New Economics Papers
on Collective Decision-Making
Issue of 2007‒02‒03
three papers chosen by

  1. De la manipulation des elections indirectes By Sebastian Bervoets (CODE – U. Barcelona); Vincent Merlin (CREM - CNRS)
  2. The First Universal Suffrage Election, at County (Gewog) Level, in Bhutan By Ura, Karma
  3. Alliances Among Asymmetric Countries By Roy Chowdhury, Prabal

  1. By: Sebastian Bervoets (CODE – U. Barcelona); Vincent Merlin (CREM - CNRS)
    Abstract: This paper is devoted to the analysis of two tiers voting rules. First, one candidate is elected in every jurisdiction and next, an aggregation procedure collects the results from the jurisdictions in order to designate the final winner. It appears that whenever individuals are allowed to change jurisdiction when casting their ballot, it is possible that they can manipulate the result of the election, except when the voting rule is the Priority rule, which assigns a priority order to the candidates.
    JEL: D71 D72
    Date: 2007
  2. By: Ura, Karma
    Abstract: Following a Royal Edict to adopt universal suffrage in election for local government institutions, maiden elections were held in 199 gewogs (counties) in Bhutan in 2002 to elect their chief executives. This paper gives an account of this first time event in a country where most villagers had never seen secret ballots and poll booths. It synthesizes detailed data, mostly qualitative, collected soon after the election was over, and assesses aspects of electoral participation that His Majesty the King of Bhutan has introduced steadily to deepen democracy. Beginning with a glance at the territorial organization of the Bhutanese state within which the counties are embedded, the paper compares the electoral results with the relevant election rules.
    Keywords: Voter turnout, Candidate criterion and attributes, Nominations, Elections, Local government, Politics, Democracy, Bhutan
    JEL: F15 O14 O30
    Date: 2006–10
  3. By: Roy Chowdhury, Prabal
    Abstract: We examine alliances between asymmetric countries. We find that the results depend on the nature of the equilibrium. If the equilibrium is an interior one then, with an increase in asymmetry, the level of the alliance-wide defense good decreases and the divergence between the first best and the equilibrium level of the defense good increases. In case the equilibrium involves a corner solution, these results are reversed though. It may be argued, however, that the interior equilibrium case is the more relevant one.
    Keywords: Alliance; Asymmetry; Public good; Defence.
    JEL: P16 D74
    Date: 2006–09

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