parties. Such party bans have been neglected in research, and this paper engages in a preliminary analysis of their effects on democracy and peace. Theoretically, particularistic party bans can block particularisms from entering politics but also run the risk of forcing groups to resort to extra-legal or violent means. Neutral or context-dependent effects are also possible. Applying macro-qualitative comparison and bivariate statistics on the basis of a unique inventory of party bans and readily available indicators for the dependent variables, no simple connection can be detected. Rather, context conditions seem to be of superior explanatory power. We also find a systematic connection between party bans and variables that could be conceptualized as the causes of their implementation. |
| Keywords: | Sub-Saharan Africa, party bans, ethnicity, conflict, democracy |
| Date: | 2008–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:gig:wpaper:66&r=cdm |