New Economics Papers
on Collective Decision-Making
Issue of 2006‒07‒21
seventeen papers chosen by
  1. Minorities and Storable Votes By Alessandra Casella; Thomas Palfrey; Raymond Riezman
  2. Optimal Quotas in Private Committees By Daniel Seidmann
  3. Applications of Relations and Graphs to Coalition Formation By Agnieszka Rusinowska; Rudolf Berghammer; Harrie de Swart
  4. Efficiency, Equity, and Timing in Voting Mechanisms By Marco Battaglini; Rebecca Morton; Thomas R. Palfrey
  5. The Paradox of Voter Participation? A Laboratory Study By David K. Levine; Thomas R. Palfrey
  6. A Theory of Voting Patterns and Performance in Private and Public Committees By Daniel Seidmann
  7. Evaluation of Parties and Coalitions After Parliamentary Elections By Andranik Tangian
  8. Perverse Committee Appointments May Foster Divide and Rule By Daniel Seidmann
  9. When Inertia Generates Political Cycles By Raphäel Soubeyran
  10. The Impact of Legislature and Citizens on the Budgeting Process in Switzerland: Lessons for Central and Eastern Europe By Krisztina Tóth
  11. Valence Advantages and Public Goods Consumption: Does a Disadvantaged Candidate Choose an Extremist Position? By Raphaël Soubeyran
  12. Coalition Governments in a Model of Parliamentary Democracy By Siddhartha Bandyopadhyay; Mandar Oak
  13. Coalition Formation in Simple Games: The Semistrict Core By Dinko Dimitrov; Claus-Jochen Haake
  14. Direct Democracy and the Stability of State Policy By Amihai Glazer; Anthony McGann
  15. A Limit Theorem for Systems of Social Interactions By Ulrich Horst; Jos´e A. Scheinkman
  16. Public Goods and Budget Deficit By Abraham Neyman; Tim Russo
  17. Competitive Proposals of Policies by Lobbies By Ashish Chaturvedi; Amihai Glazer
  1. By: Alessandra Casella; Thomas Palfrey; Raymond Riezman
    Date: 2006–07–15
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cla:levrem:321307000000000199&r=cdm
  2. By: Daniel Seidmann (University of Nottingham)
    Abstract: According to conventional wisdom, raising the quota either causes a committee to retain the status quo or has no effect on its performance; so a committee which would otherwise reach good decisions should operate with a low quota. We show, per contra, that reducing the quota may improve the quality of new decisions which a private committee reaches. In particular, it is optimal to reduce the quota of a committee which would otherwise reach good decisions, despite the failure of conventional wisdom.
    Date: 2006–04
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cdx:dpaper:2006-10&r=cdm
  3. By: Agnieszka Rusinowska (Radboud University Nijmegen); Rudolf Berghammer (University of Kiel); Harrie de Swart (Tilburg University)
    Abstract: A stable government is by definition not dominated by any other government. However, it may happen that all governments are dominated. In graph-theoretic terms this means that the dominance graph does not possess a source. In this paper we are able to deal with this case by a clever combination of notions from different fields, such as relational algebra, graph theory, social choice and bargaining theory, and by using the computer support system RelView for computing solutions and visualizing the results. Using relational algorithms, in such a case we break all cycles in each initial strongly connected component by removing the vertices in an appropriate minimum feedback vertex set. So, we can choose an un-dominated government. To achieve unique solutions, we additionally apply social choice rules. The main parts of our procedure can be executed using the RelView tool. Its sophisticated implementation of relations allows to deal with graph sizes that are sufficient for practical applications of coalition formation.
    Keywords: Graph Theory, RELVIEW, Relational Algebra, Dominance, Stable Government
    JEL: D85 C63 C88 D71 D72
    Date: 2006–05
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:fem:femwpa:2006.77&r=cdm
  4. By: Marco Battaglini; Rebecca Morton; Thomas R. Palfrey
    Date: 2006–07–15
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cla:levrem:321307000000000205&r=cdm
  5. By: David K. Levine; Thomas R. Palfrey
    Date: 2006–07–15
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cla:levrem:321307000000000188&r=cdm
  6. By: Daniel Seidmann (University of Nottingham)
    Abstract: We analyze voting in private and public committees whose members care about the selected decision and the rewards which outsiders pay for representing their interests. We characterize the voting pattern and performance in both committees; and we test these implications on the voting patterns of monetary policy committees.
    Date: 2006–04
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cdx:dpaper:2006-07&r=cdm
  7. By: Andranik Tangian (Hans Boeckler Foundation)
    Abstract: Five leading German political parties and their coalitions are evaluated with regard to party manifestos and results of the 2005 parliamentary elections. For this purpose, the party manifestos are converted into Yes/No answers to 95 topical questions (Relax the protection against dismissals? Close nuclear power plants? etc.). On each question, every party represents its adherents as well as those of the parties with the same position. Therefore, a party usually represents a larger group than its voters. The popularity of a party is understood to be the percentage of the electorate represented, averaged on all the 95 questions. The universality of a party is the frequency of representing a majority of electors. The questions are considered either unweighted, or weighted by an expert, or weighted by the number of GOOGLE-results for given keywords (the more important the question, the more documents in the Internet). The weighting however plays a negligible role because the party answers are backed up by the party ``ideology'' which determines a high intra-question correlation. The SPD (Social-Democratic Party) did not receive the highest percentage of votes, remains nevertheless the most popular and the most universal German party. A comparison of the election results with the position of German Trade Union Federation (DGB) reveals its high representativeness as well. Finally, all coalitions with two and three parties are also evaluated. The coalition CDU/SPD (which is currently in power) is the most popular, and the coalition SPD/Green/Left-Party (which failed due to personal conflicts) is the most universal.
    Keywords: Parliamentary Election, Fractions, Coalitions, Theory of Voting, Mathematical Theory of Democracy, Indices of Popularity and Universality, German Trade Union Federation (DGB)
    JEL: D71
    Date: 2006–05
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:fem:femwpa:2006.76&r=cdm
  8. By: Daniel Seidmann (University of Nottingham)
    Abstract: We analyze optimal appointments to a committee whose members play an admissibly coalition proof equilibrium. The nominator may appoint a candidate with the opposite preference ordering over the agenda, as the committee would then reach the nominator’s top ranked decision by divide and rule: the majority who prefer another decision are immobilised by internal divisions. Our results may explain why Disraeli extended the franchise to skilled male workers in 1867 against centrist opposition; and why an electorate whose preferences are not polarized may choose a polarized voting pattern.
    Date: 2006–04
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cdx:dpaper:2006-08&r=cdm
  9. By: Raphäel Soubeyran (GREQAM)
    Abstract: We propose a simple infinite horizon of repeated elections with two candidates. Furthermore we suppose that the government policy presents some degree of inertia, i.e. a new government cannot completely change the policy implemented by the incumbent. When the policy inertia is strong enough, no party can win the election a consecutive infinite number of times.
    Keywords: Political Cycles, Inertia
    JEL: D72 H7
    Date: 2006–06
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:fem:femwpa:2006.91&r=cdm
  10. By: Krisztina Tóth (Chaire de Finances Publiques)
    Abstract: Scholars evaluating national and local budget procedures in Central and Eastern Europe generally advocate a greater role for legislative bodies and citizens. Mature federations and decentralised countries in Western Europe are often cited as prime examples of participatory budgeting which is supposed to lead to greater fiscal discipline, a better allocation of public resources and higher administrative efficiency. This paper investigates the strengths and weaknesses of legislative activism in Switzerland, with special regard to its ability to answer the double challenge resulting from a push for new expenditures and lower taxes, on one side, and an attempt to maintain deficit levels close to zero, on the other. While the strong consensus orientation, the careful regulation of revenue and expenditure assignment, as well as the systematic use of voters' right to direct participation are perceived as key to the success of the Swiss democracy, this study also highlights how these features can limit the effective influence of the parliament on budgeting and planning. Central and East European countries may learn several lessons from the Swiss case, all of which are rather thought to add an input to long-term reforms rather than provide immediate solutions. The analysis points out some serious limitations of the hierarchical budgeting model as well as the consequences of a haphazard and opaque expenditure and revenue assignment. It reminds, however, that the dynamic process of post-socialist transition requires governments and parliaments to preserve a great deal of flexibility in the budget procedure. At the same time, new methods of public management and a greater transparency of public budgets are examples of tools that may be introduced on the medium term without the risk of slowing down the transition process.
    Keywords: parliament; legislative; budgetary procedure; direct democracy; intergovernmental fiscal relations; public administration; transition economies; Switzerland
    JEL: H61 H62 H70 H83
    Date: 2005–07
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:fri:fribow:387&r=cdm
  11. By: Raphaël Soubeyran (Université de la Mediterrannée)
    Abstract: Does a disadvantaged candidate always choose an extremist program? When does a less competent candidate have an incentive to move to extreme positions in order to differentiate himself from the more competent candidate? If the answer to these questions were positive, as suggested in recent work (Ansolabehere and Snyder (2000), Aragones and Palfrey (2002), Groseclose (1999), and Aragones and Palfrey (2003)), this would mean that extremist candidates are bad politicians. We consider a two candidates electoral competition over public consumption, with a two dimensional policy space and two dimensions of candidates heterogeneity. In this setting, we show that the conclusion depends on candidates relative competences over the two public goods and distinguish between two types of advantages (an absolute advantage and comparative advantage in providing the two public goods).
    Keywords: Candidate Quality, Extremism, Public Goods Consumption
    JEL: C72 D72
    Date: 2006–06
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:fem:femwpa:2006.84&r=cdm
  12. By: Siddhartha Bandyopadhyay (University of Birmingham); Mandar Oak (Williams College)
    Abstract: We analyze the relative importance of party ideology and rents from office in the formation of coalitions in a parliamentary democracy. In equilibrium, the types of coalitions that are formed may be minimal winning, minority or surplus and they may be ideologically `disconnected'. The coalitions that form depend upon the relative importance of rents of office and seat shares of the parties. If rents are high, governments cannot be surplus. With low rents or the formateur close to the median, minority governments occur for a wider ideological dispersion. Further, there is a non-monotonic relationship between connectedness of coalitions and rents.
    Keywords: Coalitions, Ideology, Rents
    JEL: C72 D72 H19
    Date: 2006–06
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:fem:femwpa:2006.83&r=cdm
  13. By: Dinko Dimitrov (Bielefeld University); Claus-Jochen Haake (Bielefeld University)
    Abstract: We consider the class of proper monotonic simple games and study coalition formation when an exogenous share vector and a solution concept are combined to guide the distribution of coalitional worth. Using a multiplicative composite solution, we induce players' preferences over coalitions in a hedonic game, and present conditions under which the semistrict core of the game is nonempty.
    Keywords: Coalition Formation, Paradox of Smaller Coalitions, Semistrict Core, Simple Games, Winning Coalitions
    JEL: D72 C71
    Date: 2006–05
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:fem:femwpa:2006.72&r=cdm
  14. By: Amihai Glazer (Department of Economics, University of California-Irvine); Anthony McGann (Department of Political Science, University of California-Irvine)
    Date: 2005–10
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:irv:wpaper:050615&r=cdm
  15. By: Ulrich Horst; Jos´e A. Scheinkman
    Date: 2006–07–15
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cla:levrem:321307000000000177&r=cdm
  16. By: Abraham Neyman; Tim Russo
    Date: 2006–07–15
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cla:levrem:321307000000000182&r=cdm
  17. By: Ashish Chaturvedi (WZ-Berlin, Germany); Amihai Glazer (Department of Economics, University of California-Irvine)
    Abstract: We consider a policymaker who must choose between the status quo and proposals made by lobbyists. Each lobbyist aims to maximize the tariff accorded his industry, but realizes that if he proposes too high a tariff, the policymaker may choose the proposal offered by another lobbyist which incorporates a lower tariff. The equilibrium has a positive probability that the policymaker who aims to maximize social welfare adopts a tariff higher than the one he prefers.
    Date: 2005–11
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:irv:wpaper:050614&r=cdm
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