New Economics Papers
on Collective Decision-Making
Issue of 2007‒12‒08
five papers chosen by

  1. The Double Majority Voting Rule of the EU Reform Treaty as a Democratic Ideal for an Enlarging Union : an Appraisal Using Voting Power Analysis By Leech, Dennis; Aziz, Haris
  2. A study of Approval voting on Large Poisson Games By Matias Nunez
  3. A Contribution to the Positive Theory of Indirect Taxation By Canegrati, Emanuele
  4. How enforcement institutions affect markets  By B. Arruñada; M. Casari
  5. The European democratic challenge By Agustín José Menéndez

  1. By: Leech, Dennis (Economics Department, University of Warwick); Aziz, Haris (Computer Science Department, University of Warwick)
    Abstract: The Double Majority rule in the Treaty is claimed to be simpler, more transparent and more democratic than the existing rule. We examine these questions against the democratic ideal that the votes of all citizens in whatever member country should be of equal value using voting power analysis considering possible future enlargements involving candidate countries and then to a number of hypothetical future enlargements. We find the Double Majority rule to fails to measure up to the democratic ideal in all cases. We find the Jagiellonian compromise to be very close to this ideal.
    Keywords: European Union ; Reform Treaty ; Nice Treaty ; Qualified Majority Voting ; Power Indices
    Date: 2007
  2. By: Matias Nunez (LEEP - Laboratoire d'econometrie de l'école polytechnique - CNRS : UMR7657 - Polytechnique - X)
    Abstract: Approval voting features are analysed in a context of large elections with strategic voters: Myerson's Large Poisson Games. I first establish the Magnitude Equiva- lence Theorem (MET) which substantially reduces the complexity of computing the magnitudes of pivotal events. I also show that the Winner of the election coincides with the Profile Condorcet Winner at equilibrium when preferences are restricted to be single-peaked. This is a positive result that strengthens the positive conclusions some scholars have previously drawn over this voting rule. I finally show that, with- out the previous restriction over preferences, both concepts do not generally coincide anymore.
    Date: 2007–11–28
  3. By: Canegrati, Emanuele
    Abstract: In this paper I analyse a probabilistic voting model where self-interested governments set their taxation policies in order to maximise the probabil- ity of winning elections. Society is divided into groups which have di¤erent preferences for the consumption of goods. Results show how candidates are captured by the most powerful groups, which not necessarily repre- sent the median voter but may be located at more extreme positions. The introduction of a probabilistic voting model characterized by the presence of single-minded groups overrules the classic results achieved by the me- dian voter theorem, because it is no longer the position on the income scale to drive the equilibrium policy but the ability of groups to focus on their most preferred goods, instead. This ability allows them to achieve a strong political power which candidates cannot help going along with, because they would lose elections otherwise.
    Keywords: Probabilistic Voting Theory; Single-mindedness; Indirect Taxation; Public Expenditure
    JEL: D11 H24 H53
    Date: 2007–12–05
  4. By: B. Arruñada; M. Casari
    Date: 2007–11
  5. By: Agustín José Menéndez
    Abstract: In this paper, I explore in a systematic manner the different components of the democratic legitimacy of the Union from the standpoint of deliberative democratic theory. Contrary to standard accounts, I claim that the question must be disaggregated, given that the Union has not only several democratic deficits, but also some democratic surpluses. On the one hand, the Union was created to tackle the democratic deficit of nation-states, and has been partially successful in mending the mismatch between the scope of application of their legal systems and the geographical reach of the consequences of legal decisions. Moreover, the European legal order is based on a synthetic constitutional law, which reflects the common constitutional traditions of the member states, which lend democratic legitimacy to the whole European legal order. On the other hand, the lack of a democratically written and ratified constitution is a central part of the democratic challenge of the Union. But equally important is the structural bias in favour of certain material legal results, which stems from the interplay of the division of competences between the Union and its member states and the plurality of law-making procedures, some of which multiply veto points at the cost of rendering decision-making rather improbable. Special attention is paid through the paper to the democratic implications of the structural features of European constitutional law for new member states.
    Keywords: constitutional change; deliberative democracy; European law; European public space; legal culture; legitimacy; national autonomy; normative political theory; participation
    Date: 2007–11–15

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