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on Collective Decision-Making |
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Issue of 2006‒06‒10
nine papers chosen by |
| By: | Hendriks, Jean (Department of Economics, CORE, Universite Catholique de Louvain,); Lockwood, Ben (CEPR and Department of Economics, University of Warwick,) |
| Abstract: | This paper studies the relationship between fiscal decentralization and electoral accountability, by analyzing how decentralization impacts upon incentive and selection effects, and thus on voter welfare. The model abstracts from features such as public good spillovers or economies of scale, so that absent elections, voters are indifferent about the fiscal regime. The effect of fiscal centralization on voter welfare works through two channels : (i) via its effect on the probability of pooling by the bad incumbent; (ii) conditional on the probability of pooling, the extent to which, with centralization, the incumbent can divert rents in some regions without this being detected by voters in other regions (selective rent diversion). Both these effects depend on the information structure ; whether voters only observe fiscal policy in their own region, in all regions, or an intermediate case with a uniform tax across all regions. More voter information does not necessarily raise voter welfare, and under some conditions, voter would choose uniform over differentiated taxes ex ante to constrain selective rent diversion |
| Date: | 2004 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:wrk:warwec:729&r=cdm |
| By: | Maurice Salles (CREM-CNRS) |
| Abstract: | Michael Dummett worked on the theoretical aspects of aggregation of individual preferences and on the strategic aspects of voting theory. He also extended Black’s analysis of single-peaked preferences for majority rule to the case of voting games (majority games), offering a greater flexibility for the expression of voters’ preferences. He is also with Donald Saari one of the major advocates of the use of Borda’s rule in actual voting. In two books and a paper, he proposed many examples showing the advantages and defects of many voting rules used in the world |
| Date: | 2006 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:tut:cremwp:200616&r=cdm |
| By: | Leech, Dennis (Warwick University); Leech, Robert (Birkbeck, London University) |
| Abstract: | We consider some of the implications of a proposed reform of the voting system of the IMF in which EU countries cease to be separately represented and are replaced by a single combined representative of the European bloc. The voting weight of the EU bloc is reduced accordingly. We analyse two cases: the Eurozone of 12 countries and the European Union of 25. Using voting power analysis we show that the reform could be very beneficial for the governance of the IMF, enhancing the voting power of individual member countries as a consequence of two large countervailing voting blocs. Specifically we analyse a range of EU voting weights and find the following for ordinary decisions requiring a simple majority: (1) All countries other than those of the EU and USA unambiguously gain power (measured absolutely or relatively); (2) The sum of powers of the EU bloc and USA is minimized when they have voting parity ; (3) The power of every other non-EU member is maximized when the EU and USA have parity ; (4) Each EU member could gain power - despite losing its seat and the reduction in EU voting weight - depending on the EU voting system that is adopted ; (5) The USA loses voting power (both absolutely and relatively) over ordinary decisions but retains its unilateral veto over special majority (85%) decisions (as does the EU bloc). |
| Keywords: | IMF ; European Union ; Voting Power Indices ; Penrose Index ; Banzhaf Index |
| Date: | 2005 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:wrk:warwec:720&r=cdm |
| By: | Nicolas G Andjiga (ENS – University of Yaoundé); Daoud Badirou (CREM – CNRS); Boniface Mbih (CREM – CNRS) |
| Abstract: | This paper is devoted to the study of power in Parliaments. We explain how the power of coalitions can be computed after political elections, and as a di¤erence with some previous papers, this analysis is used to give a prediction of what government can emerge from these elections. |
| Keywords: | power indices, parliamentary method, core |
| JEL: | C71 |
| Date: | 2006 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:tut:cremwp:200618&r=cdm |
| By: | Richard Barrett (LSE); Maurice Salles (CREM-CNRS) |
| Date: | 2006 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:tut:cremwp:200615&r=cdm |
| By: | Olivier Compte; Philippe Jehiel |
| Date: | 2006–06–05 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cla:levrem:321307000000000085&r=cdm |
| By: | Allan M. Feldman; Roberto Serrano |
| Date: | 2006 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:bro:econwp:2006-11&r=cdm |
| By: | Dutta, Bhaskar (Department of Economics, University of Warwick); Peter, Hans (Department of Quantitative Economics, University of Maastricht); Sen, Arunava (Indian Statistical Institute, New Delhi) |
| Date: | 2005 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:wrk:warwec:722&r=cdm |
| By: | Maurice Salles (CREM-CNRS) |
| Date: | 2006 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:tut:cremwp:200617&r=cdm |