New Economics Papers
on Collective Decision-Making
Issue of 2006‒10‒21
six papers chosen by
  1. Informative Voting and the Samuelson Rule By Felix Bierbrauer; Marco Sahm
  2. Ex Interim Voting in Public Good Provision By Sven Fischer; Andreas Nicklisch
  3. The Looks of a Winner: Beauty, Gender and Electoral Success By Berggren, Niclas; Jordahl, Henrik; Poutvaara, Panu
  4. El fracaso de la derecha en México. El comportamiento electoral del Partido Acción Nacional (PAN) y su llegada al poder By Manuel Zúñiga Aguilar
  5. Internationale Kooperation im asymmetrischen Gefangenendilemma: Das OECD Projekt gegen schädlichen Steuerwettbewerb By Rixen, Thomas
  6. The Provision and Pricing of Excludable Public Goods: Ramsey-Boiteux Pricing versus Bundling By Martin Hellwig
  1. By: Felix Bierbrauer (Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, Bonn); Marco Sahm (Lehrstuhl fuer Finanzwissenschaft, Munich, Germany.)
    Abstract: We study the classical free-rider problem in public goods provision in a large economy with uncertainty about the average valuation of the public good. Individual preferences over public goods are shaped by a skill and a taste parameter. We use a mechanism design approach to solve for the optimal utilitarian provision rule. The relevant incentive constraints for information aggregation ensure that individuals be-have as if they were engaging in informative voting over the level of public good provision. It is shown that the use of information by an optimal provision rule is inversely related to the polarization of preferences which results from the properties of the skill distribution.
    Keywords: information aggregation, informative voting, public goods, two-dimensional heterogeneity
    JEL: H41 D71 D72 D82
    Date: 2006–08
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:mpg:wpaper:2006_18&r=cdm
  2. By: Sven Fischer (Max Planck Institute of Economics, Jena); Andreas Nicklisch (Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, Bonn)
    Abstract: We report the results of an experimental study that compares voting mechanisms in the provision of public goods. Subjects can freely decide how much they want to contribute. Whether the public good is finally provided is decided by a referendum under full information about all contributions. If provision is rejected, contributions are reduced by a fee and reimbursed. We compare unanimity with majority voting and both to the baseline of cheap talk. Contributions are highest under unanimity. Yet, results concerning overall efficiency are mixed. When provision occurs, only unanimity enhances efficiency. Overall, however, unanimity leads to too many rejections.
    Keywords: Experimental economics, learning, minimal social situation, myopia
    JEL: D83 D84
    Date: 2006–09
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:mpg:wpaper:2006_23&r=cdm
  3. By: Berggren, Niclas (The Ratio Institute); Jordahl, Henrik (Research Institute of Industrial Economics); Poutvaara, Panu (University of Helsinki)
    Abstract: We study the role of beauty in politics. For the first time, focus is put on differences in how women and men evaluate female and male candidates and how different candidate traits relate to success in real and hypothetical elections. We have collected 16,218 assessments by 2,772 respondents of photos of 1,929 Finnish political candidates. Evaluations of beauty explain success in real elections better than evaluations of competence, intelligence, likability, or trustworthiness. The beauty premium is larger for female candidates, in contrast to findings in previous labor-market studies.
    Keywords: Beauty; Gender; Elections; Political candidates; Beauty premium
    JEL: D72 J45 J70
    Date: 2006–10–12
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hhs:iuiwop:0671&r=cdm
  4. By: Manuel Zúñiga Aguilar (Facultad de Ciencias Políticas y Sociales - [Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México])
    Abstract: El ascenso al poder en el año 2000 de la derecha en México, representada por el PAN, fue resultado de una larga lucha contra el partido del antiguo régimen (Partido Revolucionario Institucional, PRI) y enmarcada dentro de los cauces legales (participación en procesos electorales) Una vez que el PAN asume el poder, su desempeño como partido en el Gobierno dejó mucho que desear. De esta manera, el comportamiento electoral del partido se vio reflejado en una disminución de votos tanto en elecciones estatales como en las elecciones constitucionales de 2003, y de la posible perdida de la Presidencia de la República en las próximas elecciones de julio de 2006. El desencanto de la sociedad hacia la derecha se esta haciendo evidente.
    Keywords: Derecha ; México ; Partido Acción Nacional ; Poder ; fracaso
    Date: 2006–10–05
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:papers:halshs-00103867_v1&r=cdm
  5. By: Rixen, Thomas
    Abstract: Dieses Papier nimmt eine theoriegeleitete empirische Analyse des OECD Projekts gegen schädliche Steuerpraktiken vor. Auf der Grundlage der Literatur zur Handlungsfähigkeit von Na-tionalstaaten angesichts wirtschaftlicher Globalisierung wird ein theoretisches Modell des Steu-erwettbewerbs als asymmetrisches Gefangenendilemma entwickelt. Aus dieser Spielstruktur werden verschiedene Hypothesen über die Wahrscheinlichkeit und Form der internationalen Ko-operation generiert. Es kann zum Beispiel erwartet werden, dass Kooperation, sofern sie über-haupt zustande kommt, nur multilateral erfolgen wird. Des weiteren sieht das Modell die kleinen Staaten in der strukturell stärkeren Verhandlungsposition. Die Zusammenhänge, die diesen und weiteren Hypothesen unterliegen, werden mit sogenannten Schelling Diagrammen veranschau-licht. Anschließend werden die Hypothesen mit dem empirischen Material konfrontiert. Es wird ge-zeigt, dass das Modell in wesentlichen Zügen zutreffende Vorhersagen generiert. Allerdings zeigt sich, dass die kleinen Staaten ihren ökonomisch definierten strukturellen Vorteil nicht in Ver-handlungsmacht verwandeln können. Abschließend wird diskutiert, inwieweit sich die Erklä-rungslücken des interessenbasierten Modells durch die Berücksichtigung der Faktoren Macht und Ideen schließen lassen.
    Keywords: Steuerwettbewerb; OECD Projekt gegen schädlichen Steuerwettbewerb; Internationale Kooperation; asymmetrisches Gefangenendilemma
    JEL: F51 F59 F53
    Date: 2005
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:329&r=cdm
  6. By: Martin Hellwig (Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, Bonn)
    Abstract: This paper studies the relation between Bayesian mechanism design and the Ramsey-Boiteux approach to the provision and pricing of excludable public goods. For a large economy with private information about individual preferences, the two approaches are shown to be equivalent if and only if, in addition to incentive compatibility and participation constraints, the .nal allocation of private-good consumption and admission tickets to public goods satis.es a condition of renegotiation proofness. Without this condition, a mechanism involving mixed bundling, i.e. combination tickets at a discount, is superior.
    Keywords: Mechanism Design, Excludable Public Goods, Ramsey-Boiteux Pricing, Renegotiation Proofness, Bundling
    JEL: D61 H21 H41 H42
    Date: 2006–09
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:mpg:wpaper:2006_21&r=cdm
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