New Economics Papers
on Collective Decision-Making
Issue of 2007‒03‒17
eight papers chosen by

  1. Electoral Rules and Government Spending in Parliamentary Democracies By Torsten Persson; Gerard Roland; Guido Tabellini
  2. Why a Group Needs a Leader: Decision-making and Debate in Committees. By Dessein, Wouter
  3. On redistribution effects of public debt amongst single-minded generations By Canegrati, Emanuele
  4. Bureaucrats or Politicians? Part I: A Single Policy Task By Alberto Alesina; Guido Tabellini
  5. Bureaucrats or Politicians? Part II: Multiple Policy Tasks By Alberto Alesina; Guido Tabellini
  6. Codecision and Institutional Change By Henry Farrell; Adrienne Héritier
  7. Aggregation and the relevance of some issues for others By Dietrich Franz
  8. Legislate or Delegate? Bargaining over Implementation and Legislative Authority in the European Union By Carl-Fredrik Bergström; Henry Farrell; Adrienne Héritier

  1. By: Torsten Persson; Gerard Roland; Guido Tabellini
    Date: 2007–03–14
  2. By: Dessein, Wouter
    Abstract: I develop a model of group decision-making, in which a committee generates proposals and holds open discussions, but the ultimate decision is either taken by a leader (decision by authority) or by majority vote. Optimal communication processes are studied that combine both cheap talk statements (proposals) and costly state verification (discussions). I show that by favouring one particular agent — the leader — authoritative decision-making reduces rent-seeking discussions and often results in a higher decision-quality relative to majority decision-making. Institutions which guarantee a "right to voice" by separating the roles of decision maker and discussion leader may further improve efficiency.
    Keywords: Authority; Committees; Debate; Group decision-making; Leadership; Majority rule
    JEL: D71 D72 D82 D83
    Date: 2007–03
  3. By: Canegrati, Emanuele
    Abstract: In this paper I will introduce a new political economy model, where there exists a competition amongst two political candidates, which aim to set a policy which enables them to win elections, max- imising the probability of winning. I will show that, if taxes neces- sary to repay the debt are not lump sum but proportional to income, we have dramatic distorting effect on the labour supply. The prob- lem is exacerbate once we take into account that the Government set taxes in order to favour the most in‡uencing social group. As a consequence, effective marginal tax rates are differentiated amongst social groups and thus the burden of public debt is not equally borne.
    Keywords: public debt; single-mindedness; intergenerational redistribution
    JEL: J20 H63 D31 J26 H21 H55 D78 J18 D63 J22 H11 J14 D64 H60 D71 D72 H23
    Date: 2007–03–14
  4. By: Alberto Alesina; Guido Tabellini
    Date: 2007–03–14
  5. By: Alberto Alesina; Guido Tabellini
    Date: 2007–03–14
  6. By: Henry Farrell; Adrienne Héritier
    Keywords: democracy; European Parliament; European Parliament; co-decision procedure
    Date: 2006–12–15
  7. By: Dietrich Franz (METEOR)
    Abstract: A general collective decision problem is analysed. It consists in many issues that are interconnected in two ways: by mutual constraints and by connections of relevance. The goal is to decide on the issues by respecting the mutual constraints and by aggregating in accordance with an informational constraint given by the relevance connections. Whether this is possible in a non-degenerate way depends on both types of connections and their interplay. One result, if applied to the preference aggregation problem and adopting Arrow''s notion of (ir)relevance, gives Arrow''s Theorem, without excluding indifferences unlike in the existing general aggregation literature.
    Keywords: mathematical economics;
    Date: 2007
  8. By: Carl-Fredrik Bergström; Henry Farrell; Adrienne Héritier
    Keywords: accountability; European Commission; Council of Ministers; European Parliament; European Parliament
    Date: 2006–12–15

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