New Economics Papers
on Collective Decision-Making
Issue of 2006‒09‒11
four papers chosen by

  1. Group Formation and Voter Participation By Helios Herrera; Cesar Martinelli
  2. Ratification and veto constraints in mechanism design By Dequiedt, V.
  3. Who Are the Trustworthy, We Think? By Johansson-Stenman, Olof
  4. A New Explanatory Model for Policy Analysis and Evaluation By Marije Schouwstra; Michael Ellman

  1. By: Helios Herrera (Centro de Investigacion Economica (CIE), Instituto Tecnologico Autonomo de Mexico (ITAM)); Cesar Martinelli (Centro de Investigacion Economica (CIE), Instituto Tecnologico Autonomo de Mexico (ITAM))
    Abstract: We present a mobilization model of large elections with endogenous formation of voter groups. Citizens decide whether to be followers or become leaders (activists) and try to bring other citizens to vote for their preferred party. In the (unique) pure strategy equilibrium, the number of leaders favoring each party is a function of the cost of activism and the mportance of the election. Expected turnout and winning margin in the election are, in turn, a function of the number of leaders and the strength of social interactions. The model predicts a non monotonic relationship between expected turnout and winning margin in large elections.
    Keywords: Vote´x Paradox, Endogenous Leaders, Turnout, Winning Margin
    JEL: D72
    Date: 2005–05
  2. By: Dequiedt, V.
    Abstract: The note points out some restrictions imposed by the notion of ratification. This notion is widely used in the mechanism design literature that assumes that each agent has a veto power. We exhibit allocations that are note ratifiable and nevertheless can be implemented through a mechanism that gives veto power to the agents.
    JEL: C72 D78 D82
    Date: 2006
  3. By: Johansson-Stenman, Olof (Department of Economics, School of Business, Economics and Law, Göteborg University)
    Abstract: In a representative Swedish sample people were asked to judge the relative extent that different groups of people are considered trustworthy in several dimensions, including their political views and reading habits. A statistically significant effect of similarity on perceived trustworthiness was found in each of the seven dimensions analyzed. For example, right-wing voters consider Social Democratic voters to be much less trustworthy than right-wing voters, and vice versa. Thus, it seems that perceived trustworthiness decreases quite generally with the social distance. It is argued that social identity theory offers a plausible explanation. Moreover, older people are generally considered more trustworthy than younger, and people living in small cities are considered more trustworthy than people living in big cities. <p>
    Keywords: social capital; trustworthiness; social distance; identity; social identity; self-signalling
    JEL: C42 Z13
    Date: 2006–07–22
  4. By: Marije Schouwstra (Faculty of Economics and Econometrics, Universiteit van Amsterdam); Michael Ellman (Faculty of Economics and Econometrics, Universiteit van Amsterdam)
    Abstract: This model of policy evaluation has been developed to identify factors that cause policy outcomes to diverge from the intended results. In this model the explanatory factors may be inherent to the conceptual and institutional framework to which policy makers adhere, or they may be ‘real world’ factors such as badly-defined performance indicators or cyclical economic problems. This model can be used by scholars for analyzing and evaluating government policies and the policies of international organizations and by policy makers to improve their policies. The model can also be used for cross-country comparisons to establish why a certain policy works in one country or situation and why it does not work in another country or situation.
    Keywords: model of policy analysis model of policy evaluation public policy international financial institutions evaluation international organizations cross country comparison policy analysis conceptual framework institutional framework normative formal
    JEL: E61 F35 F37 F53 G38 H43 H83 O19 O21 O22
    Date: 2006–07–13

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