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on Collective Decision-Making |
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Issue of 2007‒01‒06
three papers chosen by |
| By: | Rodrigo Moita; Claudio Paiva |
| Abstract: | This paper develops a model of political regulation in which politicians set the regulated price in order to maximize electoral support by signaling to voters a pro-consumer behavior. Political incentives and welfare constraints interact in the model, yielding an equilibrium in which the real price in a regulated industry may fall in periods immediately preceding an election. The paper also provides empirical support for the theoretical model. Using quarterly data from 32 industrial and developing countries over 1978-2004, we find strong statistical and econometric evidence pointing toward the existence of electoral price cycles in gasoline markets. |
| Keywords: | Political cycle , regulated prices , gasoline prices , Political economy , Price controls , Gasoline prices , |
| Date: | 2006–11–27 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:imf:imfwpa:06/260&r=cdm |
| By: | Abbas Mirakhor; Iqbal Mehdi Zaidi |
| Abstract: | This paper attempts to set out the principal issues that need to be resolved in formulating a proposal for quotas and voice reform in the IMF that could command broad support. Following John Rawls, we argue that "justice is the first virtue of social institutions," and we use his theory of justice to provide a method for understanding what should be the case, in the context of voice and voting shares, before international institutions, such as the IMF, are to be justifiable to their members. The implementation of this process suggests, among other things, that a major revision of the quota formulas is long overdue, and leaving this unaddressed raises serious questions regarding the IMF's governance which could develop into a core mission risk and jeopardize the relevance of the institution. |
| Keywords: | Governance , International Monetary Arrangements and Institutions , International Monetary Fund , Quota increases , Quota distribution , Voting power , Quota calculations , Governance , Transparency , |
| Date: | 2006–12–12 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:imf:imfwpa:06/273&r=cdm |
| By: | Wim Groot (University of Maastricht and SCHOLAR, University of Amsterdam); Henriette Maassen van den Brink (SCHOLAR, University of Amsterdam); Bernard van Praag (SCHOLAR, University of Amsterdam, DIW Berlin, CESifo and IZA Bonn) |
| Abstract: | There is a small but growing literature on the determinants of social capital. Most of these studies use a measure of trust to define social capital empirically. In this paper we use three different measures of social capital: the size of the individual´s social network, the extent of their social safety net and membership of unions or associations. A second contribution to the literature is that we analyze what social capital contributes to our well-being. Based on this, we calculate the compensating income variation of social capital. We find differences in social capital when we differentiate according to individual characteristics such as education, age, place of residence, household composition and health. Household income generally has a statistically significant effect. We find a significant effect of social capital on life satisfaction. Consequently, the compensating income variation of social capital is substantial. |
| Keywords: | life satisfaction, social capital |
| JEL: | D1 D6 |
| Date: | 2006–12 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps:dp2529&r=cdm |