nep-cdm New Economics Papers
on Collective Decision-Making
Issue of 2007‒09‒09
eight papers chosen by
Roland Kirstein
Otto von Guericke University Magdeburg

  1. A Structural Model of Turnout and Voting in Multiple Elections, Fourth Version By Arianna Degan; Antonio Merlo
  2. What Norms Trigger Punishment By Jeffrey Carpenter; Peter Hans Matthews
  3. On the Optimal Number of Representatives By Auriol, Emmanuelle; Gary-Bobo, Robert J.
  4. Reason-Based Choice Correspondences By Michele Lombardi
  5. Spatial Pillage Game By Jung, Hanjoon Michael
  6. Power analysis and sample-size determination in survival models with the new stpower command By Yulia Marchenko
  7. Incertitudes économiques et insécurité juridique : la notion de position dominante collective dans les politiques de concurrence européennes By Frédéric Marty
  8. Strategic Information Transmission through the Media By Jung, Hanjoon Michael

  1. By: Arianna Degan (Department of Economics, UQAM and CIRPEE); Antonio Merlo (Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania)
    Abstract: This paper develops a unified approach to study participation and voting in multiple elections. The theoretical setting combines an “uncertain-voter” model of turnout with a spatial model of voting behavior. We apply our framework to the study of turnout and voting in U.S. presidential and congressional elections. We structurally estimate the model using individual-level data for the 2000 elections, and quantify the relationships between observed individual characteristics and unobserved citizens’ ideological preferences, information, and civic duty. We then use the estimated model, which replicates the patterns of abstention, selective abstention, split-ticket voting, and straight-ticket voting observed in the data, to assess the effects of policies that may increase citizens’ information and sense of civic duty on their turnout and voting behavior.
    Keywords: elections, turnout, selective abstention, split-ticket voting
    JEL: D72
    Date: 2007–02–01
  2. By: Jeffrey Carpenter; Peter Hans Matthews
    Abstract: Many experiments have demonstrated the power of norm enforcement-peer monitoring and punishment-to maintain, or even increase, contributions in social dilemma settings, but little is known about the underlying norms that monitors use to make punishment decisions. Using a large sample of experimental data, we empirically recover the set of norms used most often by monitors and show ?rst that the decision to punish should be modeled separately from the decision of how much to punish. Second, we show that absolute norms often ?t the data better than the group average norm often assumed in related work. Third, we ?nd that di?erent norms seem to in?uence the decisions about punishing violators inside and outside one’s own group.
    Keywords: public good, experiment, punishment, social norm, norm enforcement.
    JEL: C72 C92 H41
    Date: 2007–08
  3. By: Auriol, Emmanuelle; Gary-Bobo, Robert J.
    Abstract: We propose a normative theory of the number of representatives based on a stylized model of a representative democracy. We derive a simple formula, a "square-root theory" which gives the number of representatives in parliament as proportional to the square root of total population. Simple econometric tests of the formula on a sample of a 100 countries yield surprisingly good results. These results provide a benchmark for a discussion of the appropriateness of the number of representatives in some countries. It seems that the United States have too few representatives, while France and Italy have too many. The excess number of representatives matters: it is positively correlated with indicators of red tape, barriers to entrepreneurship and perceived corruption.
    Keywords: Constitution Design; Incentives; Number of Representatives; Representative Democracy
    JEL: D7 H11 H40
    Date: 2007–08
  4. By: Michele Lombardi (Queen Mary, University of London)
    Abstract: A reason-based choice correspondence rationalizes choice behaviour in terms of a two-stage choice procedure. Given a feasible set <i>S</i>, the individual eliminates from it all of the dominated alternatives according to her fixed (not necessarily complete) strict preference relation, in the first step. In the second step, first she constructs for each maximal alternative identified in the first step its <i>lower contour set</i> (i.e., the set of alternatives which are dominated by it in <i>S</i>), and then she eliminates from the maximal set all of those alternatives so that the following justification holds: there exists another maximal alternative whose lower contour set strictly contains that of another maximal alternative. This procedural model captures the basic idea behind the experimental finding known as "attraction effect". We study the rationalizability of reason-based choice correspondences axiomatically. We relate our choice-consistency conditions to standard consistency proprieties. Our characterization result offers testable restrictions on this `choice anomaly' for large (but finite) set of alternatives.
    Keywords: Reason-based choice, Revealed preferences
    JEL: D0
    Date: 2007–09
  5. By: Jung, Hanjoon Michael
    Abstract: A pillage game is a coalitional game that is meant to be a model of Hobbesian anarchy. The spatial pillage game introduces a spatial feature into the pillage game by assuming that players are located in regions. Players can travel from one region to another in one move and can form a coalition and combine their power only with players in the same region. A coalition has power only within its region. Under this spatial restriction, some members of a coalition can pillage less powerful coalitions without any cost. The feasibility of pillages between coalitions determines the dominance relation. Core, stable set, and farsighted core are adopted as alternative solution concepts.
    Keywords: allocation by force; coalitional games; pillage game; spatial restriction; stable set; farsighted core
    JEL: C71 R19
    Date: 2007
  6. By: Yulia Marchenko (StataCorp)
    Abstract: Power analysis and sample-size determination are important components of a study design. In survival analysis, the power is directly related to the number of events observed in the study. The required sample size is therefore determined by the observed number of events. Survival data are commonly analyzed using the log-rank test or the Cox proportional hazards model. Stata 10’s new stpower command provides sample-size and power calculations for survival studies that use the log-rank test, the Cox proportional hazards model, and the parametric test comparing exponential hazard rates. It reports the number of events that must be observed in the study and accommodates unequal subject allocation between groups, nonuniform subject entry, and exponential losses to follow-up. This talk will demonstrate power, sample-size, and effect-size computations for different methods used to analyze survival data and for designs with recruitment periods and random censoring (administrative and loss to follow-up). It will also discuss building customized tables and producing graphs of power curves.
    Date: 2007–08–31
  7. By: Frédéric Marty (Observatoire Français des Conjonctures Économiques)
    Date: 2007
  8. By: Jung, Hanjoon Michael
    Abstract: We model media manipulation in which a sender or senders manipulate information through the media to influence the decisions of receivers. We show that if there is only one sender and the receivers face a coordination problem without information about their opponents' types, the sender successfully influences the receivers to play the sender's favorite outcome by manipulating the information through the media, which makes the report common knowledge. This is true even when the sender and the receivers have contradictory preferences. This result extends to the cases in which the sender has imperfect information or in which the sender most values its credibility in reporting accurate information. In the case of multiple senders, however, if a sender receives a sufficient reward for reporting truthfully when others do not, all senders have incentives to report truthfully. Consequently, the receivers could play their favored outcome against the senders' preferences.
    Keywords: Arms Race; Common Knowledge; Information Transmission; Media Bias; Media Competition; Media Manipulation.
    JEL: D82 C72 D83
    Date: 2007–08

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