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on Collective Decision-Making |
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Issue of 2007‒05‒19
nine papers chosen by |
| By: | Richard J. Cebula; Garey C. Durden |
| Abstract: | This empirical study seeks to identify key aggregate-level economic and non-economic determinants of the expected benefits from voting and hence aggregate voter turnout. A unique dimension of this study is the hypothesis that PAC (political action committee) election campaign contributions, e.g., to U.S. Senate races, may reduce the expected benefits of voting and hence voter turnout because the greater the growth of real PAC contributions, the greater the extent to which eligible voters may become concerned that these contributions lead to PAC political influence over elected officials. Indeed, this study finds for the period 1960-2000 that the voter participation rate has been negatively impacted by the growth in real PAC contributions to Senate election campaigns. Another interesting finding is that voter turnout is directly/positively related to strong public approval or strong public disapproval of the incumbent President. This study also finds that the voter participation rate has been positively impacted by the opportunity to vote in Presidential elections, the Vietnam War, a “too slowly” growing real GDP, and inflation rates when they exceed five percent per annum. Furthermore, this study also finds the voter participation rate to have been negatively impacted by the public’s general dissatisfaction with government. |
| Date: | 2007 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:apl:wpaper:07-06&r=cdm |
| By: | Francesco De Sinopoli; Leo Ferraris; Giovanna Iannantuoni |
| Abstract: | We present a model where a society elects a parliament by voting for candidates belonging to two parties. The electoral rule determines the seats distribution between the two parties. We analyze two electoral rules, multidistrict majority and single-district proportional. In this framework, the policy outcome is simply a function of the number of seats parties take in the election. We prove that in both systems there is a unique pure strategy perfect equilibrium outcome. Finally, we compare the outcomes in the two systems. |
| Date: | 2007–04 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cte:werepe:we073319&r=cdm |
| By: | Gersbach, Hans |
| Abstract: | We propose a two-stage process called minority voting to allocate public projects in a polity. In the first period, a society decides by a simple majority decision whether to provide the public project. If the proposal in the first period is rejected, the process ends. Otherwise the process continues, but only the members of the minority keep agenda and voting rights for the second stage, in which the financing scheme is determined. In the second stage, the unanimity rule or the simple majority rule is applied. We provide a first round of relative welfare comparisons between minority voting and simple majority voting and outline our research program. |
| Keywords: | democratic constitutions, minority voting, public projects |
| JEL: | D60 D72 H40 |
| Date: | 2007 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:ifwedp:5567&r=cdm |
| By: | Colignatus, Thomas |
| Abstract: | Democratic nations are advised to have parliaments select the chief executive by the Borda Fixed Point method. The current practice of having direct popular elections using systems that have originated in history is inoptimal and actually quite undemocratic since winners are selected who don’t reflect the national sentiment. The paper gives the example of the 2007 French presidential elections. Under the currently and historically grown system of run-off plurality Sarkozy got elected while the more democratic method of Borda Fixed Point would have generated Bayrou. The example uses reasonable assumptions on underlying micro preferences. |
| Keywords: | voting theory; voting systems; elections; public choice; political economy; run-off plurality; Borda Fixed Point; democracy |
| JEL: | D71 H0 A2 |
| Date: | 2007–05–10 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:3170&r=cdm |
| By: | Ian Ayres, Colin Rowat and Nasser Zakariya |
| Abstract: | We study option management by committee. Analysis is illustrated by tenure decisions. Our innovations are two-fold: we treat the committee's problem as one of social choice, not information aggregation; and we endogenise the outside option: rejecting a candidate at either the probationary or tenure stage return the committee to a candidate pool. For committees with N members, we find: (1) a candidate's fate depends only on the behaviour of two `weather-vane' committee members - generalised median voters; (2) en- thusiastic assessments by one of these weather-vanes may harm a candidate's chances by increasing others' thresholds for hiring him; and (3) sunk time costs may lead voters who opposed hiring a candidate to favour tenuring him, even after a poor probationary performance. We characterise the opti- mal voting rule when N = 2. A patient or perceptive committee does best with a (weak) majority at the hiring stage and unanimity at the tenure stage. An impatient or imperceptive committee does best under a double (weak) majority rule. If particularly impatient or imperceptive, this rule implies that any hire is automatically tenured. Perversely, the performance of a patient, imperceptive committee improves as its perceptiveness further declines. |
| Keywords: | intertemporal strategic voting, real options, tenure |
| JEL: | C73 D71 D72 D80 G12 |
| Date: | 2007–03 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:bir:birmec:04-23rr&r=cdm |
| By: | Garey C. Durden; Richard J. Cebula; Patricia Gaynor |
| Abstract: | This paper extends the well known rational interest voting (rational voter) model to include a composite measure to capture the residual effects of internal, sociological motives not previously accounted for in empirical studies of general election voting. These motives are referred to here as “social conditioning” or “internal motivation” and may to at least some extent reflect a sense of duty or sense of civic duty to vote, as well as a simple “habit” of voting. Estimations using CPS data from the 1984 Presidential elections suggest that previously unmeasured internal motives, which we capture in a variable called “Social Conditioning,” may exert a powerful influence on individual voting behavior. |
| Date: | 2007 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:apl:wpaper:07-05&r=cdm |
| By: | Michael P. Keane (Department of Economics, Arizona State University); Antonio Merlo (Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania) |
| Abstract: | In this paper we assess the impact of a variety of policies that may influence the career decisions of members of the U.S. Congress, using the empirical framework of Diermeier, Keane and Merlo (2005). These policies alter incentives to run for re-election, run for higher office or leave Congress, by altering wages, nonpecuniary rewards and career prospects (both in and out of Congress). We find that reducing the relative wage of politicians would substantially reduce the duration of congressional careers. Notably, however, the effect varies considerably across different types of politicians. A reduction in the congressional wage would disproportionately induce exit from Congress by “skilled” politicians, Democrats, politicians who were relatively young when first elected, and those without pre-congressional political experience. Interestingly, however, it would not cause the type of politicians who most value legislative accomplishments (“achievers”) to disproportionately exit Congress. Thus, wage reductions would not reduce the “quality” composition of Congress in this sense. Term limits also have similar effects on achievers and non-achievers. However, we find that term limits would disproportionately induce members of the majority party to exit Congress. This has the interesting implication that term limits make it more difficult to sustain substantial congressional majorities over time. We do find three types of policies that disproportionately induce nonachievers to leave Congress: (i) elimination of seniority as a determinant of key committee assignments, (ii) restricting private sector employment after leaving Congress, and (iii) reducing the seniority advantage in elections. |
| Keywords: | politicians, political careers, monetary and non-monetary incentives, U.S. Congress |
| JEL: | D72 J44 J45 |
| Date: | 2007–05–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pen:papers:07-016&r=cdm |
| By: | Graves, Philip E. |
| Abstract: | Elected representatives have little incentive to pursue the interests of those electing them once they are elected. This well-known principle-agent problem leads, in a variety of theories of government, to nonoptimally large levels of government expenditure. An implication is that budgetary rules are seen as necessary to constrain politicians’ tax and spending behavior. Popular among such constraints are various Balanced Budget Amendment proposals. These approaches, however, are shown here to have serious limitations, including failure to address the central concern of spending level. An alternative approach is advanced here that relies on a Coase-like mechanism that transfers control of government spending to the voter. Prisoner's dilemma incentives and political competition are seen to be critical to the superiority of the present mechanism to approaches requiring budget balance. |
| Keywords: | political incentives, government spending, mechanism design, balanced budget amendments |
| JEL: | H11 H61 H62 H72 |
| Date: | 2007 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:ifwedp:5526&r=cdm |
| By: | Stefano Gagliarducci; Tommaso Nannicini; Paolo Naticchioni |
| Abstract: | In most modern democracies elected officials can work in the private sector while appointed in parliament. We show that when the political and market sectors are not mutually exclusive, a trade-off arises between the quality of elected officials and the effort they exert in political life. If high-ability citizens can keep earning money outside of parliament, they will be more likely to run for election; for the same reason, they will also be more likely to shirk once elected. These predictions are confronted with a unique dataset about members of the Italian Parliament from 1996 to 2006. Empirical evidence shows that bad but dedicated politicians come along with good but not fully committed politicians. There is in fact a non-negligible fraction of citizens with remarkably high pre-election incomes who are appointed in parliament. These citizens are those who gain relatively more from being elected in terms of outside income. Conversely, they show higher absenteeism rates in parliament votes. |
| Date: | 2007–04 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cte:werepe:we073218&r=cdm |